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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this thesis is to look at how and why some strikes are more 
successful than others by applying mobilization theory and organizational leaning (OL) 
theory in the case of the Korean banking sector. It aims to observe the relationship 
between the effectiveness of mobilization and OL in unions by looking at how learning 
from previous strikes influenced strategy-making and outcomes of subsequent strikes.
By focusing on four strikes in the Korean banking sector, the research explores how OL 
in unions affects the effectiveness of mobilization. It is thus intended to revisit and 
contribute to the existing theories of mobilization and OL.
The sector has undergone massive restructuring since the national financial crisis, which 
was part of an Asian foreign currency crisis, in 1997. The Korean Financial Industrial 
Union (KFIU) organized four strikes between 1998 and 2003 against the restructuring 
in order to protect employment security. The union failed to gain satisfactory results at 
the first and third strikes, but were successful at the second and fourth actions.
The evidence, based on interviews and primary and secondary documentation, from 
these four strikes suggests that the more successful results derived from the existence of 
positive learning (or OL) from previous strikes. In other words, when the union 
conducted higher-level Teaming, such as the adjustment of overall norms or mles and 
the change of organizational structures, it was able to increase strategic capacity. It was 
able to devise a more effective strategy, thereby more effectively mobilizing resources 
and opportunities. This, in turn, led to successful outcomes from the following strike.
Studying the learning processes in unions reveals the function of dialogical organization 
in power (or mobilization). Thus, unions are more likely to succeed in mobilization 
when they conduct meaningful dialogical learning.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Research purpose and questions
The main purpose of this thesis is to look at how and why some strikes were more 
successful than others by applying mobilization theory and organizational learning (OL) 
theory in the case of the Korean banking sector. It will also aim to observe the 
relationship between the effectiveness of mobilization and OL in unions by looking at 
how learning from previous strikes influenced strategy-making and outcomes of 
subsequent strikes. By seeking how mobilization and OL take place at unions in the 
banking sector, it is thus intended to revisit and contribute to the existing theories of 
mobilization and OL.
In addition, the thesis looks at changes of employment relationship and industrial 
relationship in the Korean banking sector during a historical restructuring period. The 
sector has undergone massive restructuring since the national financial crisis, which was 
part of an Asian foreign currency crisis1 (or Asian financial crisis), in 1997. The 
Government’s measures -  restructuring of the banking sector -  were undertaken in 
order to stabilize the sector and promote global competitiveness. Management strategy 
in the banking sector has also rapidly changed, from the pursuit of market share to the 
pursuit of profitability and from the offer of life-long employment to that of 
employment flexibility. As a consequence, the employment relationship has changed 
from employment security to employment insecurity, and the industrial relationship has 
been transformed from paternalism to endless restructuring for profitability and from 
moderation to militancy.
In the process of restructuring, the Korean Financial Industrial Union (KFIU) has 
organized four strikes against the restructuring in order to protect employment security. 
The union failed to gain satisfactory results at the first and third strikes, but were 
successful at the second and fourth actions. This research analyzes how and why the 
KFIU were more successful in some cases, by employing OL theory and mobilization 
theory. Through an empirical case study of these four strikes in the Korean banking
1 See Sections 1.2.3 and 4.3.1.
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sector I will argue that the differences in strike effectiveness derives from the content of 
OL from previous strikes.
In addition, the thesis will show how and why IR in the Korean banking sector, due to 
financial globalization, shifted towards flexibility and centralization in the process of 
restructuring (while IR in Western countries shifted toward flexibility and 
decentralization).
The foregoing brief summary suggests the following research questions. How and why 
were some strikes more successful than others? How do unions learn? Why did 
restructuring happen in the banking sector? What did change in the banking sector after 
the restructuring? How did trade unions respond to the restructuring? What roles did the 
major institutional actors play in these interactive processes? How have trade unions 
constructed strike strategies against restructuring? What is the content of unions’ 
learning?
1.2. Background of the research problems
1.2.1. Restructuring
Restructuring describes the broad changes in economic policies designed to enable 
nation states to adjust to new conditions of reduced growth rates, rising inflation or 
deflation and high unemployment in the wake of recession and economic crises 
(Beauregard, 1989: 8). The concept was used more specifically in the 1980s to refer to 
the changes in the relative importance of industries within the advanced industrial 
economies, what is now called the manufacturing-service shift. In the 1990s, it was 
widely used to refer to the strategies adopted by enterprises in their attempts to restore 
profitability and competitiveness. In both its broad and more specific uses, the concept 
of restructuring has become closely linked with the analysis of the decline of old and the 
emergence of new industries and explaining the policies adopted by governments and 
enterprises in their attempts to cope with the experience of a protracted period of 
international recession (Poynter, 2000: 5-6).
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In the leading capitalist nations, governments have adopted the rhetoric of the free 
market although, paradoxically, the policies introduced have often led to more direct 
forms of state involvement in the domestic labour market and in specific industries. The 
area in which, arguably, most success has been achieved, labour market reform, has 
enabled businesses and governments to pass on the worst effects of recession to their 
own domestic working classes (Poynter, 2000: 7).
Gallie et al. argue that there are four areas of change that have driven restructuring. The 
first has been the rapid adoption of new computerized and information technologies. 
The second has been the emergence of a new philosophy of management, known as 
human resource management. The third has been the shift away from standard forms of 
employment contract to an increased use of non-standard contracts, such as part-time 
and temporary work, which have threatened to fragment, even polarize employment 
conditions. Finally, there has been a marked increase in labour market insecurity 
resulting from a continuous process of reorganization and staff reduction (1998: 1).
While there has been a widespread acceptance of the potential significance of these 
changes, there have been sharp differences in views about their relative importance, 
their extent, and the nature of their impact. For some scholars, these developments 
represent a fundamental change from traditional production system and employment 
relations, such as the rigid forms of hierarchy associated with Taylorist methods of 
production, to the highly differentiated division of labour due to the development of 
new technologies and the change of market conditions resulting from increased 
competition (Bell, 1974; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Kem and Sabel, 1992; Boyer, 1988; 
Womack et al., 1990). They argue that the employment relationship should be based 
increasingly on high levels of discretion for employees, the reduction of status 
distinctions within the workforce, and the adoption of organizational policies designed 
to secure the long-term commitment of employees. In effect, the traditional class 
distinctions in the nature of the employment relationship would be dissolved (Gallie et 
al.: 1998: 1-2).
Others (Eiger, 1991; Hyman, 1991; Berggren, 1993), however, have viewed these 
changes in a very different light, seeing them rather as means for employers to reassert 
their control in a period of trade union weakness and to intensify the work process,
15
leaving intact or even reinforcing the core principles of the traditional pattern of 
employment relations (Gallie et al, 1998: 2).
The restructuring of work processes has been regarded as an important source of 
enhanced productivity, competitiveness, and profitability although there has been 
criticism of the impacts on employment relations. While some scholars have argued that 
such changes can deliver not only improved productivity and competitiveness, but also 
mutual benefits for workers and management within the production process (Kem and 
Schumann, 1984; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1992), others contend 
that the changes have delivered significant productivity and profitability gains to 
employers at the cost of most workers’ increased effort, non-wage gains and insecurity 
(Kelly, 1985; Eiger, 1991; Smith, 1991). Furthermore, Eiger argues that there is little 
support for projections of a cooperative employment relationship built upon such 
changes (1991: 47). Hyman (1991: 269) suggests that, in the past, one of the perceived 
benefits of restructuring for management was that, as the active, subjective character of 
labour was seen as a potentially disruptive factor, it could be channelled and controlled 
by restrictive work organization. But, today, employers increasingly appreciate that the 
productive potential inherent in new technology can be realized only through a contrary 
principle: encouraging workers’ active and subjective involvement, developing their 
knowledge and expertise, and harnessing these to the objectives of the economy; 
efficiency must be achieved by working with workers’ abilities, not against their 
personal competence (Kem and Schumann, 1984: 19-20). Furthermore, Budd (2004) 
argues that the employment relationship in restructuring has “a human face”, balancing 
efficiency, equity, and voice.
Gallie et al. contend that employers are able to shape employees’ behaviour and 
performance through performance-related personnel practices and through changes in 
the nature of work which affect motivation. However, they ask how far employees can 
continue to assimilate and reconcile the increasingly complex demands due to endless 
restructuring (1998: 289).
According to Poynter, restructuring in the financial sector emerged from a need to deal 
with four interrelated problems in America in the late 1980s. First, the industry had 
experienced acute economic crises; it was under pressure from a rise in foreign direct 
investment, which enhanced competitive pressure, a credit crisis spawned by increases
16
in domestic and international indebtedness and volatile market conditions caused by 
fluctuations in interest rates. Secondly, the financial sector had experienced continuous 
growth in employment levels throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but that growth had not 
been matched by improvements in labour productivity. From the management 
perspective, labour was outmoded, and tied to traditional patterns of work. Thirdly, the 
sector had made significant investments in information technologies that enhanced the 
range of products and services available but had relatively little impact upon the 
efficiency of work processes. Lastly, financial firms were integrated organizations with 
high costs incurred as a result of the continuous requirement to invest in information 
technologies. This burden adversely affected the potential for reaping the benefits from 
the provision of the high value-added products and services (2000: 42-3).
These factors made restructuring an imperative (Roach, 1991: 82-92), and strongly 
influenced management approaches to the solutions to be found. The solutions had five 
main elements: the reform of management organization towards delayering and 
devolution; the development of a more aggressive market orientation via the 
dissemination within enterprises of a client- or customer-centred approach; the use of 
information technologies to transform work processes; the employment of management 
consultants to create a new climate of change and organizational innovation; and the 
introduction of new approaches to employee relations towards raising productivity 
through downsizing and emphasizing commitment through encouraging staff to 
internalize management values (Kochan et al., 1986; Hammer, 1990; Hammer and 
Champy, 1993; Poynter, 2000).
Major transformations in the Korea banking have been driven principally by two 
factors, financial globalization and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The latter led the 
Government to undertake mass restructuring of the financial sector in order to stabilize 
it as well as ensure that it remain internationally competitive (See Section 4.2 and 4.3).
1.2.2. Union responses to restructuring
Trade unions have responded to the extensive restructuring led by employers and the 
Government since the 1980s. These responses can be described as being either militant 
or moderate (or cooperative), and interventionist or pragmatist according to their 
orientation and situation.
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Militant unions have responded to the restructuring through traditional methods, such as 
ambitious demands with few concessions, strong reliance on collective bargaining and 
mobilization of union membership, use of industrial action, underlying all of which is 
an ideology of conflicting interests. On the other hand, moderate unions have responded 
to the restructuring through new-style methods (or new realism), such as more 
conciliatory demands with some or many concessions, strong reliance on employers, 
third parties or law, willingness to experiment with non-bargaining institutions (work 
councils or various committees), infrequent use of industrial action (or no-strike 
agreements), all built on a foundation of an ideology of partnership (Kelly, 1996: 80).
Union militancy obviously refers to strikes but it is also used to describe other forms of 
action, depending upon the speed and vigour with which they are undertaken. That is, to 
be militant is to take the initiative, for unions to exploit fully whatever power or 
influence they possess, and to pursue a possibly successful policy in a prompt, speedy 
manner. The aims of militant action are to exploit market advantages in order to 
maximize wages and to get the best possible working conditions and hours to work. It 
means that if unions are to maximize their returns they must uninhibitedly play the 
market by demanding what they think the market will bear and refusing to accept terms 
which are less than that. By doing this they would satisfy the criteria for militancy 
(Allen, 1969: 19).
On the other hand, moderate unionism has been frequently prompted by the demand to 
be responsible to company survival or national interests. With this responsibility in 
mind, employers and the government have enforced the socialization of union activities 
by the adoption of legislative measures that restrict and moderate unions’ militancy. 
Thus, unions have to operate with in limited scopes or legal systems and union action is 
limited by the systems (Ibid: 169).
The industrial relations literature on union responses to restructuring suggests that what 
unions choose to do in response to the restructuring shapes the eventual outcome 
(Bacon et al., 1996; Cooke, 1992; Eaton and Voos, 1992; Frost, 2001; Bacon and 
Blyton, 2002, 2004). Almost all scholars rely on a conceptualization of a union response 
to management strategies that arrays labour’s response along a unidimensional 
approach, either militant or moderate (or cooperative) (Katz, 1988; Bluestone and
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Bluestone, 1992; Kelly, 1996; Bacon et al., 1996). The militant are seen as simply 
blocking change as a means of preserving the status quo, while the moderate are viewed 
as willing followers of management’s agenda (Frost,-2001: 541).
Scholars who support moderate unionism argue that union survival and recovery depend 
on the willingness of unions and their members to behave non-confrontationally, and to 
offer concessions to the employer; this, they argue, is the wisest course for the future of 
the trade union movement in an era of intensified world competition (Crouch, 1986; 
Bassett, 1986; Lloyd, 1986; Leadbeater, 1987; Rico, 1987; Kem and Sabel, 1992; 
Bacon and Blyton, 2002). On the other hand, mobilization theorists argue that militant 
unions are more likely to secure union survival and recovery (Kelly, 1996, 1998; Cohn, 
1993; Cronin, 1979; Gall 1997, 2001). Their argument has been developed into a more 
wide-ranging critique of the social partnership between labour and management and a 
renewed theoretical focus on mobilizing trade union members (Kelly, 1996: 80-5; 
Section 6.3.6.1 and 8.1.5.1). Kelly contends that union moderation inhibits the growth 
of union activity in the workplace because an ideology of common interests erodes the 
willingness and capacity of union members to resist employers, who take advantage of 
union moderation to restructure employment at the expense of workers’ terms and 
conditions (Ibid: 80-5).
According to a study by Bacon and Blyton, union negotiators thought they behaved 
rationally in the pursuit of goals although their goals and actions related to beliefs and 
ideologies. For example, moderate unionists placed a greater value on long-term plant 
survival and sacrificed the protection of manning and workloads. On the other hand, 
militant unionists did not believe management claims that accepting changes with little 
in return would secure plant survival, placing their emphasis on protecting current jobs 
and preventing work intensification (2004: 770).
Recent researchers have begun to emphasize the importance of context and workplace 
institutions in shaping the outcomes of workplace restructuring in preference to 
identifying points along a unidimensional continuum ranging from militant to moderate 
(Boxall and Haynes, 1997; Frost, 2000; Bacon and Blyton, 2004). That is, the emphasis 
is not on the characteristics of the union approach per se, but rather on the mode of 
interaction between unions and employers.
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According to Frost (2001: 542), a greater focus should be placed on how unions engage 
with management on the issue, rather than on the unions’ orientation (militant or 
moderate). She classifies union responses as interventionist or pragmatist according to 
the stage at which unions become involved with management and the depth of their 
involvement. Frost contends that unions making an interventionist response entered into 
negotiations at an early stage and fully involved with employers in reorganizing work, 
thus producing outcomes that met the needs of all stakeholders: management, workers 
and unions. In contrast, unions making a pragmatic response allowed management to 
make proposals that the union subsequently negotiated; the resulting outcomes, however, 
were less impressive for managers and employees (Frost, 2001: 55-6).
Bacon and Blyton (2004: 752) argue the interaction between what unions do and union 
ideology is important and produces different patterns of workplace change outcomes for 
employees and managers. Trade union actions in the negotiation process and the 
orientation of a union are both important and separate, but related, resources for 
responding to workplace restructuring. During negotiation, unions may engage in 
integrative bargaining, joining with management at an early stage of decision-making to 
explore solutions through joint problem-solving. The alternative is to wait for 
management proposals, and then seek to extract concessions in return for change during 
distributive bargaining. Thus, whether a union engages in cooperative or conflictual 
strategies represents a rational choice between actions following a calculation of ‘how 
best to maximize their interests given the constraints of the situations’ (Crouch, 1986: 
12-3). Orientation, on the other hand, reflects deeply held assumptions or frames of 
reference about the employment relationship. Such ideologies of trade unionism 
develop over a long period of time and tend to endure unchanged in workplaces despite 
changes in management policy and union leadership (Blyton et al., 1996). Thus, whilst 
the decision to engage in integrative or distributive bargaining is a short-term rational 
choice, orientations reflect historical relationships within workgroups about the 
employment relationship.
To sum up, the above literature review of union responses to workplace restructuring 
show that theories of these responses have developed from approaches of unions’ 
orientation, militant vs. moderate, to approaches of unions’ engagement in management 
of restructuring, intervention vs. pragmatism. From the foregoing review, we can make 
the argument that those unions which intervene in restructuring at an early stage through
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militant methods are more likely to produce better outcomes than those which enter into 
negotiation after management has devised a restructuring plan.
Union responses, regardless of their orientation and the kind of industry, to restructuring 
may differ according to the degree of the change of political and economic 
environments2, the originator of restructuring (government or employer), and the scale 
of restructuring. In the case of the Korean banking sector, the massive restructuring was 
introduced forcefully by the Government as a response to the national financial crisis in 
1997. The result was large-scale redundancy, and previously moderate bank unions 
considered that the most effective response if they were to protect employees’ 
employment security in such circumstances was through strike action (a militant 
method). The strike cases in the Korean banking sector will show the effectiveness of an 
interventionist approach to restructuring at an early stage through militant mobilization.
1.2.3. The Korean banking sector
The Korean banking industry originated in the latter years of the 1890s, when Cho Sun 
Bank (in 1896), Han Sung Bank (in 1897), and Dae Han Cun IL Bank (in 1899) began 
banking business. At that time, those banks’ main businesses were the operation of 
taxation and the lending of the Kingdom’s capital (Lee et al., 2004: 23-5). All retail 
banks in Korea were nationalized in 1961 when a military government took power. The 
Government utilized the banks as a means of national economic development for the 
following 20 years. Since 1980, when the Government began to privatize banks, grant 
autonomy to bank management, and relax the entry barrier to the industry in order to 
solve the sector’s laggardness and structural contradiction (derived from the government 
policy of the previous two decades), the number of retail banks has increased from five 
in 1969 to 26 in 1997. In addition, the amount of retail banks’ assets rose rapidly, from 
19.9 billion won (£10 million) in 1969 to 50,588.7 billion won (£25.3 billion) in 2000 
(Lee and Kim, 2001).
2
Locke and Thelen argue that “the studies of varying degree of labour success of labours’ response to 
restructuring between different countries are misleading because they give the impression that they are 
comparing ‘apples with apples’ when instead, given different in starting points and varying degrees of 
valence varying issues possess in different national contexts, they are often in practice comparing 
substantially different phenomena (comparison between ‘apples and oranges’). In short, labour 
movements in different countries confront seemingly similar challenges with varying degrees of intensity 
and/or at different historical moments” (1995: 340).
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However, during this period (i.e. post-1980), the banks had lent mainly to Chaebol 
groups (i.e. conglomerates), leading to an unhealthy financial situation. The banks had 
believed that these groups would never become bankrupt, chiefly because the Chaebol 
groups were too big to fail. Furthermore, according to government economic policy, 
banks, regardless of their will, still had to play a public service role (lending to mainly 
big enterprises). This role, a restriction on the banks’ full autonomy, was a consequence 
of the FSC’s control of, and involvement in, banking business (i.e. such matters as 
management appointments, decisions on big enterprise loans, and the permission to 
release new products had to be approved by the FSC: see Section 4.6.3.2). The banks 
also thoughtlessly borrowed short-term capital from overseas and turned to long-term 
lending without having financial risk management skills. As a result, the Korean 
banking sector could not prevent the development of a national financial crisis 
consequent upon a drain of foreign currency in 1997 when, as a result of the Asian 
foreign currency crisis, foreign investors retreated from the Asian market. The 
Government had to apply for an IMF3 rescue fund. The IMF package was made 
available only on the condition that the financial sector was restructured. The main 
features of the restructuring were the closure of bankrupt banks, mass redundancy, the 
creation of larger banks through mergers, the reform of bank governance, the reform of 
credit practices, the advance of universal banking, and the pursuit of performance.
As a result, the number of banks decreased from 26 in 1997 to 14 in 2003. In addition, 
40 percent of the sector’s regular employees were fired, and the employment 
relationship was changed significantly, from one of lifetime employment practice and 
based on the seniority principle to endless redundancy (or labour flexibility) and based 
on the performance principle. The previous moderate industrial relationship was 
transformed into a militant one, with major disputes breaking out as unions sought to
3 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a specialized agency of the United Nations established in 
1945 to promote international monetary cooperation and expand international trade, stabilize exchange 
rates, and help countries experiencing short-term balance of payments difficulties to maintain their 
exchange rates. The Fund assists members by supplying the amount of foreign currency it wishes to 
purchase in exchange for the equivalent amount of its own currency. The member repays this amount by 
buying back its own currency in a currency acceptable to the Fund, usually within three to five years. The 
Fund is financed by subscriptions from its members, the amount determined by an estimate of their means. 
The IMF provides funds to members on conditionality, that conditionality being the terms under which it 
provides balance-of-payments support to member states. The principle is that support will only be given 
on the condition that it is accompanied by steps to solve the underlying problem. Programmers of 
economic reform are agreed with the member; these emphasize the attainment of a sustainable balance- 
of-payments position and boosting the supply side of the economy. Lending by commercial banks is 
frequently linked to IMF conditionality (Pallister, J and Isaacs, A., 2003: 117, 276).
22
protect employees. Between 1997 and 2003, the unions went on strike on four occasions 
against the government in order to protect employment security4 (Chapter. 5).
In the process of restructuring, the Government relaxed regulations on the industry and 
further opened the banking market for foreign investors. By September 2004, foreign 
investors owned 57.8 per cent of Korean retail banks’ shares (FEI, 2005: 24). Therefore, 
the public function5 of banks has almost disappeared and been replaced by competition 
between banks (under market principles). In response, unions have demanded that the 
public functions of banks be strengthened, and have made this a social issue.
1.3. Scope of the research
1.3.1. Mobilization
According to Tilly (1978: 69), “mobilization” identifies the process by which a group 
goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life. 
Mobilization theorists have studied the reasons and processes that lead individuals to 
take collective actions. Mobilization theory has advanced from the social psychological 
approach, to the structural correlates approach and the process approach (see Section 
6.1.1). Mobilization theorists have developed a large body of work addressing the 
mobilization of labour, asking a number of key questions in their research. How do 
workers acquire a sense of the collective? How do they organize collectively to pursue 
their grievances? How do they take collective action? (Tilly, 1978: Offe and 
Wiesenthal, 1985; McAdam, 1988; Gamson, 1992, 1995; Kelly, 1998). These questions 
entail analysis of the ways in which groups perceive and acquire power resources and 
deploy them in the construction of different types of conflictual and collaborative 
relationships (Kelly, 1998: 24).
4 The main reason that bank workers could go on the strikes with strong unity and determination against 
the government is that they regarded the placing of the blame for banks’ insolvency on bankers as an 
injustice. That was because the banks’ insolvencies were derived, mainly, from the government’s 
financial policy and its involvement in bank business. In addition, in Korea, bank workers were regarded 
as one-half, public, and one-half, private, workers. Even labour law states that the banking sector is part 
of the general public sector and restricts industrial actions (see Section 4.6.5).
5 Previously, banks had contributed to the development of the national economy, guided by government 
policy. They had also privileged customer convenience, rather than profitability, with their strategy of 
market share extension.
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For example, the process approach theorists have argued that there are four critical 
processes in effecting the transition from a set of individuals with a sense of injustice to 
a social group with collective interest: social identification, attribution, leadership, and 
cost and benefits calculation. First, social identification entails the process whereby 
people develop a sense of themselves as a distinct group, we, defined in opposition to an 
out-group, them, which has different interests and values. Secondly, aggrieved 
individuals have to blame an agency for their problem. That agency can then become 
the target for collective organization and action. Thirdly, both attributions and social 
identities are socially constructed by activists or leaders (Kelly 1998: 44). Finally, 
individuals will decide whether or not to engage in collective action on the basis of a 
personal cost-benefit calculation (Tilly, 1978: 69).
However, mobilization theories have not shown the methods by which the capacity of 
mobilization effectiveness 6 can be extended. This is very important because 
organizations like unions could not, even if they had favourable political opportunities 
and succeeded in mobilizing resources, necessarily produce successful outcomes if they 
did not have the ability to devise successful strategies.
1.3.2. Union Learning
Organizations are increasingly paying attention to the concept of OL in order to increase 
competitive advantage, innovation, and effectiveness. OL occurs when an organization 
learns lessons from the mistakes it has made. In other words, it occurs when errors are 
detected and corrected, and organizations are able to carry on with their present policies 
and goals. It also occurs as a result of the influence of various factors, such as 
experience, environment, technology, and culture (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Hedberg, 
1981; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Dodgson, 1993; Morgan, 1997; Crossan et al., 
1999; Argyris, 1999).
There is a substantial literature on OL and firms. However, very little has been written 
about OL and trade unions. This is unsurprising as organized labour has not been 
generally regarded as having the necessary qualities or the potential for becoming a 
constructive and effective subject of OL, due to a common perception that organized
6 The definition of effectiveness is the degree to which the organization is meeting its goals (Klassen et al., 
1998: 3).
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labour has tended to resist and impede changes in organizations (Drinkuth et al., 2001: 
446). In addition, distinctive differences in organizational characteristics between firms 
and unions (organized labour) might also have contributed to the belief that there is 
little to link OL, as it is usually understood, and unions. First, firms are committed to 
the pursuit of profits while unions are non-profit organizations. Secondly, firms’ 
decisions are made at the board level, the ultimate responsibility resting with a chief 
executive, while unions’ decisions are made on a democratic basis, the result of 
dialogical processes between members (leaders and rank-and-file). Thirdly, firms’ 
leaders act for self-interest while unions’ leaders act as volunteers serving the interests 
of their members. Fourthly, firms’ members operate for the organizations to which they 
belong, while unions seek to represent the interests of all their members (i.e. beyond the 
interests and performance of any single enterprise). That is, unions can exert influence 
at the meso- and macro-levels of societies through their industry-wide collective 
bargaining and input into policies and programs initiated by governments and by 
supranational organizations such as the European Union (Drinkuth et al., 2001: 447) as 
well as at the micro-level through plant representatives and works councils. Lastly, OL 
in firms is linked to outcomes defined by management, such as profitability and 
productivity, while OL in unions would focus on ways of developing better strategies 
to, for example, more successfully mobilize, increase participation by the rank-and-file, 
recruit new members, and to improve the democratic operations of the organization.
However, unions are also organizations and their leaders and members do leam through 
reflecting on their strategies, methods and needs. Thus, research needs to be conducted 
into union learning. How do unions leam? Why do they leam? What kind of knowledge 
do they leam, and to what level? What are the factors which inhibit and facilitate 
learning? In answering these questions we will be able to identify how union learning 
has influenced the competitive advantage, innovation, and effectiveness of unions’ 
activities, particularly strike activity (Section 6.3.6; Chapter 7).
The KFIU have gone on four strikes since 1998 in order to protect employment security 
threatened by restructuring measures. Two of these strikes, those held in July 2000 and 
June 2003, were more successful than others. These successes resulted from improved 
strategies, improvements made possible by active learning from the failures of previous 
strikes.
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I will argue that the methods by which the effectiveness of mobilization can be extended 
lie in conducting organizational learning (OL), thereby devising effective strategies.
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY
The thesis uses the qualitative case study approach as the research strategy. This chapter 
looks at what the qualitative case study is in more detail; it will include examinations of 
the research strategy and design, the method of data collection and analysis, the case 
selection and scope of analysis, the level of research and the research rationale.
2.1. Qualitative research
This research requires application of the qualitative analysis method, a method 
appropriate for the study of processes where data collection, analysis, and action often 
take place concurrently (Gummesson. 1991: 2). Gubrium and Holstein argue that 
qualitative research involves the scrutiny of social phenomena, and that qualitative 
researchers look beyond ordinary, everyday ways of seeing social life, and try to 
understand it in novel ways. Qualitative researchers endeavour to understand social 
processes in context while quantitative researchers try to extract abstract categories 
from social phenomena (1997: 111-4). Thus, the quantitative research never succeeds in 
representing what has preceded the strikes, such as decisions of employers to fire 
workers, processes of rationalization, delocalization, and reorganizations, government 
interventions in the economy, police interventions, and so on (Leisink, et al., 1996: 12). 
In addition, qualitative researchers pay attention to the subjective nature of human life, 
not only the subjective experiences of those they are studying but also the subjectivity 
of the researchers themselves.
Qualitative research is not easy because it involves complex issues of interpretation. 
Gathering data typically takes longer, and the researchers have to develop their 
analytical skills and apply them to texts. Learning to think sociologically in qualitative 
research involves not only developing a set of discrete methodological skills but also 
learning how to move back and forth between theory and evidence. It involves learning 
the art of interpretation (Kristin, 2002: 3).
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This research’s main aim is to look at the degrees of, and reasons for, success in four 
strikes, all held in response to historically unprecedented restructuring of the Korean 
banking sector, through an empirical case study. The relationship between each variable 
and the multi-faceted nature of processes can only be understood through analytical 
inference based on more informed and in-depth research methods. Thus, it needs a 
qualitative analysis which, in this research, will be implemented by adopting the case 
study approach.
2.2. Research strategy (case study approach)
2.2.1. Case study
The case study approach is an appropriate one to adopt for this research because by 
placing phenomena in their wider context they can be better understood and explained. 
Such a study involves the detailed investigation of a single or small number of research 
objects in their complex contexts or settings. According to Zonabend, the case study is 
conducted “by giving special attention to totalizing in the observation, reconstruction 
and analysis of the case under study” (1992: 52). Thus, a case study is an in-depth study 
of the cases under consideration; this depth is, indeed, a key feature of the case study 
approach (Hamel et al., 1993: 1). In addition, an important advantage of a case study is 
the opportunity it allows for a holistic view of a process (Gummesson, 1991: 76).
Yin argues:
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The case study 
inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will 
be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and 
analysis (1994: 13).
The descriptive case studies have tended to be traditionally given low status, and 
viewed primarily as being ancillary (Gummesson, 1991: 75). However, Sen argues that 
“whether a descriptive statement is acceptable could be resolved simply by observing” 
and, in making a description, investigators have to make choices which are guided by
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their paradigm, access, and pre-understanding. There is no description without analysis 
and interpretation (1980: 353-69). The case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal 
with a full variety of evidence -  documents, artefacts, interviews and observations -  
beyond what might be available in the conventional historical study (Yin, 1994: 8).
Furthermore, case research is a useful strategy for studying (and explaining) processes 
in organizations because statistical methods are scarcely applicable to studies of 
processes of decision implementation, studies of organizational success and failure, and 
change in organizations (Gummersson, 1991: 77)
2.2.2. Criticism of case study approach, and responses to that criticism
The case study approach has been criticized on the basis of the preference of validation 
(Hagg and Hedlund, 1978: Rubenowitz, 1980; Bryant, 1985). The critics’ main 
arguments are as follows: 1. Case studies lack statistical validity. 2. Case studies can be 
used to generate hypotheses but not to test them. 3. Generalizations cannot be made on 
the basis of case studies (Gummersson, 1991: 75).
According to Hamel et al.:
The case study has basically been faulted for: 1. its lack of 
representativeness, and especially the lack of representativeness of the 
case used as a point of observation for the social phenomenon or issue 
constituting the object of study. 2. Its lack of rigor in the collection, 
construction, and analysis of the empirical materials that give rise to this 
study. This lack of rigor is linked to the problem of bias. Such bias is 
introduced by the subjectivity of the researcher, as well as of the field 
informants on whom the researcher relies to get an understanding of the 
case under investigation (1993: 23).
Furthermore, proponents of statistical methods argue that such methods are the most 
suitable for a sociology which claims to be a fully controlled form of analysis because 
they require a theoretical basis aimed at explaining a given social issue. Testing this 
theory involves a deductive process, incorporating technical procedures that could 
demonstrate its accuracy, while eliminating any biases on the part of the researcher or 
the empirical context (Ibid: 19).
However, the criticism of the case study approach has been reassessed as researchers 
have strengthened the process involved in producing a case study so as to supplement
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the objectivity and the generalization of their research (Ibid: 23). In other words, it has
been argued that the problems of the approach could be solved by bolstering the
research design of case study. Yin suggests ways in which this can be done.
Case study research design should include the following five 
components: the study’s questions, its propositions, its units of analysis, 
the logic linking the data to the propositions, and the criteria for 
interpreting the findings. In addition, a complete research design for the 
case study requires the development of a theoretical framework. This is 
because the use of theory is not only an immense aid in defining the 
appropriate research design and data collection but also becomes the 
main vehicle for generalizing the study’s results (Yin, 1994: 20).
Yin also argues that the theory development not only facilitates the data collection 
phase of the ensuing case study. The appropriately developed theory is also the level at 
which the generalization of the case study results will occur. This role of theory has 
been characterized as ‘analytic generalization’, and has been contrasted with another 
way of generalizing results, ‘statistical generalization’. In ‘analytic generalization’, a 
previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical 
results of the case study. If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, 
replication may be claimed. The empirical results may be considered yet more potent if 
two or more cases support the same theory but do not support an equally plausible, rival 
theory (Ibid: 26-7). In other words, case studies are generalizable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes. Thus, the investigator’s goal is to 
extend and generalize theories (‘analytic generalization’) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (‘statistical generalization’ (Ibid: 9-10).
To sum up, the case study approach, previously criticized for its perceived lack of rigour 
and generalization, has been reassessed by the development of research design in order 
to be able to validate its theoretical basis.
2.2.3. Research strategy and design
Research strategy
In this thesis, the qualitative case study approach is employed as the research strategy to 
investigate the following questions: 1. why did the restructuring happen, and how have 
industrial relations changed in the Korean banking sector? 2. Why and how did 
employees respond to the restructuring? 3. Why and how were some strikes more 
successful than others?
30
The research examines these questions by drawing on official data, examinations of 
archives and newspapers, interviews conducted by the author as well as personal 
observations of those working within the sector undergoing profound change.
Having established a link between unions’ learning and outcomes of strikes, the research 
draws on mobilization theory and OL theory to conduct an analysis of data to identify 
conditions that could account for such differences in mobilization strategy. In addition, 
the research aims to establish a grounded hypothesis to explain the observed differences 
in outcomes discussed in Section 6.4.
Research design
This research applies the five important components (identified by Yin in the preceding 
section) of research design necessary for theory validation. First, there are research 
questions mentioned above and discussed in Section 1.1. Secondly, it has a proposition: 
if unions could leam positively from previous strikes they are more likely to produce 
more successful results at their next strike. Thirdly, there are units of analysis: four 
strikes by Korean banking unions, discussed in Section 2.4, and Chapters 4 and 5. 
Fourthly, there is logic linking the data to the proposition that there is a relationship 
between mobilization and OL, discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Fifthly, there are criteria 
for interpreting the findings, discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
2.3. Method of data collection and analysis
The data are drawn from primary and secondary sources as well as personal 
observations drawn from my experiences as an elected official with the Korean 
Federation of Financial and Clerical Labour Unions7 (KFFCU) and Korea-fiet8 between 
1987 and 2001. Although Ganz (2000: 1019) argues that there is a potential problem of 
bias when the researcher is or has been an interested participant and, furthermore, 
utilizes personal experiences, I believe that my experience equips me with a deep
7 The KFFCU is composed of various financial and clerical workers unions (representing employees of 
insurance companies, investment banks, foreign banks, other financial institutions, and cooperative 
associations, as well as shipping, computer, and other white collar workers) while the KFIU is composed 
of mainly retail bank workers. The KFFCU belongs to a militant national centre, Korea Federation of 
Trade Unions, while the KFIU belongs to a moderate national centre, Federation of Korean Trade Unions. 
In addition, it is a federation of unions while the KFIU is an industrial union.
8Korea-fiet is a committee composed of Korean unions (e.g. KFIU and KFFCU) that are members.of 
Fiet (An international trade union of white collar workers).
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understanding of the context of these events and enables me to access important 
research material, such as primary sources.
The primary sources include interviews (with union officers and members, bank 
managers and IR academics), the minutes of union meetings, annual reports of union 
activities, union newspapers, reports about strike strategies, union organization 
statistics, union rulebooks and union educational material. Secondary sources include 
daily newspapers’ accounts of the strikes, academic analyses of the strikes, restructuring 
in the banking sector, the national financial crisis and industrial relations, and 
government labour statistics.
Two sessions of fieldwork were conducted during visits to Korea, in November- 
December 2003 and in October-November 2005. The purpose of the first visit was to 
conduct the feasibility study of my hypothesis and to collect data regarding the strikes 
and the change of industrial relations resulting from restructuring. The second period of 
fieldwork was semi-structured and more focused on specific issues, such as processes of 
union learning and of strike strategy-making; the issues were identified on the basis of 
an analysis of the data obtained during the first visit.
Thirty-seven people were interviewed: 21 union members (a mixture of officers and 
rank-and file), eight managers in retail banks, and eight researchers (or academics) of 
industrial relations (Table 2-1). The interviews were intensive, covering all the relevant 
research questions (unions’ learning, unions’ response to restructuring, and, in specific 
detail, the strikes and the restructuring of the banking sector). Fifteen union officers in 
the KFIU headquarters and branches were interviewed on the subjects of union learning 
(processes, methods, goal, levels, facilitators and inhibitors), union strategies in 
response to restructuring, union organization (including structure and democracy), and 
the strikes (mobilization, negotiation, strategy, evaluation, and learning). Of these, 
seven were current or former union officers from union headquarters (the current 
President, a former President, the general secretary of the KFIU, and four managers of 
strategy-making9 and education), while eight were branch officers (two branch 
presidents and six managers of policy-making and education). They were chosen 
because they took charge of the strategy-making, learning, and mobilization in response
They take charge of union policies, and strategies and tactics of collective bargaining and industrial 
actions.
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to the restructuring. Six rank-and-file members were asked about the process of their 
acquisition of information about the union, the integration of their views into union 
knowledge, and the effects of such learning on the strikes. They were chosen because 
they had a chance to experience learning processes of strikes at their banks. The eight 
bank managers in charge of employment relations were interviewed about changes in 
management strategies in response to changes in the external environment, the content 
of work reorganization, and changes in employment relations. Lastly, the eight IR 
academics were interviewed on the general subject of Korean IR and learning in unions.
This wide variety of material can be likened to the components of a giant puzzle. The 
underlying reason for the puzzle's existence is clear enough; it is based on Korean bank 
employees' response to restructuring within their sector as it underwent unprecedented 
changes precipitated by a national financial crisis. However, the parts played by each 
actor, and the actions, reactions and interactions between them are much more complex. 
In one sense, a portrait of the situation is revealed in the materials. However, the 
material can serve more than a descriptive function when selected information is 
interpreted through theoretical perspectives, such as mobilization theories, OL theories, 
and strategy perspectives (see Chapters 7 and 8). The application of these other theories 
enables me to provide a multifaceted view of my subjects. The inclusion of these 
various theoretical perspectives also enables me to distance myself from the official 
information’s subjectivity that has already been organized by the needs of the 
institutions that collected it. Comments from interviews further enabled me to remain 
aloof from officially collected information, as well as from hypotheses formed to 
explain both this information and that given by fieldwork. Finally, detachment is further 
guaranteed by constant confrontation within the framework of the case study. If the 
subjectivity of the researcher and of field informants is presented within this study, it is 
possible to clearly distinguish them by comparison (Hamel et al., 1993: 25).
Nevertheless, we need to mention the shortcomings of the way in which OL in unions 
was measured. First of all, as the research focused on the processes of OL in unions 
related to mobilization interviews were limited to union officials and active rank-and- 
file members who had participated in strikes. Secondly, the content of debates within 
union meetings (such as the NC, the CC, and branch meetings) was not thoroughly 
enough investigated or described in order to be able to let the reader get a sufficiently 
strong sense of the integration part of OL in unions. This was actually because unions
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generally did not make detailed records of debates; instead, only note summaries of 
debate outcomes appeared in union reports. Thus, if members not directly involved in 
strikes or passive in union activities had been interviewed to supplement the 
measurement of the effects of OL and more interviews conducted to dig out the detailed 
content of debates on significant issues in union meetings the research would have been 
much persuasive.
2.4. Case selection and scope of analysis
As an object of the research, a union representing workers in the banking sector, the 
Korean Financial Industry Union (KFIU), was chosen. The KFIU is a particularly 
appropriate organization to investigate for this research as bank workers have, since the 
financial crisis of 1997, suffered from severe restructuring of their industry, and have 
responded by taking a number of strike actions. It should be noted that the restructuring 
has been carried out mainly by the Government (rather than the banks themselves) as 
one of the conditions of the IMF’s bail-out was that the banking sector be extensively 
restructured.
Bank unions that had been enterprise unions and which had pursued their unity under a 
federation of bank unions, the Korean Federation of Financial Unions (KFFU), could 
not respond effectively at the first round of restructuring. This was because each bank’s 
union was a relatively sovereign entity. As a consequence of ineffectual strike action in 
September 1998, bank unions were motivated to establish an industrial union in order to 
strengthen unity, and thus respond with greater effect to subsequent restructuring. The 
enterprise unions were dissolved, and an industrial union, the KFIU, was established in 
March 2000. Subsequently, between 2000 and 2003, there were three historic strikes 
overseen by the KFIU, two of which resulted in successful outcomes for the union. 
Together, these four strikes constitute useful cases as I seek an answer to my research 
question; how and why are some strikes more successful than others?
This research will first look, in detail, at the national financial crisis and the subsequent 
restructuring, the changes to both the employment and the industrial relationship in the 
banking sector, and the four strikes. This will be followed by an analysis of the process
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of union learning through previous strike experiences and the relationship between 
mobilization and learning.
2.5. Level of this research and its rationale
This research is a descriptive, explorative and, in terms of its explanatory function, 
suggestive study of a single group of cases, four strikes in the Korean banking sector. 
This research is seen to satisfy the requirements of a descriptive and explorative study, 
although it can be argued that it might not be a perfect explanatory case study, in that it 
does not conclusively establish a casual relationship (in this research, between union 
learning and strike outcome).
I believe that the research is valuable as a descriptive and revelatory case study as it 
satisfies at least the rationale for a single-case study10. This is so because I used to work 
for another union in the financial sector, and therefore had the opportunity to leam 
about the day-to-day operations of a financial union. My observations of, and insights 
into, the problems of the Korean bank union strikes contribute to a significant case 
study because few social scientists have previously had the opportunity to investigate 
these historic actions. Although strikes are a common phenomenon throughout the 
world, there had been no bank strikes in Korea before 1998.
Furthermore, this study is also valuable in that it offers an explanation which future 
researchers could explore further. Scholars state that some researchers in the social 
science seek to achieve a deep understanding of particular events or circumstances 
rather than a theoretical understanding that will elicit one or more theories that could be 
validated by other cases and be generalizable across situations or events (Golelier, 1982: 
25; Yin, 1992; Becker, 1992; Hamel et al., 1993: 29). This work suggests, but does not 
present conclusive proof of, a casual relationship between the degrees of strike success 
and of OL.
Nevertheless, a potential vulnerability of the single-case design is that the case may turn 
out to be not useful because of a lack of rigour in the investigation or because it is
10 Yin argues (1992: 39) that in such cases (i.e. the single-study case) the researcher has an opportunity to 
observe and analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation.
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largely sui generis, and thus provides an inadequate basis for generalization. Therefore, 
this case study has been carefully planned in order to minimize the chances of 
misrepresentation and to maximize the access needed to collect the case study evidence 
(Yin, 1992: 42).
36
<Tabl e 2-1 > List of Interviewees
No Date Job Name of 
Organization 
(or Institution)
1. 11.2005 The current President KFIU
2. 11.2003 The former President KFIU
3. 11.2005 The general secretary KFIU
4. 11. 2003 & 
11.2005
Senior manager of policy (or 
strategy)-making
KFIU
5. 11. 2003 & 
11.2005
Junior manager of policy (or 
strategy)-making
KFIU
6. 11.2005 Manager of education KFIU
7. 11.2005 Manager of publicity KFIU
8. 11.2005 The president CHBU
9. 11.2005 Manager of policy-making CHBU
10. 11.2005 Manager of education & 
publicity
CHBU
11. 11.2005 Manager of organizing CHBU
12. 12. 2003 The president KMBU
13. 11. 2003 & 
11.2005
Manager of policy-making KMBU
14. 11.2003 Manager of education & 
publicity
KMBU
15. 10. 2005 Manager of organizing JIBU (JelL Bank 
union)
16. 11.2005 Rank-and-file member (Chief 
of sub-branch)
CHBU
17. 11.2005 Rank-and-file member CHBU
18. 11.2005 Rank-and-file member CHBU
19. 11.2005 Rank-and-file member CHBU
20. 10. 2005 Rank-and-file member KMBU
21. 10. 2005 Rank-and-file member KMBU
22. 11.2003 Senior manager of HR KMB
23. 11.2003 Junior manager of HR KMB
24. 11.2003 Senior manager of HR CHB
25. 11.2003 Junior manager of HR CHB
26. 11.2003 Manager of HR SHB
27. 11.2003 Manager of HR Foreign Exchange 
Bank
28. 11.2003 Manage of HR Jae EL Bank
29. 11.2003 Manager of HR Ha Na Bank
30. 11.2005 Professor Sociology 
in Jung-Ang 
University
31. 12. 2003 Lecturer Labour studies 
in Korea 
University
32. 12. 2003 & 
11.2005
Head KLSI
33. 12. 2003 & 
11.2005
Senior researcher KLSI
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34. 12. 2003 & 
11.2005
Senior researcher KLSI
35. 12. 2003 & 
11.2005
Head KCWC
36. 12. 2003 & 
11.2005
Senior researcher KCWC
37. 11.2005 Senior researcher KLI
*KLSI (Korea Labour and Society Institute)11,
KCWC (Korea Contingent Workers Centre)12, KLI (Korea Labour Institute)13
11 A leading private research institute specializing in labour & social issues and policy.
12 A private research centre specializing in contingent workers issues.
13 A public research institute specializing in labour issues and policy.
CHAPTER 3. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
KOREA
3.1. Introduction
This thesis uses four strike cases from the Korean banking sector in order to look at the 
reasons for union victories and failures in such actions. In each case, the strike was 
organized as a response to Government-led restructuring of the sector (The demand for 
restructuring itself had originated as a condition of the IMF’s bail-out following the 
national financial crisis of 1997). Before an analysis of the main issues of this thesis, it 
is necessary to provide a general background of Korean economy, politics, and 
industrial relations (IR) before and after the financial crisis. Therefore, this chapter 
looks at the cultural background of Korean IR, and changes in Korean IR before and 
after the 1997 crisis.
3.2. Korean economy and politics
Korea, once one of the world’s poorest nations, has undertaken economic development 
in earnest since 1962. An export-oriented economic development strategy contributed 
greatly to a radical economic transformation. As a result, Korea has enjoyed an annual 
average economic growth rate of 8.6 percent for the last three decades, becoming, by 
1996, the world’s 12th largest trading nation (OECD, 1998). By 2004, Korea had 
become the world’s 11th biggest economy in term of gross domestic product (GDP), 
estimated at US$667.4 billion (NSO, 2005). This overall achievement has been called 
the ‘economic miracle on the Han River’ in Seoul.
Korea has also become one of the world’s leading manufacturers in the field of 
shipbuilding (major companies include Hyun Dai, Dae Woo, and Sam Sung), 
semiconductors and mobile phones, electronic home appliances (Sam Sung and LG), 
and automobiles (Hyun Dai, KLA, and Dae Woo). In 2004, the country’s major export 
partners were China (19.6 per cent), USA (17 per cent), Japan (8.6 per cent), and Hong
39
Kong (7.1 per cent). Its major import partners were Japan (20.6 per cent), China (13 per 
cent), USA (12.9 per cent), and Saudi Arabia (5.3 per cent) (CIA, 2006).
There have been diverse views on the reasons for Korea’s economic development: 
Success has been attributed to external factors, such as the infusion of US economic aid, 
the roles of foreign firms such as Japanese electronics manufacturers and beneficent 
foreign markets (Castley, 1997; Cathie, 1998), and internal factors such as the 
government (Amsden, 1989; Chibber, 2005), business management (Kim, 1997; 
Westphal, 1982), and well-educated people (Moore and Jennings, 1995). Certainly, 
external factors contributed to the economic development at the early stage. However, 
the most important factor has been the government's role. It was government 
initiatives14 which created the conditions for the subsequent success. However, the parts 
played by Korea’s own enterprises and low-wage, hardworking labour force should not 
be forgotten. The growth was also achieved at the expense of civil and labour rights, a 
result of the repression of political and industrial democracy (Kim and Bae, 2004: 5-7).
However, the national financial crisis at the end of 1997, part of a wider Asian foreign 
currency crisis, threatened the nation’s remarkable economic achievements. With the 
support of an IMF rescue fund and a government-directed restructuring of the economy 
(particularly of the financial sector and big enterprises) Korea has once again been able 
to grow economically.
The IMF Executive Board, in December 1999, declared that the foreign exchange crisis 
in Korea was completely resolved (Korea.net, 1 June 2004). Korea’s foreign currency 
reserves, which had totalled a mere US$3.8 billion at the end of 1997 rose to US$216.9 
billion by the end of 2005 (The Economist, 4th -  10th March, 2006).
During the last five decades, Korean politics has also gone through many stormy 
periods. Korea was divided into South Korea (2005 population: 48.8 million)) and 
North Korea (2005 population: 23.5 million) in 1945 when the nation recovered its 
sovereignty at the end of the Second World War. This split was the consequence of a 
compromise between the USA and the Soviet Union. It led to another war, the Korean 
War, which lasted for three years, from 1950 to 1953.
14 The main contents are; 1. The pursuit of economic development plans led by the government (1963- 
1982). 2. Promotion (and alliance with) of Chaebol groups (conglomerates) in order to promote export- 
led industrialization and improve global competitiveness.
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Since the establishment of the first republic government in 1948, Korean politics has 
experienced a dynamic history, including dictatorships (using anti-Communism and 
rapid economic development as their main justifications for taking power) and civilian 
revolutions (to install democracy). From 1948 to 1960, the country was led by a civilian 
dictator. However, he was overthrown by a peoples’ revolution, the so-called “April 
Revolution”, in 1960. The new democratic government was in power for only one year. 
In 1961, it was replaced in a military coup; the General who led the coup remained as 
leader of the country until 1979, when he was assassinated by one of his men. Other 
military generals took control of the government following another coup in 1980 after 
repressing a civilian democratic revolution, the so-called “May Revolution”. They 
controlled the Korean government until 1993, when a democratic civilian government 
stepped in once again, the result of another civilian revolution, the “June Revolution” of 
1987 (note: the country still had a military leader, albeit an elected one, in the 
intervening six years.) The revolution also led to a change in the Presidential Election 
system, from indirect to direct. Korean politics, since the Second World War, has thus 
been greatly dynamic and revolutionary. The revolutionary dynamics o f Korean politics 
and economy has affected the character of its industrial relations.
3.3. Cultural background of Korean IR
Like many of its East Asian neighbours, Korea’s religious and philosophical beliefs are 
rooted in Confucianism15 and Buddhism. Buddhism was the national religion during the 
Shilla Dynasty (57 BCE-935 CE) and the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392), the ancient 
Korean states. After all the kingdoms in the Korea peninsular united under the Shilla 
Kingdom 16 Buddhism became the fundamental socio-political ideology for the 
reconciliation and the integration of people, regions, and social classes. Hence, the main
15 Confucianism : Confucius (551-479 BCE) taught the necessary actions for harmony and order during a 
time of political violence and social disorder. During the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) his teachings 
(compiled by his disciples in the Analects) became state orthodoxy in China and remained so until 1911. 
Confucianism taught that nobility was not to be attained through inheritance but by following the correct 
rituals and acts of filial piety, reciprocity, and righteousness. In particular, juniors (such as subjects or 
sons) should show loyalty to seniors (rulers, fathers), while seniors should show benevolence to juniors. 
Confucianism's emphasis on harmony, respect for authority, loyalty, benevolence, meritocracy, literacy, 
and scholarship, lies behind the recent economic growth of Japan and the newly industrializing countries 
(NICs) of East Asia (Marshall, 1998).
16 BakJe Kingdom (18 BCE-660 CE), KoGuLyo Kingdom (37 BCE-668 CE).
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ideology of Korean Buddhism was the pursuit of compassion, harmony and unification. 
This emphasis on compassion, in conjunction with Confucianism, has had a long-term 
impact on Korean society, surfacing in such aspects of industrial relations as the 
paternalistic approach and work harmonization (Kim and Bae, 2004).
The disciplined methods and way of life of Buddhist monks especially influenced 
labour activists and politicians. For example, Korean labour activists very often shave 
their heads and conduct hunger strikes in order to demonstrate their determination to 
persist with their struggles. Some have occasionally used the extreme method of 
burning themselves to death when there has appeared no other way to achieve their 
demands. Between 1970, when a famous Korean labour activist, Jyun Tai-IL, did it, and 
2000, 36 activists chose this form of protest17. These struggle methods are derived from 
the penance-ways of Buddhist monks. People who decide to become Buddhist monks 
must shave their hair as a sign that they are quitting their relationship with the world in 
order to put their hearts and souls into their discipline. In addition, monks have 
occasionally done hunger penance18, while others have burnt themselves to death in 
order to attain Nirvana (spiritual enlightenment) (Cho, 1992).
Confucianism, the state religion during the 500-plus years of the Chosun Dynasty 
(1392-1910), influenced not only the values and norms, ways of thinking, attitudes and 
conduct of Koreans, but also affected corporate culture and management systems and 
practices. Confucianism emphasizes five ethical codes governing human relations. 
These are: 1. filial piety to parents; 2. absolute loyalty of subjects to sovereigns; 3. 
obedience to one’s husband and warmth towards one’s wife; 4. precedence of the elder 
over the younger, and; 5. mutual trust among friends. These codes place an emphasis on 
harmony and social order (Kim and Bae, 2004: 40).
The Confucian traditions led, on the one hand, to hierarchical and unequal relationships 
between senior and junior members of society, between the upper and lower class, and 
between men and women. High priority was thus traditionally given to members of the 
upper class, more senior people, and men. Furthermore, this tradition influenced 
leadership style, which was authoritarian and hierarchical. On the other hand, the
17 www.yolsa.org: the site of the Memory Group for Martyrs, people who died for democracy and their
fellow citizens.
18 Siddhartha (founder of Buddhism) did hunger penance during his life o f extreme asceticism.
42
Confucian tradition also emphasizes the obligation of senior or upper class people to 
take care (courteously) of junior and lower class people. There is thus an emphasis on 
harmony in human relations.
These social values and norms influenced several social orientations, such as familism, 
Yongoism, and collectivism, that are deeply related to the culture of Korean industrial 
relations. First, Confucian beliefs emphasize the importance of one’s family and clan. 
One important ritual is ancestor worship. The rite is usually held at the eldest son’s 
house. This tradition has had an impact on Korean companies. There, familism resulted 
in family-based management and ownership on the one hand, and a paternalistic 
approach to the employment relationship on the other. Secondly, Confucianism created 
Yongoism. Yongo refers to connection. Yongo-based relations have pervaded almost 
every aspect of Korean society. Three of Yongo’s different manifestations are Hyulyon 
(connection by blood), Hakyon (connection by education), and Jiyon (connection by 
geography). Yongo has been applied to such actions as promotion within a company, 
recruitment, and the selection of partners for strategic alliances. Yongoism can be 
positively interpreted as the exercise of social capital. On the other hand, it hampers the 
process of enhancing trust and transparency, resulting in inefficiency, corruption and 
selfishness. It also facilitates the practice of taking care of people who have connections 
rather than competencies (Ibid: 41-4). Thirdly, Confucianism generated collectivism. 
Collectivism in Korea can be characterized by in-group harmony and the hierarchical 
principle (Cho and Yoon, 2001). These features generate both in-group solidarity and 
unity and some tension and competitive relationships with out-groups as well as 
endorsing a paternalistic management style. Therefore, employers take responsibility for 
their employees, while employees, in turn, have a strong loyalty and commitment to the 
firm. Life-time employment and seniority-based practices are also related to this (Kim 
and Bae, 2004).
The social values of the traditional hierarchical family system have influenced Korean 
companies, making them strongly hierarchical, with virtual organization principles. In 
addition, a similar level of importance has been assigned to the authority and 
paternalism of owner-managers. Among peers at work, trustworthy relations, 
collectivism, a strong sense of duty and harmony are highly valued. People usually 
work hard and are devoted to the company.
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In short, the traditional Confucian social values governing human relations are directly 
responsible for some features of Korean HRM systems and practices, such as seniority- 
based systems, the paternalistic approach, long-term attachments, tenure-based 
promotions and job grade by cohort. Under the influence of traditional social values, 
Korean employment relationship has been characterized by a strong sense of solidarity 
and a unitary view of industrial relations. However, this strong sense of solidarity and 
unitarianism paradoxically contributed to the promotion of militant unionism (which 
was based on strong solidarity) during the great labour disputes of 1987 as workers 
protested against the repression of pluralism.
3.4. Korean trade unionism
Since 1987, the character of Korea trade unionism (“although rhetorically committed to 
socialist aims” has developed as a kind of ‘militant economism’ within a system of 
enterprise unionism (Hyman, 2001: 68). That is, Korean unions have typically adopted a 
character of militant economism to gain their demands (such as wage increases and 
improvements of working conditions) through the use of ‘industrial muscle’ (by 
applying such militant methods as strikes or collective power) (Bae and Cho, 2003: 92- 
3). This particular form of trade unionism stemmed from the government’s regimental 
labour policy in the period of development dictatorship (from 1962 to 1993) and the 
traditional enterprise union system.
The root of the militancy of Korean unions lies in the militant independence movement 
against colonization in the early 1900s (1910-1945), the militant left-wing labour 
movement after independence (1945 to 1950), and the fierce struggle for democracy 
against dictatorship, between 1955 and 1987 (Ibid, 2003: 93). In addition, since 1970, 
when the labour activist, Jyun Tai-IL, burnt himself to death in his demand for respect 
for labour law, many intellectuals and university students have pursued social reform by 
going into workplaces to promote the labour movement. Activists had frequently no 
choice but to rely on militant methods to fight against the repressive employment 
systems (Lee, 2005: 245).
However, there were few labour disputes before 1987 because successive authoritarian 
governments suppressed the democratic and militant labour movement. Furthermore,
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the national centre of trade unions, FKTU, was a moderate body, frequently cooperating 
with the government (from whom it received much of its funding and other material 
support such as its buildings) and employers to discourage union militancy.
It was against this background that, in July 1987, explosive labour disputes, known 
collectively as the Great Labour Struggle, occurred (discussed in Section 3.5.2), a 
month after the door of political democratization was opened as a result of the June 
Revolution (see Section 3.2). These disputes resulted in a change of labour policy by the 
government, from a repressive one to autonomic industrial relations between labour and 
employers. Nevertheless, employers still preferred the authoritarian employment 
relationship. Unions were sometimes forced to adopt a peculiar strategy, striking before 
they engaged in negotiations with employers; this strategy was known therefore as 
“Strike First and Negotiation Later”19.
The number of strikes decreased sharply in the early 1990s (Table 3-5) because the 
Government and employers pursued a Unitarian policy of IR for economic development, 
a combination of carrots (wage increases and improvements of working conditions) and 
sticks (strong crackdowns on illegal labour disputes). Then, in January 1997, the 
militancy of the unions was once again ignited. They demonstrated their political power 
when the Government unilaterally tried to legalize labour laws concerning flexibility. 
Unions went on a general strike to repel the laws, forcing the Government to revise 
them (Lee, 2003: 34). Unions’ confidence in the efficacy of strikes was thus increased, 
prompting more labour disputes when mass restructuring was introduced in response to 
the national financial crisis which occurred at the end of that year (Table 3-5).
In addition, unions established since 1987 have tended to prefer militancy. They 
succeeded in establishing an autonomous national centre of trade unions, KCTU, in 
1995 although the Government did not grant it legal status until 1998. They have also 
increased their interest in social issues, such as labour law revision, and aligned their 
standards, education, and pensions with those which exist internationally. They also 
established, with farmers, students and liberal groups, a socialist party, the Democratic 
Labour Party, in 2000. In the 2004 general election, the party received 13.1 percent of
19 In addition, union leaders have been conditioned through fights, imprisonment, and dismissals since 
1987. The rank-and-file have also shown a tendency to prefer militant candidates to moderate ones at 
leadership elections (Bae and Cho, 2003: 117).
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the national vote, and ten of their MPs were elected to Parliament (there are 299 
members in all) (kdlp.org). Thus, they became the third party, ensuring that KCTU is 
now an organization with political power. Furthermore, it became the number one 
national centre of trade unions in April 2006, when its membership reached 800,000,
20,000 more than the moderate FKTU (Seoul Economy Daily, 20 April 2006).
Other characteristics of Korean trade unions are, first, the single enterprise union system 
(only one union can operate in any one enterprise). However, as in a result of a revision 
of the labour law in 1997, it will become legal in 2010 for more than one union to 
operate in enterprises. As it concentrates labour power into one group, this single union 
system is effective if it is allowed to operate autonomously and democratically; 
however, if the union is operated undemocratically by a small number of leaders 
controlled by management it can provide less assistance to employees. The single 
enterprise union system has decayed slowly since 1997, to be replaced by a new 
movement towards industrial unionism (see Section 3.6.3). Secondly, the number of 
full-time union officers in Korea is greater than in other countries. On average, there is 
one full-time officer to every 174 members in Korea unions in 2003 according to a 
survey by KTC (Cho, 2004). This is quite a high ratio compared to other countries. The 
reason for this is that union power at collective bargaining has increased since 1987, the 
time of the “Great Labour Struggle”. Almost full-time officers (except the small number 
of officers employed by the unions) are employees in their companies and their 
companies pay them according to the CBA (Section 4.6.2.1). Lastly, the labour 
movement has been led by militant big enterprise unions (in Hyun Dai Group, Dae Woo 
Group, and the public sector) established since 1987. They have engaged in labour 
disputes almost every year.
3.5. Korean IR before the national financial crisis in 1997
Previously authoritarian industrial relations in Korea had experienced dynamic 
transformation under new environmental conditions, such as democratization in 1987, 
globalization in the 1990s, and the national financial crisis in 1997.
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3.5.1. Authoritarian IR under the military government before 1987
Before 1987, Korean industrial relations were authoritarian in nature, dictated by the 
military government that had been in power since the early 1960s. The government that 
took power in a coup d ’etat in 1961 actively mobilized national resources for a 
designated purpose, industrialization, and transformed Korea into a strong authoritarian 
developmental state in the process (Amsden.1990: 24-5). Under successive military 
governments for 30 years, Korean society was effectively militarized. Firms tend to 
imitate the regime in terms of hierarchical structure, centralized decision-making, and 
autocratic management coordination (Janelli. 1993: 48-9). During this period, the 
government’s interventionist labour policy tightly controlled collective actions, such as 
the organization of trade unions or strike actions, by employees. At the corporate level 
however, employers were free to exercise their managerial prerogatives when 
determining wages and working rules. Until 1987, since labour unions were too weak to 
voice their members’ discontent and demands, industrial relations was, by and large, 
stable and static, dominated by the unchallenged authority of the government and 
employers (Lee, 2001). In summary, forced unitarism was a characteristic of Korean 
industrial relations.
3.5.2. From authoritarianism to autonomic IR after 1987
Since 1987, Korean industrial relations have been transformed from authoritarian to 
democratic. In June 1987, the growing power of the civil movement pressured the 
military ruling group to make the “Declaration of Democratization”20; this was a critical 
moment, adding momentum to the move towards political democratization. The “Great 
Labour Struggle” that closely followed dismantled the existing regimented industrial 
relations system dominated by management and the authoritarian government, and gave 
rise to a new autonomic environment.
This phase began with the dramatic surge in labour disputes. The number rocketed from 
276 in 1986 to 3,749 in 1987, 1,873 in 1988, and 1,616 in 1989. Along with the sharp 
rise in labour disputes, the number of trade unions increased from 2,742 in 1986 to 
7,883 in 1989 (Table 3-5). In the same period, union membership nearly doubled from
20 This was a result of the June Revolution by people.
47
1,050,000 to 1,931,000, and union density increased from 11.7 percent to 18.6 percent 
(KLI. 2001a, 2001b).
Faced with the offensive by organized labour as well as social democratization, the 
Government abandoned its interventionist industrial relations policy and officially 
recognized the autonomy of labour unions and management in dealing with firm-level 
labour issues through collective bargaining. The explosive growth of the labour 
movement in this period also transformed the power balance between labour and 
management. Authoritarian control by management eroded substantially, and labour 
unions in many large firms took control of the shop floor. Management was forced 
under strong pressure by labour unions to allow high wage increases, improved working 
conditions and corporate welfare programs.
3.5.3. Traditional characteristics of Korean IR
Some of the characteristics of industrial relations before 1997 include, first, enterprise 
union system had become an entrenched arrangement for collective bargaining. The 
enterprise-based unions were characterized by fragmentation, uncoordinated actions and 
a weak confederate structure, a tendency to focus on distributive issues and were not 
well prepared to deal with production issues following industrial adjustment 
(Wilkinson, 1994: 354-5). Secondly, firms had developed organization-based 
employment systems in order to retain and increase skilled labour during rapid 
industrialization. Corporate employment systems were created on the basis of lifetime 
employment, seniority-based pay system, and corporate welfare benefits. Thirdly, an 
authoritarian, paternalist management style was developed at the firm level. This 
management style was nurtured by the traditional Confucianism culture and the 
militarization of the society. However, the latter literally began to be revised after 1987 
and the traditional Korean industrial relations systems (based on Confucianism) 
underwent significant change after the financial crisis of 1997.
3.6. Changes of Korean IR after the financial crisis
The pressure to improve national economic competitiveness in the global economy had 
been mounting since the early 1990s; this pressure increased with the 1997 national
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financial crisis. The impact on Korean industrial relations was profound, with a strong 
emphasis on labour flexibility and performance-based practices.
Following the crisis, the Korean Government applied to the IMF for a bailout The IMF 
provided a comprehensive financial package of about $65 billion. In return, the Korean 
Government was asked to contain inflationary pressure through tight monetary and 
fiscal policies, and to fundamentally restructure the banking and financial sector. More 
importantly, the IMF stressed that, in its view, the Korean labour market was too rigid 
and that the Government should take the necessary steps to improve its flexibility.
The Government and employers perceived that the financial crisis presented an 
opportunity to eliminate redundant aspects of the labour force. Consequently, the two 
groups actively pursued such restructuring programs as downsizing and merger and 
acquisitions despite strong resistance from trade unions and the labour force.
3.6.1. The impact on the labour market
The restructuring impacted seriously on the Korean labour market. First of all, the 
unemployment rate in Korea rose sharply, from 3.1 percent in December 1997 to 8.6 
percent in February 1999; the actual number unemployed by February 1999 had reached 
about 1.3 million (Table 3-1). Secondly, since downsizing had been implemented in 
almost all sectors of the Korean economy, the main focus of collective bargaining 
shifted from wage increases to the need to improve employment security. Consequently, 
concession bargaining was widespread during the financial crisis in order to secure 
employment guarantee agreements with employers, while wage levels for most workers 
fell (the growth rate of real wages was -9.3 percent in 1998) (Table 3-2). Thirdly, the 
use of contingent labour (i.e. irregular workers) became widespread. The ratio of 
contingent workers to the total employed population increased from 46 percent in 1997 
to 53 percent in 2000 (Table 3-3). Contingent workers usually took the jobs of regular, 
full-time workers, and assumed the same level of responsibility. However, their wage 
level was two-thirds or a half of regular workers.
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3.6.2. Change of employment practices
Traditional Korean employment practices cultivated employee loyalty and commitment 
through long-term employment and seniority-based pay. As economic competition 
intensified throughout the 1990s, these rigid practices were challenged by the need for 
more flexible use of human resources. American-style employment practices focusing 
on relatively short-term, performance-based and market-oriented methods of managing 
human resources began to spread, and the legacy of lifetime employment was greatly 
weakened in most private companies.
First, the seniority wage was traditionally combined with a group bonus system. Thus, 
the bonus was not performance-based, but a regular component of the total wage. 
However, the trend in bonus payouts declined during the financial crisis and 
performance-based bonus was introduced in almost all firms. In addition, Korean 
employment practices regarding recruitment, appraisal, and training became 
increasingly Americanized. For example, 360-degree appraisal was introduced in many 
firms, reducing reliance on the traditional top-down appraisal; recruitment decisions 
began to be decentralized, giving line managers more decision-making authority; the 
selection process placed more importance on interviews than traditional paper-and- 
pencil tests, and; training and education programs began to focus more on technical 
knowledge and skills than on loyalty and commitment to the company.
3.6.3. The impact on trade unionism and collective bargaining
Due to the restructuring, labour organizations experienced substantial setbacks during 
the early period of the crisis. Unions lost about 50,000, or 3 percent, of their members 
during the first nine months of the emergency (Kim, Bae and Lee, 2000). The sudden 
decline was mainly due to employment restructuring and the bankruptcy of firms. The 
response of labour to downsizing was to oppose any restructuring programs by 
mobilizing union members and calling for a series of general strikes. Although the 
financial crisis initially appeared to be detrimental to the labour movement, it seems to 
have made trade unionism more active and dynamic in the long run. The trend was 
evident in the following three developments.
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First, the financial crisis actually reversed the declining trend of union membership 
partially due to grassroots organizing among employees in small- and medium-size 
firms. Consequently, the number of unionized workers increased by 116,000 between 
1998 and 2000 (Table 3-4). Secondly, strike activity increased noticeably, rising from 
78 in 1997 to 250 in 2000. The number of workers involved in strikes increased from 
43,991 to 177,969 and the number of working days lost increased from 444,720 to 
1,893,563 during the same period (Table 3-5). As to the reason for strike action, almost 
four-fifths (196 out of 250) of the total in 2000 centred on issues of employment and 
working conditions; the remainder focused on wage issues. This clearly indicates that 
employment-related issues arising from restructuring led to most of the disputes. 
Finally, the movement to transform traditional enterprise unions to industrial unions 
was revitalized after the financial crisis. The massive layoffs led union leaders to realize 
the inherent limitations of enterprise-based unionism. Enterprise-based unions could not 
respond effectively to industrial and national-level employment issues, such as 
industrial-level restructuring plans forced by the Government. The formation of the 
KFIU was a direct response to the financial industry restructuring which led to layoffs 
of approximately 40 percent of employees in the sector (Table 5-10). The most 
important goal of industrial union establishment was to protect the job security of 
employees against an imminent second round of restructuring. Employees in the 
banking sector believed that a single, large-scale industrial union would be more 
effective than scattered enterprise unions in preventing restructuring programs by the 
Government and employers.
The transformation from enterprise unionism to industrial unionism was decisive and 
swift. In the four-year period between 1998 and 2002, 17 new industrial unions were 
formed. Most of these were formed by merging existing individual enterprise unions. 
The combined membership of these industrial unions reached 31.4 percent of the total 
union membership in Korea in 2002; in 1997 it had accounted for just 6.2 percent 
(Table 3-6). However, industry-level bargaining has so far only been conducted in a 
handful of sectors, such as banking, education, and hospitals mainly due to the refusal 
of employers in other sectors to participate.
51
3.6.4. Experiment of corporatism
The Korean financial crisis in November 1997 resulted in a crisis consciousness among 
the three parties, labour, Government, and employers, leading them to form the Korea 
Tripartite Commission. The establishment of the KTC stemmed from the Government’s 
need to implement restructuring as smoothly as possible. In the past, the Korean 
Government had considered labour to be an obstacle to economic development and had 
tried to subordinate official labour unions to the state and to suppress any independent 
labour movement. Thus, the creation of the KTC implied that the Government at least 
now regarded labour as a legitimate actor in the political structure. On 20 January 1999, 
the first Tripartite Joint Statement was announced; it identified the shared goal of 
economic reform and the principle of fair sharing of burdens. Then, on 9 February 1998, 
the three parties agreed on 90 major items and declared its Social Compact to the public. 
In return for accepting the immediate implementation of layoffs of redundant staff, the 
labour movement saw some basic labour rights made law.
Among the 90 agreed-upon items, the most important included: 1. to allow immediate 
implementation of layoffs of redundant staff. However, the laying off of staff should be 
the final resort in all subsequent business problems; layoffs should be carried out only 
in the case of business crisis; fair criteria should be applied to select the workers to be 
laid off; advance notice should be given to affected employees; 2. to improve income 
security programs for the unemployed; 3. to provide government employees with the 
right to organize; 4. to guarantee teachers the right to organize trade unions from July 
1999; 5. to guarantee political activities of trade unions by revising the Elections Act 
and the Political Funds Act during the first half of 1998; 6. to recognize unemployed 
workers’ right to join trade unions organized on the trans-enterprise level from 1999 
(Kim and Bae, 2004).
Kim and Bae (2004) argue that the Social Compact greatly improved the credibility of 
the Korean economy, highlighted the Government’s crisis management capacity, and 
helped the country overcome the credit crunch. However, the Commission has not 
functioned effectively since February 1999 because union national centres (KFTU and 
FKTU) and the Korean Employers Federation have repeatedly withdrawn from and 
rejoined it. Nevertheless, the Commission has played an important role the resolution of 
major disputes between unions and Government. For example, the Tripartite
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Commission played a role as a mediator between the KFIU and the Government 
whenever strikes in the financial sector occurred in 1998, 2000, and 2003.
3.7. History of bank unions in the Korean labour movement
The history of Korean bank unions is less than 50 years old. The first union, Cho Hung 
Bank trade union, was established on 1 June 1960. Although the history of the Korean 
trade union movement goes back as far as 1898, when a port workers’ union was 
established in Sung Jin, the trade union movement had confined itself to the 
manufacturing industry until 1960 when a civilian revolution (the so-called 4.19 
revolution or April Revolution) overthrew a dictatorial government run by the police.
The reasons for such a restricted union movement were, first, the Government’s fear of 
the organization of highly educated workers such as teachers, reporters, and bank 
workers, and, secondly, a public misconception that the labour movement was just for 
manual workers.
Further motivation for the Government’s suppression of trade unions emerged from the 
Korean War (between communist North Korea and capitalist South Korea) fought 
between 1950 and 1953. After the war ended, the South Korean government pursued a 
stronger anti-communism policy. This included opposition to the trade union movement 
by the police who were concerned by the revolutionary agenda of the left-wing union 
leaders who had led the movement prior to the war.
However, following the 4.19 revolution and the establishment of a democratic 
government the trade union movement was revitalized. Knowledge workers, such as 
teachers, journalists, and bank workers, could now organize trade unions. The 
Commercial Bank Union, the Korea First Bank Union, the Han IL Bank Union and the 
Seoul Bank Union were all established within weeks of the setting up of the Cho Hung 
Bank Union. In order to strengthen their collective power, the unions formed the Korean 
National Association of Bank Unions very soon after (23 July 1960). Collective 
bargaining agreements between unions and banks (which formed the basis of stable 
industrial relations in the Korean financial sector) were signed shortly afterwards.
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However, a military coup in 1961 led to a government crackdown on the growing trade 
union movement, and teacher and press unions were disbanded. However, the bank 
unions were able to survive in the cold wave of suppression, and continue to grow 
because they renounced political campaigns and focused on only the improvement of 
workers’ rights and interests (Kim, 1982). Under labour legislation introduced by the 
military government there was a change from the enterprise union system to an 
industrial union system. The Government believed that control of the workers would be 
easier under the latter. An industrial union system remained in place until 1980, when, 
under a new military government strongly opposed to a citizens’ democracy movement, 
new labour legislation was passed, resulting in reversion to the enterprise union system. 
The industrial union system had had a positive aspect in that the unions were able to 
represent all employees in the banking industry. A collective bargaining agreement 
negotiated by the unions applied a uniform wage system and working conditions on all 
bank employees.
Although bank unions had to once again operate under an enterprise union system retail 
banks maintained multi-employers’ bargaining as it was convenient for both unions and 
employers; both groups were used to the system and they could avoid unnecessary 
competition of wages and working conditions between banks. However, it was not a 
compulsory form of collective bargaining but an optional one. Accordingly, when 
employers did not agree on trade unions’ requests unions could not take any legal action 
against them. Each union was thus forced to engage in single employer bargaining again 
in order to attain its objects. Newly established retail banks favoured enterprise-based 
bargaining and tried to differentiate their wage and working conditions from the bigger, 
more established retail banks. Wage and working conditions were generally better in 
these new banks than in the older banks.
In 1997, at the time of the Asian financial crisis, many bankrupt banks were closed and 
a huge number of employees had to be dismissed, in accordance with the Government’s 
forced order of structural adjustment. Bank unions, being enterprise unions, could not 
protect employees effectively. They began to promote the establishment of an industrial 
union in order to cope with the second structural adjustment proposed by the 
Government, the purpose of which was to merge banks so as to strengthen the 
competitiveness of Korea’s banks. An industrial union, the KFIU, was established in 
March 2000. Since then, it has effected major changes to industrial relations in the
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banking sector. For instance, the union has organized major industrial actions in order to 
resist the second structural adjustment by the Government, and has instigated multi­
employer bargaining in which all banks participate.
3.8. Conclusion
This chapter looked at the cultural background of Korean IR with a snapshot of the 
economic and political landscape, and changes in Korean IR before and after the 
financial crisis. The findings can be summarized as follows.
First, Korean industrial relations culture is rooted in Confucianism and Buddhism. The 
main ideology of Korean Buddhism was the pursuit of compassion, harmony and 
unification. This emphasis on compassion, taken along with Confucianism, has had a 
long-term impact on Korean society, surfacing in such aspects of industrial relations as 
the paternalistic approach and work harmonization. The disciplined methods and way of 
life of Buddhist monks especially influenced the struggle methods of labour activists; 
examples are hair shavings and hunger strikes. Confucianism influenced not only the 
values and norms, ways of thinking, attitudes and conduct of Koreans, but also affected 
corporate culture, management systems, and employment practices, such as seniority- 
based systems, the paternalistic approach, long-term attachments, tenure-based 
promotions and job grade by cohort. Due to the influence of traditional social values, 
the culture of Korean industrial relations has been characterized by a strong sense of 
solidarity and a unitary view of industrial relations. However, these characteristics also 
contributed to the promotion of militant unionism, which was based on that solidarity, 
in the great labour disputes of 1987 against the repression of pluralism.
Secondly, since 1987, the character of Korean IR has changed from one of 
authoritarianism to one based on democratic principles. Korea’s industrial relations 
reflected the authoritarianism of the military government that had implemented 
economic growth policies since the early 1960s. During that period, the Government’s 
interventionist labour policy tightly controlled labour’s collective actions, such as the 
organization of trade unions or the taking of strike action. Therefore, forced unitarism 
was a characteristic of Korean industrial relations. However, due to political 
democratization in 1987, Korean industrial relations were likewise transformed from
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authoritarian to democratic. The so-called “Great Labour Struggle” dismantled the 
existing industrial relations system previously dominated by management and the 
authoritarian government (section 3.5.2). As a result, authoritarian control by 
management was eroded substantially, and labour unions in many large firms took 
control of the shop floor. In particular, management was forced under strong pressure 
by labour unions to allow high wage increases and improve working conditions and 
corporate welfare programmes.
Thirdly, since the national financial crisis in 1997, Korea’s traditional employment 
systems, based on life-long employment and seniority-based pay, have rapidly changed 
toward American-style ones based on employment flexibility and performance-based 
pay. As a consequence of extensive restructuring following the financial crisis, the 
unemployment rate in Korea increased sharply. As a result, strike activities also rose 
(Table 3-5). In addition, the movement to transform the traditional enterprise unions to 
industrial unions was accelerated as employees sought to respond to restructuring by 
employers and the Government. As a result, 17 new industrial unions were formed 
between 1998 and 2002 (Table 3-6).
Fourthly, the Government began to experiment with corporatism of labour policy by 
establishing the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC). The financial crisis had resulted 
in a crisis consciousness among the three parties (labour, government, employers), 
leading them to form the Commission. On 9 February 1998, the three parties agreed on 
90 major items and announced its Social Compact to the public. The unions, by 
accepting the immediate implementation of layoffs of redundant employees, were 
rewarded with the legalization of basic labour rights. The Social Compact greatly 
improved the credibility of the Korean economy, highlighted the Government’s crisis 
management capacity, and helped the country overcome the credit crunch (Kim and Bae, 
2004).
Lastly, bank unions established since 1960 had generally maintained moderate IR with 
employers. However, since 1997, when the Government embarked on a massive 
restructuring, involving the closure of insolvent banks and personnel reduction, of the 
banking sector, the unions have had no alternative but to change their approach to 
industrial relations from moderation to militancy. A traditionally quiet workforce, 
facing serious employment insecurity, has therefore shed its image of moderation. To
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increase the effectiveness of their response to the restructuring, the unions also changed 
their union form from enterprise unions to an industrial union, the KFIU, and organized 
a number of strikes.
As we have seen, due to the national financial crisis, the Government began to 
systematically restructure the financial sector. This led to mass redundancies and, in 
response, bank unions went on four strikes between 1998 and 2003. The following 
chapters will explore in detail the proposed restructuring, changes in industrial relations, 
and each of the strikes.
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<Table 3-l> Unemployment rates around the period of the financial crisis 
   _______________ (by percentage)_______________ _________
Month 1997 1998 1999 2000
February 3.2 5.9 8.6 5.3
December 3.1 7.9 4.8 4.1
Source: National Statistical O ffice (2001)
<Table 3-2> Changes in real wages (by percentage)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Ratio of wage 
increase
6.6 2.5 -9.3 11.1 5.6
Source: Korea Labour Institute (2002), KLI Labour Statistics.
<Table 3-3> Ratio ol ‘ irregular workers (1,(100)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1 .No of regular workers 7,401 7,151 6,457 6,050 6,212
2.No of temporary workers 3,860 4,182 3,998 4,183 4,545
3.No of daily workers 1,804 1,892 1,735 2,289 2,373
4.No of irregular workers 
(2+3)
5,664 
(43 %)
6,074 
(46 %)
5,733 
(47 %)
6,472 
(52 %)
6,918 
(53 %)
5. Total (1+4) 13,065 13,226 12,191 12,522 13,086
Source: National Statistical Office, 2001.
<Tab e 3-4> Num >er of union members in Korea
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002
No of 
union 
members
1,599,000 1,484,000 1,401,000 1,480,000 1,527,000 1,605,972
Source: Ministry of Labour (1997-2004)
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<Ta )le 3-5> Statistics on labour disputes in Korea
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1993
No of 
strikes
276 3,749 1,873 1,616 322 144
No of 
workers 
involved 
in
47,000 1,262,000 293,000 409,000 134,000 109,000
No of 
working 
days lost
72,000 6,947,000 5,401,000 6,351,000 4,487,000 1,308,000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002
No. of 
strikes
85 78 129 198 250 322
No. of 
workers 
involved 
in
79,000 43,991 146,000 92,000 177,969 93,000
No. of 
working 
days lost
892,000 444,720 1,452,000 1,366,000 1,893,563 1,580,000
Source: Ministry of Labour (1986-2004): White Paper on Labour
<Table 3-6> Statistics on industrial unions
1997 2002
No. of industrial unions 7 34
No. of members of the 
industrial unions
92,525 503,486
Ratio of total union 
members
6.2% 31.4%
Source: Ministry of Labour (1997-2004): White Paper on Labour
<Table 3-7> History of chan ges of union form in the Korean banking sector
1960 1961 1980 2000
Union Form Enterprise
Union
Industrial
Union
Enterprise
Union
Industrial
Union
Source: 40 Years History of KFI1J  (KFIU, 2001).
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CHAPTER 4. FINANCIAL CRISIS, 
RESTRUCTURING, AND CHANGES IN 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE KOREAN 
BANKING INDUSTRY
4.1. Introduction
By 1996, Korea had become the 11th biggest economy and the 12th largest trading 
country in the world. On becoming a member of the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development), an organization of the world’s most advanced 
countries, Korea received public recognition for its economic achievement.
However, in 1997, the very year it joined the OECD, Korea was declared bankrupt, a 
victim of the Asian foreign currency crisis. The Korean case is an example of the ‘Icarus 
Paradox’21 (Jung, BG and Han, CS., 1990). Although there were several hypotheses 
regarding the reasons for the Korean financial crisis, many economists agreed that the 
root causes were Korea’s internal economic structural problems and the impact of the 
Asian foreign currency crisis (Section 4.3.1). Booz-Allen & Hamilton’s report (1997) 
argued that the Korean economy had become a nut cracked between the China of cheap 
labour and the advanced countries of high technologies. The McKinsey Report (1998) 
noted that the productivity of Korean industry was just 51 percent of that of America. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) wrote, in agreeing to a rescue fund, that the 
crisis in Korea derived from fundamental defects in both the financial sector and the 
country’s enterprises (IMF, 1997).
As a consequence, the Government resolved to restructure the financial sector and 
enterprises in order to solve the economy’s structural problems. The result of this was
21 The Icarus Paradox refers to cases where a people or an organization, after experiencing extreme and 
rapid growth, fails because of their or its over-confidence. Icarus, a character in Greek mythology, was the 
son of Daedalus, architect of the labyrinth for Minos of Crete. Daedalus made wings of feathers and wax 
in order to escape to the mainland, and was successful. Icarus, however, flew too near the sun, which 
melted his wings, and he fell into the sea and drowned (Shin and Han, 1995: 22).
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overall changes in employment and industrial relationships in all Korean enterprises. 
The financial sector, especially, had to undergo extensive restructuring under new 
government plans because the Government had diagnosed that a main reason for the 
financial crisis had been the inflexibility of the industry and the sheer wrong­
headedness of some of its business practices.
The support of an IMF rescue fund was conditional upon the restructuring of financial 
institutions (i.e. restoring their soundness as businesses) and the introduction into the 
industry of greater labour flexibility. Therefore, first, many bankrupt financial 
institutions were closed and merged. Secondly, work reorganization was undertaken in 
all financial institutions. Thirdly, mass redundancy of regular employees occurred and 
the number of irregular employees increased rapidly. Fourthly, human resource 
management in the financial sector was radically changed as management strategy was 
transferred from the pursuit of quantity (i.e. market share) to the pursuit of quality based 
on profitability. In other words, financial institutions were restructured, using the twin 
strategies of cost saving and labour flexibility in order to propel performance. Fifthly, 
due to the pursuit of a labour flexibility strategy which included endless redundancy, the 
previous moderate industrial relationship was transformed into an increasingly militant 
one, with many disputes breaking out as unions sought to protect employees against the 
strategy.
The following chapter takes a detailed look at changes in the employment and industrial 
relationships in the banking sector since the 1997 financial crisis, the crisis itself, and 
the restructuring it precipitated.
4.2. Globalization and the Korean financial sector
4.2.1. Globalization factors in the financial industry
The financial industry has been globalized since the late 1960s. Three factors have 
driven this. These are 1) the increasing advance of Western capital beyond the West, 2) 
new technologies, and 3) deregulation. These factors tend to make financial institutions 
in different countries do business in similar ways. They have however been structured 
and mediated by national institutions, tending to give birth to nation-specific sectoral
61
governance regimes. The arrangement between the three forces of globalization and 
each national system provides a background against which convergence versus 
divergence occurs.
Let us look at the three factors in more detail. First, the activities of multinational 
companies and the international advance of financial institutions have increased 
markedly since the late 1960s. Of especial significance was the first oil crisis in the 
1970s. This prompted Western banks, which held a huge amount of oil capital, to invest 
in developing countries in Asia and South America in order to make more profits. In the 
1990s, even the financial institutions in the developing countries had tended to follow 
the way of the Western banks. For example, Korean financial institutions invested huge 
funds in the capital markets of South Asia and Russia, the so-called emerging markets, 
without enough knowledge or experience about the rules of the game of global financial 
markets. However, global financial integration has caused a lot of problems. It has 
given a one-sided victory to Western investors, who know the rules of the game better, 
instead of efficiently distributing the world’s financial resources.
Furthermore, global capital tends to move as a ‘block’, looking for profits. Thus, capital 
is invested in countries where there is a profitable prospect. The reverse is also true, 
with capital being withdrawn when prospects are gloomy. Therefore, countries that 
borrowed capital can suddenly fall into financial crisis; this is what happened to the 
Asian countries in 1997 (Son and Jung, 2001:31).
Secondly, due to the development of new technologies such as computers and dedicated 
software packages, financial skills have developed rapidly. Computerization has made it 
possible for financial institutions to operate (i.e. move capital more speedily around the 
world market) for 24 hours a day. The new technologies have enabled banks to make 
savings on working hours and operation costs, and to consolidate their operations by 
automating, rationalizing, and computerizing work processes. As a result, the new 
technologies have become an important factor in producing changes of work 
organization, employment security, and human resource management. The role of new 
technologies therefore has been a strong force of convergence across countries in the 
banking industry’s work methods and work processes (Cho, 2000a: 17).
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Thirdly, the deregulation of the financial industry has progressed across countries since 
the early 1980s when the economic system, neo-liberalism, with its emphasis on 
deregulation, emerged. As a consequence, the opening-up of markets and privatization 
in the banking sector became irrevocable global trends during the 1980s and 1990s. 
These ignited great market competition in domestic and overseas markets. Deregulation 
has been a massive influence on the restructuring of the financial sector in most 
countries. The deregulation of employment relations relates to the weakening of, or 
removal of, employment rules from the market, in order to give maximum scope to the 
forces of supply and demand in the setting of wages and the determining of levels of 
employment. It is a policy advocated by free-market economists and neo-liberalists, and 
is based on a conviction that regulation of the labour market promotes inefficiency and 
generates perverse effects (Lee and Kim, 2001: 88) (Table 4-1).
Yun (2001) argues that a leading actor who hastened the process of financial 
globalization through deregulation was the American Government. As America’s 
competitiveness decreased because of faster economic growth in Japan and Europe, the 
American Government adopted the strategy of further opening-up of the financial 
industry (i.e. that industry in which America was most competitive). The UK 
Government, traditionally a leading financial country, supported the American strategy. 
These strategies were a key part of what came to be known as Reaganism and 
Thatcherism. Moreover, financial globalization deepened the globalization of all levels 
of the international economy. One effect was that welfare policies around the world 
were vitiated because the free flow of capital weakened the autonomy of national 
economies, making it difficult for countries to pursue effective welfare policies (Yun, 
2001).
4.2.2. Deregulation in the Korean banking sector
The Korean Government has supported financial liberalization and an open-door policy 
in the financial market since the early 1980s. It was these policy decisions which made 
it necessary for the Korean financial market to become more efficient, and for Korean 
financial institutions to become more competitive in order that the country is able to 
survive (economically) in the era of financial globalization. There was also pressure 
placed on the Government from developed countries, such as the USA and the Western 
European countries, to open the financial market. It was in the interest of the developed
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countries to do so; enlarging their overseas market was good business for them, 
especially as the developing countries lacked the knowledge or the experience to reap 
the majority of the benefits. The developed countries were thus able to strengthen their 
control of the global economy.
The Korean Government pursued a policy of deregulation of the financial sector in 
order to progress financial liberalization in preference to the development policy it had 
supported in the past. In addition, the Government was motivated to promote efficiency 
and competitiveness as the financial industry entered a new era of international 
competition. First, it supported the privatization of retail banks in order to promote their 
(the banks') autonomous management. Several banks, such as Han IL Bank (1981), 
Seoul Bank (1982), Jae IL Bank (1982), and Cho Hung Bank (1983), were privatized.
Secondly, the Government permitted the establishment of banks with foreign investors 
as partners as part of an open-door policy. As a result, Shin Han Bank (1982) entered 
into partnership with Japanese investors and Han Mi Bank (1983) joined with American 
investors.
Thirdly, the Government permitted new entrants into the banking sector in order to 
promote competition. New banks, such as Dong Hya Bank (1989), Dong Nam Bank 
(1989), Dea Dong Bank (1989), Ha Na Bank and Bo Ram Bank (1991), and Pyung Hya 
Bank (1992) were therefore established; the number of retail banks increased from 15 in 
1980 to 26 in 1997.
Fourthly, the Government relaxed restrictions on the trade of foreign capital and foreign 
currency, and permitted both foreign investment in the stock market and overseas 
investment by national financial institutions in order to promote international trade of 
capital and currency. However, this relaxation of restrictions exacerbated the 1997 
financial crisis; simultaneously, much foreign capital was withdrawn and domestic 
financial institutions made big losses on their overseas investments.
Fifthly, many governmental restrictions on financial institutions were removed (or 
relaxed) in order to reduce the Government’s involvement in the industry.
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Sixthly, the Government allowed banks to increase capital and the number of branches 
in order to strengthen the competitiveness, and the enlargement, of financial institutions.
Lastly, the Government introduced legislation which facilitated reform (largely via 
extensive restructuring of the financial industry) at the time of the 1997 financial crisis; 
this was a necessary condition of its application to the IMF for rescue funds (Son, 2001) 
(Table 4-2). As a result, many bankrupt banks were closed and merged, and large 
numbers of employees were made redundant (Table 4-10).
However, financial liberalization led to a number of problems, often because financial 
institutions, accustomed to governmental control, simply possessed neither the 
knowledge nor the experience to survive and prosper in an open market. Many still 
expected government support and intervention. For example, despite the rapid increase 
in the number of enterprises being made insolvent in early 1997, banks were reluctant to 
act because they still believed that the Government would, as they had in the past, solve 
their problems. In addition, the inefficiency of the supervision of the industry remained 
although financial risks increased as financial liberalization, due to globalization, 
progressed. The Korean financial industry was thus very vulnerable to external shocks; 
the possibility of a financial crisis in Korea might have been foreseen (Lee and Kim, 
2001: 87-140)'.
4.3. Financial crisis and restructuring
4.3.1. Reasons for the financial crisis
There are several theories regarding the reasons for the financial crisis in Korea. First, 
proponents of the impact theory argue that it occurred as a result of the rapid 
redemption of foreign currency loans following the Southeast Asian foreign currency 
crisis (Park, 1998: 46). Secondly, supporters of the policies failure theory argue that it 
was due to the Government’s mismanagement of foreign exchange policy, financial 
liberalization, and financial supervision (Park and Choi, 1998: 3). Thirdly, those who 
favour the structural problem theory argue that long-existing structural problems in the 
Korean economy meant that it was especially ill-equipped to handle an external crisis 
(Kim, 1998: 46; Lee and Kim, 2001: 87). Fourthly, there are conspiracy theorists who
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argue that there was a conspiracy of foreign hedge funds concerned solely with profit 
maximization through the manipulation of “forward exchange market22” (Choi, 1998; 
The Economist, 1998). However, the majority of Korean scholars agree that the crisis 
was caused by internal structural problems in the Korean financial sector as well as the 
external influence of the Southeast Asian foreign currency crisis.
Looking back, one can see that it was not one single event, but a number. These were: 1. 
chain bankruptcies of conglomerates from early 1997 onwards; 2. rapid growth of bad 
credits in the financial sector; 3. decline in solvency of financial institutions; 4. rapid 
fall of foreign confidence; 5. failure of expiration renewal of foreign currency debt, and; 
6. impact of foreign currency crisis in other Southeast Asian countries.
Let us describe the progress of the Korean financial crisis in more detail. From January 
1997 chain bankruptcies, due partly to flaws in the country’s financial infrastructure and 
partly to the declining profitability of middle-class conglomerates, such as Han Bo, Sam 
Mi, Jin Ro, Dae Nong, and Kia had been declared. These chain bankruptcies led to an 
increase in the number of bad credits in the financial institutions. As a result, foreign 
confidence in those institutions declined rapidly. In addition, the shortage of foreign 
currency that had begun to affect several financial institutions since early 1997 was 
getting worse, due, chiefly, to the influence of the mid-1997 foreign currency crisis in 
other Southeast Asian countries, particularly in Thailand and Indonesia.
Therefore, the rate of expiration renewal of foreign currency debts decreased rapidly as 
foreign financial institutions began to retrieve loans. When several financial institutions 
faced bankruptcy because of foreign debts, the Government made up the shortage by 
supplying the institutions with money from the national reserve of foreign currency. As 
a result, this reserve ran speedily dry, causing a national foreign currency crisis.
One of the reasons that Korean banks could not competently manage such risks was that 
they had been forced to play a role as an auxiliary industry to, mainly, the
22 A foreign-exchange market in which currencies are traded for exchange at a future date. The seller, by 
buying and selling exchanges for future delivery, makes a market and earns his living partly from the 
profit he makes by selling at a higher price than that at which he buys and partly by speculation (Pallister 
and Isaacs (2003: 223).
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manufacturing industry for a long time; in other words, they were not regarded, or 
managed as, an independent industry. Although the quantitative growth (total sales or 
market share) of the banking sector continued, like the economy, to grow rapidly, the 
banks were not concerned with the pursuit of profitability. In the process of industrial 
development, the Bank of Korea had made a special loan to banks whenever they were 
suffering as a result of enterprises being declared bankrupt. This ensured that banks 
never failed. Therefore, banks were lazy in their assessment of the credit status of 
customers. Banks mainly provided loans to conglomerates that had a high ratio of debt, 
yet which were recognized as too big to fail, rather than superior small firms that had 
the potential to make profits. As a result, the asset soundness of many banks was 
becoming more and more fragile as the years passed.
The structural problems of banks can be summarized as follows. First, they could not 
establish a responsible management system because of the Government’s control and 
over-protection; in other words they had no incentive to manage themselves 
responsibly. Therefore, they had serious business problems (e.g. the aforementioned 
weakness of credit examination, a dependence on collateral, an inclination to place too 
much faith in conglomerates, and the external pressure, from the Government and the 
conglomerates, to lend). Banks also had no say in firms’ investment decisions, nor could 
they curb those firms’ excessive dependence on loans.
Secondly, the banks’ ability to manage foreign currency was poor. This caused a foreign 
currency liquidity problem when banks were exposed to the excessive risk associated 
with a major external impact, such as the Asian foreign currency crisis. Due to the 
deregulation of the financial industry and the capital liberalization policy by the 
Government, the banks, never well managed in the first place, found their difficulties 
compounded as they enlarged their foreign currency business without, however, 
possessing an adequate knowledge of the management of risk or liquidity. Furthermore, 
the expiration imbalance of foreign currency assets and debts became a very serious 
issue because banks borrowed foreign currency in the short term, and lent it in the long 
term. In sum, structural problems in the Korean financial sector were a main contributor 
to the financial crisis (Table 4-3).
As the Government believed that structural problems within the financial industry were 
the main cause of crisis within that industry, the focus of its remedy was reformation of
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the sector. The Government therefore announced a series of measures aimed at 
stabilizing the financial market, and requested a relief loan from the IMF. As part of the 
terms of relief loan support from the IMF the Government agreed on comprehensive 
restructuring plans. The agreement with the IMF consisted mainly of reforms of the 
financial sector; these included the closure and merger and acquisition (M&A) of 
financial institutions that had no other chance of recovery. The agreement also 
contained plans for labour market reform; such reforms included the introduction of 
regulations to allow employers to dismiss permanent workers for managerial reasons 
and to use workers from outsourcing companies in order to increase the flexibility of the 
labour market, and thus ease the restraints employers believed were inherent in having a 
large, permanent workforce. Employees in the financial sector, faced with the prospect 
of mass redundancies, were understandably opposed to the agreement (Park, 1998; Park 
and Choi, 1998; Kim, 1998; Choi, 1998; Lee and Kim, 2001).
4.3.2. Restructuring of the banking sector and input of public funds
The Korean banking sector has been extensively restructured since the 1997 crisis. In 
the process, many financial institutions that had excessive bad loans or were exposed to 
extreme risks were closed. Although there had been a legend that banks never fail (until, 
of course, 1997), the number of retail banks decreased from 26, in 1997, to 14, in 2002, 
as a result of closures and mergers. On 29 June 1998, the business of five banks, Dae 
Dong Bank, Dong Nam Bank, Dong Hya Bank, Chung Chyung Bank, and Kyung Ki 
Bank, whose Capital Adequacy Ratio23 (CAR), according to the Bank for International 
Settlements’ (BIS) standard, was under eight percent, and had no possibility of 
management normalization, was undertaken by other banks (Kook Min Bank, Housing 
Bank, Shin Han Bank, Ha Na Bank and Han Mi Bank) by the P&A24 (purchases and 
assumption) method (Table 4-6). The following mergers subsequently took place: Kook 
Min Bank and JangGi Bank (1998), SangiYup Bank and Hanll Bank (1998), Ha Na 
Bank and Bo Lam Bank (1998), and Cho Hung Bank, Chung Puk Bank and Kang Won 
Bank (1999). Furthermore, Jae IL Bank was purchased by New Bridge Capital, a
23 Capital adequacy refers to the ability of a bank to meet the needs of their depositors and other creditors 
in terms of available funds. The Bank for International Settlement (BIS) requires them to maintain eight 
percent of their risk-adjusted assets as capital. This is known as the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR).
4 P&A is a merger method in which the Government transfers the property and debt of a bankrupt bank 
to a ‘superior’ bank in order to dispose of the bankrupt bank easily. Then Government then takes charge 
of other processes of liquidation, including responsibility for employees. P&A is easier (for buyers) than 
the M&A method in that in the latter case the ‘superior’ bank is responsible for the entire process.
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foreign financial institution. These mergers were the outcome of the so-called first 
restructuring of financial institutions by the Government in 1998/99.
Since the second restructuring began, in 2000, there have been further mergers: Kook 
Min Bank and Housing Bank (2001), Han Bit Bank and Pyung Hya Bank (2001), and 
Ha Na Bank and Seoul Bank (2002) (Table 4-6). In addition, financial holding 
companies, such as the Woo Li financial holding company, were established in 
accordance with new legislation.
Since 1997, the Government has had to commit a large level of public funding to the 
financial sector in order to finance restructuring. According to the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy, the Government had invested £41 billion for the restructuring of banking 
sector (£68 billion for the whole financial sector) up till March 2001 (Table 4-4). This 
public money has mostly been dedicated to normalizing the functions of financial 
institutions, and to assisting the financial market in recovering its stability. Seven banks 
were nationalized (Table 4-5); the Government has since tried to privatize them in order 
to recover the money spent on restructuring.
4.3.3. The Korean financial industry after restructuring
As a result of restructuring, there have been many important changes in the banking 
sector. The main, early ones were as follows. First, there was a solution to the problem 
of excessive competition between banks. The number of retail banks decreased from 26, 
in 1997, to 14, in 2002. This reduction is attributable to the fact that banks whose 
financial situation was so bad as to be commercially unsustainable were either closed or 
merged with other banks. This situation was in direct contrast to the past when the 
number of banks had increased constantly due to the long-lasting healthy development 
of the economy. In the past, the Government had authorized (excessively) the addition 
of new banks to the sector. Despite the presence of so much competition the banking 
industry (even in such a healthy economy) remained inefficient. Accordingly, the 
process of restructuring after the financial crisis presented the Government with an 
opportunity to address systemic problems that had been accumulating in the financial 
sector for a long time.
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Secondly, there was the creation of larger banks. In the process of the restructuring of 
the banking sector, the superior (i.e. more efficient and more profitable) banks became 
bigger, chiefly through mergers, while unhealthy banks were acquired by their better- 
run competitors. The larger-sized banks can improve profitability and efficiency, and 
increase competitiveness through the effect of scale economics. In other words, the 
larger institutions are able to both increase their market share and reduce their costs. In 
addition, they can improve the effectiveness of the financial industry if they can play a 
leading role in the restructuring process, pricing decisions, and risk management; 
smaller financial institutions usually follow the market leaders.
Thirdly, there was the advance of universal banking, in the form of financial holding 
companies. The Government introduced financial holding company legislation in 2000, 
the purpose being to encourage universal banking by supporting the establishment of 
such holding companies. As a result, several of them, such as Shin Han Holding 
Company and Woo Ri Holding Company, were created. A financial holding company is 
a kind of financial conglomerate comprising various financial organizations, such as a 
bank, an insurance company, and a securities company; the holding company holds the 
individual companies’ stocks. The holding company can pursue universal banking 
through a cooperative system between the affiliated companies. It can therefore 
strengthen its position in the financial market, reduce costs, and disperse risk through 
the removal of dual functions and the sharing of information.
Fourthly, there was the reform of bank governance. The Government reformed the 
function of the bank board of directors by making it law that the majority of directors 
must be from outside the company (i.e. not part of the daily management). Furthermore, 
the board of directors, representing the interests of shareholders, has had more extensive 
supervisory powers over bank management.
Fifthly, there was the reform of credit practice. Since 1997, advanced credit 
management systems have been introduced in order to reform some of the previous 
credit practices that were held to be contributory reasons for the financial crisis. They 
include advanced credit assessment techniques, such as the Credit Scoring System, the 
division of the roles, Relationship Manager and Credit Officer, and the introduction of 
the Loan Review System. In addition, each bank was required to establish an
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independent risk management department, which had to check the sales department as 
well as comprehensively manage credit, market, interest, and liquidity risk.
Lastly, there was the pursuit of performance. Banks introduced both a performance pay 
system (or, more accurately, one that combines both performance and seniority) and a 
divisional organization system in order to maximize profitability. [In the past, the banks 
had had a pay system based entirely on seniority and a functional organization system.] 
The chief of division is responsible for the efficient and effective management of his/her 
division. The purpose of these changes was to improve profitability and to encourage a 
performance culture (Son and Jung, 2001: 53-9).
4.4. Work Reorganization
4.4.1. Introduction
Following the financial crisis, banks have reorganized their workplaces with a view to 
maximizing profitability. This section looks at that work reorganization in detail, 
reviewing the change of organization form toward divisional organization, the 
fragmentation of branch business, the use of call centres, and the application of new 
technologies for cost minimization and customization.
4.4.2. Divisional organization
In 1997, banks began to reorganize themselves along divisional lines. This replaced the 
former functional organization. The new focus was on the differentiation of customers 
(i.e. customization). In addition, the banks introduced more responsible management, by 
devolving decision-making to the divisions.
Previously, the functional organization in banks had meant that they were generally 
divided into departments having similar and related businesses. In other words,
25 Risk Management: the control of an individual's or company's chances of losing on an investment. 
Managing risks can involve taking out insurance against a loss, hedging a loan against interest-rate rises, 
and protecting an investment against a fall in interest rates. A bank will always try to manage the risks 
involved in lending by adjusting the level of charges and interest rates to compensate for a percentage of 
losses.
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departments had specialist functions (e.g. personnel department, sales department, 
financial department, examination department, etc). One of the merits of functional 
organization is that problems related to a specialist area (such as training) yet which 
affect the whole organization can be discussed and resolved by experts in one place. 
However, it has problems when the size of the organization grows. The structure of the 
department becomes unwieldy and complicated, and the decision process can be 
delayed. As a result, it can be difficult for management to effectively control. Therefore, 
functional organization was regarded as structurally defective for an organization which 
wished to encourage employees to concentrate on sales and, therefore, profits (Lee and 
Kitay, 2002: 122).
Consequently, banks changed their organizational form from functional to divisional 
after the financial crisis. With the focus now on creating a sales mentality among staff 
and pursuing profit, banks divided their central organization into two divisions based on 
customers, a personal customer division and an enterprise customer division. Individual 
branches were also divided along these lines. Shin Han Bank and Foreign Exchange 
Bank went further, separating the enterprise customer division into general and big 
enterprise customer divisions. In effect, regional branch offices comprise two branches, 
one which serves personal customers, and another which serves firms. Shin Han Bank 
was the first to introduce divisional organization, in 1998. Since then, it has also been 
introduced in Woo Ri Bank (1999), Cho Hung Bank (1999), Foreign Exchange Bank 
(1999), Kook Min Bank (2001), and Jae II Bank (2002) (Interviews by author with 
union officers and bank personnel managers, November 2003).
Shin Han Bank’s 2003 annual report illustrates this changed structure well.
The bank has three individual divisions dedicated to sales, a personal 
customer division, a general enterprise customer division, and a big 
enterprise customer division. Each branch of the bank is also separated 
into the three divisional branches, each of which has its own chief who 
conducts his/her business independently of the other branches. Previously, 
the branches undertook all functions within a branch, sales, cash accounts 
[transactions], credit, foreign exchange, and general affairs (2004).
The divisional organization gives a chief of division independent management authority 
and the control of almost all business in the division, from development of new 
products, to sales, to even personnel management. On the other hand, the chief of 
division is also responsible for management results. In addition to independence, an
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advantage of this structure is that decisions can be made, and acted upon, quickly. 
However, it must be remembered that branches are not fully autonomous, and there may 
be occasional discord between the activities of a division and those of the bank as a 
whole.
Due to the introduction of divisional organization, employees had to be assigned to a 
particular division. Problems arose when there was a conflict between employees’ 
professional skills and ambitions and the positions (i.e. the part of the branch to which 
they were assigned) which they suddenly found themselves in.
As each division assumes responsibility for results, it has been found that sales divisions 
are reluctant to take staff no longer required in non-sales divisions. The reason is that 
the staff member may not have enough sales ability to justify his/her salary. In addition, 
co-operation between the personal and firm customer divisions is also declining as 
competition between them accelerates.
4.4.3. Fragmentation of branch business
Since 1997, the business of bank branches has been divided in two - front business, 
which is conducted in the branch office itself, and includes functions such as sales and 
paying-in and paying-out, and back business, conducted either in central offices or call 
centres, which includes functions such as filing of customer information, management 
of performance, consultations by telephone, and monitoring of customer calls - as banks 
have pursued a strategy of sales maximization, in branch offices, and cost minimization 
through new-Taylorism, in one of the aforementioned back business offices (Lee and 
Kitay, 2002: 122).
The development of new technology has enabled banks to carry out a series of changes. 
For instance, branch officers can now access automated records instead of going into a 
back office and finding a paper copy of a customer’s account. They can also perform 
preliminary data entry during the transaction with customers. The centralization of 
processing work in large, separate back offices became possible through all the 
advantages of high throughput and specialization, and the abilities of Taylorized 
production regimes.
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In the past, bank branches were bureaucratic organizations that dealt with all kinds of 
business in an office. Some branches employed more than 100 staff. A branch was a 
kind of small bank, with the branch chief playing the role of bank chief. However, 
branch chiefs are now like the chiefs of convenience stores, and all branches have 
become sales counters. In other words, branch employees have come to be redefined as 
sales staff, branches redefined as sales outlets, and the branches themselves relocated 
from their traditional High Street settings to shopping malls or, increasingly, as ‘micro’ 
branches located in supermarkets and other large retail outlets (A personnel manager of 
Kook Min Bank).
The situation in branches has, in some respects, become complicated. Even though the 
physical separation of front business and back business inherently entails greater 
specialization, conversely a degree of deskilling has also undoubtedly taken place in 
some positions. In some cases, the demise of the branch employee with a lull range of 
banking skills does, indeed, mean that jobs are more routine, and require less skill (or, a 
smaller range of skills). In other cases, however, branch staff are expected to be able to 
perform all kinds of front office tasks, and need to possess the traditional banking skills
0
of performing quick and accurate transactions. Furthermore, conducting sales business 
undoubtedly requires new skills, although staff now receive help from prepared scripts 
and computerized customer profiles.
If no common trends can be identified in the skill requirements of banking jobs, the 
same cannot be said for work intensification. Back office work in central processing 
areas is subject to the efficiencies of large volumes of standardized work, and most 
banks set branch staffing levels using sophisticated computer models. Employees 
commonly view the results as chronic understaffing.
Pressures on staff have also mounted with the introduction of sales targets for branches 
and individual employees. Computerization’s information-sharing potential can be used 
not only for providing branch staff with financial records, but also for keeping 
management informed of the outcomes of customer interactions. Tellers are expected to 
make referrals to customer service staff to sell products. Although branch officers 
previously reported to higher management in terms of months, they can now be 
monitored in (close to) real time, down to individual work positions. A common theme 
in this regard is that not only do employees have little input into the level at which their
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targets are set, but also targets are frequently moved - usually higher - before they can 
realistically be achieved.
4.4.4. New-Taylorism
One of the most important developments for work rationalization in the banking 
industry has been the establishment of call centres, operated as a kind of assembly line. 
Call centres use Computer Telephony Integration (CTI), the integration of telephone 
and Visual Display Unit (VDU) technologies. Work in a call centre is mainly composed 
of inbound operation and outbound operation. Central to the former is the Automated 
Call Distribution (ACD) system that receives incoming calls and automatically channels 
them to waiting operators according to pre-programmed instructions (Taylor and Bain, 
1999: 102).
In the case of outbound operation, concerned largely with telesales or telemarketing, the 
Predictive Dialing System (PDS) works its way through databases of customers’ phone 
numbers, and, in accordance with programmed requirements, automatically dials the 
number, connecting operator to customer. Prior to, or at the precise moment of 
connection, the relevant customer details appear on the screen, enabling the employees 
to make informed communication. In outbound operation, the onus is placed on the 
employee to either sell, or create interest in, a particular product or service. However, 
the simple inbound/outbound dichotomy is becoming inapplicable . in call centres 
because operators, when dealing with incoming queries, are also required to attempt to 
sell from a menu of products (Ibid: 108).
Through these automation processes of operation in the call centres, it is possible to 
optimize the number of people taking calls to the size of demand. In other words, 
whenever an operator finishes a call from a customer, the next call is automatically 
delivered to the operator without any slack time. Calls keep being fed to the worker like 
yet-to-assembled parts of vehicles, which keep coming through a conveyor belt in an 
auto factory. Workers in call centres have to expect or associate endlessly coming calls 
in their mind as soon as they finish a call. That is why operators have to have ‘an 
assembly line’ in their heads (Ibid: 109).
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Where the processing business has been removed from branches and centralized in call 
centres, specialization has increased concomitantly as branch staff can concentrate on 
sales and transactions, while even call centre staff can concentrate on processing. 
However, the Taylorization of jobs can cause particular problems in processing centres; 
these include low-trust relations, dissatisfaction, and conflict between managers and 
operators derived from notoriously poor working conditions. Many operators in the call 
centres share a dislike for the new sales model, preferring, instead, the routine of the 
back office to the requirement to sell products. They frequently find the latter to be 
intrusive and distasteful.
As a result, the fiercely competitive environment and the demanding labour process, 
combined with labour market pressures, are generating a series of profound problems 
for employers. First, demotivated, stressed staff are less capable of sensitive and 
responsive interaction with customers even though the role of call centres has shifted 
from simple inquiry handling to value-adding business, such as product sales and 
customer relationship management. Secondly, many call centres experience high levels 
of staff turnover due to the intrinsic pressures of the job and the flat organizational 
structures which mean that operators cannot anticipate promotion opportunities (Ibid: 
110 and Tables 4-17 and 4-20). Annual turnover rates are now over 20 percent (Lee, 
2000) because operators are constantly looking for alternative employment possibilities 
\  providing better salaries and working conditions.
A 2003 KFIU survey of irregular employees (Tables. 4-7 and 4-11-4-21) reveals, in 
detail, the situation in Korean bank call centres. Looking at the specific situation of the 
Kook Min Bank call centres the number of staff, as at June 2003, was 1,580, 1,430 of 
whom were irregular staff. Of these, 1,350 were consultants and 80 were supervisors. 
The former were divided into inbound consultants, who dealt with customer inquiries, 
and outbound consultants, responsible for sales of financial products and credit cards. 
The ratio of inbound consultants to outbound consultants was 4:1. Supervisors are in 
charge of the consultants. Regular staffs in the call centres were responsible for back 
business, such as the filing of customer information, management of performance, 
planning, training, and monitoring of customer calls. Call centres were operated as a 
form of bank branch. Other banks in Korea operate their call centres in a similar way. 
However, Cho Hung Bank and Foreign Exchange Bank have outsourced their call 
centre operations to their subsidiaries (Table 4-7).
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4.4.5. New customization
The development of new information technology has enabled banks to undertake mass 
customization to a degree that was unimaginable in the past. Mass customization may 
be defined as a new effective way of service delivery designed to meet customers’ 
diversified demands for services on a massive scale in terms of shortened lead-time, 
punctuality, prioritization, and convenience. Pine and Joseph (1993) note that mass 
customization has been extensively adopted in the service sector. Macdonald and 
Carmen (1996) argue that customers often intervene in services production to a more or 
less degree because services are produced in the interactive processes between 
customers and service workers. It is related largely to frontline workers who contact 
customers directly rather than to back office workers.
Customization in the banking sector is being constantly developed. Since 1997, Korean 
banks have pursued a strategy of customer differentiation. They now allocate more time 
and personnel to profitable customers than to general customers. As for effective 
customer differentiation, banks have developed customer relation and risk management 
skills such as the Credit Scoring System (CSS) and Customer Relation Management 
(CRM). In addition, banks offer a ‘One-stop Service’, in which staff deal with a wide 
range of services with the customer on the spot. This effective customization is made 
possible by the fact that the staff member can have immediate access — via computer -  
to all the relevant information about a customer.
The customization of service delivery -  the means include Automatic Teller Machines 
(ATMs), call centres, and Internet banking -  has also gradually developed as banks 
have pursued their competitive advantages through the provisions of more responsive 
services (Table 4-9).
Above all, it is the customers’ increasingly sophisticated demands for services and 
products, coupled with their pursuit of convenience, which have underpinned 
customization. Berry et al. (1994) argue that competitive advantages lay in firms’ 
abilities to provide customers with both diversified services tailored for individual tastes 
and high standards of reliability and responsiveness.
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Differentiation of service
Banks use differentiated customization strategies according to customers’ differing 
levels of contribution to bank profits. Thus, more resources are devoted to wealthier 
customers. The introduction of divisional organization immediately identified which 
customers were individuals and which were organizations. The enterprise customers’ 
branch includes staff with the title, Relation Manager (RM). RMs take charge of several 
firms and provide a one-stop service for them, offering advice on loans as well as doing 
credit assessments.
A branch division responsible for personal customers also provides differentiated 
services, according to the size of the customer’s actual and potential contribution to 
bank profitability. There are generally three counters in a branch for personal customers, 
a counter for simple paying-in and paying-out, a counter for one-stop service, and a 
counter for superior customers (i.e. those who have a deposit of more than £25,000). 
Banks position irregular employees (who receive a lower wage than regular employees) 
as tellers at the counter(s) for simple paying-in and paying-out, and which requires an 
ability to deal with business quickly and accurately. On the other hand, regular staff are 
employed at the counter(s) for one-stop service; these staff deal with customers’ 
problems, products sales, and the opening of new accounts. Staff at the counter(s) for 
superior customers are known as ‘Private Bankers’ (PBs); they provide support on all 
the financial services offered by the bank. The arrangements for personal customers can 
vary. The Shin Han Bank has three counters for personal customers, a ‘Fast counter’ for 
simple business, an ‘OK counter’ for one-stop service, and a ‘PB counter’ for superior 
customers. Each Kook Min Bank branch has four counters, a ‘One-line counter’ for 
simple business, a ‘Product sales counter’ for one-stop service and product sales, a ‘PB 
counter’ for superior customers, and a ‘Soho counter’ for self-employed persons (2003 
Annual Reports of Shin Han Bank and Kook Min Bank).
These differentiated services are evidence of a development in customization. However, 
not all customers are pleased. Banks are losing the trust of more general personal 
customers, who are experiencing worse service than they received in the past.
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New techniques for customization
Banks have actively used new tools in order to analyze new business opportunities and 
to provide better customer service according to customers’ tastes and needs. They have 
also needed new skills to manage and analyze the huge volumes of data captured by 
their systems. The objective has been to get the right information, to the right people, 
and at the right time, in order to carry out a number of critical business activities and 
provide better customer service. Therefore, they have recently adopted new marketing 
measures, such as Customer Relation Management (CRM) and the Credit Scoring 
System (CSS). These new techniques for customization enable banks to exploit 
changing and widening markets, to implement a customer-centric approach, to 
concentrate on financial budgeting, cost control, and risk management, and to figure out 
new ways to minimize costs, while increasing profitability and shareholder value.
Customer Relation Management (CRM)
Finding and keeping customers is the heart of bank business. In recent years, the 
concept of Customer Relation Management (CRM) has been developed as a way for 
businesses to approach customer relations systematically and efficiently. Of course, 
business has always had relationships with customers. What is new about CRM is the 
focus on actively managing customer relations in an organized and strategic manner. In 
practice, it means developing a company’s internal operations, software and Internet 
capabilities so that its customer relationships can become more profitable. For example, 
a company could use CRM to track key customer information, such as accounts, buying 
histories, and preferences so that it can match customer needs with product plans and 
offerings.
CRM has many potential benefits. It can help companies identify their best customers, 
enrich and individualize customer contact, manage marketing campaigns, reduce 
customer response times, and serve wide geographical regions. All in all, it can help to 
build long-term, profitable customer relations. CRM is important because, 
fundamentally, it is cheaper and more efficient to retain your existing customers than to 
find new ones (www.bba.org.uk. 21 July 2003). For example, the Han Mi Bank 
recognized that just seven percent of its customers contributed to 90 percent of the 
bank’s total profit. The bank thus realized that to remain constantly in profit it needed to 
prioritize, and focus on these customers. The bank first identifies existing superior 
customers and potential superior customers through data analysis. The bank then
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appoints a PB for each superior customer in order to manage the customers 
continuously and create more profit from them. The bank also nominates a particular 
caller (from a group whose job it is) to phone potential superior customers regularly, 
with the aim of inducing them to become superior customers (ciokorea.com.21 July
2003).
Banks mainly use direct mail (DM) and the telephone as the methods to contact 
customers. Usually, after analyzing customers’ individual needs, the bank will first mail 
information about appropriate products and/or services to a customer. Later, the bank’s 
telemarketers will call the customers and attempt to sell them the product(s) and/or 
service(s) (crmpark.com.21 July 2003).
Credit Scoring System (CSS)
All banks in Korea now use a CSS in order to make quick decisions on customer loans. 
The active use of a CSS became possible once all staff members had been supplied with 
their own personal computer. Staff can now make a decision on whether or not to 
approve a loan while they have a conversation with the customer. Prior to the 
introduction of the CSS, banks made decisions on personal loans by recourse to such 
simple standards as the customer’s annual income or a jobs rating table. However, the 
CSS is a system that calculates loan amounts according to the credit scoring of the 
customer. The score is calculated by referring to all the information about a customer’s 
credit (e.g. income, job, financial situation, and history of financial transactions). The 
CSS makes it possible to reduce costs through effective risk management and a system 
assessment by a devised system mechanism. In addition, it is easier to please a customer 
if a decision is made quickly. The CSS is divided into die Application Scoring System 
(ASS) and the Behaviour Scoring System (BSS).
The ASS is a system that predicts future credit by an assessment of the applicant’s 
current information. It is used when a customer applies for a credit card or a loan. The 
BSS is a system that protects credit accidents and predicts the possibility of a customer 
being declared bankrupt through a check of a customer’s credit history. The BSS is 
mainly used to develop differentiated strategies to attract credit card customers, based, 
as the name suggests, on their behaviour.
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“Credit scoring is a technique used to access a customer’s ability to run their financial 
affairs. Credit scoring uses information from the bank’s own records, although it may 
also include data received from credit reference agencies. The system helps banks make 
decisions about opening accounts and granting credit. Credit scoring uses statistical 
techniques to measure the likelihood that a customer applying for credit will be a good 
credit risk" (www.bba.org.uk).
The CSS works through the process of data mining analysis that is aimed at delineating 
client behaviour profiles, in order to measure the probability of their purchasing a new 
product or service or, conversely, the possibility that they will take their custom 
elsewhere. The fundamental prerequisites needed to reach these aims are: an appropriate 
technological infrastructure, a data environment for marketing analysis, and a 
methodological knowledge for data analysis.
Diversification of delivery outlets
New technology has also enabled the diversification of delivery channels for banking 
services. Customers no longer need to enter a branch to conduct business. Simple 
transactions can be performed using electronic means such as Automatic Teller 
Machines (ATM)26, Electronic Fund Transfer at the Point of Sale (EFTPOS)27, Internet 
banking, and mobile banking, significantly reducing the staff and property costs 
associated with branches and allowing customers the convenience of 24-hour banking. 
It has become unnecessary for branches to deal with customer inquiries, as call centres 
have been established to handle a high volume of calls.
Customers have been encouraged to change their behaviour, from entering branches to 
using the new low cost channels. Where they have proved reluctant to do so voluntarily 
-  particularly those who value the opportunity to speak face-to-face with a bank 
employee -  banks have introduced fee structures with incentives to use the lowest-cost 
mode of delivery and penalties for transactions carried out in branches. As a result, the 
use of call centres, Internet banking, and mobile banking is increasing rapidly.
26 ATM (or Cash Dispenser): A computerized machine usually attached to the outside wall of a High 
Street bank or placed in convenient places for customers that enables customers to withdraw cash from 
their current accounts, especially outside normal banking hours.
27 EFTPOS Automatic debiting of a purchase price from the customer’s bank or credit card account by a 
computer link between the checkout till and the bank or credit card company.
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According to the Bank of Korea, the ratio of Internet banking to the full range of 
banking services in commercial banks rose from 23.2 percent, in 2002, to 30.4 percent, 
in 2003. On the other hand, the ratios of counter service decreased from 29 percent, in 
2002, to 26.7 percent, in 2003, and of ATM services, from 32.9 percent to 28.6 percent. 
The number of customers using mobile banking, begun in 2002, increased from 1.1 
million, in that year, to 2.56 million, in 2003 (Figure. 4-1). The main reasons for the 
increased use of new channels are their inexpensiveness and convenience.
<Figure 4-l> Ratio of Business in Korean retail banks according to delivery outlets
Series 1 —■—  Series2 - - a- - • Series3
_ A 30,4
♦ 28,6
26,7
a 23,2
Series 1: CD/AMT. Series 2: Counter Series 3: Internet Banking
1. 1: 12.2002 2: 12.2003
2. Source: The Current Situation of the Use of Internet Banking (Bank of Korea,
2004).
4.5. Changes of employment relationship
4.5.1. Introduction
As we have seen, following the 1997 financial crisis, the Government carried out an 
extensive restructuring of the financial sector based upon its diagnosis that the Korean 
financial crisis derived from structural problems within the industry. The restructuring 
focused on establishing the financial soundness of the sector’s institutions. Therefore,
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the closure of bankrupt financial institutions, mergers of banks, and personnel 
restructuring (i.e. redundancies and the use of irregular employees) in all financial 
institutions, was carried out endlessly, in order to reduce costs and to attain labour 
flexibility. In addition, banks have refocused their management strategy, from a growth 
in quantity through the increase of market share to a growth in quality centred on 
profitability. Due to this change, human resource management in the banks (i.e. 
evaluation and pay systems, and recruitment and education methods) has also been 
dramatically revised. This section looks at the changes in the employment relationship 
in detail.
4.5.2. Employment security
4.5.2.1. Reduction of regular employment
Since the financial crisis in 1997, banks have shed regular staff through endless 
redundancy. The number of regular staff decreased from 113,994, in 1997, to 66,881, in 
2002 (Table 4-10). One of the roots of this policy lies in the IMF (to whom the Korean 
Government had applied for assistance) requirement (as a condition of the rescue fund) 
that steps be taken to improve labour market flexibility. As a response, President-elect 
Kim Dae Jung established the Presidential Tripartite Commission. In February 1998, the 
Commission reached an agreement to allow enterprises to offer redundancies when they 
were absolutely unavoidable, as in cases of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), or a 
firm’s imminent financial crisis. As a result, confrontations between unions and 
management regarding redundancies escalated as unemployment increased rapidly 
(Table 4-10).
There were internal reasons for the financial crisis in Korea that can largely be 
explained by corporate misbehaviour and government negligence. Enterprises, including 
some of Korea’s key multinational companies and financial institutions, borrowed too 
much money from both internal and external financial institutions and invested in too 
many industries at home and abroad. However, it is also true that the Korean banking 
sector itself functioned ineffectively in the market (Park, 1998: 11). Excessive corporate 
investment indebtedness would not have occurred if the financial intermediaries had 
played their proper roles, that is, if they had made critical assessments about the 
profitability of investments and the risks inherent in corporate finance. Furthermore, if 
the Government had properly played its role as a rule setter, regulator and supervisor,
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rather than promoter and grantor (often informally), the financial institutions would 
have been able to monitor and manage risks. Instead, most banks in Korea took it for 
granted that the Government would protect them from any possible debt crisis.
The aftermath of the crisis required the recapitalization of financial institutions with 
public funds, which led to the de facto nationalization of a number of Korean banks. By 
the end of first and second round of Korea’s bank restructuring in June 2001, £41 billion 
of public funds had been spent, 12 banks had closed, and some larger retail banks 
realigned through government-arranged recapitalisation and mergers. The number of 
regular employees had also decreased by 41.3 percent between 1997 and 2002. On the 
other hand, the number of irregular employees increased by 53 percent, from 15,043 to
22,951, during the same period as the banks filled many of the positions vacated by 
regular employees with irregular employees in order to save costs and to pursue labour 
flexibility. In all, the total number of employees in the banking sector decreased by 30.4 
percent, from 129,037 in 1997 to 89,832 in 2002. The number of banks’ branches also 
decreased, by 16 percent, from 5,987 in 1997 to 5,019 in 2002 (Table 4-10).
The methods used as the means of employee reduction were voluntary retirement (i.e. 
so-called ‘honorary retirement’) and forced employment adjustment. A survey of 
employment adjustment in the financial sector (Lee, 2000) shows that voluntary 
retirement accounted for 56.3 percent of the departures, while the remaining 43.7 
percent were cases of forced employment adjustment. The forced retirements were 
usually, firstly, a list of employees laid-off following a unilateral announcement; this 
was then followed by the enforced retirement of specific individuals. Even many cases 
of voluntary retirement were also executed by indirect forced means.
Both retirees and remaining employees point out problems of the procedure of 
employment adjustment. They say that both the amount and principles of employment
adjustment were unreasonable. The amount, about 32 percent of the total number of
I
employees, was decided unilaterally by the Government without an objective and 
concrete examination (Lee, 2000).
4.5.2.2. End of lifetime employment and increase of irregular employment
Lifetime employment was virtually promised to the staff of Korean banks until 1997. 
However, due to the financial crisis, the tradition of lifetime employment ended as
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banks were closed and merged, and had to carry out huge redundancy programs in order 
to survive. Banks began, frequently, to recruit irregular employees in order to fill the 
(reduced) number of vacancies. As a result, the number of irregular workers increased 
rapidly. As already noted, between 1997 and 2002, the number of irregular employees 
rose by 53 percent while the number or regular staff members decreased by 41.3 
percent. In 1999, 90 percent of new recruits in the banking sector were irregular 
employees; most of them were women (Kong, 2002).
Many irregular employees were actually ex-regular employees, and nearly all were re­
engaged to perform the same or similar work within the same bank. Under pressure 
from management, they had had to resign their old positions, often with the inducement 
of additional retirement funds. Unable to find work elsewhere in the restructured sector 
they had returned to fill what vacancies did exist. However, they received a much lower 
salary than regular employees. Casual wage rates were cut by about 50 percent, while 
some employees who were forced to accept part-time work earned only 20 percent of 
their previous incomes. More than 50 percent of tellers in 2000 were irregular 
employees (on average, each branch employs three to five tellers) (Lee, 2000).
Middle managers have been less vulnerable to the effects of structural adjustment than 
either the top or bottom group because the redundancy programmes were focused 
mainly on managerial staff, who received high salaries, and low-level female staff who 
could be replaced by irregular staff. Many middle managers were dispersed to the new 
teams or units introduced in the organizational changes within the banks. In other 
words, functional flexibility has chiefly been applied to lower-level employees. 
However, middle management may be faced with new challenges as the impact of IT 
continues to grow. Most importantly, even managers themselves suspect that they 
cannot survive as generalist employees in the new era (Lee, 2000).
4.5.2.3. Situation of irregular employees
The number (and percentage) of irregular employees in the banking sector continues to 
grow. As Table 4-10 shows, the number have increased from 15,043, in 1997, too
22,951, in 2002; in percentage terms, irregular employees now account for more than 33 
percent of the total bank staff. Accordingly, many scholars have turned their attention to 
the employer-irregular employee relationship.
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This section looks at the situation of irregular employees. Extensive use is made of a 
questionnaire survey, published in July 2003, by the KJFIU. A total of 5,020 
questionnaires were distributed to employees in all banks; 2,745 responses were 
received. Of these, 1,169 were from irregular employees and 1,564 from regular 
employees. The analysis of the survey sheds a revealing light on the situation of 
irregular employees with respect to a variety of issues, including the jobs to which they 
are appointed, recruitment and training, pay, promotion, fringe benefits, working hours, 
and levels of satisfaction with their employers.
Irregular employees: positions held
According to the KFIU survey, the total number of irregular employees in the financial 
institutions (with which the KFIU is involved) in June 2003 was 37,291. Breaking that 
figure down by job, the most commonly held position was that of teller (14,822, or 39.7 
percent). However, the number employed in call centres showed a higher increase ratio, 
58 percent, from 3,109, in December 2002, to 4,912, in June 2003. Furthermore, the 
number of irregular employees in secretarial and professional positions increased 
dramatically, by 108.2 percent, from 2,196 to 4,571, and 324.5 percent, from 102 to 
433, respectively (Table 4-11).
Recruitment and education/training
The banking industry recruits most of its irregular employees by placing advertisements 
in newspapers or from choosing the most appropriate of the unsolicited applications that 
are sent to banks via the Internet. However, informal recruitment by branches also 
exists. Research shows that open recruitment accounted for 40.9 percent of irregular 
employees while informal recruitment by private introduction accounted for 31 percent 
(Table 4-12). More than two-thirds of irregular employees (67.3 percent) said that they 
taken irregular jobs because they could not find regular jobs, while just 8.5 percent 
reported that they chose an irregular job because they wanted to job that did not 
interfere with their personal life (Table 4-13).
A survey on training reveals that 59.9 percent of irregular employees did not receive the 
basic training that new regular employees get, while 72.8 percent did not even receive 
on-the-job training (OJT) (Table 4-14). The reason for this might be that banks recruited 
experienced workers, and that the jobs assigned to irregular employees were simple.
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Pay, promotion, and fringe benefits
According to a survey by the KFIU, the annual pay of irregular employees was 46 
percent of that of regular employees; that gap increased when bonuses were taken into 
account (Table 4-15). In addition, annual pay increases for irregular employees are very 
small, and promotion is almost impossible. Because of the attractions of higher pay and 
employment security 86.8 percent of irregular employees expressed a hope that one day 
they would become regular employees (Table 4-16). However, 91.5 percent of them 
believed that the possibility of transfer to regular employment was very small or non­
existent (Table 4-17).
There are also much bigger differences regarding fringe benefits between regular and 
irregular employees. The former more often receive housing loans, education fee 
support both for themselves and their children, leave days, and expenses for 
congratulations and condolences (Table 4-18).
Working hours
There was a one and a half-hour difference in the number of hours worked each week 
by regular and irregular employees. Regular employees work that extra time on the 
management of overdue loans (Table 4-19).
Satisfaction with firm
According to the survey, 86.2 percent of regular employees answered that they were 
satisfied with their firm, while 56.1 percent of irregular employees reported that they 
were not satisfied with their firm (Table 4-2Q). The main reasons for the latter are 
unhappiness with pay and fringe benefits, limited opportunities for promotion, and 
dissatisfaction with the working conditions. They said that they receive much less pay 
than regular employees, although they do the same or similar work. Accordingly, the 
survey shows that 23.6 percent of irregular employees are actively seeking a better job 
elsewhere (Table 4-21).
4.5.3. Changes in human resource management
Due to the financial crisis, HRM policies in banks changed from the traditional ‘soft 
HRM’ to a ‘hard HRM’. In effect, this meant that bank management strategy changed
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from the pursuit of stability in the long-term (a developmental perspective) to the 
pursuit of a flexibility which was more conducive to short-term profitability (Beardwell 
and Holden, 2001: 6-7; Legge, 2005: 105).
4.5.3.I. Compensation 
Change of pay system
Since 1997, as part of the restructuring of the banking industry, the pay system has been 
based on performance. Traditionally, the pay system in Korean firms had been based on 
seniority and education level. Pay levels were decided mainly on the basis of an 
employee’s length of service and education career, with the pay increasing automatically 
with the passing of each working year. Pay in the banking industry is composed of three 
items, basic pay, allowances, and bonuses. The basic pay is decided by a grade (i.e. 
progress to a higher grade requires promotion) and a class (i.e. progress to a higher class 
occurs automatically every year). Allowances differ according to an employee’s grade, 
and bonuses are decided in proportion to the employee’s basic pay. Pay based on 
seniority has some merits; these include stability for both the organization and the 
employee (i.e. each knows the present and future place of an employee in the 
organization’s hierarchy) and the establishment of a ranking order. The system functions 
most effectively when the national economy is stable and experiences lasting growth. 
On the other hand, the system can be exposed as rigid and costly when the economic 
environment is neither good nor certain. In addition, pay based on seniority does not 
encourage personal motivation as it fails to reward performance and ability (Park, 2000: 
190).
There were several reasons for Korean companies to have a pay system based on 
seniority. First, Korea’s traditional Confucian values emphasize hierarchy in 
organizations. In addition, traditional paternalism and the pursuit of harmony based on 
equality make it difficult for firms to conceive of differentiation based on ability and 
performance. Secondly, it was possible for firms to increase pay constantly, due to the 
country’s long-lasting (i.e. since the 1960s) economic development. Thirdly, Korean 
firms had a tendency to preserve pay consistency within industries (i.e. the pay levels in 
all banks were similar). This last factor was, in a sense, supported by the Government’s 
uniform labour policies.
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However, a differentiated pay system based on performance was the inevitable 
concomitant of the revolution in business attitudes (i.e. the introduction of management 
methods based on maximizing profitability) that developed rapidly following the 1997 
financial crisis. Performance-related pay could provide motivation for effort and co­
operation to maximize results for the firm; it was also good for morale if staff realize 
that they will get paid more when profits are good. On the other hand, it could transfer 
some of the firm’s risks to its workers, who if they are risk-averse might prefer incomes 
which were smaller on average, but safer (Heery, 1997b).
Nevertheless, a basic pay, depending on employee’s class and grade, still exists 
strongly; only the size of the bonus is based on performance evaluation. Namely, non­
merit pay still exists. This differs from the American system, in which the total annual 
pay is calculated on the basis of performance evaluation (see Table 4-22).
Advance of pay for performance and promotion
As already noted, the pay and promotion system in banking has traditionally been based 
on seniority, employees’ salaries being calculated according to pay class and grade. Pay 
class is a ladder of pay that is upgraded automatically every year from an entrance year, 
while grade is a ladder of promotion. In the case of Kook Min Bank, pay classes
tVigenerally begin at six and continue to 40. High school graduates start from the 6 class 
while university graduates start from 10th class (because they have had four more years’ 
education); employees then proceed at the rate of one class per year of employment. 
Grades are divided into six ladders. High school graduates start in the 6th grade and
t V iuniversity graduates start in the 5 grade. Promotion from grade 6 to grade 5 is carried 
out automatically. However, employees have to pass a promotion exam in order to be 
promoted from 5th grade to 4th grade. Subsequent promotions from 4th to 1st grade are 
based on seniority and performance (Lee, 2002: 136).
However, since the 1997 financial crisis, banks have tried to change the wage and 
promotion system in order to improve employees’ productivity although the basic wage 
and promotion structure remains intact. Nonetheless, there have been changes, and the 
new performance-based wage systems have advanced as follows. First, banks 
introduced a collective performance bonus that is awarded to all employees if the 
organization has made a profit at settlement.
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Secondly, banks introduced a performance-based bonus system in the late 1990s that 
rewards specific groups and individuals. Cho Hung Bank, for instance, introduced such 
a system in 2000. The performance bonus system’s targets are composed of four parts, a 
financial part, a non-financial part, a self-venture part, and a sales part, each of which is 
assessed and rewarded individually. In the financial part, professional experts, such as 
foreign exchange dealers, fund managers, and M&A brokers are awarded bonuses if 
their achievements exceed targets. The performance bonus of the non-financial part 
focuses on employees who contribute to the introduction of new systems and new 
products, and provide sales information and new ideas to management. In the case of 
the venture part, the bank rewards employees who have formed self-venture teams 
which achieve their business targets. Lastly, the performance bonus o f the sales part 
recognizes groups and individuals whose sales results exceed pre-set targets.
Thirdly, the banks introduced an individual performance bonus system for managers in 
2000. Again, the level of achievement determines the size of the bonus. Fourthly, in 
2002, after an agreement with the union, Foreign Exchange Bank introduced an 
individual performance bonus system for all employees. The system operates as 
follows. The bank, as before, firstly pays a basic wage based on seniority to all 
employees. Secondly, the bank pays a differential bonus (it ranges from 600 percent to 
1,500 percent) to managers; the earlier bonus was fixed at 1,000 percent. Lastly, the 
bonus banks pay to general employees cannot, as a result of the union agreement, ever 
fall below 1,000 percent; however, the maximum to which it can rise is only a little 
higher, 1,075 percent. The last offer was agreed to by unions and management as an 
incentive to union members resistant to the idea of a performance-based wage system 
(Kook Min Daily, 7 January 2002).
Although the individual performance wage system is still new the expectation is that 
inefficient and/or ineffective employees will be weeded out. In addition, several banks 
in Korea have offered stock options to high-performing managers. Shin Han Bank 
conferred 472,000 shares in 2000 as a stock option to managers, apportioning them 
according to the achievements of each individual manager. Ha Na Bank also gave 
managers 968,000 shares as a stock option, again based on performance. One bank 
manager has commented that the differential grant of stock options plays a key role in 
the transition to a performance wage system (Kyung Hyang Daily, 26 May 2000).
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Along with the introduction of these performance wage systems, banks have begun to 
promote employees on the grounds of their performance and ability. In short, the 
traditional wage and promotion systems based on seniority have been replaced by ones 
based on performance and ability.
4.5.3.2. Evaluation
Korean banks have traditionally incorporated the evaluation of an employee’s ability 
and achievement into a single assessment, usually carried out by the personnel 
management department; the outcome was known as a merit rating. The evaluation was 
based on information acquired at the admission stage, was one way, and input-oriented. 
The merit rating was used in consideration of promotions in grade and advances in 
class. However, since the financial crisis, and the introduction of management for 
profitability and performance-based pay, the methods of evaluation have changed to a 
graduation method, involving two-way evaluation (or multi-evaluation), and output- 
oriented.
To explain the above in detail, first, evaluation in the past used just an admission 
method for promotion. The admission method was used to decide successful candidates 
after fixing the number limit (or the ratio) for admission. It was a kind of relative 
evaluation to rank the staff. However, a graduation method, linking pay increases to 
performance, has recently been introduced. With the graduation method, employees are 
granted pay rises on attaining a certain standard or achieving a particular target. It is an 
absolute evaluation in that it is based on objective standards.
Secondly, evaluation was previously one way, as the assessment of an employee was 
based on the opinion of his/her manager. However, since 2000, banks have started to 
use two-way and multi-side evaluation in order to increase credibility and propriety 
(Table. 4-24). In two-way evaluation a supervisor and his/her subordinate evaluate each 
other. In multi-side evaluation, evaluation is carried out by superior officers, colleagues, 
and subordinates. This form of evaluation assists in personal development as employees 
can recognize their problems and revise them through feedback. However, multi­
evaluation is still relatively new in Korea; just three banks had introduced it by 2003.
Thirdly, evaluation based on the input-oriented method has been replaced by the result- 
oriented method. The input-oriented evaluation measures are length of service,
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educational qualifications, and number of certificates. On the other hand, output- 
oriented . evaluation measure relies upon achievements of business targets (e.g. 
Management By Objectives (MBO)). MBO is a goal-directed process that relies on 
setting clear targets for each employee and reviewing his/her performance against these 
targets. The targets are established through a joint discussion between employee and 
his/her manager. The participation in target setting is designed to increase the 
employee’s commitment to achieving the targets. MBO has been used in all banks since 
pay for performance was introduced (Table 4-24).
4.5.3.3 Recruitment
Recruitment is the process of generating a pool of candidates from which to select the 
appropriate person to fill a job vacancy. Recruitment policies have become more 
flexible. Recruitment in the past was conducted on a regular basis, usually once or twice 
a year. This has now changed to irregular recruitment; in other words, banks now recruit 
at any time. Advertising of positions on the Internet, instead of in daily newspapers, is 
now spreading. In addition, more employees are now obtained from employment 
agencies now that the labour market is more flexible; irregular employees are likely to 
be registered with such agencies. Banks have typically filled managerial vacancies 
through internal recruitment (i.e. promotion or transfer), but filled general employee 
vacancies through external recruitment.
New entrants are either university graduates or high school graduates. Before the 
financial restructuring started in 1997, banks undertook a large-scale external 
recruitment at least once a year. However, since the financial crisis and the subsequent 
large-scale reductions of employment as one of the main means of restructuring, banks 
have all but ceased the external recruitment of regular employees, preferring, instead, to 
employ irregular staff.
Therefore, the number of the latter has increased rapidly while the number of the former 
has decreased significantly (Table 4-10). The irregular employees recruited by the banks 
have mostly been appointed as tellers or to call centres; few have been professionals. 
Their employment contracts are renewed every two years (as labour law prohibits 
longer contracts, chiefly to protect the abuse of such irregular employment contracts). 
The small numbers of irregular employees assigned to specialist professional positions 
(they include fund managers, foreign currency dealers, human resource managers, and
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lawyers) have been recruited through employment agencies; they also have fixed-term 
contracts.
There are several steps to the recruitment process. Banks, first, select about three times 
as many employees as they need after a thorough examination of the written 
applications. Secondly, after these have been interviewed by working-line managers, a 
short-list, comprising about 1.5 times as many vacancies as there are, will be compiled. 
Finally, these will be interviewed by bank executives, after which a final decision is 
made. The first interview focuses on the business ability of the interviewee while the 
second concentrates on character and personality (i.e. the applicant's personal qualities). 
[Note: Many banks have recently begun to outsource, to job agencies, the first stage of 
the above process (i.e. the review of written applications) as the numbers of applicants 
have become so great and, therefore, so time-consuming to review.]
4.5.3.4. Education/ training
The education (or training) of bank employees in Korea was traditionally conducted in- 
house through a system of job rotation, On-the Job Training28(OJT), and courses, most 
of which were offered by the bank’s own education centre. Most staff were therefore 
generalists, not specialists. However, banks are now turning to external education 
resources to supplement the internal system in order to produce financial experts. The 
main reasons for these changes are to save costs and time (Park, 2001: 18), and to foster 
a small number of experts who will produce greater profits for the banks. In addition, 
the development of computer technology has made it possible for employers to offer 
what is known as cyber education.
Education of bank employees now proceeds in three directions. First, it aims to produce 
financial experts such as analysts (of enterprise credit and risk, and wealth management) 
and dealers (of stock, bond, and foreign exchange). Banks thus send employees to 
higher education institutions, either in Korea or overseas. For example, Woo Li Bank 
sends selected employees to Michigan University in America. It also sends others to 
Asian and East European countries to foster them as regional experts. Ha Na Bank is 
one that enrols elite cadets at a home university, in this case, the MBA course at Korea 
University (kbir.moneytoday.co.kr).
28 OJT is a training method that employees receive instruction within the place of work, usually through 
observing the tasks, being guided through them by experts, and then practicing them.
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Secondly, self-education is encouraged. Employees who enrol in private education 
institutions to improve English and computer skills, or to acquire certificates related to 
bank business have their tuition fees fully or partly paid by the employer. The 
subsequent academic achievements are also recognized on their personnel records.
The third form is cyber education. This is very useful when banks need to inform 
employees, very often in branches throughout the country, about new products and 
trends. For example, Ha Na Bank’s ‘Cyber Academy’ offers a great variety of courses 
suitable for employees of all levels; employees are also able to study at the speed and at 
the time that is most convenient to them. Among the packages offered are AICPA 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) courses such as CFA (Credit 
Financial Accountant) and CRA (Credit Risk Analyst). However, one of the problems 
of cyber education is that employees do not necessarily study hard. Woo Ri Bank has 
attempted to overcome this problem by making employees take exams every two 
months in order to . improve the effect of cyber education while Shin Han Bank sets 
aside compulsory education/training hours (www.goodbank.com/company/recruit and 
Table 4-27).
In conjunction with these new education trends, banks still offer banking-related 
courses, a traditional education method, in order to educate employees in general, 
practical business. These days, such education tends to focus on sales and marketing. 
The courses are chiefly conducted at each bank’s education centre or at the Korean 
Financial Education Centre. Banks also place a great emphasis on kindness and 
helpfulness to customers. Both Han Mi Bank and Kung Nam Bank employ a customer 
service team whose job is not only to provide customer relations education to staff but 
to monitor the kindness shown to customers by employees. The team’s assessment is 
then fed into the calculation of the performance-based bonus of employees 
(emanner.co.kr/admin/view. 20 June 2003).
Some banks have also established outplacement support centres, where ex-employees 
are given advice regarding re-employment and business foundation. Kook Min Bank set 
up the first such centre in early 2003. The first intake comprised 126 ex-employees, 81 
percent of whom succeeded in either finding work with other organizations or 
establishing their own businesses (Money Today, 20 March 2003).
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4.6. Changes of industrial relationship
4.6.1. Introduction
Employment relations in the Korean banking industry have traditionally been based on 
pay and promotion linked to length of service, and the presumption of lifetime 
employment with the one organization. In addition, the enterprise union network has 
supported these approaches as they have led to stable industrial relations between 
employers and their staff. However, extensive and rapid restructuring within the 
banking sector since 1997 has destabilized an industrial relations environment based on 
symbiosis. The relationship has become much more hostile with (seemingly) continuous 
labour disputes as unions have fought to protect employees’ jobs and conditions. In 
short, a traditionally quiet workforce, facing serious employment insecurity, shed its 
image of moderation and shifted to militant one.
This section looks at the changes in industrial relations between trade unions and 
employers, and collective bargaining between them, in the banking sector as a result of 
restructuring.
4.6.2. Trade unions
4.6.2.1. Organization of trade unions
In response to the massive restructuring, previous moderate bank unions went on strikes 
to protect employees and changed their organizational form from enterprise unions to an 
industrial union, the Korean Financial Industry Union (KFIU), in order to strengthen 
their solidarity. The KFIU represents employees from 35 institutions, 14 retail banks 
and 21 other financial institutions, including special banks. In 2003, the total number of 
members was 79,820 (53,719 retail banks worker and 26,101 others). Of these, 56,039 
(70.04 percent) were male and 23,781 (29.96 percent) were female. At the time, the 
KFIU had 35 branches (i.e. one at each organization from which it draws its members) 
and approximately 6,000 sub-branches. There were 302 full-time officers (32 at 
headquarters and 270 at branches) working for the union. The union’s density was 58.1
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percent (79,820/136,812). The form of collective bargaining was (and still is) a multi­
employers bargaining between the KFIU and a federation of employers (Table 4-28).
At its peak, in 1992, the Korea Confederation of Financial Unions (an earlier 
incarnation of the KFIU) had been composed of 171 local unions, representing a total 
membership of 139,206 financial sector workers. However, due to the restructuring of 
financial institutions precipitated by the Asian financial crisis, the number of members 
rapidly decreased from 127,507 in 1997 to 77,399 in 2002 (Table 4-29), mainly because 
the number of employees actually working in the banking sector decreased sharply. 
During the five years, 1997-2002, the number of regular workers employed in retail 
banks decreased by 40 percent, from 113,994, in 1997, to 66,881, in 2002 (Table 4-10).
Almost all retail banks in Korea are unionized and all workers below managerial level 
are entitled to become union members. Virtually all regular workers are union members, 
but irregular workers generally do not join the union. Before the financial crisis, each 
individual bank’s enterprise union bargained separately with their management. 
Members voted to select their own union leaders at the company level while also 
holding membership in the confederation of bank unions.
In response to the massive restructuring by banks following the 1997 crisis, bank unions 
were reorganized. In 2000, a united financial industry union, the KFIU was formed. The 
degree of autonomy experienced by enterprise unions was replaced by a more collective 
response to issues affecting employment as the KFIU began to engage in bargaining 
with representatives of bank employers at an industry level.
By July 2002 the union density of all employees in the retail banks was 60 percent (of a 
total workforce of 89,832, 53,975 were union members); the union density of regular 
employees in the retail banks was 80.7 percent (i.e. of the 66,880 regular employees 
53,975 were union members) (Table 4-30). However, almost all irregular employees did 
not join the union although they were eligible to do so. The figure of 60 percent 
represented a decline in union density, chiefly attributable to the decrease in number of 
regular staff and increase in number of irregular employees; in April 1998, before the 
restructuring began, 69.9 percent of bank employees had been union members. 
Nevertheless, the figure of 60 percent union density in the retail banking sector is still 
quite high compared with the total union density in Korea, 12 percent in 2002 (Table 4-
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31). It is for this reason that the organizational culture in banks is bureaucratic, and that 
the organizations themselves have relatively large workforces (Blackburn, 1967; 
Sturmthal, 1966).
As the number of irregular employees in the sector increased rapidly, the KFIU, on its 
establishment in 2000, sought to include them. Membership comprised “all employees 
in the financial industry, employees sacked as a result of union activities, employees 
dismissed because of banks’ management decisions, people who have worked in the 
financial industry, and people who have certificates related to finance” (Kong, 2002). In 
other words, almost all people working, or who have worked, in the financial (or 
related) industry were eligible for union membership.
However, in reality, almost all irregular employees still cannot join the union. The main 
reason is that bank unions still hesitate to organize them because bank management 
dislikes it, and unions are not confident in representing those who are working under 
different working conditions. For example, Hyun Dai Automobile Trade union, a very 
strong union, has not joined the Korea Metal Industrial Union because of the problem 
regarding the organization of irregular employees (the former opposes the organizing of 
irregular workers while the latter is in favour of it). Therefore, irregular employees 
cannot join the union although they want to (KFIU, 2003). Accordingly, the KFIU 
created an independent branch for irregular employees in 2004, and thus began to 
organize them at an industrial level (KFIU. 2004).
Looking at the operation of the KFIU, the executives (at the national level) are elected 
by direct vote of all members every three years; executives of union branches are also 
elected by each branch’s members every three years. The membership fee is one per 
cent of each member’s basic salary (Kong, 2002). In 2003, there were 302 full-time 
officials working for the union (Table 4-28). The reason that so many full-time officials 
are able to work for the trade union is derived from a unique tradition of the Korean 
enterprise union system. Under that system, the collective bargaining agreement 
between each company and its trade union stipulated that companies pay full-time union 
officials. As the Government cultivated the enterprise union system in order to block 
political activities of trade unions in the past, the Government encouraged management 
to pay for full-time trade union officials in the belief that it weakened the union capacity 
for autonomous development. However, since the great union democratic movement of
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1987, the presence of so many full-time officials has not only helped the union to grow, 
but, because of the power of the union, the system of officials’ salaries being paid by the 
firm, not the union, still exists29.
The KFIU is a member of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), a national 
centre of moderate trade unions. According to labour legislation, the KFIU can mandate 
the right of collective bargaining to FKTU in an emergency situation.
4.6.2.2. Organizational structure and democracy in the union
4.6.2.2.I. Organizational structure of the KFIU 
National Office
Elected union officers, such as the President, Vice-Presidents, General Secretary, and 
other executive officers (appointed by the president), work at the National Office. They 
have responsibility for all kinds of union business as well as being the senior managers 
of the organization. They carry out the National Congress's (NC) decisions and 
mandates. The National Office has several departments, for organizing, rule-making, 
policy-making, education, public information, general affairs, and international affairs. 
Their role is to make union rules and policies according to decisions made at the NC, to 
organize or support labour actions, to disseminate the union’s knowledge to members 
(i.e. OL), and to deliver information to members via union newspapers and its website. 
These departments are the main actors with respect to the institutionalization of OL in 
the union.
In 2003, the number of officers in the National Office was 32. Four of these were 
employed permanently by the union at the National Office, while the other 28 were 
dispatched from branches. In accordance with the CBA the latter receive their salaries 
from their companies.
29 However, as a result of a revision of labour law in 1997, employers will no longer pay for full-time 
union officers from 1 January 2010.
National Congress (NC)
Like all trade unions, the KFIU belongs to its members. In particular terms, this 
expresses itself through the union’s annual Congress. Each year, the union brings 
together about 240 delegates from around the country; any member of the union can 
become a delegate (KFIU, 2003). According to the KFIU’s rules, the NC is composed of 
representatives who are elected by members at branches. Every branch can elect at least 
one representative. In cases in which the number of members is below 100 it can elect 
one representative; branches are allowed to elect one extra representative for each 
additional 300 members (thus two representatives if there are between 100 and 400 
members, three representatives if the branch has between 400 and 700 members, etc). 
The total number of representatives in 2003 was 243; at least 75 percent of these 
representatives attended the annual congress in 2001, 2002 and 2003 (according to the 
KFIU activity reports of those years). Their tenure is one year.
A regular NC is called by the President of the union before the end of the fiscal year. 
He/she has to notify union members of the NC seven days in advance, providing details 
of date, venue, and an agenda. The regular NC usually deals with general union 
business. An irregular NC is called whenever the President of the union decides one is 
needed or when more than one-third of the representatives, because of a specific issue 
(or issues), request that one be held. A NC addresses the following matters: 1. the 
introduction and modification of bylaws; 2. the election or discharge of union officials; 
3. collective bargaining; 4. budgets or closing; 5. establishment, admission, and 
withdrawal of an associated organization; 6. merger, division, or dissolution; 7. 
structural changes; 8. election of two auditors. 9. other important matters.
According to labour law, a NC shall make general resolutions by the affirmative vote of 
a majority of all members who are present. Resolutions related to the introduction and 
modification of bylaws, the discharge of elected union officials, and merger, division, 
dissolution and structural change of a trade union shall be passed by the affirmative vote 
of more than two-thirds of the members who are present. (A majority of all members 
must be present in the vote). Resolutions regarding the establishment and modification 
of union bylaws or the election and discharge of elected union officials shall be made by 
direct, secret, and unsigned ballot. The NC therefore is an important place for the
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integration of OL because representatives can make rules and decisions required by the 
rank-and-file (Figure 6-4).
Central Committee (CC)
The CC is composed of executive members of the National Office, the presidents of 
branches, and other full-time officers of branches elected to the Committee. According 
to the union rules, in cases in which the number of union members at a branch is more 
than 1,000 it can elect another member of the CC in addition to the branch president. 
The number of additional members depends on the size of the branch; for each 2,000 
additional members one more can be elected to the CC (thus, two representatives if 
there are between 1,000 and 3,000 members, three members if there are between 3,000 
and 5,000 members, etc). The total number of CC members in 2003 was 94. The CC is 
called to meet whenever the President of the KFIU decides it is needed or when a 
majority of CC members request that it meet.
The CC is responsible for carrying out the policies agreed at the National Congress and 
for the efficient administration of the union. The CC also deals with issues of the 
joining and withdrawal of membership, and the rewarding and disciplining of members. 
In addition, the CC deals with all kinds of urgent and important union issues as the 
members of the CC can be summoned quickly and are able to execute practical 
decisions at both the headquarters and individual branches. The members of the CC 
therefore possess real power within the union. Thus, they are very important actors in 
the integration and institutionalization of OL in the union (Figure 6-4).
Union Branch
The union branch is the first point of contact for the rank-and-file member, providing 
him/her with an opportunity to participate in the government and administration of the 
union (Flanders, 1972: 50). A union branch is established at a firm (or bank) which has 
a single employer. Within the KFIU, branches range in size from a minimum of 42 (in 
the Foreign Exchange Brokerage) to as many as 15,000 (in the Kook Min Bank). Every 
branch has an organizational structure, which usually consists of a Representative 
Congress (RC), an Executive Committee (EC), and sub-branches. Membership 
participation at branch meetings is quite high because branches continue to operate very 
much like enterprise unions. Each branch has a President, a Secretary, an Auditor, and 
other full-time officers. As with the KFIU executives (President, General Secretary,
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vice-Presidents, and Auditors) all branch executives are elected every three years. In the 
workplace (i.e. the actual branch), there are sub-branches with a chief (a kind of shop 
steward) who is directly elected by union members. The branch also becomes an 
important actor in the integration and institutionalization of OL within the union (Figure 
6-4). The branch endeavours to integrate the demands of members within the union at 
the NC or the CC; it also institutionalizes the union’s policies and information (for the 
members) through the branch’s organizational structures.
4.6.2.2.2. Communication (or learning) process
Communication in the KFIU between the rank-and-file and union officials progresses 
through various parts of the organizational structures, such as branches, the NC, the CC, 
and the NO. The processes of communication are interpreting, integrating, 
institutionalizing, and intuiting. Firstly, the rank-and-file share and correct (or interpret) 
their knowledge and views with each other through dialogue and meetings within the 
branch or by communication with union officers (e.g. via the union homepage). 
Secondly, representatives of the branch and union officers of the NO integrate the 
knowledge and views (or demands) of the union through the NC or the CC. Thirdly, the 
NO institutionalizes the decisions made at the NC or the CC in organizational structures 
through rule-making, policy-making, establishment of education courses and systems of 
information delivery. Lastly, information delivery via the union newspapers or 
homepage facilitates the intuiting of new information by the rank-and-file (Figure 6-4). 
In short, the processes of communication within the union is identical to the learning 
processes in an organization argued by Crossan et al. (1999; Section 6.3.3).
An elected officer of KFIU summarizes the general learning processes in the following 
words:
The preparation of policy and decisions are made through various 
meetings and processes between union officials in the NO, full-time 
officers in branch offices and the rank-and-file. First, officers in BOs 
[branch offices] collect members’ opinions through meetings or surveys. 
Secondly, officers in the policy-making department draff a strategy or 
policy after meetings or seminars between officers in the NO and in the 
BOs. Thirdly, officers in the NO and chiefs of the BOs decide on 
strategies or policies at the CC after discussions through seminars. 
Fourthly, the NO informs the members of the strategies or policies 
through union newspapers and/or their homepage and/or education 
forums. Lastly, in cases of important issues such as strikes, the President 
of the union calls the NC. He/she and representatives discuss the issue(s), 
and then take a vote to decide the preferred course of action.
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In addition, whenever the union needs assistance from professionals (e.g. 
academics, lawyers, labour experts) to decide on policy alternatives (e.g. 
against the Government’s policy, in response to a lawsuit, on a social 
issue), the union entrusts projects to them and then organizes seminars or 
conferences at which union officers in the BOs and the rank-and-file can 
participate.
In the preparation and progress of these processes, the departments of 
policy-making and education and publicity play important roles. In order 
to improve their performances, the KFIU has employed experts for both 
departments (interviewed by the author on 15 November 2005).
The following comments from a sub-branch chief illustrate the processes of the
interpretation of information and integration at the union branch level.
Our union sub-branch is composed of 17 members. My role as the chief 
of the sub-branch is firstly to hold a monthly meeting. Although the 
meeting is held regularly (on the evening of the second Friday of the 
month) other, irregular, meetings are called if there is an emerging issue.
We also often continue talking at the restaurant after the formal meeting.
I have to summarize the results of the meeting and report those to our 
branch office. Secondly, I distribute the union’s newspapers to members 
as well as leave copies in the refectory in order for all employees to be 
able to see them at any time. Thirdly, I participate in our union branch 
meetings. Those are the RC, meetings of the chiefs of sub-branches, and 
training/education for the chiefs of sub-branches. I (formally) deliver my 
members’ opinions to these meetings. Fourthly, I sometimes meet the 
chief of the branch of the bank in order to deliver members’ views 
regarding working conditions or predicaments of business; together, we 
try to find solutions. Lastly, we hold a picnic or an athletic meeting 
annually with other local sub-branches.
As I am not a full-time union officer I can only perform my role as chief 
of sub-branch when I can make time. In addition, because members 
generally do not want to take the job, senior members take the job in turn 
for one year (A sub-branch chief, interviewed by the author on 23 
November 2005).
4.6.2.2.3. Democracy in the union
In order to look at democracy in the union it is necessary to review in detail the aspects 
of influence, communication, representation, and involvement in unions through a case 
study of a branch. Thus, this section considers one such branch (CHBU) of the KFIU.
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Mechanism of influence and communication
Members of the CHBU30 learn union principles and develop an understanding of union 
democracy through joining a union’s education courses, participating in sub-branch 
meetings and events, participating in branch and union’s meetings and events (such as 
elections of union officials), voting for (or against) strikes, attending rallies, becoming 
involved in labour disputes, consulting the union’s computer communication network 
(or union homepage), and by observing the labour disputes of other unions.
First, as required by the CBA, union branches practise three kinds of education. These 
are: 1. new employees receive a three-hour education course from the union, in which 
they are generally told about union history, union principles, and labour law; 2. four-day 
education courses given by the bank which will also include two hours of education 
from unions, and; 3. the chiefs of sub-branches (and exemplary members and women 
members) also get two paid working days every year during which they receive 
education from union branches.
Secondly, a union sub-branch meets at least once a quarter; here, members of the sub­
branch talk of union matters. The sub-branch also holds events for members, such as 
picnics and athletic meetings, at which members can leam and discuss union matters.
Thirdly, union members leam more about unions and develop an understanding of 
union democracy by participating in the elections of union officials, voting for/against 
strikes and collective bargaining agreements, and participating in meetings, conferences, 
rallies and strikes. Informally, a small number of union members join particular political 
factions, and here they talk and leam more detail, albeit with a factional perspective. 
They often participate in election campaigns and propose motions at representative 
conferences in order to ensure that their views are heard. According to the results of a 
survey (KFIU, 2004b)31, full-time officers of the KFIU stated that political factions 
exist within the union but they are organized on the basis of personal relationships 
rather than for political reasons.
30 Cho Hung Bank Union (a branch of the KFIU): some facts. The union has 5,445 members (out o f a 
total of 6,629 employees), 500 sub-branches,, and 16 full-time officers (KFIU, 2003).
31 Of a total of 302 full-time officers in the KFIU (32 at headquarters and 270 in branches), 106 answered 
the survey.
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Fourthly, union members leam about unions through computer communication 
networks, Local Area Networks (LANs), (union branches use communication networks 
operated by firms, one of the conditions of the CBA) or union homepages (both the 
KFIU’s and the union branch’s, in this case, the CHBU’s). Members are able to read 
details of all union activities, as well as communicate with full-time union officials or 
other members by these computer networks.
Fifthly, union branches and the KFIU publish and distribute monthly newspapers to all 
members; they also send newsflashes, prompt reports, news releases, and statements by 
fax to the chiefs of sub-branches. Information can thus be circulated to members 
quickly. For example, the CHB branch publishes and distributes a newspaper entitled 
“Morning Sunshine" at least once a month to members, and sends a newsflash entitled 
“Headline News” and statements to the chiefs of sub-branches (at any time) by fax. The 
KFIU also distributes a monthly newspaper entitled “Financial Labour News” to 
members as well as also sending newsflashes and fax statements to the chiefs of sub­
branches. Furthermore, union branches and the KFIU occasionally publish books for the 
education of members; these are sent to the chiefs of sub-branches for display. Members 
are thus able to read these at any time.
Lastly, members leam from the labour disputes of other unions and the media. The 
media generally report union principles in detail whenever big labour disputes (such as 
strikes) occur around the country. These reports constitute very good education sources 
for union members. Through these processes, union members can leam about trade 
unions and develop an understanding of union democracy. These are the formal and 
informal mechanisms of communication and their influence operates both upwards and 
downwards in the union.
Representation and involvement
In order to examine learning processes in unions, we need to look at the organizational 
structures and the extent of representation and involvement at the branch level, the level 
at which a rank-and-file member is, or is not, provided with an opportunity to 
participate in the government and administration of the union (Flanders, 1972: 50). We 
will continue to use the CHBU as an example. First, the CHBU is structured in such a 
way as to enable members’ opinions to be expressed democratically and to carry out 
union business efficiently. The committees or fomms which facilitate this democracy
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and efficiency are the Representative Congress (RC)32, the Executive Committee 
(EC)33, the Full-Time Officer Committee (FOC)34, and the sub-branch (SB)35. Secondly, 
the views of members are promoted by their representatives elected at sub-branches, the 
elected chiefs of sub-branches, and by the members of committees representing
32 The RC: The Representative Congress (RC) is composed of representatives who are elected by 
members at sub-branches. According to branch rules, a sub-branch can elect one representative for each 
50 members. The total number of representatives in 2004 was 400. Its function is similar to that of the NC.
33 The EC: The Executive Committee (EC) is composed of the President and the Vice-Presidents of the 
CHBU, and other executives who take charge of departments in the CHBU office. The executives, only 
some of whom are full-time officers, are appointed by the President of the CHBU. The number of 
members of the EC in 2004 was 30. Its function is similar to that of the CC.
34 The FOC: The Full-Time Officer Committee (FOC) is composed of the president and vice-presidents 
(elected officers) and other appointed full-time officers of the CHBU. The number of FOC members in 
2004 was 20. The CHBU has not employed union officers. 2. They carry out the EC’s decisions and 
mandates, and support the president of the branch on collective bargaining, education, research, and 
general affairs.
The SB: The sub-branch (SB) is the most important point of contact for rank-and-file members as it is 
here that they meet every day, and talk of union and firm affairs. Each union branch establishes union 
sub-branches at all departments and branches of the bank. Each sub-union branch operates according to 
the union’s operation rules for sub-branches. For example, the CHBU regulations are as follows: 1. the 
branch establishes a sub-branch at each workplace (bank branch, department) that is composed of 
members who work there; 2. each sub-branch has to elect its chief and vice-chief, and its representatives 
who will be sent to the representative conference (for branches). A sub-branch can elect one 
representative for each 50 members; 3. sub-branches decide the proposals (or motions) to be submitted to 
the union branch; 4. sub-branches carry out the decisions of the union branch; 5. sub-branches deal with 
the matters of the sub-branch operation; 6. each sub-branch has to have regular meetings. Irregular 
meetings can also be called in cases in which the chief of the sub-branch or more than one-third of the 
members believe that such a meeting is required; 7. the chief of the sub-branch has to understand 
completely the rules and regulations of the trade union and to manage the following: sub-branch 
activities, documents of sub-branch meetings, reports of union activities, official documents of the trade 
union, and seals.
The branch rulebook states that the provision of publicity activity (information delivery) at the sub-branch 
is the responsibility of the sub-branch chief who is required to promote the unification of members 
through publicity. The detail outlined in the rulebook is as follows:
The unique source of union power is its large membership. However, although the union has a large 
number of members, if the union has no solidarity it is not a union but the expression of personal will or 
action. Therefore, the union has to try to lead its members in the direction of collective thoughts and 
collective actions. To do this, the first condition is the quick and accurate delivery of information. To 
achieve this, the chief of the sub-branch has to do employ the following three methods; firstly, he/she has 
to present the summary of sub-branch activities and trade union newspapers by dissemination in the 
workplace (bank branch) before/after working hours. Secondly, he/she has to put notices of trade union’s 
official documents and newspapers on noticeboards in the workplace, and to display the union’s activity 
reports, meeting reports and education materials in places, such as the refectory, where members can see 
them easily. Thirdly, he/she has to circulate the trade union’s official documents to all members after their 
release.
The branch rulebook also regulates the procedures of sub-branch meetings as follows. First, the chief of 
the sub-branch has to inform and prepare the meeting in advance in the following manner for it to proceed 
effectively: 1. he/she has to inform members in advance of the date, the venue, and the issues to be 
discussed on noticeboards, by broadcasting, and by circulation; 2. he/she has to promote sufficient 
discussion and mediation between members regarding the main issues before the meeting; 3. he/she has to 
prepare a memo of the proceedings (an agenda, discussion papers, etc) of the meeting in advance in order 
to prevent confusion arising at the meeting. Secondly, he/she has to try to reflect (and influence) the 
opinions of members and to report the results as follows: 1. the chief of the sub-branch has to submit to 
the chief of the union branch the decisions (or motions) that members wish to suggest to the trade union; 
2. he/she has to submit to the chief of the workplace (or bank branch) the decisions that members decided 
to suggest to the chief of the workplace, and endeavour to persuade him/her to consider them; 3. he/she 
has to report to the members the results of the proceedings as soon as possible.
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disadvantaged groups, such as, for example, the Women’s Committee (WC)36 and the 
Craft Committee37. Lastly, the involvement of rank-and-file members is realized by 
their participation in sub-branch meetings, union education, and the opportunity to vote 
for the President of the branch, for the representative and chief of the sub-branch, and 
on decisions on whether or not to take industrial action, such as going on strike.
As a result of these various and detailed activities of involvement and representation, 
OL between leaders and the rank-and-file in CHBU is executed quite well. One union 
official38 of CHBU reported that the level of membership participation at sub-branch 
meetings always exceeds 50 percent. Van de Vail (1970: 105) argues that it is necessary 
that at least 20 percent of the total membership should attend union meetings if the 
organization is to hold firmly together. By this standard, we can see that there exists a 
strong relationship between leaders and the rank-and-file at the CHBU.
Discussion of Union democracy
Union democracy refers to the participation of trade union members in the government 
of their trade unions. Trade unions are membership organizations that are formally 
democratic and allow for member participation and control of policy-making through a 
variety of mechanisms. “Unionists themselves, in defining the democratic quality of 
their established procedures, cite the practices governed by majority vote of the 
members” (Cook, 1964:9).
Regalia (1988: 361) argues that “unions are organizations founded on consent, 
constrained, even, to preserve the consent of the represented or at least to attempt to 
contain manifest dissent. Unions are organizations in which the democratic requirement 
of responsibility and receptiveness to rank-and-file preferences is also a condition for 
survival itself’. Thus, “unions are organizations which are constrained to be democratic, 
if we mean by this to continuously take into account the opinions and preferences of the 
represented”.
36 The WC is composed of the President of the branch and woman members (no more than 15 may be on 
the committee). The WC deals with issues related to the rights, working conditions, and welfare of 
women members.
37 The Craft Committee is composed of members who are employed in particular bank jobs, such as 
security, drivers, and tellers. The CC pursues the improvement of rights and working conditions of the 
members in discussions with union officers.
38 From an interview with a full-time officer by the author, on 25 November 2005.
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Furthermore, supporters of union democracy make a plea that the political realities of 
unions should be taken into account in formulating a theory of democracy. They call 
attention to unions’ instruments of democracy, to constitutionally established 
mechanisms -  the union meeting, the convention, the referendum -  constituted on a 
representative basis and set up through periodic secret elections (whereby the leadership 
can be held to account and aggrieved members get due process including adjudication 
by officials or bodies who are not involved in the dispute) (Barbash, 1956, 1967).
However, many researchers have argued that union democracy suffers from many 
weaknesses. Their criticisms have highlighted the problems of the rights of individuals 
and minority or opposition groups, of the separation of powers implied in an 
independent judiciary, of a detailed prescription for due process, of motivations and 
opportunities for members participation not only by attendance at union meetings but in 
decision making, and of the powers exercised by the union’s leaders (Cook, 1964). 
Particularly, Michels’s theory o f ‘the iron law of oligarchy’ (1959) pointed to the virtual 
irremovability of elected leaders, the effective control of policy by full-time officials, 
and the minimal involvement of rank-and-file members in the formal channels of 
internal democracy. However, the authors of many more recent countervailing 
(empirical) studies argue that “Michels presented an overdetermined model of 
oligarchic development” (Sayles and Strauss, 1953: Coleman, 1956; Clegg, 1970; Fox, 
1971; Hyman, 1971:28).
Other writers (also employing empirical data) argue that democracy, as a system of 
organized decision forming in which leaders are to some degree responsive to rank 
members, operates even with a comparatively low level of participation (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lipset et al., 1956; Van de Vail, 1970: 153). They demonstrate that 
“democracy and oligarchy constitute only a normative polarity. Their findings show it 
to be at variance with reality, since most democratic organizations belong to an 
intermediate form. In the empirical polyarchy, neither the members nor the leaders 
alone are decisive”. Instead, by means of the democratic rules, active members and 
leaders are able to achieve a balance of power. In other words, “the polyarchic 
organization differs from the oligarchic one (one in which there are powerful leaders 
and passive memberships) because there is a third group, the active participants. By 
their two-way communication within the organization, they act as its democratic core. 
The larger and the more active this third group the closer the organizational approaches
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the ideal of the democratic theorists. The smaller its membership and strength, the more 
the organization moves toward the oligarchic pole” (Van de Vail, 1970: 153-4).
However, to evaluate union democracy fully, a critical ideological requirement has to be 
added to these instruments, namely, that democracy is not simply the mechanics of 
determining consensus. Democracy is necessarily related to the values for which 
consensus is sought. If the thrust of the union is generally on the side of democratic 
values, both in society and within its own institution, then its actions are so imbued with 
democratic values that we may say the union is democratic. More importantly, the 
satisfying criterion about democracy in the union is not so much the instruments but the 
existence of a climate that makes the utilization of the instruments possible. Such a 
climate is made up of two elements, intent on the part of leadership to abide by 
democratic principles in the management of union affairs, and a will to democracy on 
the part of the rank-and-file members. Thus, if both leaders and members accept 
democracy as a desirable standard of government, although they may not conduct all 
their affairs by the standards of a democratic model, they will be constrained in the 
purpose and use to which the regulation of authority is put by making it conform to 
constitutional due process (Cook, 1964: 9-18).
Unions have recently faced many tough challenges to represent and manage more 
appropriately members’ heterogeneous and contradictory interests, a consequence of an 
increase in the membership spectrum (e.g. white and blue-collar workers, regular and 
irregular workers). Thus, unions now need more dialogical democracy (‘interactive 
democracy’), pursuing unity through interaction and conflict after a lengthy but 
constructive dialogue. In other words, ‘the trade-off between interactive and conflictive 
strategies should replace traditional monological (instrumental) decision orientation’ 
(Jahn, 1988: 339; Lewin, 1980).
On the other hand, a blind emphasis on union democracy focusing on decentralization 
of decision-making toward at the enterprise level without strategic orientation (e.g. the 
improvement of strategic capacity and solidarity through strengthening dialogical 
democracy) by union leadership is more likely to weaken actual union capacity to 
pursue democracy based on unions’ original organizational purposes (such as the 
improvement of workers’ political and economic interests and industrial democracy 
through membership participation). For example, in France, attempts to modernize
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employment relations through stimulating company-level agreements paradoxically led 
to further membership decline and the erosion of unions’ workplace influence (Daley, 
1999; Hyman, 2003: 429). In Korea and Japan, countries which have kept the enterprise 
union system, unions have remained faithful to procedural and substantial democracy 
between leadership and membership at the individual enterprise level. However, the 
unions have suffered from weak leadership, with leaders lacking the experience and 
knowledge to solve problems at the industrial and national level. Furthermore, even 
though they have remained democratic organizations (regarding the processes of 
decision-making), the unions have been turning into company unions39 as states and 
employers dominate and substantially control labour issues at the macro and micro 
levels. Fragmented unions lack the strategic capacity to respond effectively to the 
problems (Hyman, 2003: 429).
Moreover, many unionists argue that unions have recently been forced to produce 
stronger leaders and become more professional in order to be able to respond to attacks 
from globalized employers and neo-liberal governments’ anti-labour policies. For 
example, Korean unions have pursued centralization of decision-making by changing 
union form from enterprise unions to industrial unions (see Section), while Western 
unions have pursued amalgamations. Heery and Kelly (1994: 15) note that ‘the 
relationship between leadership and their membership is seen as an effect of a 
determining eternal variable (a kind of ‘contingency theory’). In other words, the 
structure of union government varies according to the structure of collective bargaining, 
which is itself a function of the strategic choices of governments and employers’.
Cook (1963: 18) mentions that in any discussion of democracy, one must keep in mind 
that democracy is a process and a goal rather than an absolute body of procedures and 
rights. Thus, if democracy is a superior form of government it should be preferred in 
practice where it is possible (Kerr, 1960: 1).
4.6.2.2.4. Influence of the Internet on communication
The influence of the Internet on communication has increased rapidly as the Internet has 
come to play an increasingly large part in people’s lives. All Korean unions have their
39 It is because unions at enterprise level have a strong tendency to assume that they have common 
interests with employers in boosting productivity and competitiveness in the competing market conditions. 
Thus, the unions generally pursue moderate unionism as long as employers do not show antagonism 
toward them (or their self-interests rather than total labour interests when the two collide).
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own websites, and their use in union communications, activities and services is already 
very high. The unions’ input to Internet communications has been fairly significant in 
the past few years. Members’ questions are answered and the unions contact them 
regularly by email via firms’ LANs or the unions’ homepages.
Email offers the most real-time and interactive link between the union and its members. 
Sending a personal email message is a way to strengthen member commitment and to 
emphasize a member’s significance to his/her own union. It is also a way to increase 
participation and to communicate (and confirm) the union’s activities and decisions. 
Indeed, the KFIU conducted a leadership election by Internet vote in 2005, although, as 
it turned out, that particular event was hampered by a technical problem. In addition to 
communication between the union and members the Internet also allows members to 
communicate with each other.
However, there are diverse expectations among members regarding communication 
channels. Some members prefer active email communication, others text messages, and 
others prefer to receive information via traditional newspapers or magazines. Some 
expect all of these means to be used. Therefore, newspapers and magazines still have an 
important role in the organizations’ communications even though Internet 
communication is speedy and effective for interaction and the storage of information. It 
is difficult to offer a general or an overall picture of issues and subjects on the Internet. 
A newspaper or magazine can perform this function more adequately, giving 
background information, and stating the arguments for or against. It can also raise 
subjects, and direct members to the network for further information and discussion 
(Aalto-Matturi, 2005: 480).
Korea has rapidly become a mobile phone society (70 percent of the population have a 
mobile phone) and the Internet has become a part of everyday life for people; It is also 
the number one country in the world for the subscription rate to hyper-speed Internet.40 
Therefore, the main method of information delivery has become via the Internet 
(possible, of course, also by mobile phone). However, the introduction of new network- 
based services does not alone guarantee that members will increase their level of 
participation in their unions. The trade union still needs to have the energy to exploit the
40 In 2004, 76.5 percent of all Korean households subscribed to hyper-speed Internet (Digital Times, 12 
January 2004).
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potential benefits of that network. The network should be a place not only for acquiring 
information but also for community, social interaction, networking, socializing, 
deliberation, influence, participation, leisure time, and friendships (Ibid: 480).
4.6.3. Employers
4.6.3.I. From paternalism to restructuring
Due to the Government’s restructuring of the banking sector, employers actively 
pursued labour flexibility through layoffs, outsourcing and the replacement of regular 
employees with irregular employees. Some employers perceived the financial crisis as 
an opportunity to eliminate redundant aspects of labour force without strong resistance.
In looking back on banks’ policies on labour, it can be seen that employers were 
influenced by certain long-standing values broadly encapsulated in the idea of a 
paternalistic employment relationship (in which banks looked after the interests of their 
staff), and that their decisions were not strictly determined by the logic of the 
commercial environment. Rather, labour management policies stemmed from both an 
effort to control labour costs and the desire to sustain commitment and motivation. 
Accordingly, the identity of employer and employee was fostered by job security and a 
reliance on internal promotion systems.
The objectives of the labour policies of the bank employers were to maintain a level of 
commitment to organizational aims, to minimize the potential for conflicts of interests, 
to generate motivation for the execution of jobs, and to insulate staff from the effects of 
the external labour market (Morris, 1986).
Since the early 1990s, the prime change the banks have faced is one of increasing 
competition due to technological innovations and liberalizing or deregulation policies 
pursued by the Government. The changes caused by these factors mean new forms of 
money transmission, deposit taking and lending can be developed without extensive and 
labour-intensive branch systems, providing competitors with the potential for significant 
cost advantages. In marketing terms, a clearer segmentation of customer groups has 
replaced the general growth policies of the 1980s. These trends are not simply the result
111
of a more mature product market but reflect a more intensively commercial approach in 
the face of increased competition.
Therefore, employers’ labour policies have shifted rapidly from paternalism to the 
control of labour costs related to productivity. It has meant, simply, the shedding of 
labour. It is no surprise therefore that industrial relations in the banking industry 
changed for the worse after the 1997 financial crisis, leading to the strikes discussed in 
Chapter 5.
4.6.3.2. Change of management practices from stability to performance
Almost all Chief Executives of Korean banks used to be appointed by the Government 
(which meant also that the Government had significant influence over senior managerial 
appointments). The reason for this is that the autonomy of banks was restricted by 
government regulations, the so-called Positive System; prohibition in bulk, but 
permission of exceptions. It meant that all kinds of bank activities required 
governmental permission (Lee, 2001). On the other hand, the Government protected 
banks whenever they had any difficulties. In return, banks assisted in the carrying-out of 
government economic policies. As Korean banking law stood the Government had 
substantial supervisory powers. Accordingly, Korean banks had a role as public service 
institutions. Unsurprisingly, bank management was generally conservative.
Therefore, banks, whose success was measured as much, if not more, by the degree to 
which they did as the Government bid rather than their actual business performance, 
tended to avoid confrontation in industrial relations matters, preferring to compromise 
peacefully with trade unions. The political pressure on management to maintain stable 
relations with the unions enabled the union to negotiate for improved working 
conditions even though substantial strike action (by bank employees) was forbidden by 
law because the bank industry was defined as a public service (Section 4.6.5.2). 
However, since 1997, the Government’s bank policies have been revised completely. It 
has forced the banks to make extensive structural adjustments; these have included the 
closure of bankrupt banks, M&A, and mass reduction of employment. Government- 
owned banks were also privatized: The Government’s assessment of what constituted 
successful bank management also shifted, to one based much more strongly on 
performance.
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Methods of appointments of bank management, the operation of banks, and industrial 
relations have undergone remarkable change. First, as the reform of banking sector has 
progressed since 1998, a commission in each bank, comprising financial experts and 
representatives of shareholders, has been appointed to select executives on the basis of 
ability rather than seniority or closeness to the Government. Secondly, the emphasis on 
performance in a competitive business environment has led to significant readjustments 
of the formerly conservative organizational structure. Thirdly, industrial relations in the 
banking sector have become less conciliatory (in which unions and management 
recognized their interdependence), and more confrontational. The principal point of 
tension has been the series of (seemingly) endless structural adjustments which 
management has viewed as necessary to performance improvement but which trade 
unions have perceived as a threat to employment security.
4.6.3.3. Shift of management paradigm in employment relations
Changes of market conditions in banking have propelled employers into adopting new 
paradigms of management. First, the management approach to industrial relations has 
become increasingly business-led. The key decisions in industrial relations must have 
regard to the business strategy.
Secondly, there is now an emphasis on flexibility. Management needs to develop the 
capacity to respond more quickly to business conditions. Management generally uses 
three kinds of flexibility, numerical flexibility, time flexibility, and financial flexibility. 
Numerical flexibility refers to the increase of the amount of subcontracting as well as 
temporary and part-time working. Time flexibility refers to the free arrangement of 
working hours of each worker, involving, for instance, the use of minimum-maximum 
hour contracts, which predefine the range of hours to be worked within the day, week, 
month, or year. Financial flexibility refers to changes of pay, from the pay for the job 
concept to performance-related pay (Jung, 2000: 33).
Thirdly, management, especially in private banks, no longer tends to see collective 
bargaining with trade unions as the indispensable factor of the system, and is instead 
placing more emphasis on the direct relationship with individual employees. This makes 
up the essence of the human resource management approach. In other words, there has 
been a more explicit effort to manage communications with staff. This reflects a 
paradox in that, as the business environment becomes more competitive the need for
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staff co-operation and commitment increases, yet uncertainty is more likely as the old 
assumptions about job security and career progression are eroded (You and Park, 2000: 
58).
This has not led to a reduction in union consultation, but is rather a parallel 
development. Consultation has been extended into such areas as the introduction of new 
technology, staffing levels, and appraisals. However, the issues have always been 
regarded as strictly within the managerial prerogative. Consultation can shade more 
easily into negotiation and in this sense the area of joint regulation has never been 
wider. Hence, the object of management strategy has not been to reduce trade union 
activity but to mould it within a general pattern of labour relations, which does not 
inhibit organization change, but rather makes the implementations of such change more 
predictable (Sisson and Marginson, 1995: 107).
Previously, in the principles of pay determination, employers incorporated a mixture of 
factors, including market considerations and concerns with fairness and morale. Further, 
they believed that bargaining should incorporate a degree of flexibility without being 
linked to corporate performance. However, competitive pressures have fed through the 
pay criteria favoured by employers, and the previous preoccupation with comparability 
in the labour market has been replaced by a more pronounced concern with the ability to 
pay.
The new bargaining criteria also arguably reflect an ideological shift, being designed to 
reinforce the identity of the employee with the organization, by seeing his/her fortunes 
as intimately linked with those of the bank rather than the broader industry trends. 
Hence, the argument goes that profitability, which is crucial to future expansion and is 
the best guarantee of employment, requires cost/wage constraint, as real profit levels are 
inadequate. Short-term employee benefits must be tempered in the interests of longer- 
term organizational prosperity. However, finance workers' consciousness in the banking 
sector has often become relatively more union-like as a result of the unintended 
collectivizing impact of the employers' policies of individualization, on pay in 
particular, because employers have often introduced unilaterally determined pay for 
performance (Thomley et al., 1997: 96).
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4.6.4. Government
4.6.4.1. From authoritarian labour policy to experiment of corporatism
Since the national financial crisis, the Government, which used to be authoritarian in its 
industrial relations, has adopted corporatism. Due to the IMF’s demands, the 
Government needed to pursue labour flexibility and the restructuring of industry 
(including the financial sector). The national financial crisis resulted in a crisis 
consciousness among the main actors (government, labour and employers), leading to 
the establishment of the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC) comprising 
representatives of the three, previously hostile, groups. The resistance that was 
anticipated from labour and international organizations (such as ILO and OECD) 
prevented the Korean Government from relying on its traditional, authoritarian and 
oppressive labour policy when it imposed its economic restructuring. Consequently, it 
had to resort to a more consensual system of industrial relations.
In particular, the KTC has operated the Special Committee of Financial Restructuring 
(SCFR) in order to resolve issues related to the restructuring of the financial sector. 
However, the KTC has not functioned effectively since February 1999 because unions 
(KFIU and FKTU) and the Korean Employers Federation have repeatedly withdrawn 
from and rejoined it. Nevertheless, the Commission has played an important role in 
resolving big disputes between unions and the Government. For example, the Tripartite 
Commission played a role as a mediator between the KFIU and the Government 
whenever strikes in the financial sector occurred in 1998, 2000, and 2003 (see Section 
3.6.4).
4.6.4.2. Restructuring of the financial sector
Due to the national financial crisis of 1997, the Korean Government received a bailout 
fund from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The fund was conditional upon the 
restructuring of financial institutions, such as the closure of insolvent financial 
institutions, the restoration of financial soundness, and the opening of financial markets 
to foreign investors. Consequently, in 1998, the Government commenced the 
restructuring of financial industry in earnest (Table 4-10).
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4.6.5. Collective bargaining and labour disputes
4.6.5.I. Collective bargaining
Until March 2000, under the enterprise union system, industrial relations matters had 
been negotiated at the individual bank level, between each bank’s management and that 
bank’s union. However, with the advent of an industrial union system (and the 
formation of an industrial union, the KFIU), collective bargaining has become a form of 
group negotiation (a form of multi-employer bargaining) between representatives of all 
banks and a union, which represents all employees in the industry. In 2002, for 
example, 26 Chief Executive Officers41 and the same number of union representatives 
sat down at the negotiation table to discuss the collective bargaining agreement. 
However, this was an ineffective and time-wasting process because all 52 of the 
participants had to be in the same place at the same time. Since then, employers have 
recognized the need for an employers’ organization that could represent all employers in 
collective bargaining negotiations. Employers nominated the Korean Federation of 
Banks (KFB) as that representative in 2003 (Kong, 2003).
Collective bargaining between the KFIU and employers has made progress pleasing to 
both groups since 2000. In October 2000, they signed a collective bargaining agreement 
that covered all employees in the banking industry. That agreement was supplemented 
in August 2001. The agreement, including the supplement, contains 108 articles of 
Basic Agreement, 11 articles of Employment Security Agreement, and seven articles 
related to a Bank Development Committee. In addition, they decided (in 2001) upon a 
wage increase in the banking industry of 7.4 percent + a. The “a” refers to the amount 
that each bank and union branch agrees is appropriate, based on that bank’s 
circumstances. The two groups also agreed on a five-day working week, the first time 
that this had been introduced in Korea at the industry-level by a CBA. This was 
supported by the Government which wanted to introduce it to all industries, although 
there had been opposition from employers (from all industries).
There are several reasons why industrial negotiations in the banking sector have 
progressed so smoothly. First, bank management and trade unions have been settling
41Fourteen retail banks and 12 other financial institutions
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industrial relations matters by group negotiation42 since the 1970s; the participants 
therefore have considerable experience with the process. Secondly, until the changes 
prompted by 1997’s financial crisis, the wage structure and working conditions in the 
banking industry had remained virtually unchanged since the establishment of bank 
unions, in 1960. Thirdly, the banking industry has been regarded as a public service and 
almost all management appointments have been made by the Government. As 
mentioned earlier, this last factor had acted as a disincentive to managers who might 
otherwise have engaged in industrial conflicts. Lastly, employers have found it easier (if 
not always easy) to deal with the union’s strong responses to restructuring of the bank 
industry by negotiating as part of a multi-employer group rather than as single banks 
(Kong, 2002).
Although centralized collective bargaining by the KFIU is now the main process in 
industrial relations discussions, local union branches still play a major role in wage 
negotiations through supplementary collective bargaining at the branch level. For 
example, in 2001, the KFIU and the KFB agreed upon a wage range, 7.4 percent + ’a’ or 
7.4 percent -‘a’, for all bank employees. However, the decision as to what the exact 
amount of “a” should be was decided by each individual bank and local union 
representatives as it was based upon the performance of that particular bank. In 
addition, bargaining over issues of working conditions and company welfare continues 
to take place between the local union branch and the management of each bank.
The new industrial bargaining process exposes several problems. As most negotiations 
now take place at industry level instead of individual bank level, the interest of 
members in union activities is decreasing. Furthermore, union branches are inclined to 
rely upon union headquarters even for the solution of trivial problems. Union branches 
are now less autonomous and have less responsibility for local matters (Kong, 2002).
The Trade Union and Labour Relations Adjustment Act (TULRAA) prescribes that the 
issues of collective bargaining have to be wages, working conditions, and other issues 
for the improvement of workers’ social and economic status. However, issues related to 
trade union activity, such as the number of full-time union officials and their wages, are 
generally also included in collective bargaining negotiations. Managerial and personnel 
matters too, such as the participation of union representatives on, for instance, personnel
42 There have been two groups, one of nation-wide retail banks and another of regional retail banks.
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management committees, are included in the collective bargaining process. TULRAA 
also stipulates that the valid period of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) cannot 
exceed two years. Accordingly, each CBA must be renewed at least once every two 
years.
4.6.5.2. Labour disputes
Until 1997, the Korean banking industry was a no-strike zone. Even though there had 
been strikes across almost all industries in 1987, the so-called great union revolution 
period, there had been none in the banking sector. The reasons for this were that the 
industrial relationship between employers and employees in the banking sector had been 
stable since 1960, and working conditions were (relative to many other industries) quite 
good. In addition, most banks had no specific, private owner because bank law 
prohibited any particular investor owning more than five percent of bank securities. The 
Government also chose the CEOs of banks, and their terms of service were generally 
short. Accordingly, due to political pressure and personal ambition, these CEOs sought 
to maintain a good relationship with trade unions. In other words, CEOs who wanted 
promotion to better positions in other financial institutions recognized the importance of 
a good reputation as a prudent manager whose banks were efficient and stable. The 
banking industry was also an oligopoly, and always received government protection. 
Management therefore did not need to (greatly) care about management performance 
while employees could enjoy lifetime job security and good working conditions.
Nevertheless, there were endless small disputes (which did not, however, result in strike 
action) in the banking sector, before 1997. In 1960, when trade unions were first 
established in the sector, there were several disputes between trade unions and 
management over collective bargaining agreements. There were also some conflicts 
(some deliberate) during this early period because the unions and management were 
establishing an industrial relationship for the first time (Kim, 1982).
Later, in 1987, when a great trade union revolution occurred in Korea, bank unions also 
took some ‘light’ industrial action, such as sit-ins, work-to-rule, and overtime bans, in 
order to improve working conditions. This period also presented the unions with a very 
good opportunity to reform previous collective bargaining agreements. However, since 
1997, the industrial relations situation has changed completely. Bank unions have had 
no choice but, for the first times in their history, to take strike action in order to protect
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employment security in the face of the Government’s massive restructuring of the 
sector. There were four such strikes between 1998 and 2003 (for detailed discussion, see 
Chapter 5).
It was almost impossible for bank unions not to break the labour law when choosing 
strike action as Korean labour law actually prohibits strikes in the public service 
workplace. According to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Adjustment Act 
(TULRAA), unions in Korea must abide by the following legal processes before taking 
strike action. First, public services, such as banks43, must apply to the Labour Relations 
Commission (LRC) for mediation at least 15 days (ten days in the case of a general 
business; non public service) before they go on a strike. Secondly, the LRC mediation 
committee, which comprises three members (representatives of labour, management, 
and the general public), must draft a proposal, and attempt to persuade both parties to 
accept it. If both parties agree to it, the proposal will have the same legally binding 
status as a collective agreement. If either party refuses, however, the mediation process 
comes to a halt and industrial action can take place. Thirdly, the union must gain ‘Yes’ 
votes not from a majority of voters in the sector (or the bank(s))as a whole, but from a 
majority of union members in the sector (or the bank(s)) at which the strike is proposed 
to take place.
Lastly, the Labour Minister can decide on emergency mediation in the case of a public 
service strike or the case that is more likely to endanger people’s daily lives and national 
economy (e.g. a bank strike). If that second mediation fails, the meditation committee 
can send the case to an arbitration committee that can settle a dispute forcibly, 
regardless of the intentions of the concerned parties. In short, once the Labour Minister 
decides on emergency mediation the bank union cannot legally go on strike. Therefore, 
in the cases of the strikes organized as protests against the massive employee reduction 
consequent upon the forced structural adjustment in 1997 the unions had no choice but 
to break the law.
43 According to the revision of labour law, banking business transferred from a public service to a general 
business from 1 January 2001. Thus, the period of mediation decreased from 15 days to ten days.
4.7. Conclusion
One of the main reasons for the severity of the Korean financial crisis in 1997 was that 
there were serious structural problems in the financial sector. Accordingly, the 
Government instigated extensive restructuring of the sector. The main focuses of the 
restructuring programme were the establishment of financial soundness in the 
institutions and greater labour flexibility. As a consequence, many banks were closed 
and merged. Moreover, work organization and industrial relations were reviewed and 
restructured, as follows.
First, as banks changed their sales strategy from one of increasing market share to that 
of the pursuit of profitability, they reorganized their work by rationalization and new 
customization. These can be summarized as follows: 1. banks changed the form of 
organization from functional organization to divisional organization in order to 
strengthen the responsible management of executives and to promote competition 
between divisions for the increase of profit. This has made it very difficult for staff to 
move from division to division. In addition, each division tends to avoid recruiting new 
staff in order to reduce their cost ratio.
2. Banks divided branch business into both front business (i.e. generally, sales) and back 
business (i.e. processing work). Front business continued to be conducted in the branch, 
but back business was transferred to central office or call centres. Therefore, staff are 
now more likely to be specialists, not generalists. Of particular concern for some has 
been the deskilling of operators in the call centres. However, the situation is not so 
simple, as these operators are also required to undertake sales activity through phone 
and computer. 3. The processing business of call centres has become, through the use of 
new technologies, a new form of Taylorization. However, this New-Taylorism has 
caus*ed problems, such as low trust and conflict between operators and management. As 
a result, there has been a high turnover of staff in call centres.
4. Banks now provide differentiated customer services according to the kind of 
customer and the degree to which he/she contributes to profits. For example, banks 
provide RM service for enterprise customers, PB service for superior personal 
customers, and fast one-stop service for general personal customers. The differentiated
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customer services are a new development in customization. However, banks are losing 
the trust of a third group, general personal customers, who are experiencing worse 
service. 5. Banks now actively utilize new techniques, such as CRM and CSS, in order 
to analyze new business opportunities, and to provide faster and better customer 
services. However, the development of these new techniques requires huge investment. 
Accordingly, banks have to take the risk of suffering big losses.
6. The development of new technologies has enabled banks to utilize various service 
delivery channels, such as ATMs, EFTPOS, phone banking, Internet banking, and, more 
recently, mobile banking. The proliferation of service delivery channels has benefited 
the customer, who can now choose what is most convenient to him/her. However, these 
services require fewer bank staff. Furthermore, there is the problem of the security of 
some of these service delivery channels, thus increasing the banks’ exposure to crime. 
Although rationalization and customization contributed to increased profits, a price was 
paid by bank employees; many lost their jobs, and many of those still working in the 
industry complained of worsening working conditions.
Secondly, the personnel restructuring of the financial sector derived from the pursuit of 
labour flexibility led to a decrease in employment security. There was a huge reduction 
in the number of regular employees as many banks were closed and merged, and banks 
undertook redundancy measures in order to save costs. The result was that the number 
of regular employees in the banking sector decreased from 113,994, in 1997, to 66,881, 
in 2002 while the use of irregular employees increased, from 15,043, in 1997, to 22,951, 
in 2002 (Table. 4-10), as banks recruited the latter in order to fill positions vacated by 
the former. As a result, the era of life-long employment was now over, replaced by a 
seemingly permanent state of employment insecurity.
Thirdly, due to the change of management strategy (i.e. to one now concerned with 
cutting costs and rewarding individuals whose performances contribute to greater 
profits), human resource management in the banks has undergone dramatic change. For 
example, the pay and promotion systems were changed from traditional ones based on 
seniority to new ones based on performance and ability. The preferred performance 
evaluation method, previously an admission method by relative evaluation, one-side 
evaluation by superior officers, and input-oriented evaluation by length of service and 
education, was replaced by a graduation method characterized by absolute evaluation,
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multi-side evaluation by superior officers, colleagues, and subordinates, and output- 
oriented evaluation by MBO. Recruitment methods were changed from regular 
recruitment once or twice a year, advertised either in daily newspapers or internally, 
whereby existing staff were promoted or transferred, to irregular recruitment on 
demand, through advertising on the Internet and using job agencies; the net result has 
been a decline in the number of regular employees but a rise in the number of irregular 
staff. Education/training methods were also changed from an emphasis on courses 
offered by the bank and OJT, each with an overall aim of creating a workforce of 
generalists, to cyber education and the support of self-education, with an aim of 
producing financial experts. Above changes were because the management strategy of 
employment relationship was changed from the pursuit of stability to the pursuit of 
profitability.
Fourthly, faced with a steep rise in employment insecurity brought about by 
restructuring, the national union (the KFIU) mounted a strong resistance to protect 
employees. The KFIU changed the form of the trade union from an enterprise union to 
an industrial union in order to respond effectively to the proposed restructuring of the 
banking sector. This also had a direct impact upon the bargaining method, which 
shifted from single-employer bargaining to multi-employer bargaining. The change 
(centralization of IR) was a result of unions’ great efforts and needs to respond 
effectively to huge restructuring conducted by the government. However, it was also 
possible because employers did not have any control power of IR in the historical 
restructuring due to external influences and thought it easier to deal with the union’s 
strong responses to restructuring by negotiating as part of a multi-employer group rather 
than as single banks. Furthermore, they were used to the group negotiation for last 
decades (Section 4.6.5.1).
Fifthly, the bank workplace has become a site of industrial hostility (there had been no 
bank strikes before the 1997 crisis) as unions began to believe that, in some instances, 
strikes are the most effective form of industrial action with which to fight proposed 
redundancies. There is no doubt that the tradition of stable industrial relations has come 
to an end, and that a new era of confrontational industrial relations has begun.
Lastly, the Government’s authoritarian industrial relations policy was replaced by 
corporatism, the latter being viewed as more effective in making restructuring progress
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more smoothly. Thus, the Government established the KTC which has played a role as a 
mediator between the Government and unions whenever strike action has either 
appeared a possibility or actually occurred.
Industrial relations within the Korean banking sector have changed radically (towards 
flexibility and profitability, and centralization and militancy) since the national financial 
(or foreign currency) crisis in 1997. Notwithstanding the increased confrontation 
between employers and employees, there have been attempts to build a new form of 
industrial relations that meets the needs of both groups. It is to be hoped that this new 
form can be built on the foundation of the traditional symbiosis of Korean banking.
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<Table 4.1> Globalization factors in the financial sector
Factor Content
1. International advance of 
financial institutions
Western banks’ investments in developing countries 
and the emerging markets
2. Development of new 
technologies
Financial institutions become able to operate in the 
world market for 24 hours each day because of 
computerization
3. Deregulation of financial 
industry, due to neo-liberalist 
policies
Market-opening and privatization become global 
trends.
Restructuring of financial sector towards increased 
flexibility of organizations and labour in order to 
pursue greater profits.
<Table 4.2> Process of financial liberalization in Korea
Action Reason Result
1. Privatization of retail 
banks
To promote autonomous 
management
Privatization of Han 11 
Bank (1981), Seoul Bank 
(1982), Jae 11 (1982), Cho 
Hung Bank (1983)
2. Permission for banks to 
seek injections of foreign 
capital
To pursue open-door 
market
Establishment of Shin Han 
Bank (1982), Han Mi Bank 
(1983)
3. Permission for 
establishment of new banks
To promote competition Establishment of Dong Hya 
Bank (1989), Dong Nam 
Bank (1989), Dae Dong 
Bank (1989)
4. Relaxation of restrictions 
on the trade of foreign 
capital and currency
To promote the 
international trade of 
capital and currency
Promotion of domestic 
investment of foreign 
capital and overseas 
investment of domestic 
capital
5. Curtailment of the 
Government’s restrictions 
on financial institutions
To reduce the 
Government’s involvement 
in the industry
Increase of autonomy
6. Liberalization of capital 
increase and branch 
establishment
To strengthen the 
competitiveness, and 
enlargement, of financial 
institutions
Increase of capital and 
number of branches
7. Legislation for financial 
reform (1997)
To promote the 
restructuring of the 
financial industry
Restructuring of financial 
institutions, resulting in the 
closure of bankrupt banks, 
mergers between banks, 
and mass redundancy.
Source: Lee and Kim (2001: 87-148)
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<Table 4.3> Reasons for the Korean financial crisis
Factor Reason Result
External
reason
Asian foreign currency 
crisis
Rapid devaluation of 
Asian currencies, due to 
economic problems and 
speculators of foreign 
currency
Devaluation of 
financial property and 
collapse of economy. 
Evacuation of foreign 
capital.
Internal
reason
1. Absence or, at least, 
insufficient responsible 
management in financial 
institutions, due to 
government control and 
over-protection
2. Failure of foreign 
currency management by 
financial institutions
1. The government used 
financial institutions as 
a tool of economic 
development.
2. No knowledge and 
experience of risk 
management and 
liquidity management 
of foreign currency
1. Poor financial 
soundness in the 
financial institutions, 
solvency decline, 
fall in foreign 
confidence
2. Bankruptcy of 
foreign debt, due to 
expiration imbalance 
of foreign currency 
assets and debts
<Table 4-4> Size of Government’s public fund input to financial institutions 
_____________ (MFE, June 2001)_________ _______________
Banks Other financial 
institutions
Total
Amount £41 billion £27 billion £68 billion
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy (Son and. Jung, 2001: 51-2)
<Table 4-5> Government’s share ratio of banks after public fund input (KFC 
_______________________Report, September 2001)_______________________
Bank Ratio of share by Government 
(percentage)
Han Bit Bank 100
Pyung Hya Bank 100
Kyung Nam Bank 100
Kyang Ju Bank 100
Seoul Bank 100
Cho Hung Bank 80.05
Je Ju Bank 95.74
Jae 11 Bank 49.01
Average 86.13
Source: Lee and Kim, 2001: 132
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<TabIe 4-6> Bank mergers in Korea
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1. Kook Min Bank + 
Dae Dong Bank = 
Kook Min Bank
8. Kook Min Bank (1) 
+ Housing Bank (2) = 
Kook Min Bank
2. Housing Bank + 
Dong Nam Bank = 
Housing Bank
3.Sang Yup Bank + 
Han 11 Bank = Han 
Bit Bank
9. Han Bit Bank (3) + 
Pyung Hya Bank = 
Woo Ri Bank
4. Ha Na Bank + Ba 
Lam Bank + Chung 
Chyung Bank = Ha 
Na Bank
10. H aN a Bank 
(4) + Seoul Bank 
= Ha Na Bank
5. Shin Han Bank + 
Dong Hya Bank = 
Shin Han Bank
6.Han Mi Bank + 
Kyung Ki Bank = 
Han Mi Bank
7. Cho Hung Bank + 
Kang Won Bank + 
Chung Puk Bank = Cho 
Hung Bank
From 26 banks 
(in 1997) to 19 banks 
(in 1998)
17 banks 15 banks 14 banks
Source: Lee and Kim, 2001: 91
<Table 4-7> Call centres: the situation as at June 2003
Bank Number of employees Role of employee Form of 
operation
Kook Min 1 .Irregular employees: 
1,430
-Consultants: 1,350 
-Supervisors: 80
2.Regular employees: 
150
1. Consultant
-Inbound: handling of inquiries 
-Outbound: sales of products and 
credit card
-Ratio of Inbound and Outbound: 
4:1
2. Supervisor: supervision of 
consultants.
3. Regular employees: back 
business, such as planning, 
education, management of 
performance, and monitoring of 
calls.
A branch of 
bank
Shin Han 1. Irregular: 130
2. Regular: 20
As above As above
Woo Ri 1. Irregular: 450 -
2. Regular: 50
As above As above
Jae 11 1. Irregular: 284
2. Regular: 289
As above As above
Ha Na 1. Irregular: 290
2. Regular: 90
As above As above
Foreign Exchange 1. Irregular: 210
2. Regular: 20
As above Outsourcing to 
a subsidiary
Cho Hung 1. Irregular: 290
2. Regular: 90
As above Outsourcing to 
a subsidiary
Sources: Interviews with union officers and personnel managers by the author (November 2003) and 
The situation of irregular employees and organizations (KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
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<Table 4-8> Workplace reorganization
Past Present Reason
Change of form of 
work organization
Functional
organization
Divisional
organization
Introduction of 
a responsible 
management system
Fragmentation of 
branch business
1. Front business: 
sales, paying-in and 
paying-out.
2. Back business: 
filing of customers’ 
information, 
management of 
performance, 
answering 
customers’ queries 
by telephone, 
monitoring of 
customer calls
Front business in 
branch: sales, 
paying-in and 
paying-out
Strategy of sales 
maximization
New-Taylorism of 
call centre (i.e. back 
office)
Back business in 
call centre by New- 
Taylorism (CTI, 
ACD, PDS)
Strategy of cost 
minimization
Source: Interviews with union officers and personnel managers by author (November 
2003) and 2003 Annual Reports of Kook Min Bank and Shin Han Bank.
<Table 4-9> New customization: summary
Action Service Strategy
Differentiation of 
customer service
Separation of 
branches into those 
dedicated to the 
needs of enterprise 
customers, and 
those which deal 
with personal 
customers
1. RM service for 
enterprise customers
2. PB service for 
superior personal 
customers
3. One-stop service 
for general personal 
customers
Differentiated 
customer service 
according to 
customer's 
contribution to a 
bank’s profits
Use of new 
techniques
CRM and CSS Supply of better 
customer service 
through analysis of 
customer
information, such as 
service tailored 
according to a 
customer’s character 
and ability.
Exploiting 
customer 
information for 
marketing
Diversification of 
delivery outlet
ATM, EFTPOS, 
Internet banking, 
mobile banking
24-hour banking 
service
Cost saving and 
Convenience
Sources: Interviews with union officers and personnel managers ?y the author
(November 2003) and 2003 Annual Reports of Kook Min Bank and Shin Han Bank.
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<Table 4-10.> Changes in the number of employees and branches in the 
  _________  retail banking sector (1997-2002) ________ _____
1997
(a)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
(b)
Ratio
of
change
(a-b/a)
No. of 
banks
26 21 17 17 15 14 -47.4
%
No. of 
regular 
employees
113,994 
(88.3 %)
75,677 74,744 70,559 68,360 66,881
(74.5
%)
-41.3
%
No. of
irregular
employees
15,043
(11.9%)
19,013 20,796 Data not 
available
21,433 22,951
(25.5
%)
+53 %
No. of total 
employees
129,037 94,690 95,540 89,793 89,832 -30.4
%
No. of 
branches
5,987 5,056 4,780 4,709 4,776 5,019 -16%
(a-b/a)
Source: Korea Federation of Banks (2003), Financial Supervisory Commission (2003),
Yon Hap Tong Sin (15 August 2003).
<Table 4-11> Irregular employees: positions held
Job Number of employees 
and ratio (percentage) 
(2003.6)
Number of 
employees and 
ratio (percentage) 
(2002.12)
Increase and 
decrease ratio 
(percentage)
Teller 14,822 (39.7) 12,316(42.8) 20.3
Call centre 4,912(13.2) 3,109(10.8) 58
Secretary (assistant of 
regular employee)
4,571 (12.3) 2,196 (7.6) 108.2
IT 566 (1.5) 493 (1.7) 14.8
Credit consultant 334 (0.9) 565 (2.0) -40.9
Claim withdrawal 665 (1.8) 1,237 (4.3) -46.2
Professional 433 (1.2) 102 (0.4) 324.5
Other (security man, 
driver, cleaner, 
mail deliverer)
10.988 (29.5) 8,764 (30.4) 25.4
Total 37,291 (100) 28,782 (100)
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
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<Table 4-12> Recruitment channels of irregular employees
Number Ratio (percentage)
Open recruitment 478 40.9
Scout 10 0.8
Informal recruitment by 
private introduction
363 31
Re-employment after 
retirement
162 13.9
Etc 156 13.4
Total 1,169 100
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
<TabIe 4-13> Reasons for getting irregular jobs
Number of responses Ratio (percentage)
No regular job 787 67.3
Family reasons 29 2.5
Personal reasons (education, 
health)
70 6.0
Better than regular job 
(professionals)
4 0.3
To learn job 47 4.0
Other 162 13.9
No answer 70 6.0
Total 1,169 100
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
<Talble 4-14> Training of irregular employees
Training for new employees 
(percentage)
On-the-job training (OJT) 
(percentage)
Received 450 (38.5) 270(23.1)
Not received 700 (59.5) 851 (72.8)
No answer 19(1.6) 48 (4.1)
Total 1169 1169
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
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<TabIe 4-15> Regular and irregular employees: comparison of pay levels
(10,( '00 won)
Annual pay (Number 
of respondents)
Annual bonus 
(Number of 
respondents)
Total
Average of
Regular
employee
3,990 (662) 868 (662) 4,858
Average of
irregular
employee
1,646 (362) 196 (362) 1,842
Difference 2,344 672 3,016
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
<Table 4-16> Irregular employees: their hopes iby employment form)
Number Ratio (percentage)
Hope of irregular employment 88 7.5
Hope of regular employment 1,015 86.8
No response 66 5.6
Total 1169 100
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
<Table 4-17> Irregular employees: their thoughts on the possibility of transfer to 
_____________________  regular employment ________________________
Number of respondents Ratio (percentage)
Very high 12 1.1
High 83 7.4
Little 343 30.4
None 689 61.1
No response 34
Total 1043 100
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
<Table 4-18> Receipt of fringe benefits
Fringe benefit Regular employees 
(Ratio of application 
- percentage)
Irregular employees 
(Ratio of application 
-  percentage)
Housing loan 1,119(94.8) 26 (4.4)
Tuition fee for children 1,080 (94.4) 1,094 (63.0)
Tuition fee for employee 851 (86.7) 27 (4.6)
Traffic expenses 1,247 (96.1) 136(21.3)
Expenses for congratulations and 
condolences
1,255 (98.4) 311 (47.2)
Sick leave 1,033 (94.1) 221 (36.4)
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
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<Table 4-19> Comparison of working hours
Regular number of working 
hours per week
Regular number of overtime 
working hours per week
Regular
employees
40 7 hours, 22min
Irregular
employees
40 5 hours, 46min
Difference 0 1 hour, 36min
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
<Table 4-2()> Degree of satisfaction with firm
Regular employees 
(percentage)
Irregular employees 
(percentage)
Very satisfied (1) 127 (8.3) 12(1.1)
Satisfied (2) 1,189 (77.9) 479 (42.8)
Unsatisfied (3) 190(12.4) 486 (43.5)
Very unsatisfied (4) 21 (1.4) 141 (12.6)
Sum 1,527(100) 1,118(100)
Average degree of satisfaction 2.07 (Near satisfaction) 2.68 (Near unsatisfied)
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC, 2003)
<Table 4-21> Irregular employees* desire to remain with firm
Number of responses Ratio (percentage)
Trying turnover 
(i.e. to seek
employment elsewhere)
276 23.6
Not trying turnover 841 71.9
No answer 52 4.4
Total 1169 100
Source: The Situation of Irregular Employees and Organization 
(KFIU and KCWC.2003)
<Table 4-22> Comparison of annual base pay systems
Form of pay Components of pay Method of pay increase
Traditional 
pay form in 
Korea
1.
Basic
pay
2.
Allowances
3.
Fixed
bonus
Base-up
(1+2+3)
Increase 
of a class
Current 
annual base 
pay
in Korea
1.
Basic
pay
2.
Allowances
3.
Bonus
Base-up
(1+2)
Increase 
of a class
Incentive
bonus
American 
annual base 
pay
Basic
pay
Merit pay 
by
performance
evaluation
Incentive
Pay
Source: Park, 2000b: 197
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<Table 4-23> Advance of performance wage system in Korean banks
Step Content Example
1. Collective performance bonus to all employees 
according to profit settlement
All banks since 1990
2. Performance bonus to specific groups and 
individuals such as sales teams and fund 
managers
Cho Hung Bank in 2000
3. Individual performance bonus to managers All banks in 2000
4. Stock options to managers according to their 
performance
Shin Han Bank and Ha Na 
Bank in 2000
5. Individual performance bonuses to employees Foreign Exchange Bank 
in 2002
Sources: Interviews with union officers and personnel managers by the author 
(November 2003), www.cho.co.kr/newchb (21 July 2003),
Kook Min Daily (7 January 2002), Media KHAN (26 May 2002), 
Kyung Hyang Daily (26 May 2000).
<Table 4-24> Changes of evaluation method
Past Present
1. Admission method: relative evaluation Graduation method: absolute evaluation
2. One-side evaluation by superior officers Two-way or multi-side evaluation by 
superior officers, colleagues, and 
subordinates
3. Input-oriented evaluation: length of 
service, educational qualifications, and 
number of certificates
Output-oriented evaluation: result, MBO
Sources: Interviews with union officers and personnel managers by the author 
(November 2003) and Park (2000a: 159-87).
<Ta )Ie 4-25> Changes of recruitment
Past Present
Time of recruitment Regular recruitment: once 
or twice a year
Irregular: on demand
Notice of recruitment Daily newspaper Internet
Filling of vacancy From internal labour 
market
From external labour market
Status of entrants Regular employees Irregular employees
Sources: Interviews wit i union officers and personnel managers by the author
(November 2003) and Jung, 2000.
<Table 4-26> Changes in education/training in the banking sector
Past Present (Method)
1. Cultivation of generalists Cultivation of financial expert (education 
in external institutions in Korea or abroad)
2. Job rotation by OJT Support of self-education (payment of tuition 
fees and recognition of achievements on staff 
personnel records)
3. Courses offered at education 
centres, generally at the bank
Cyber education
Sources: Interviews with union officers and personnel managers by the author
(November 2003) and www.goodbank.com/company/recruit (21 July 2003)
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<Table 4-27> Comparison of HRM in six nation-wide retail banks
Bank Compensation Evaluation Recruitment Education
1. Kook Min 
Bank (27,000 
employees)
1. Manager: performance pay
2. Staff: seniority pay
3. Executive: stock option
4. All employees: collective 
performance bonus according 
to profit settlement
5. Specific group and 
individuals such as sales teams 
and fund managers: group or 
individual performance bonus
MBO 1. Occasional 
recruitment
2. Internet 
applications
3. Use of 
employment 
agencies
4. Preference 
for irregular 
employees
1.Main method: 
Cyber education
2. Support of 
self-education.
3. Cultivation of 
financial experts by 
external institutions
2. Woo Ri
Bank
(14,000)
As above MBO/
Multi­
evaluation
As above 1. As above
2. Education by exams 
every two month.
3. Cho Hung
Bank
(10,000)
As above MBO As above 1. Main method: 
Cyber education
2. Support of 
self-education
3. Cultivation of 
financial experts by 
external institutions
4. Foreign 
Exchange 
Bank (6,700)
1. All employees: performance 
Pay
2. Executives: stock option
MBO As above 1. Main method: 
Cyber education
2. Support of 
self-education
3. Cultivation of 
financial experts by 
external institutions
5. Shin Han 
Bank (5,500)
1. Managers: performance pay 
and stock option
2. Staff: seniority pay
3. Executives: stock option
4. All employees: collective 
performance bonus according 
to profit settlement
5. Specific groups and 
individuals such as sales teams 
and fund managers: group or 
individual performance bonus
MBO/
Multi­
evaluation
As above 1. Main method:
Cyber education
2. Support of 
self-education
3. Cultivation of 
financial experts by 
external institutions 4. 
System of compulsory 
education hours in 
branch
6. Jae 11 
Bank (5000 
employees
1. Managers: performance pay
2. Staff: seniority pay
3. Executives: stock option
4. All employees: collective 
performance bonus according 
to profit settlement
5. Specific groups and 
individuals such as sales teams 
and fund managers: group or 
individual performance bonus.
Points
rating44/
Multi­
evaluation
As above 1. Main method: Cyber 
education.
2. Support of 
self-education.
3. Cultivation of 
financial experts by 
external institutions.
Source: Interviews with union officers and personnel managers in the six banks by the author
(November 2003)
44 Points rating is an analytical, factor-based method of job evaluation. Under a point-rating scheme, jobs 
are scored under a number of different job characteristics or factors, such as skill, effort, know-how, level 
of responsibility, and decision-making.
133
<Table 4-28> KFIU: basic information (December 2003)
Date of 
establishment
March 2000: Prior to this, bank unions belonged to a federation 
of enterprise unions, Korea Federation Financial Unions 
(KFFU).
Scope of organizing Workers of banks and financial institutions.
Number of members 79,820: 1). 53,719 (67.3 percent in retail banks) and 26,101 (32.3 
percent in other institutions). 2). 56,039 (70.04 percent) male and 
23,781 (29.96 percent) female
Number of branches 35 (14 at retail banks and 21 at other institutions)
Number of 
sub-branches
6,000
Number of full-time 
officers45
30246: 32 at headquarters and 270 at branches
Union density 58.1 percent (79,820/136,812)
Form of collective 
bargaining
Multi-employers bargaining between the KFIU and a federation 
of employers
Source: 2003 KFIU Annual Report (2004a).
<Table 4-29> Change of the number of union members in the KFIU
Year 1992 1995 1997 1998 2002 2003 Decrease
ratio
No of 
members47
139,206 137,883 127,507 110,666 77,399 79,820 *1992-
2002:
44%
*1997-
2002:
39%
Source: KFIU 2002 Annual Report and KCWC (2003).
<Table 4-30> Union density in retail banks (2002)
Date No of union
members
(A)
Total No of 
employees 
(regular and 
irregular) 
(B)
No of 
regular 
employees 
(C)
Union
density
(A/B)
Union 
density of 
regular 
employees 
(A/C)
2002 53,975 89,832 66,881 60% 80.7%
April 1998 75,579 108,191 95,236 69.9% 79.4%
Sources: KFIU Annual Report (1999, 2002), FSC’s statistics (2003).
45 The number of full-time officers is decided by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the 
employer and each union branch. The CBA states that the president of the branch union is able to select 
the full-time officer, and that the company pays for that person.
46 This means that there is one full-time officer to every 264 members (79,820/302) of KFIU (see Section 
3.4).
47 The membership of the KFIU is dominated by men and women employed by banks and affiliated 
financial institutions. Those employed by insurance companies, security companies, and investment 
companies generally belong to another union, the KFFCU.
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<Table 4-31> Union density in Korea
1989 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
19.8% 12.2% 12.6% 11.9% 12% 12%
Source: 2003 Labour White Paper, by Ministry of Labour
<Table 4-32> Changes in collective bargaining before and after 2000
Union
Form
Bargaining
Form
Representative 
of Union
Representative 
of Employer
Level of 
bargaining
Before
2000
Enterprise
union
Enterprise
bargaining
Union chief of 
each bank union
Chief executive 
of each bank
Each bank
After
2000
Industrial
union
Industrial
bargaining
President of 
industrial union
Chief Executive 
of each bank (or 
Chairman of 
Bank
Association)
Banking
industry
Sources: KFIU Annual Reports (1998-2004), Kong (2002).
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CHAPTER 5. STRIKES IN THE BANKING 
SECTOR: CASE STUDIES
5.1. Introduction
The bailout fund from IMF was conditional upon the restructuring of financial 
institutions. Consequently, in 1998, the Government commenced the restructuring of the 
financial industry in earnest, closing insolvent banks, pursuing bank-large-sizing by 
mergers, and privatizing banks. The net result was mass redundancies in the banking 
sector.
Trade unions in the banking sector went on four strikes between 1998 and 2003 in order 
to protect employees’ jobs and to attain their demands for financial reform. The first 
strike was held in September 1998. It was an industry-wide strike. The second strike, 
also an industry-wide strike, was held in July 2000. In December 2000, the unions at 
Kook Min Bank (KMB) and Housing Bank (HB) went on the third strike, their being to 
prevent the Government-enforced merger between the two banks. The fourth strike, by 
Cho Hung Bank (CHB) union members, was held in June 2003. Its aim was to prevent 
the sale of the bank to Shin Han Bank (SHB), a privatization venture by the 
Government.
This chapter takes a detailed look at the strikes. Why was strike action taken? How did 
the strikes proceed? What was achieved by the strikes? Of especial concern (it is the 
main subject of my thesis) is an account of the reasons for the success or failure of the 
strikes, which were all led (or coordinated by the KFIU (previously the KFFU).
All four strikes (including the pre-strike battles) received extensive media attention 
from their commencements to their conclusions. In addition to this coverage, there were 
also published reports on the disputes from the KFIU and the CHBU (KFIU, 1998- 
2004; CHBU, 2004). This chapter has drawn on these sources (i.e. media and union 
reports).
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5.2. The trade unions’ response to restructuring in the banking sector
The Korean government has been embarked upon an ongoing programme of 
restructuring of the banking sector. The programme can be divided into three, the first 
restructuring, the second restructuring, and the third restructuring, each with its own 
focus and content. In terms of strike action, trade unions in the banking sector have 
responded to the restructuring through two industry-wide strikes and two enterprise- 
level strikes.
5.2.1. The first restructuring and the trade unions’ response
The first restructuring of the banking sector lasted from the first half of 1998 to the first 
half of 1999. The FSC chose unhealthy banks according to the BIS standard, closing 
five and merging four of them with other banks after inputting public funds (Table 5-1). 
Consequently, the number of banks decreased from 26 to 17 and the number of 
employees from 113,994 to 74,744 during this period. Employment instability became a 
big issue in industrial relations, and unions began to actively demand employment 
security. In September 1998, the Korean Federation of Financial Unions (KFFU) went 
on an industry-wide strike (Table 5-2).
5.2.2. The second restructuring and the trade unions’ response
The second restructuring of the banking sector covered the period from the second half 
of 1999 to the second half of 2001. During this time, the Government first pursued a 
merger between Kook Min Bank (KMB) and Housing Bank (HB) in order to improve 
the international competitiveness that it considered a larger bank would have. Secondly, 
the Government established a financial holding company with responsibility to 
rearrange insolvent banks that had no other possibility of survival. The Government had 
attempted to help these banks survive by inputting public funds in the first restructuring 
period. Consequently, KMB and HB merged (keeping the name of the former) while six 
insolvent banks came under the control of a financial holding company. Therefore, the 
number of both banks and employees decreased respectively from 17 to 15 and from 
74,744 to 68,360 (Table 5-2).
During this time, trade un io n s responded actively to the restructuring. First, trade unions 
transferred their organization form from enterprise unions to an industrial union, the
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Korean Financial Industrial Union (KFIU), formed in March 2000. Secondly, in July 
2000, they went on a powerful industry-wide strike to change the direction of the 
Government’s restructuring, succeeding in gaining an agreement from the Government. 
Thirdly, the Kook Min Bank Union (KMBU) and the Housing Bank Union (HBU), both 
branches of the KFIU, went on a strike under the KFIU’s command in order to prevent 
the merger being forced by the Government. Although the strike was ultimately 
unsuccessful it virtually brought the banks’ business to a standstill for seven days.
5.2.3. The third restructuring and the trade unions’ response
The third restructuring of the banking sector occurred between the first half of 2002 and 
the second half of 2003. During this period, the Government pursued two policies, the 
privatization of those banks which had received public funds during the first 
restructuring period, and bank large-sizing through mergers. The Government sold the 
Seoul Bank to the Ha Na Bank and the Cho Hung Bank to the Shin Han Bank. 
Therefore, the number of both banks and employees decreased further (Table 5-2).
During the period, the Cho Hung Bank Union, CHBU (also a branch of the KFIU), 
undertook an eight-month battle, at the end of which the bank’s business was stopped 
for four days. The CHBU eventually entered into a successful (for employees) 
agreement with the bank’s buyer and the Government (Table 5-9).
5.3. Industry-wide strikes in September 1998 and July 2000
5.3.1. Industry-wide strike in September 1998
The Government, in its application to the IMF for a bailout fund, promised economic 
reforms. Thus began, in earnest, the restructuring of the financial sector. The 
Government ordered banks to reform their management practices. The result was 
extensive restructuring, which particularly affected unhealthy banks. On 29 June 1998 
the Government closed five insolvent banks. The trade unions responded, protesting 
against the restructuring at a rally held on 27 June 1998. The leaders of the Korean 
Federation of Financial Unions (KFFU) also shaved their hair off as a demonstration of 
their determination to fight against the restructuring at a rally in front of Myung Dong
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4RCathedral on 6 July 1998. In addition, the unions asked their members to ballot on the 
subject of a strike on 9 July and established a strike fund (collecting donations from 
members).
The second step in the restructuring process was the demand, by the FSC on 18 August, 
o f nine unhealthy banks that they reduce the size of their workforce as a precondition 
for the investment of public funds needed to keep them afloat. The precise details of this 
step were, first, seven unhealthy banks (Cho Hung, Han II, Sang Yup, Foreign 
Exchange, Pyung Hya, Kang Won, and Chung Puk) were required to reduce staff 
numbers by 30 percent (including those who had already retired in 1998) before the end 
of 1998 (a further 10 percent reduction was required by the end of 1999), the staff being 
paid a retirement bonus equivalent to five months salary, and, secondly, the two most 
seriously unhealthy banks (Seoul Bank, Jae II Bank), for whom foreign buyers were to 
be sought (Table. 5-1), were required to reduce staff numbers by 50 percent (including 
those who had already retired in 1998) by the end of 1998, again with a retirement 
bonus equivalent to five months salary.
First of all, the unions of the nine banks mandated their right of negotiation to the 
KFFU, who undertook to organize opposition to the restructuring. Negotiations between 
unions and employers regarding staff reduction were held -  at three meetings -  between 
7 and 15 September. However, the parties could not reach an agreement, and employers 
declared the negotiations at a close. Nevertheless, the unions demanded that the 
negotiations continue, and prevented the employers from departing. The Government 
sent riot police into the negotiation venue, and the union delegates were arrested. The 
union cause appeared ruined. However, the unions held two big rallies, on 16 and 19 
September, which attracted more than 10,000 members. There, the unions accused the 
Government of oppression and began preparing for a general strike against the 
restructuring.
The unions’ demands at the negotiations had been: 1. cancellation of the Government’s 
forced demand for staff reduction; 2. guarantee of autonomous negotiation between
48 Myung Dong Cathedral: The Cathedral has been a kind of Holy Land (or sanctuary) of the democracy 
(and labour) movement in Korea since the 1960s when a military government took power through a coup, 
and thereafter suppressing democracy. Democracy, labour and other social activists have held 
demonstrations at the Cathedral whenever they have been involved in critical, difficult to legally resolve, 
issues (http://hot.empas.com/vogue/read.html?_bid=unbearable&asn=8521).
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unions and employers, and; 3. guarantee of 12 months retirement bonus for departures. 
These were not issues that the management of the unhealthy banks could deal with. 
Thus, the KFFU submitted an application requesting mediation of labour dispute 
between the union and the Financial Supervision Commission (FSC) to the Labour 
Relations Committee (LRC)49. However, the LRC returned the application to the KFFU, 
explaining that the FSC was not an employer according to Korean labour law. The 
unions felt that they had no option but to take strike action in order to resolve these 
issues. The strike was announced for 29 September.
On the eve of the strike, about 20,000 union members (out of a total number of 36,569 
staff employed at the nine banks) gathered in front of Myung Dong Cathedral, the site 
of many previous demonstrations, and staged an all-night sit-in demonstration. During 
the night, the head of the FSC visited the site to meet the head of the KFFU, thus 
recommencing negotiations; however, they were unable to reach an agreement. At 6 am 
on the following morning, the head of the KFFU formally announced that the union 
would proceed with the strike. Employers then changed the method of negotiation from 
an industry-level one to the individual bank-level in order to prevent the strike. They 
succeeded in settling individual agreements at Jae IL Bank and Seoul Bank in the 
morning with a mixture of conciliation and intimidation50. Thus, members of those two 
bank unions returned to work, meaning however that the heads of the two bank unions, 
in betraying the KFFU and the other bank unions, had broken the law as they had 
already mandated their negotiation right to the KFFU. This crack in union solidarity 
weakened the position of the union delegates at the negotiations. Nevertheless, 7,000 
members still remained at the demonstration site, and the strike continued until 1 pm, 
when an agreement was finally reached. The strike thus lasted for four hours, from 9 am 
to 1 pm. It was the first industry-wide strike in Korean banking history. Due to the 
strike, many bank branches could not operate properly during the day (Seoul Daily and 
Han Kye Rae Daily, 30 September 1998). However, the Government, in order to save 
face (i.e. by proving that it was able to resolve such situations) and to avoid complicated 
legal problems for the unions, did not agree that it had been a real strike. Thus, although 
the event had been declared, legally, to be a strike, the prosecution authority announced
49 Labour Relations Committee: The committee reconciles and arbitrates labour disputes according to 
labour law.
50 Employers both conciliated and threatened union officers: ‘our banks are different from other insolvent 
banks because they (i.e. ours) are the ones that the government will sell to foreign investors after inputting 
the public funds to them (Table.5-1). However, if  our employees go on strike the government’s policy 
might change. The result might be a merger through the P&A method’.
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that it rescinded the decision to punish 95 union officials for organizing, and engaging 
in, an illegal strike.
The details of the agreement were as follows: 1. there would be a staff reduction 
(including already retired employees in 1998) of 32 percent within 1998; 2. Departing 
staff would be paid the equivalent of 9-12 months salary as a retirement bonus. It meant 
that, as a result of the strike action, the unions had reduced the percentage of staff to be 
laid off from between 40 and 50 percent to 32 percent, and had persuaded the banks to 
increase the retirement bonus from the equivalent of three-five months salary to 9-12 
months salary (Table 5-3). Han Kye Rae Daily (30 September1998) observed that the 
strike confirmed that staff reduction was impossible without union agreement, and such 
outcomes had been achieved because of the unions’ successful mobilization (a reference 
to the fact that 20,000 members had participated in the sit-in demonstration held on the 
evening before the strike) and the collection of a substantial strike fund (approximately 
£2,500,000).
Nevertheless, union members concluded that the strike had been a failure, and felt 
defeated (KFIU, 2000). They felt that union unity was very weak, too weak to confront 
and overcome the Government’s restructuring plans. Moreover, as a result of the 
compromise agreement, 9,026 additional employees would be losing their jobs by the 
end of 1998. The total number of departures from the nine banks in 1998 was 
approximately 16,000 (Don Aha Daily, 30 September 1998).
The strike strategy had been to mobilize union members only in order to reduce the 
percentage of employees who would lose their jobs. As already noted, the KFFU 
succeeded in attracting approximately 20,000 members to the pre-strike demonstration. 
However, they failed to maintain the unity between union members until the end of 
strike. The problem stemmed from the union form (each bank was represented by its 
own union, i.e. they were enterprise unions). The union members had no experience of 
an industry-wide strike. Their preparation was poor as they had no precedent from 
which to learn. In addition, they were unable to make their case a political issue because 
the public, because of the national financial crisis, understood the need for, and 
generally supported, the Government’s restructuring plans.
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5.3.2. Industry-wide strike in July 2000
5.3.2.1. Background
After the Government had completed the first restructuring of the financial sector, it 
began to prepare for the second restructuring in the second half of 1999 (Table 5-2). The 
KFIU and the Government consulted, from September 1999, on financial policy as it 
affected the second restructuring as members of the Special Committee of Financial 
Restructuring (SCFR) in the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC). At the SCFR, the 
KFIU requested that the Government explain, in detail, the direction of its restructuring 
policy.
However, the Government proved to be insincere in its attitude at the meetings. For 
instance, the core committee members from Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) 
and the FSC did not attend a SCFR meeting for seven months after the first meeting. 
Instead, the Government either sent lower-level officials to the meetings or, on 
occasions, nobody at all. Therefore, the consultations at the SCFR became meaningless, 
and the Government’s attitude provoked distrust and anger from the KFIU. In addition, 
the Government proceeded unilaterally with the second financial restructuring. For 
instance, it tried to introduce the Financial Holding Company (FHC)51 legislation in 
order to propel mergers between banks. Consequently, the KFIU felt that it had no 
choice but to go on strike if it was to prevent unilateral restructuring by the 
Government.
5.3.2.2. Mobilization
As the Government confirmed its intentions to proceed with the second financial 
restructuring on 7 June 2000, including an intention to pass the FHC legislation, at a 
meeting of economy-related ministers, the KFIU withdrew from the SCFR and 
announced that it would call a general strike.
First, the leaders of the KFIU and union branches held a rally on 16 June, declaring 
their determination to go to jail if necessary; they also shaved their hair as a symbol of 
their determination to fight against the restructuring.
51 Financial Holding Company: A company in a group of financial companies that holds shares in other 
financial companies (as its subsidiaries).
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Secondly, the KFIU held a big rally, attended by approximately 10,000 members, at a 
public park on 1 July. The formal declaration of a strike, to be held on 11 July, was 
made. The strike’s objective was to force the Government to cease its involvement in 
financial institutions. Around this period, the KFIU held other rallies; approximately 
50,000 members participated in ones held on 21 June and 3 July.
Thirdly, on 4 July, the KFIU announced its six formal demands to the Government. 
These were: 1. dismiss the Minister of Finance and Economy who is responsible for the 
failure and confusion of the financial market, and hold a hearing into the financial 
restructuring! 2. The Government has to take responsibility for the insolvent credits 
resulting from the Government’s involvement in financial institutions! 3. Enact special 
laws in order to eradicate the Government’s involvement in financial institutions! 4. 
Cancel the policy of forced mergers of financial institutions! 5. Repeal the hurried 
legislation regarding Financial Holding Companies! 6. Cancel the plan to separate the 
credit business from the cooperative associations! (Table 5-4).
Fourthly, the union submitted a mediation application of labour dispute to the Labour 
Relations Commission on 26 June. In compliance with Korean labour law it also asked 
approximately 65,000 members to vote on a strike on 3 July. Ninety percent of the 
members voted for the strike; union members also agreed to begin wearing casual 
clothing to work from 4 July. The head of the Tripartite Commission suggested that the 
head of the FSC should meet with the head of the union.
Fifthly, the union sought the support of outside (i.e. non-union) resources. On 5 July, 
the union and civic groups established a committee whose aims were the cessation of 
the Government’s involvement in financial firms and the development of the financial 
industry. The organization was to support the fight by the KFIU.
Sixthly, the KFIU collected £5,000,000 in strike funds from members. The union let 
members submit a leave of absence for five days to their banks in order to be able to 
participate in the strike legally.
Seventhly, the union exerted political pressure, requesting the support of opposition 
MPs in delaying the passing of the FHC legislation in the National Assembly. This was
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a success, in that the legislation was delayed until 10 July. This placed the FSC under 
enormous pressure, forcing it to be much more positive during the negotiations.
Lastly, the union requested that its members gather at a stadium at Yun Se University 
(in the centre of Seoul) on the evening of 10 July, on the eve of the strike. 
Approximately 30,000 union members (out of a total of 65,000 in bank unions, and out 
of a total of 83,000 members in the KFIU) participated in the rally which continued 
until the formal commencement of the strike at 8 am on the following day. (The media 
estimated the crowd at 30,000, the union at 40,000. and the FSC at 25,000.) However, 
two bank unions (E Bank and K Bank branches of the KFIU) announced their 
withdrawal from the strike around lunchtime due to pressure from their employers and a 
difference of interest related to the FHC legislation. Thus, the number of strikers 
decreased to approximately 20,000 (the media and the union’s calculation was 20,000; 
the FSC placed the figure at approximately 16,000). The media argued that this lack of 
unity was a characteristic of white-collar unions (Mun Ha Daily, 12 July 2000). 
Nevertheless, 20,000 strikers was still an impressive number, and their commitment was 
apparent despite the fact that it rained intermittently throughout the day.
As a result of the strike, the business of several banks was partially paralyzed and 
customers were seriously inconvenienced. Approximately 40 percent of the employees 
of Han Bit Bank, Seoul Bank, and Cho Hung Bank participated in the strike. The FSC 
reported that deposits of about £800 million were transferred from strike banks to non­
strike banks because of the strike (Kook Min Daily, 13 July 2000).
At this strike, the KFIU began to use a new method of communication with its 
members, the telephone community service, the so-called “companions’ room”. It is a 
cheap and convenient telephone service which allows members of a group to send and 
receive voice messages. The union used the service to inform union members (via their 
mobile phones) of the strike venue, meeting time, and the decision to return to work. 
Due to the strike, negotiations recommenced at 1 pm. The union and the FSC reached 
an agreement at 7.20 pm. The head of the KFIU announced the formal end of the strike 
to members at 8 pm. The strikers had been together for exactly 24 hours, with the strike 
itself lasting officially for 12 hours (8 am to 8 pm on 11 July).
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This strike was much stronger than the one that had been held in September 1998. In the 
earlier strike, union members (all representing enterprise unions) from just nine 
insolvent banks had participated, and the unity between unions had been weak. 
However, in the 2000 strike, more union members from all banks participated. Not only 
did they do so under the leadership of an industrial union, but the preparation and 
general organization of the strike were much more thorough. It was also a genuine 
industry-wide strike as all the issues were related to the second restructuring, something 
which affected all banks.
The success was partly due the union having learned from the September 1998 strike, 
which the leaders of the KJFIU had concluded had been a failure (KFIU, 2000). For 
instance, since then (in March 2000) the form of union had been transformed from 
enterprise to industrial in order to respond more effectively to the second restructuring. 
Secondly, unions were better prepared, undertaking a number of activities before the 
strike. These included the public declaration by union leaders of the commitment to risk 
going to jail, and the holding of regional rallies attracting approximately 50,000 
members.
In the face of such organized opposition, the Government had no alternative but to 
actively engage in the negotiation process. The strike would have been prolonged had it 
failed to do so. After intensive negotiations, lasting from 1 pm to 7.20 pm on the day of 
the strike, an agreement was produced.
5.3.2.3. Negotiation
There was no negotiation between the union and the Government until a day before the 
strike. On 4 July, as the strike day neared, the head of the Tripartite Commission 
recommended to the head of the FSC that he begin negotiations with delegates from the 
KFIU. The FSC therefore had no choice but to engage in negotiation. The first meeting 
took place on 7 July. Two further meetings were held on 9 and 10 July. However, the 
parties could not reach a compromise before the day of the strike. The negotiations were 
conducted at two levels, chief-level and working-level. The chief-level negotiation
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involved the heads of the KFIU and the FSC, and it was they who made the final 
decision. The working-level negotiations were held between executives; it was they 
who formulated agreements for consideration by the chiefs. The first working-level 
meeting was held from 11.50 pm, 10 July to 4 am, 11 July, but it failed to produce a
145
potential agreement. The second working-level meeting began a few hours later, at 9.15 
am, and it did produce an agreement which could be presented to the heads. 
Negotiations between the heads of the two organizations began at 1 pm. The parties 
produced a final agreement at 7.20 pm.
There was no precedent in Korean history for the signing of a collective agreement 
related to a labour dispute between the union and the Government. Thus, the agreement 
was announced as a decision of the Tripartite Commission on 12 September. The KFIU 
had obtained a promise from the Government that it (the Government) would not be 
involved in financial institutions, the permission for a trial of management 
normalization by banks (that are judged to be able to solve insolvent bonds for 
themselves and to survive individually although they received public funds), the 
guarantee of personnel and organization reduction according to autonomous 
consultation between unions and employers, and the payment of debts for which the 
Government had a responsibility (see the content of the July agreement in Table 5-4). In 
return, the union conceded that the Government could proceed with elements of the 
second financial restructuring, such as the FHC legislation, subject to the union’s 
agreement. The most important outcome of the agreement was that the Government and 
the union would now decide on the direction of financial policy together. Therefore, the 
union attained a position of direct influence on government policy.
However, the agreement mainly dealt with the basic direction and execution of the 
second financial restructuring. There thus remained the possibilities of conflicts with 
regard to the actual details of restructuring (KTC, 2000).
5.3.2.4. Strategy
The union’s strategy was to stop the second restructuring of the financial sector through 
the development of a justification for a strike that would win public support, the 
mobilization of both internal and external resources, and the maximum use of current 
political opportunities. First, the union sought, as justification for its action, the 
eradication of the Government’s inappropriate involvement in the actual running of 
financial institutions. It was hoped that this would appeal to bankers, union members, 
and the public. To do this, the union referred to several instances of government 
intervention: 1. The Government had appointed a Vice-Chairman of the FSC as the 
CEO of Kook Min Bank in disregard of legal process. 2. It forcefully allocated bonds
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valued at £5 billion to banks in order to support capital investment to composite 
financial firms. These were high-risk bonds, and would eventually become debts for the 
banks. 3. It did not compensate the loss resulting from the £5 billion economy 
cooperation loan to Russia that it had guaranteed. 4. The Government forced banks to 
make loans valued at £2 billion to the Dae Woo Group. These also became debts for the 
banks. The union argued that the Government transferred the responsibility of the 
financial crisis to those working in the financial sector when, in fact, the insolvency of 
the banks stemmed from instances of government involvement, such as those described 
above.
Secondly, with the shaving of their heads and their declaration that they were willing to 
go to jail the union leaders tried to mobilize support for a strike from their members. In 
addition, various collective actions were undertaken before the strike. These included 
the holding of big rallies, a strike vote, the collection of strike funds, the wearing of 
casual clothing to work, the submission of leave of absence requests, and the agreement 
from IT operators that they would participate in the strike. The last of these was 
particularly effective as the Government greatly feared the consequences of a 
breakdown of the banking sector’s IT network. (However, in the end, the union did not 
ask IT operators to participate in the strike).
Thirdly, the union used outside resources in order to extend its sphere of influence. 
These included the Tripartite Commission, civic groups, and the national centre of 
unions. The use of all these assisted greatly in persuading the Government to participate 
in the negotiations.
Lastly, the union adroitly took advantage of political opportunities. The union utilized 
the period leading up to the General Election in April to publicize their opposition to the 
restructuring. The union prepared a pamphlet containing its argument against the 
restructuring, and distributed it to the people on the street and at canvassing places. The 
union also appealed to opposition MPs to prevent the passing of the FHC legislation. 
As a result, the MPs delayed the FHC legislation in the National Assembly, adding to 
the pressure on the Government to compromise with the union.
To sum up, the union’s strike strategy was to mobilize both internal and external 
resources and to utilize possible political opportunities through the development of a
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strike justification. As a result of a mobilization strategy employing all of the above, the 
union was able to attain successful outcomes from the strike.
5.3.2.5. Evaluation
Evaluations of the strike were conducted by the media, the union, and the Government. 
The media appraised the strike as a win-win result for both the union and the 
Government, as it had ended with an “exquisite” compromise (Mun Hha Daily. 12 July 
2000). The Government and the union compromised, each making concessions and each 
committing to financial reform. The union attained the Government’s promise that it 
(the Government) would cease direct involvement in financial institutions, compensate 
bank losses that had resulted from that involvement, and force no more mergers (Table 
5-4). The Government received union approval to proceed with the second restructuring 
of the financial sector, subject to the union’s agreement (Kyung Hyang Daily, 12 July 
2000). The media noted that the strike had been the first led by an industrial union and 
that the amount of strike funds, £5,000,000, had been the biggest in Korean history. In 
addition, the contents of the agreement were directly related to the Government’s 
financial policy, and that high-level officials had participated in the negotiations. Thus, 
the strike served as a new model for the Korean labour movement. However, the strike 
still revealed one limitation of the participation by branch unions in an industrial union 
strike, as some withdrew during the middle of the strike (Mun Hha Daily, 12 July 
2000).
The union’s conclusion was that the strike had been a great victory. According to an 
official of the KFIU (Han Kook Economy Daily, 12 July 2000), it demonstrated the 
powerful mobilization ability of a white-collar industrial union and suggested a new 
model (i.e. negotiation between the union and the Government on the issue of 
government policy) for the labour movement. The head of the KFIU argued that the 
strike was a victory for the attainment of autonomous management of banks through 
labour power following the Government’s promise that its officials would no longer be 
directly involved in the running of financial institutions (Han Kook Economy Daily, 12 
July 2000). However, as several union branches either did not participate in the strike or 
withdrew during it, some members concluded that white-collar labour unions preferred 
individual interests to industry-wide interests.
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A spokesman for the Blue House (the Presidential Palace) described the compromise 
between the union and the FSC as a victory for democracy. He argued that the process 
and results of negotiation reflected well on democratic procedures, maintained social 
order, and accomplished the reform that the President had emphasized (Kook Min 
Daily, 13 July).
Finally, the head of the FSC told reporters after the compromise “Please, understand the 
results as the Government’s answers to the union’s requests, and that it is an example of 
the Government’s acceptance of union requests as well as the requests of employers and 
shareholders” (Se Ge Daily, 12 July).
Although the union believed that it had achieved good outcomes from the strike the 
Government also thought that the compromise agreement justified their programme of 
financial reform. The reason for the latter was that the agreement confirmed the basic 
direction of, and execution of, the second financial restructuring. The possibility of 
conflicts related to the more detailed contents of the agreement remained, especially 
when the restructuring programme proceeded in earnest in the future (KTC, 2000).
5.3.2.6. Learning
The success of the strike was derived, in part, from learning the lessons of the failure of 
the September 1998 strike. On that earlier occasion, the unions had felt defeated and 
desperate even though they had managed to reduce the level of the staff reduction. 
Overall though, because of poor organization they had not achieved totally satisfactory 
outcomes. First of all, they were disappointed with the poor solidarity between bank 
unions. Just nine insolvent banks’ unions had participated in the strike. Furthermore, 
several unions seceded from the federation during the negotiation and struck individual 
deals with their employers. (This was one of the drawbacks of the enterprise union 
system; each union was free to negotiate with its own bank, independently.) Thus, the 
influence of the strike was diluted significantly, forcing union leaders to finish the 
negotiation quickly while their bargaining position was still relatively strong.
Consequently, in March 2000, unions first transformed their form from enterprise 
unions to an industrial union, with the establishment of the KFIU, in order to strengthen 
their solidarity. Only then did they respond to the second restructuring. The KFIU could 
coordinate the participation of all financial institutions’ unions in the strike. Secondly,
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unions based their demands around the Government’s financial policy. As this affected 
all financial institutions, the union could count on the support of all banks, civic groups 
and political parties. Thirdly, the unions encouraged IT operators to participate in the 
strike in order to increase the pressure on the Government although the union actually 
did not mobilize them for the strike. None of these tactics had been employed in 
September 1998. In fact, all were developed in the light of the failure of that strike.
5.4. Strike at Kook Min Bank in December 2000
5.4.1. Background of strike
Under the KFIU’ command, the Kook Min Bank Union (KMBU) and the Housing Bank 
Union (HBU)52 went on strike to prevent the Government’s merger plan between the 
two banks. The two unions contended that the merger would bring about mass layoffs 
and that the forced merger was a breach of an agreement53 contracted between the 
Government and the KFIU on 17 July 2000. The main goal of the second restructuring 
of the financial sector had been a bank large-sizing policy, achieved by mergers 
between banks, which the Government believed was necessary to improve international 
competitiveness. The merger of banks meant huge personnel reductions. The KFIU had 
considered that it had no choice but to go on strike to protect workers’ jobs.
In accordance with the July Agreement (Section 2 in Table 5-4), the Management 
Evaluation Commission of Bank (MECB) evaluated the management normalization 
plans of unhealthy banks, announcing the results of their investigation into bank 
management on 8 November 2000. The Commission concluded that six banks54 could 
not survive independently. This meant that these banks would be merged with other 
banks. Thus, the second round of restructuring of banking was unavoidable. The main 
forms that the restructuring would take would be the establishment of a financial 
holding company and mergers between banks by the Government. Accordingly, the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) suggested a reform plan, financed by public
52 The KMBU and the HBU are branches of the KFIU. In each case, the branch union (i.e. KMBU and 
HBU) is the only union at its bank. Korean labour law prohibits union pluralism at enterprise level until 
the end of 2006.
53 Agreement Clause 3; There will be no forced merger instigated by the Government in the second 
financial reform (Table 5-4).
54 The six banks were Jae II Bank, Seoul Bank, Kyung Nam Bank, Kwang Ju Bank, Je Ju Bank, and 
Pyung Hya Bank.
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funds, to the National Assembly on 28 November. The core of the reform plan was that 
insolvent banks had to attach a union’s agreement to personnel restructuring when they 
contracted a memorandum of understanding (MOU)55 with the Government in order to 
receive public funding. Union resistance to personnel restructuring was thus blocked in 
advance. Agreeing to redundancies was, in effect, a precondition of the receipt of public 
funds for insolvent banks.
The KFIU contended that the Government’s enforcement of the agreement between 
employers and unions regarding restructuring was a breach of the July agreement 
contracted between the Government and the KFIU as part of a strike settlement in July 
2000: “There will no be forced mergers instigated by the Government in the second 
financial reform. The Government will respect collective bargaining agreements 
between unions and employers regarding the reduction of personnel and reorganization” 
(Table 5-4). The KFIU stated that it could not accept the Government’s request for 
additional personnel reductions because insolvent banks had already cut staff numbers 
in the previous October.
The MOFE threatened to dispose of insolvent banks through Purchase and Assumption 
(P&A)56 instead of establishing a financial holding company if the union did not agree 
to the downsizing. An MOFE official described the Government’s position clearly: 
“There is no way to avoid self-help efforts, including personnel reduction, because the 
inputting of public funds to insolvent banks is to increase each bank’s competitiveness. 
So, if banks refuse the self-help option they will be disposed of according to P&A” 
(Dong Aha Daily, 1 December 2000). The KFIU responded in strong terms, announcing 
that it would call a general strike if the Government compelled the restructuring and did 
not respect the July agreement.
Nevertheless, the Chairman of the FSC issued a statement on 8 December, revealing the 
establishment of a financial holding company led by Han Bit Bank as well as mergers 
between healthy banks. The specific merger between healthy banks to which he referred 
was that between KMB and HB. The Chairman emphasized that the “Korean banking
55 MOU (Memorandum of Understanding): This refers generally to appended contracts of a mother 
agreement, dealing with follow-up steps.
P&A (Purchase and Assumption): With this method the Government lets healthy financial institutions 
assume assets and debts of insolvent financial institutions. In the case, undertaking institutions do not take 
employment responsibility of employees of insolvent institutions, and they can reject excessive debts.
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sector would be able to have global competitiveness when it has at least two banks 
within the top 100 world banks. Such banks will come into existence soon, by the end 
of 2000” (Han Kook Economy Daily, 9 December 2000).
The announcement of mergers between healthy banks was a surprise attack. It was the 
starting signal of the Government’s bank large-sizing policy. The KFIU, the KMBU and 
the HBU announced that they opposed the merger plan and that they would respond to 
the merger through various industrial actions, including a strike. They understood that 
the merger would be synonymous with mass layoffs and that other mergers would 
follow.
KMB was the biggest bank in Korea, with 11,026 regular employees and 3,493 irregular 
employees, 600 branches, and assets valued at £45 billion. HB was the third biggest 
bank in the country, with 8,855 regular employees and 3,244 irregular employees, 557 
branches, and assets of £38.5 billion. Many of the bankers were also members of their 
respective bank’s unions; the KMBU had 8,166 members and the HBU had 7,127 
members. The biggest shareholder of KMB was Goldman Sachs, with 11.07 percent of 
the shares, while the biggest shareholder in HB was the Government, which owned 14.5 
percent of the shares. The Government announced that the merged bank would be the 
60th biggest bank in the world, with assets valued at £83.5 billion
5.4.2. Mobilization
As soon as the KMBU and the HBU heard of the merger plan on 8 December 2000, 
they deployed collective actions, including a strike, in order to prevent the merger plan. 
However, they had not enough time to develop a proper strategy, one necessary to 
achieve their object. Therefore, they failed to attain their goal although they succeeded 
in mobilizing members for a strike.
5.4.2.I. Progress before the strike
As soon as the unions recognized the Government’s merger plan of their banks, they 
began to prepare for a strike which they hoped would force the Government to cancel 
the merger. However, they had just 13 days to prepare for the strike, from 8 to 21 
December. During this period, they undertook several activities designed to prevent the 
merger. These included a membership rally, a sit-in demonstration, a strike vote, a
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collection of strike funds, and the recommendation to staff that they wear casual 
clothing to work.
As the rumour of a merger between HMB and HB began receiving media attention on 8 
December, the leaders of the KMBU and the HBU judged that it was imperative that 
they act quickly to cancel the merger plan at an early stage. Thus, they at once set about 
mobilizing employees. On 11 December, they informed employees in a union notice: 
“The unions have learned that the merger between KMB and HB is being propelled 
secretly behind closed doors... Thus, huge downsizing of personnel and organization 
will be unavoidable in the short and long run although employers are discussing the 
merger in terms of an increase of share price and the synergy effect of finance... 
Nobody knows who will become the target of staff cuts if about 30 percent of the 
workforce has to leave the new bank... The KMBU and the HBU will take all kinds of 
measures in order to break up the merger plan” (Han Gye Rae Daily, 12 December 
2000). The unions then asked employees to ballot if they supported the merger or if they 
supported a strike against it. The object of the vote was to marshal employees’ energy 
and commitment against the Government-forced merger.
On the evening of 12 December, 1,000 KMBU members staged a sit-in demonstration 
at the bank’s headquarters. They asked the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in front of his 
office for the cancellation of merger plan. It was effectively a blockade of the CEO’s 
office; the CEO was unable to leave his office until 14 December. He had a continuous 
round of meetings with union delegates as well as some of his own management staff 
who recommended the cancellation of the merger plan. During this period, one union 
member even poured gasoline over himself, and threatened suicide, an indication of the 
strength of feeling against the merger. As a result, the CEO had to sign an agreement to 
the effect that the current merger discussions had been temporarily suspended. “The 
merger talks will be advanced transparently after listening to employees’ opinions, that 
is if the merger talks proceed again afterwards” (Mae IL Economy Daily, 15 December 
2000).
The Government’s plan to make a public announcement of the merger by 14 December 
was thus delayed. The media reported that the merger plan did seem to have been 
cancelled (Kyung Hyang Daily, 15 December 2000). However, the Government argued
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that the impetus for merger was coming from major shareholders, not the CEOs. 
Therefore, the promise of the CEO was an almost meaningless statement.
As preparation for a strike, the KMBU and the HBU held a meeting of shop stewards on 
16 December. The two unions then put a vote to strike to members on 18 December. 
Almost all union members took part in the on-line vote; 99.98 percent of the total 
members of the KMBU voted, with 95.18 percent (of voters) voting in favour of the 
strike. At HB, 91 percent of total union members participated in the vote, and 89.8 
percent (of voters) voted to strike.
From that day onwards, union members of the two banks started to wear casual clothing 
as a symbol of collective action. The two unions also collected £600,000 in strike funds 
from members. On the same day (18 December), the KFIU called the CC in order to 
deal with the issue and decided that the union members from all six banks57 identified 
by the MECB as requiring merging if they were to survive would go on strike together 
on 22 December in order to block the Government’s unilateral restructuring (i.e. the 
mergers). On 19 December, 1,100 team managers (non-union members) of KMB 
announced they would also wear casual clothing as a protest against the merger and, 
later, hand in their resignations if mergers became an ongoing government policy.
As it became clearer that the KFIU strike was about to become a reality, on 21 
December the Government declared that such a form of industrial action by the union 
would be illegal58, and that union leaders and participants would be arrested on the spot. 
According to Korean labour law, it was very difficult bank unions to legally strike 
because banking was considered a kind of public industry (see Section 4.6.5.2). In 
response, the KFIU announced its requests to the Government a day before going on 
strike. These were: 1. Honour the July agreement between the union and the 
Government (Table 5-4: Agreement Clause 3). 2. Censure ministers for the failure of 
the financial restructuring and economic policy.
The KFIU ordered the union members of KMB and HB to meet at the Financial 
Education Centre (FEC) in II San City at 9 pm 21 December. In response, 13,000
57 The six banks were KMB, HB, and four insolvent banks (Kyung Nam Bank, Kwang Ju Bank, Je Ju 
Bank, and Pyung Hya Bank). Seoul Bank and Jae II Bank were objectives to sell foreign investors 
individually (Table 5-1).
58 The union did not step on legal processes of strike and Korea labour law regulates that strike of 
managerial rights such as the decision of merger is illegal.
154
members of the two banks gathered there. This was 65 percent of the total number of 
regular employees of the two banks (13,000/20,000) and 95 percent of the union 
members (13,000/14,360). In addition, 2,500 union members of the four other insolvent 
banks gathered at Kyung Nam University in MaSan City.
Negotiations between the KFIU and the Government started at the Tripartite 
Commission office at 3 pm, 21 December An agreement was reached at 2 am, 22 
December (Table 5-7). After learning of the above agreement, union members of the 
four insolvent banks, who had met at MaSan City, dispersed at 5 am because their 
issues had been resolved. The media expressed the view that the Government had 
capitulated under the pressure of a threatened strike (Cho Sun Daily and Dong Aha 
Daily 23 December 2000). In other words, the media evaluated the content of the 
provisional agreement as a unanimous victory for the union.
5.4.2.2. Progress of the strike
However, members of the KMBU and the HBU who had gathered in the Financial 
Education Centre (FEC) in IL San City rejected the agreement. Unhappy with the 
outcomes of the negotiations they went on strike, demanding the complete cancellation 
of the merger plan. Leaders of the KFIU could not persuade them to change their minds 
on this issue59, although, to some extent, they also thought that the merger could not 
ultimately be prevented without a strike. The Government then utilized the fact of the 
illegality of the strike to renege on the agreement. The Government pushed the CEOs of 
the two banks to announce that they had contracted a MOU of the merger in the 
afternoon. It proceeded with a forceful break-up of the strike, and the prosecution issued 
a warrant for the arrest of 10 union leaders.
On the first day of the strike, the business of both banks was almost paralyzed. 
Customers could use just Cash Dispenser (CD)/Automatic Transfer Machines (ATMs)60. 
The bank was unable to honour the cheques of some business customers. The FSC 
promised to save those businesses seriously damaged by this. KMB confirmed that 130
59 In accordance with the provisional agreement, union leaders should have persuaded and dismissed 
members once to have negotiations with employers regarding the merger. Provisional Agreement Clause 
1; According to the July agreement, any merger between KMB and HB should be decided by autonomous 
negotiation between the unions and the employers (Table 5-7).
60 CD/ATM: A computerized machine usually attached to the outside wall of a High-Street bank or placed 
in convenient places for customers that enables customers to withdraw cash from their current accounts, 
especially outside normal banking hours.
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of a total of 330 employees in IT centres appeared for work while HB said that 450 of 
their 700 IT staff had reported for duty. Union members held an all-day sit-in 
demonstration on the grounds of the FEC. To prepare for a long strike, they set up a 
huge tented city (to accommodate male strikers as the FEC itself had enough space for 
female strikers only), and made fires in drums (for warmth). It looked like a refugee 
camp.
On the second day, the sit-in rally continued all day. The strikers sang movement songs, 
listened to speeches, and planned their strategy for the following day. Meanwhile, riot 
police waited outside to break up the strike. Two police helicopters made low 
intimidating sweeps over the makeshift tent city, distributing leaflets urging the strikers 
to disband. It seemed that the riot police was about to advance into the grounds. Thus, at 
the main gate, union members set up barricades to block the expected advance. In the 
meantime, HB reported that just 800 of the 4100 CD/ATMs were operating; the bank 
recommended that customers use other banks’ CD/ATMs. Other banks agreed to the 
exemption of the usual additional fee for the use of their CD/ATMs as a support 
measure.
On the morning of the third day, 2,500 riot policemen were once again stationed in front 
of the main gate; there was also a threat to break up the strike with the support of two 
police helicopters. The President of the KFIU announced “we will never go out before 
riot police break up our demonstration forcibly and we will gather again at another place 
if the police do break us up” (Han Gye Rae Daily, 25 December 2000). The CEOs of 
both banks issued an order to striking workers to return to work by 26 December, 
threatening disciplinary action against employees who failed to comply. In the 
afternoon, 300 KMB team managers brought 1,000 cakes to the strikers and joined the 
sit-in demonstration. Members of the strikers’ families also visited. They brought food 
and clothing. It was Christmas Eve, and a Christmas mood enveloped the place in the 
evening. A three-metre-high Christmas tree in front of the main building was lighted, 
and a children’s choir visited and sang the carols for the strikers. Several hundred 
Christians also held a Christmas mass. Meanwhile, the media reported that due to 
customers’ withdrawals from the two banks, the deposits in other banks had increased 
by about £1.4 billion during the first three days of the strike.
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On the fourth day, because of staff shortages, both banks decided to operate just key 
branches and to close small branches. The FSC announced that it would send their 200 
employees to the key branches in order to help business. In response, the KFIU sent a 
message to all their branch unions, recommending that a general strike on 28 December 
be held in support of the two banks’ strike. The message recommended three actions: 1. 
Conduct strike vote on 26 December. 2. Wear casual clothes and a ribbon as symbols of 
support of the strike on 27 December. 3. Go on strike at 9 am, 28 December.
On the fifth day, 26 December, KMB opened just 35 key branches (out of 594) and HB 
operated 84 key branches (out of a total of 533). However, the key branches found it 
hard to operate normally because of both the scarcity of staff and business congestion. 
The chief of one branch said: “Just 10 part-time employees among 23 employees were 
working (E-Daily, 27 December 2000)”. ATMs did not operate, except at key branches. 
The FSC reported that 5,568 regular employees, out of a total of 20,000, reported for 
work on this day. Meanwhile, the KFIU remained determined to continue with the 
strike, while also encouraging other banks’ unions to prepare for the supporting strike of 
28 December.
On the sixth day, 27 December, 7,000 riot policemen, with support from two 
helicopters, at last rushed into the grounds of the FEC. They were confronted by 10,000 
strikers, and a scrimmage ensued. In the process, several union members were injured 
by riot policemen’s cudgels and shields. However, the use of force prevailed, and the 
union members dispersed. Following instructions from the KFIU, the dispersed 
members met up again at a second venue. On the same day, following another order 
from the KFIU, 800 union members in IT centres, turned off their mobile phones, hid 
themselves, and awaited for the union’s instruction about the second gathering place. 
They communicated by the Internet in order to block interruption of phone calls by 
management. They were a last fortress for the strike. The impact of a refusal to work by 
the IT operators was viewed as the last throw of the dice for the union. At this time, the 
union used the Internet community site, the so-called “Internet companions’ society”, to 
communicate with union members employed at IT centres. The members of the 
community site had to input a password to enter the site. The union used the website to 
secretly inform members at the IT centre of the new location, thus preventing the police 
from learning of it.
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Meanwhile, the Government instructed the CEOs of the two banks to take disciplinary 
action against employees who did not return to work by 28 December. The FSC 
reported that 6957 of the 20,000 regular employees appeared in their offices on the day 
before that deadline.
The KFIU instructed members (by phone message) to gather at Korea University from 4 
pm on that afternoon, 27 December; however, the riot police blocked all gates of the 
university. The police also blocked other potential sites, such as Myung Dong 
Cathedral, Cho Ge Temple, and other universities. Eight hundred union members of IT 
centres were, however, able to meet in an education centre of the Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions in Yea Ju City (this had been agreed upon via the Internet community 
site, to which the police did not have access). The fate of the strike still hung in the 
balance at this point because, according to the KFIU’s request, the ballots from other 
bank unions for a supporting strike vote were progressing. Unfortunately, the results of
t
the ballots were disappointing, with fewer than 50 percent of members agreeing to the 
action. It meant that the KFIU were unable to carry on the strike. The failure to obtain 
backing for the supporting strike was a result of differences of interests between banks. 
Specifically, insolvent banks, reliant on public funds for survival, were reluctant to 
upset the Government. In addition, there was a residuum of antipathy against the two 
bank unions because they had not joined the July strike. The reason had been simple; as 
healthy banks, the two had not had any need of public funds.
At 4.20 pm, on the seventh day, 28 December, the President of the KFIU announced the 
cessation of the strike on the following conditions: 1. the merger talks must only 
progress through autonomous negotiation between employers and unions. 2. No 
punishment must be taken against union members who had participated in the strike. 3. 
Legal punishment of union leaders must be minimized.
The President of the KFIU ordered members to return to work. He mentioned the 
deepening difficulties faced by the financial market as the main reason for calling the 
strike off. However, the more pressing reasons were, in reality, the following: 1. the 
union had no alternative venue at which its members could gather. As a result, some 
members had already started to return to work; 2. The KFIU had failed to convince 
other bank unions to take strike action in support of the two banks directly affected by 
the merger, and; 3. Union leaders were becoming increasingly aware of (and burdened
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by) the financial damage to the two banks, customers’ dissatisfaction with the strike, and 
a trend amongst the general public towards opposition to the strike.
The FSC reported that about 50 percent of union members returned to work on the day 
after the announcement of the calling-off of the strike. HB was able to open 498 of its 
533 branches, and KMB 332 of its 594 branches. However, without a full complement 
of staff only basic business could be carried out on that day. The media reported that 
deposits of £1.6 billion had been transferred from KMB and HB to other banks during 
the strike period (22 to 28 December).
A consequence of the strike failure was that 29 union leaders, including the heads of the 
KFIU, the KMBU and the HBU, were arrested and prosecuted61. The Government was 
able to subsequently progress with the second financial restructuring without any union 
resistance.
5.4.3. Negotiation
Before the KMBU and the HBU went on strike, the KFIU had won some concessions 
from the Government through the threat of a strike. However, it failed to persuade union 
members to accept the result. Thus, the KFIU, without a proper strategy in place, was — 
in a sense -  forced to go on strike as a result of demands by its members. The strike was 
broken up by riot police before the union had achieved any significant outcomes from 
the action.
Since the financial crisis in 1997, negotiations regarding the restructuring of the 
financial sector had been made through the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC). As the 
Government advanced the second restructuring of the sector, the Federation of Korean 
Trade Unions (FKTU62) announced the suspension of its participation in the KTC. This 
decision, made on 8 November, was a protest against the Government’s unilateral 
progress of the restructuring. However, on 12 December, the FKTU had to return to the 
KTC in order to obtain details of the development of the restructuring and to submit its 
views as the Government’s plan was increasingly acquiring definite and substantial
61 In the end, three leaders were sentenced to imprisonment (one year for two of them, eight months for 
the other), another leader was sentenced to 8 months imprisonment and a stay of execution for two year 
while 25 leaders received £5,000 fines (note: six of the 25 had also served three months in prison while 
awaiting the final judicial decision).
62 FKTU is the union national centre to which the KFIU belongs.
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shape. Therefore, the Special Committee of Financial Restructuring (SCRF) in the KTC 
was re-activated; the KFIU protested strongly against the second restructuring, 
including the merger issue between KMB and HB which it claimed was a breach of the 
July agreement. However, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) answered that 
it was not enforcing or leading the merger, but that it (the merger) was progressing due 
to the request of big shareholders.
Notwithstanding this denial, there were no subsequent meetings between the union and 
the employers because the union believed that the Government was indeed behind the 
merger. Therefore, KFIU had no choice but to call a strike which would force the 
Government to the negotiation table. When it became apparent that a strike was 
imminent formal negotiations between the union and the Government (in the person of 
the Chairman of the FSC), with the Chairman of KTC as mediator, began at the KTC’s 
office at 3 pm, 21 December; the aim was to prevent a strike due to commence formally 
at 9 am on the following day. In the negotiation, the Government had no justification to 
reject the union’s demands based on the July agreement although it argued that it was 
not forcing through the restructuring unilaterally. The two parties reached an agreement 
based on the July agreement at 2 am, 22 December. The contents of the agreement were 
as follows: 1. According to the July agreement, the merger between KMB and HB 
should be decided by autonomous negotiation between union and employers. 2. The 
four insolvent banks would be operated independently although they would be united as 
subsidiaries of an FHC. 3. Their functions should be reformed by July 2002, after 
negotiation between union and employers. Redundancies should be decided after 
negotiation between union and employers. The agreement was regarded as a victory for 
the KFIU because the decision on the fate of the four bankrupt banks was clearly that 
which the union had sought, while the merger between KMB and HB was to be decided 
on the basis of the July agreement. As the media expressed it, the Government had 
“knelt in front of a union strike” (Cho Sun Daily, 23 December).
Nevertheless, the members of both the KMBU and the HBU refused to accept the 
outcome of the negotiation. They misunderstood the situation, and were confident that a 
strike would be as successful as the one held in July 2000. The KFIU leaders were 
unable to persuade them that this would not be the most effective option; they thus 
acquiesced to the members’ request. In fact, some of the leading figures in the KFIU 
also thought that the merger could not be prevented unless strike action was taken.
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However, the Government, which had received strong criticism from the media over the 
content of the agreement, saw that by declaring the strike illegal it would not be obliged 
to honour the agreement. The Government determined to take strong action to break up 
the strike. As a result, although the KMBU and the HBU remained on strike for the 
longest time in Korean banking history (seven days), in the end, the KFIU had to call 
the strike off (following intervention by the riot police) without having prevented the 
merger.
5.4.4. Strike strategy, evaluation, and learning
5.4.4.I. Strategy
The first stage of the KFIU’s strike strategy was to induce certain outcomes through the 
threatened deployment of a general strike by six bank unions. It succeeded in producing 
a provisional agreement with the Government at the pre-strike stage, but failed to 
persuade union members of KMB and HB that this was an acceptable result. Therefore, 
the KFIU was forced by its members to proceed with a general strike before it had 
devised a comprehensive strike strategy that would lead to a victory. As it was, the 
union’s strategy was to mobilize members from within the banks and endeavour to 
paralyze the business of both banks for as long as possible.
The KFIU addressed two issues with its strike, that of yet-to-be-announced mergers 
involving four insolvent banks and that of the merger between two other banks, KMB 
and HB. In the early stages (i.e. before the actual commencement of the strike), the 
union had been confident of success on the basis of the commitments contained in the 
July agreement signed by itself and the Government. Indeed, the union succeeded in 
making an agreement with the Government before the strike. Although the provisional 
agreement was acceptable to the union members of the four insolvent banks the 
members of the KMBU and the HBU, as already noted, rejected it.
Consequently, the KFIU had to proceed with a strike on behalf of just two banks, not 
six as originally planned. The goal of the strike became the complete cancellation of the 
KMB/HB merger plan. The KFIU then chose an education centre located away from the 
city as the venue for the strike in order to avoid a quick intervention from the riot 
police; they also wished to use the facilities in the centre in the event of a long strike. 
Lastly, the strike strategy involved the maximum mobilization of internal resources and
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the forcing of the Government to cancel the merger by bringing the business of the two 
banks to a standstill. In addition, the union attempted to enlist the aid of other bank 
unions (other KFIU branches) by requesting them to also begin strikes from 28 
December.
Strike action continued successfully for eight days. The business of the two banks was 
almost paralyzed for that time. However, the union failed to persuade other bank union 
branches to strike in support (i.e. undertake secondary strike action). The Government 
dispersed the striking members by riot police and blocked off all potential places where 
union members could gather again. As a result of being unable to gather their striking 
members together the union was forced to end the strike. This failure was the 
consequence of the absence of a complete strike strategy, one which took into account 
the response that the Government eventually took. Furthermore, the union mobilization 
was limited to just the members of the KMBU and the HBU.
5.4.4.2. Evaluation
Although union members evaluated the strike as a failure the media evaluated as, in 
equal parts, a success and a failure. The unions had been able to demonstrate their 
power through the staging of a one-week strike, yet had failed to achieve the central aim 
of that strike, the cancellation of the merger. Hence, the conclusion that it had been 
partly a success, partly a failure.
The media concluded that the provisional agreement signed by the Government and the 
union on the day before the strike was evidence of the former's surrender to the latter 
(daily newspapers, 22 December). However, the KFIU failed to persuade union 
members that the outcome had been positive. Instead, the union members insisted that a 
strike go ahead. As a result, the Government was given a chance to recover their 
position (and their face).
The KFIU was completely successful in a mobilization of members by identifying the 
merger plan forced by the Government as an injustice. However, the KFIU had no 
strategy to achieve the final victory that was desired by the members of the KMBU and 
the HBU. The KFIU was unable to persuade the members of those two unions to accept 
the provisional agreement it had made with the Government, even though the union had 
begun to win concessions through the negotiation process (Table 5-7). The subsequent
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strike, although it lasted a week and had a powerful impact on the two banks involved, 
was eventually unable to achieve its stated central aim, the prevention of the merger. 
The union had not prepared a strategy to cope with the Government’s response (i.e. the 
intervention by riot police). The failure was a typical model of negative learning, in this 
case, the product of an over-confidence built up following the success of the strike held 
in July 2000.
How could the outcome have been different? If the union had been able to overcome 
‘interpretation gap’ and persuade union members of the two banks to accept the 
agreement of 22 December, which states “the merger between KMB and HB would 
progress through negotiation between the union and employers”, then the union might 
have been able to produce a clear strategy. As it was, it seemed to be turning its back on 
a concession. A strike would have been justified if the employers had proceeded with 
the merger without consulting the union. The union might also have been able to build 
strong alliances with civic groups and other banks union members if it could have 
proposed better alternatives to the Government’s unilateral merger plan.
A demand63 oriented by just self-interest and leaders’ “political exchange” without prior 
internal consensus should have been avoided (Pizzomo, 1978). At the same time, if the 
strike could have identified members' needs with public needs, and thus have drawn on 
public sympathy and support, the outcome of the strike might have been different.
According to Terry and Femer (1986: 1-2), union leaders generally prefer to rely on 
political rather than industrial influence to obtain benefits. Pizzomo (1978) uses “the 
notion of ‘political exchange’ to illuminate the trade-offs between economic power and 
political influence that characterize certain types of union-state relations”64. However, 
the leaders’ preference to such political exchange has both costs and benefits for unions 
regarding on the relationship between leadership and membership. The benefits are to
63 They demanded the unconditional cancellation of the merger plan without suggesting any condition or 
alternatives in order to remove the possibility of invisible job insecurity. In fact, management had already 
promised all employees job security after the merger. This promise was seen to be possible because of 
both banks being in a healthy financial condition.
64 Muller-Jentsch_(1985:3-33) describes trade unions as “intermediary organizations”. He argues that 
“unions in advanced capitalist societies have been under structural constraints to pursue a policy of 
intermediation between the opposing interests of labour and capital. The unions’ politics are result of the 
pragmatic resolution of differences between the interests of both sides and this is derived the historical 
changes in the position and functions of trade unions” (such as the need of pursuit of common interests of 
members due to the amalgamation of unions, the bureaucratization of administration due to centralization 
of decision-making, and the concentration of external representation due to the extension of state social 
policy).
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be seen in the possibility of modifying market outcomes under conditions in which 
relaying on free collective bargaining would be less fruitful or more risky. The costs are 
that notably “the limitation of autonomy in the industrial relations arena and the 
moderation involved in political exchange are likely to put a strain on unions’ relations 
with the rank members” (Regini, 1984: 130).
Regini (1984) notes that “the leadership is aware both of the benefits of political 
exchange and of the corresponding need for moderation and control of the rank 
members. But, the benefits (and the consequent reasons for moderation) may be less 
apparent to the membership at large. It is because such benefits are on the whole long­
term and it is therefore hard for the membership to judge if a good bargain has been 
struck on the political exchange. Faced with the immediate day-to-day cost-benefit 
calculus at the work place, the union membership and local activists may put a very 
high discount-rate on the long-term future benefits to be obtained by political exchange, 
especially when these become less certain” (Terry and Femer, 1986:1).
Thus, there may be “an interpretation gap between leaders and other levels, and the 
danger of a breakdown in representation”. Namely, relationships between the leadership 
and membership are seen as crucial when unions indulge in political exchange. It means 
that more attention should be paid to “the strategies employed in overcoming the 
interpretation gap and to the membership’s perception of the benefits to be derived from 
the political exchange” (Ibid, 1-2). In other words, unions need the active seeking of an 
internal consensus within the democratic framework of the union. This involves a 
continual search for compromise and agreement. The December 2000 strike case 
provides us with an opportunity to explore what happens when political exchange 
breakdown.
5.4.4.3. Learning
The failure of the strike was due partly to a failure to learn positively from the 
experience of previous strikes. The union had then attained a successful agreement 
regarding the second restructuring of the banking sector. The agreement was signed by 
delegates from the union, the Government, and employers at the Korea Tripartite 
Commission. Through this agreement (which followed a strike in which 20,000 bank 
employees participated) the union managed to change the direction of national financial
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policy. The morale of the union members was lifted greatly after the victory of the July 
strike. On the negative side, their self-confidence also produced an over-confidence.
After the July strike, the union leaders appraised the strike through a meeting with union 
officials. From this meeting they learned the importance of social justification for strike 
success as well as identifying the difficulties of mobilizing industry-wide support from 
union branches with different interests each other (Section 7.4.1.2). This latter problem 
appeared after several branches, such as Seoul Bank Union branch, seceded in the 
middle of the strike, while others, such as KMBU and HBU, even declined to join the 
strike. However, the union did not share these findings with the rank and file, nor did 
they store them for future use (Huber. 1991). Argyris and Schon (1978: 5) describe such 
a process as inhibitory learning loops: a self-reinforcing cycle, in which errors are 
reinforced, or in which group and inter-group dynamics enforce conditions for error 
because of ambiguity or vagueness of interpretation of problems.
The union members of KMB and HB did not participate in the July strike because their 
banks were healthy, and thus did not require an injection of public funds; one of the 
consequences was that other bank unions did not support them when they needed it. The 
union members of KMB and HB were encouraged only indirectly by the July strike 
victory achieved by other bank unions. More significantly, they did not know or 
experience the difficulties of a strike. They thus did not learn from it. Consequently, 
dissatisfied with the negotiation outcome that the leaders of KFIU had obtained they 
demanded that a strike go ahead, confident that it would succeed yet without a well 
thought-out strategy. Their confidence was derived from a mis-placed over-confidence.
5.5. Strike at Cho Hung Bank in June 2003
Under the KFIU’s command, the Cho Hung Bank Union (CHBU65) called a strike in an 
attempt to prevent the sale of Cho Hung Bank (CHB) to Shin Han Bank (SHB), because 
the sale meant a merger that would lead to mass layoffs. In addition, the sale was a 
breach of an agreement of July 2000 contracted by the Government and the KFIU
65 The CHBU is a branch of the KFIU. It is the only union at CHB as Korean labour law prohibits union 
pluralism at enterprise level until the end of 2006.
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(Additional clause “b” in the Article 2: Table 5-4). The KFIU and its branch at CHB 
were not only opposed to the sale but were prepared to act against it.
5.5.1. Background of strike
In August 2002, the Government announced a plan to privatize CHB, then owned by the 
Government, and began to accept applications of intentions to take over the business. 
The Shin Han Financial Group (SHG), parent company of Shin Han Bank (SHB), 
submitted an application of takeover intention on 23 October 2002. SHG’s plan was to 
merge CHB and SHB, a scenario which upset all employees, including management, of 
CHB. The merger would be unique, as the country’s youngest bank had taken over its 
oldest bank. CHB was the nation’s fourth largest lender, and had 6,557 regular 
employees and assets valued at £32.3 billion, while SHB was the fifth largest lender, 
employing 4,458 regular staff and having assets valued at £32.5 billion (Table 5-8). 
Ironically, the takeover bid came just a few years after an attempt by CHB to take over 
SHB. CHB was forced to be sold off because it had accumulated large non-performing 
loans after decades of heavy financing of the country’s industrial growth. Its difficulties 
derived from the large number of firms made bankrupt as a result of the national 
financial crisis.
CHB was Korea’s first bank, commencing business in 1897. However, due to the 
national financial crisis in 1997, the Government gained 80 percent ownership of the 
bank after injecting 2.7 trillion won (£1.4 billion) of public funds. It then promised to 
re-privatize the bank in a way that did not transfer management of the bank provided the 
bank fulfilled the Government’s demands of management normalization (Daily 
Economy, 9 November 2000). Motivated by this promise, CHB’s management and 
employees cooperated to bring the bank back to health. The bank implemented 
aggressive measures to improve managerial transparency and operational efficiency. It 
had reduced the number of its staff by about 40 percent and closed more than a hundred 
branches by the end of 1999. By the following year, the bank had returned to 
profitability. The bank was lauded as one of the most successfully restructured banks in 
Korea (Korea Economy Daily, 29 October 2002).
On 13 August 2002, however, the Government suddenly announced its desire to find a 
buyer for its entire holding, giving as its reasons the need to maximize the retrieval of
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public funds and to complete the second restructuring of the financial sector, a central 
policy of which was the creation, by mergers, of larger banks. The reasons seemed very 
reasonable, but, in fact, the announcement of the sale was inconsistent with an earlier 
schedule, in which the Government had said it would sell banks’ shares owned by the 
Government gradually until 2005 or 2006 in order to minimize the influence of the 
market and, in particular, it would not decrease the ratio of CHB's shares owned by the 
government to below 50 percent until the first half of 2003. However, the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy argued that it would be better if the government could sell all 
shares of CHB as soon as possible when buyers appear because the prospects for the 
economy and stock market this year were not good (Korea Economy Daily, 29 October 
2002).
The KFIU and the CHBU were strongly opposed to the bank being sold in a hurry, and 
to a single buyer. Instead, the union required a gradual sale over a few years to a mix of 
strategic and financial investors on the basis of the Government’s original plan. The 
union cited a number of reasons for its demand. First, if the Government proceeded with 
a too-hasty sale, because the market was weak at the time it would be a ‘dirt-cheap’ sale 
for the profit of specific investors. Thus, it would be a poor financial return for the 
taxpayers, and instigate objections of special favouritism. Secondly, if the Government 
persisted with its bank large-sizing policy through merger and acquisition (M&A) by 
banks owned by foreign investors, the monopolistic centralization of the financial 
industry and the subordination of domestic capital to foreign capital would be deepened. 
Furthermore, those banks would pursue maximum short-term profits for foreign 
investors, weakening the Government’s ability to execute independent financial policy 
for the interest of the nation. Thirdly, the Government had to honour the July agreement 
to which it had been a signatory. The Government had promised that it would permit 
independent survival to those banks which demonstrated management normalization 
(Table 5-4). Finally, although its formal demand was the independent survival of CHB, 
the biggest reason for the union’s opposition was its concern that the merger would lead 
to mass-layoffs.
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5.5.2. Mobilization
5.5.2.1. Action before strike
The CHBU undertook various activities and collective actions in order to prevent the 
sale of CHB between October 2002 and June 2003, when the decision to strike was 
taken. The CHBU, whose 5400 members represented 70 percent of the bank’s 
employees, had not undertaken any collective action in the past (Table 5-8).
However, upon learning of the Government’s intentions to sell its entire holdings in the 
bank, the union’s first reaction was to confiscate loan files of CHB to try to thwart the 
process of actual inspection of files by potential buyers and to write multiple memos (to 
explain the unreasonableness of the sale of CHB) to the Government, to lobby groups, 
and to the press on 31 October. These detailed the future objectives of CHB and the 
problems of too much consolidation in the banking industry, and argued that market
( \ f i  (\*1forces , not government policy , should be allowed to determine the value of the 
bank’s operations. They essentially argued that even small banks could compete as long 
as they were well capitalized and followed prudent risk and credit norms (KILS, 2004). 
As preparation for a strike against the sale to SHB, the union collected £2,500,000 as a 
strike fund from members (£400 per person); 5,400 union members also handed in their 
resignations (from the bank) to the union as a determination for struggle. The union and 
the KFIU held 20 big and small rallies against the sale of CHB between November 2002 
and June 2003. More than 10,000 KFIU members participated in the rallies, which 
included a national labour rally on 3 November, the Cho Hung family rally held six 
days later, on 9 November, and a financial labour rally on 17 May 2003. Two thousand 
CHBU members (male and female) and the President of the KCTU had shaved their 
hair to demonstrate the strength of their determination for struggle at the rallies. 
Moreover, employees in CHB donated blood to Red Cross as a sign of opposition to the 
sale on 5 December 2002.
In addition, the union sought public support through the dissemination of information. 
Union members distributed approximately 1,000,000 leaflets to the public on the street, 
500 union Cyber fighters everyday distributed the union’s points of view to the media,
66 The union thought that the CHB could be sold to investors having no bank that could offer better price, 
once the government put the public bidding of the bank._The union reasoned that such a sale would avoid 
a merger with another bank and preserve the historical bank’s identity.
67 Bank large-sizing policy by merger between banks.
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political parties, civic groups, and government institutions through Internet, and the 
union inserted an advertisement in newspapers, informing readers of the injustice of the 
sale of CHB. The union also released a petition, signed by 1,000,000 citizens, opposing 
the sale. In all, the union spent about £1,000,000 on public information activities (KILS, 
2004).
There was a lot of support for union events from individuals and groups from outside 
the bank. For example, ex-presidents and ex-executives of CHB were among those who 
signed the petition against the sale. A group of small shareholders of CHB applied for a 
motion against the sale of the bank to the court, arguing that the sale was damaging to 
the rights of shareholders. A committee of 40 civic groups opposed to the sale was 
established. As a result of such mobilizations led by the KFIU and the CHBU, Han Na 
La party (the main opposition party) also declared its opposition to the sale. Even a 
presidential candidate of the ruling party proposed the postponement of the sale till after 
the presidential election. Consequently, the sale of CHB was postponed indefinitely.
On 14 January, the newly elected Korean President met union leaders to hear the 
union’s viewpoint. Following this meeting, he proposed a close examination of the sale 
of CHB by an accounting firm, a firm which the union agreed would produce an 
impartial report. The examination lasted for three months. Following the firm’s proposal 
that the sale should proceed, the President announced that CHB would be sold, 
eventually. However, the union raised several objections, and requested a meeting with 
the President; the request was denied. Thus, the union decided that it had no choice but 
to call a strike. As the decision to sell appeared imminent, the CHBU announced that 
the strike would commence on 18 June.
Two days before going on strike, the union delegates marched to the Blue House (the 
Presidential Palace) to deliver the resignations of all 7,224 employees, evidence of their 
determination to strike. However, they were unable to enter into the palace because riot 
police blocked them in front of the building. They placed the resignations on the ground 
in front of the Blue House, then left (afterwards, the police returned them to the union). 
On the day before the strike, another 2,000 union members shaved their hair as a 
symbol of support for the industrial action while the head of the CHBU commenced a 
hunger strike. In all, the total number of participants who had now shaved their hair was 
about 4,000 (out of 5,446 union members). The CHBU gathered 302 (out of 329)
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operators working for IT centres at a secret venue in order to strengthen their 
determination of participation in strike. The union believed that their participation 
would be a critical factor in the strike’s success. On the evening of 17 June (the eve of 
the strike), 2,500 union members working at CHB branches from around Seoul (the 
nation’s capital) held a rally, followed by a sit-down protest, in the plaza in which the 
bank’s headquarters are situated. They stayed all night, waiting for other members. On 
this day, bank management had prepared emergency measures in order to minimize the 
anticipated damage to business caused by the strike. They organized teams comprising 
four to six staff (one chief, one security, and two irregular employees) for each branch 
and dispatched 35 emergency staff for the operation of IT centres (located outside head 
office). The Government dispatched 220 riot police and six staff of the FSC in order to 
protect the IT centres because of a concern that union members might occupy the 
centres, and bring bank operations to a halt (MelL Economy Daily, 18 June 2003).
5.5.2.2. The strike
The strike lasted for five days, from Wednesday, 18 June, to Sunday, 22 June. During 
this period, the bank’s business was almost paralyzed due to the participation of almost 
all of its employees, including IT operators except 20 core operators and irregular 
employees, in the strike. On the morning of the commencement of the strike on 18 June, 
5,000 union members gathered at the bank’s headquarter; they also slept in the plaza of 
the bank’s headquarter building and ate their meals at a refectory inside the bank for the 
duration of the strike. Almost all bank business stopped. One hundred of the 547 
branches were closed, while other branches, with just four to five staff68 (non-union 
members), were able to deal only with emergency business. The FSC dispatched their 
90 staff to support the business of CHB. The prosecution sent writs of summons, on the 
grounds that the strike was illegal (because the union had not followed the correct legal 
process for a strike and the strike disturbed the business of bank), to 16 union leaders. A 
leading conservative newspaper (Cho Sun Daily, 18 June 2003) urged the Government 
to crack down strongly on the strike. The newspaper argued that the strike would hurt 
international credibility and discourage investors, leading to a slowing of the rate of 
national economic development.
On the second day of the strike, 19 June, the number of strikers increased to 6,000. 
Even 800 irregular employees (non-union members) participated in the strike. The bank
68 On average, each branch employs about 20 staff.
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said that 170 branches of its 547 branches were closed on that day (the union claimed 
that 400 branches were closed). As the amount of money drawn by jittery depositors 
between 16 and 18 June reached £1.5 billion, the Bank of Korea (BOK), the central 
bank, injected £1 billion as emergency funds into CHB to stave off its possible liquidity 
squeeze. The central bank said it supplied funds under reserve repurchase agreements to 
prevent CHB from causing risks to the overall financial systems. “If CHB suffers from 
funds shortage despite the repo-supply, we will encourage other banks to extend call 
loans to CHB. If the situation worsens nevertheless we will provide other kinds of loans 
for liquidity management”, a BOK official said (Korea Herald, 20 June 2003). The 
KFIU announced that members of all of its branch unions would be balloted on 22 June 
to ascertain if they would also strike in support of the CHBU’s action. Members of a 
committee comprising 51 civic groups supporting the strike visited the strike 
headquarters, and encouraged strikers. They argued that “the Government is trying to 
sell CHB for its scrap value due to trade pressure from America. Thus, the Government 
has to stop the sale plan of CHB at once” (Han Kye Rae Daily, 20 June 2003). In the 
evening, the union additionally withdrew 20 core operators from IT centres in order to 
increase the pressure on the Government and SHG. In all, 325 out of a total of 329 IT 
operators came to participate in the strike. It meant that the IT network would, sooner or 
latter, cease to function; this was a real threat to the Government and SHG. As the 
situation worsened, negotiations between delegates from the union, the buyer and the 
Government began at 11.30 pm. However, the first meeting was simply used by each 
party to ascertain knowledge about the others, and failed to produce any outcome. It 
finished a few hours later, at 3 am.
On the third day of the strike, 20 June, more branches were closed. The bank announced 
that 249 (out of 547) branches were closed and that deposits of £3.15 billion (about 15 
percent of the bank’s total outstanding deposit of £24.5 billion) had been withdrawn by 
customers since the beginning of the strike (Me IL Economy Daily, 21 June 2003). 
Furthermore, problems with the IT network began to occur at about noon, leading to 
fears that the entire network might be brought to a standstill sooner or later. The union 
decided to allow 20 IT staff to return to work in order to avoid such a disaster. 
According to a Vice-President of the CHBU, “the union decided to let them return to 
work to avoid a downing of IT operation that could cause an enormous inconvenience 
to customers” (Korea Economy Daily, 21 June 2003). This gesture by the union 
strengthened its position at the negotiation table. The second meeting started at 2 am, 21
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June. All the strike issues, except that concerning the CEO of the merged bank, were 
discussed. Finally, at 3 am, 22 June, the delegates of the three parties reached an 
agreement. After receiving a vote of support for the agreement from its members the 
union announced that the strike was over, that all employees would return to work that 
day and that bank operations would be normalized. It was the fifth day of the strike.
The consequences of the strike were that the union achieved almost that it had set out to 
do, with the exception of preventing the sale of CHB to SHG. The media's evaluation 
was that the results of the negotiations constituted a one-sided victory for the union.
One reporter wrote his impression of the strike as follows:
It was a very hard four nights and five days. CHB union members had to 
lie down on a cold concrete floor during the strike, after giving up their 
comfortable homes and friendly workplaces. Approximately 70 reporters 
who stayed with them also had to endure these conditions. The reporters 
were extremely nervous during the night of the final stages of 
negotiations. The union members, after several crises during the strike, 
decided to leave. Although there were sighs of grief and regrets the 
strikers were comforted by the thought that they could at last go home 
and rest. Many of the female strikers were in tears, disappointed with the 
agreement, which they felt was not the best outcome. Experienced 
bankers were also sobbing, because of the fact that their bank, with its 
106-year history, would disappear. The strong head of the CHBU could 
not bear the sobbing as well, and was unable to finish the last fighting 
song. He looked up at the sky and wiped away his tears. He appraised the 
strike as a half success. He told the strikers that the remaining half would 
be won after they returned to work. I wish them that whole success so 
that the hardness of those five days (which felt like five years) would not 
be in vain (Money Today Daily, 23 June 2003).
5.5.2.3. Effect of the strike
As a result of the strike, the union gained, in addition to a victory, two added effects 
related to union activity. First, members of the CHBU gained confidence in the 
effectiveness of strikes, and obtained an increased consciousness of labour and 
camaraderie through participation in a battle which had lasted, in all, for eight months. 
Almost all of the rank-and-file had had no previous direct experience of a strike. For 
eight months they had participated in a variety of activities, such as distribution of 
leaflets to the public, submissions of resignation, (symbolic) haircuts, blood donations, 
and sit-in strikes. Therefore, they learned much and acquired a sense of confidence in 
their own power to contest decisions made by those in authority. In addition, the staging
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of a successful strike at CHB provided both an inspirational precedent and a learning 
opportunity for union members employed in other banks, many of whom were 
pessimistic following the failure of strikes at KMB and HB in 2000.
Secondly, the strike became an opportunity to establish a proper relationship, with 
clearly defined roles, between leaders of the KFIU and leaders of branch unions which 
would prove beneficial should another branch union elect to take similar action. The 
leaders of the KFIU and the branch unions learned that it was necessary, first, to agree 
upon a strategy of negotiation and action in advance before deciding to go on strike, and, 
secondly, they had to divide their roles and responsibilities during a strike (although it 
was necessary to discuss every critical point during the strike). It was also felt that the 
leaders of the KFIU should assume the role of negotiators while the leaders of the 
branch union should be responsible for the mobilization of members. The reasons for 
such a division were simple; the leaders of the KFIU are negotiation professionals while 
the leaders of the branch union are more familiar with their branch members as people 
and the specifics of their work conditions. This division was employed during the CHB 
strike, and was a key factor in its success. In the cases of the earlier strikes, at KMB and 
HB, the KFIU representatives failed to adequately work with members of the KMBU 
and HBU on the negotiation strategy. Thus, they had tasted bitter defeat.
5.5.3. Negotiation
The union, the Government and SHG held three meetings between 11.30 pm, 19 June, 
the second day of the strike, and 6 am, 22 June, the fifth day of the strike. An agreement 
was reached after these meetings; the media appraised the result as a victory of union.
Negotiations commenced as the impact on the IT network began to affect the bank’s 
operations and the withdrawal of considerable deposits by customers drained the bank 
of much of its assets. A strong inducement to negotiation was this participation in the 
strike by union members of IT centres as well as that of almost all of the bank’s 
employees. Almost all of the staff (325 out of a total of 329) in IT centres joined in the 
strike; the decline of IT capability began to occur a mere two days after they joined the 
strike, on its third day, 20 June. In total, almost all CHB business was paralyzed as a 
result of the strike.
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The first negotiation meeting began at 11.30 pm, 19 June. The Minister of Finance and 
Economy and the President of the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMC)69 
were the Government’s delegates, the Chairman of SHG70 and President of SHB 
represented the buyer, and the heads of the KFTU and the KFIU served as delegates of 
the union. At the negotiation, delegates of the union requested that the Minister cancel 
the planned sale to SHG. The minister responded that the sale had already been 
finalized, but that he would support the union in its efforts to gain good outcomes in the 
negotiations with SHG regarding employment security.
The union delegates then asked the representatives of SHG if they (SHG) could merge 
CHB and SHB equally, immediately they acquired the former71. In addition, the union 
asked if the use of the CHB brand could be preserved in the name of the merged bank, if 
full employment security for all employees could be guaranteed, for the appointment of 
a person from CHB as President of the merged bank, and for the composition of a 
merger preparation committee comprising five representatives each from CHB and 
SHB. The delegates of SHG answered the questions as follows: 1. there would be a 
gradual merger over a period of three years on the grounds that an immediate merger 
would not be successful because of differences of organizational culture and personal 
productivity. 2. Employment security and independent management by CHB would be 
guaranteed for two years. 3. An executive of SHB would be appointed as President of 
the merged bank. 4. CHB staff would be represented on the merger preparation 
committee. The parties were unable to reach an agreement at the first meeting, which 
ended at 3.30 am, 20 June. This was not surprising as the first meeting was just an 
engagement in which each party announced a wish list and undertook a reconnaissance 
of each other (Me IL Economy Daily, 21 June 2003).
Parts of the IT network began to break down after noon on 20 June. As a result, a 
delegate of the Government met a delegate of the union privately that evening, the 
former advising the latter that the Government would have no choice but to send riot 
police to break up strikers on 22 June because of the possibility of further, if not 
complete, breakdown of the IT network. The cessation of the functioning of the IT
69 The Korea Asset Management Corporation KAMC is responsible for the process (including the actual 
sales) of the privatization of national enterprises.
70 SHG is a financial holding company which includes SHB and other financial institutions.
71 This was a tactical manoeuvre by the union to strengthen its justification for a strike and improve its 
bargaining position. The union believed that an equal merger, one which would ensure that there would be 
no discrimination against CHB, immediately after the sale would actually be impossible for SHG to 
accept.
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network was, potentially, a major problem for all parties. The Government worried 
about the impact on other banks also connected to the network; the buyer was concerned 
about more damages to deposit levels; finally, the union also could not help agonizing 
about the breakdown of the IT network as it increased the possibility of repression by 
riot police. The KFIU also had painful memories from a strike failure due to forced 
dispersal by the riot police at KMB in December 2000. All parties, therefore, were 
strongly motivated for a second meeting, which commenced at 2 am, 21 June. Almost 
all of the issues were discussed except that of the identity of the CEO of the merged 
bank. However, they could not produce an agreement. Finally, after marathon talks from 
the late evening (9.45 pm), 21 June, the delegates of the three parties reached an 
agreement at 2.10 am 22 June.
After 59 percent of the union members endorsed the agreement in a vote, the head of the 
KFIU, the President of the SHB and the President of the Korea Asset Management 
Corporation, representing the three parties, signed a 10-point agreement, wrapping up 
the tripartite negotiation brokered by the Government. The CHBU announced that all 
employees would return to work that day and that bank operations would be normalized 
as soon as possible. The contents of the agreement can be summarized as follows: 1. 
CHB will be an independent firm for three years within the Shin Han Holding Company.
2. CHB will be operated independently for three years. 3. The Chief Executive of CHB 
will be someone from within CHB for three years. 4. The CHB brand will continue to 
be used for three years. 5. The details of the merger will be formulated by a merger 
preparation committee during the first two years. 6. CHB and SHB will each contribute 
one-half of the membership of the committee of merger preparation. 7. Job security of 
all employees of CHB will be guaranteed. 8. The wages of CHB employees will be 
improved to the level of SHB wages within three years (meaning that the wages of CHB 
employees would increase by about 30 percent). 9. Fifty percent of the executives of the 
Shin Han Holding Company will be from SHB, with the other half from CHB. 10. An 
equal merger will be a principle if the committee of merger preparation decides upon a 
merger. In addition, the Government and employers promised the union, in the 
agreement, that they would try to minimize penal punishment or assign any civil 
responsibility related to the illegal strike to the union (Table 5-9). The agreement meant 
that the union actually gained almost all of its demands except that of the cancellation of 
the sale to SHG itself.
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The achievements of the CHB employees show clearly how effective strike action can 
be. One can compare the fate of CHB with that of Seoul Bank, merged six months 
earlier with Ha Na Bank without any dispute. CHB and Seoul Bank, both insolvent 
because of the national financial crisis, and both the recipients of public funds, had been 
sold by the Government in line with its policy of privatization and bank large-sizing. 
First, CHB employees obtained a promise of a phased wage increase (of 30 percent) 
bringing them to the level of SHB employees. On the other hand, Seoul Bank 
employees, earning 30-40 percent less than Ha Na Bank employees, were unable to gain 
any wage increase. Secondly, CHB employees received a promise of job security for 
three years, while Seoul Bank had to agree to an immediate staff reduction of 15 percent 
(519 out of 3840). Thirdly, CHB attained a promise that it would be able to operate 
independently of SHB for three years, while Seoul Bank was merged with Ha Na Bank 
just three months after the merger contract was signed (Cho Sun Daily, 23 June 2003).
After signing the agreement, delegates of the union, the Government, and SHG went to 
a restaurant to have breakfast together. After that meal, the head of the CHBU told 
reporters that the union had achieved substantial goals although it had failed to prevent 
the Government’s sale of CHB. He concluded that the Government had exercised its 
influence substantially in the negotiation process, and that it (the union) had at least 
prevented what could have been a considerable catastrophe. The head of the KFTU said 
that the negotiations had led to an early settlement because the effects of an IT network 
breakdown presented a major burden to the Government, and SHG were concerned by 
the loss of any advantages of acquisition resulting from a prolonged strike. The 
Government played the role of mediator sincerely. The Minister of Finance and 
Economy, who mediated the negotiation, said that it had been very difficult to induce 
the union to participate in the negotiation under the premise of the sale of CHB. He 
added that he had tried to solve the labour problem under a paradigm of talking and 
compromise. The Chairman of SHG said that “SHG would not discriminate between 
SHB and CHB as a one real child and a child bom out of wedlock”. He added that both 
had to try to produce synergy effects together (Korea Economy Daily, 23 June 2003).
Although the media interpreted the results of the negotiation as a victory for the CHBU 
the union position was, in fact, endorsed by just 59 percent of its members. What this 
meant was that the independent survival of CHB was more important for members than 
any substantial outcomes.
176
5.5.4. Strategy, evaluation and learning
5.5.4.1. Strategy
The union’s strategy was to claim the justification to fight, to organize to the utmost 
various resources from inside and outside the organization, and to exploit a favourable 
political environment to achieve its demands.
First, the union’s mobilization strategy was to make aware to its members and the 
general public that the Government’s sale of CHB was unjust. To do that, the union 
argued the following reasons for mobilization: 1. the hasty sale of CHB was a breach of 
the July agreement; the Government had promised that it would permit the independent 
survival of those banks that demonstrated management normalization. 2. The sale to 
SHG was seriously undervalued and motivated by political reasons. 3. The sale of the 
nation’s oldest bank (it was 106-years-old) to a bank owned by foreign investors would 
be a relinquishment of national financial sovereignty. Therefore, the union’s fighting 
motto was “opposition to a forced merger and desperate defence of a historically 
important national bank”.
Secondly, the union leaders started to mobilize their members towards a strike against 
the sale of CHB on the basis that immediate and strong measures would be most 
effective in blocking it. First of all, union leaders confiscated loan files to try to thwart 
the due-diligence process as soon as they heard of the Government’s intentions to sell its 
entire holdings in the bank (29 October). The next steps were as follows: the holding of 
a conference of representatives to decide on fight measures, a rally in front of the FSC, 
the start of the symbolic wearing of casual clothing to work by members (1 November), 
a large rally and (symbolic) haircutting by representatives to demonstrate commitment 
to the cause (9 November), a strike vote (12 November), the collection of a strike fund 
and the submission of resignations by all employees (17 November), another large rally 
and cutting of hair by union members (22 November), and, blood donation by all 
employees (5 December). There were also other measures designed for successful 
mobilization of employees before the commencement of the strike (Section 5.5.2).
Thirdly, the union exploited a favourable political situation, the imminent Presidential 
election of 15 December. The union argued that the sale of CHB was hurried and 
tantamount to a giveaway, a ploy by the Government to show the great success of the
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restructuring of the financial sector. Not only was the sale poor business (because it was 
being sold so cheaply) but the union contended that there was a political conspiracy 
related to the sale, in that it would benefit a specific buyer. The main opposition party 
was able to exploit this allegation. A presidential candidate of the ruling party also 
asked the Government to delay the sale until after the election. Afterwards, the elected 
President contributed to the success of mobilization. He had been an advisor to trade 
unions in the past as a human rights lawyer. In addition, the KFIU helped him to win at 
the Primary Election by encouraging members to vote (Section.7.5.1.2). Consequently, 
the union was able to force the Minister of Finance and the Economy to the 
negotiations, where he was to play the role of mediator between the union and SHG 
until the end.
Fourthly, the union actively sought the cooperation of outsider groups, such as the 
Citizen Commission (comprising 51 civic groups), a small shareholders group formed 
specifically to oppose the sale, and a group of ex-executives and ex-employees of the 
bank to join it in its fight against the sale of CHB. This support boosted the morale of 
union members and further justified the rightness of their actions.
Fifthly, the union’s tactic was to occupy the bank’s headquarters and to control the 
operation of IT centres, measures calculated to bring the other parties to the negotiation 
table as soon as possible. The union succeeded in encouraging 6,000 (i.e. almost all) 
employees, including IT operators and irregular employees (non-union members), to 
participate in the strike. The participation of IT staff, in particular, became a main factor 
in the strike’s success as the breakdown of the IT network seriously worried the banks 
and the Government. Therefore, the union’s strategy involved the use of traditional 
strike methods but with twenty-first century information technologies.
Lastly, the union kept the public informed of the injustice of the sale of CHB. Union 
members distributed a total of 1,000,000 leaflets to the public on the street as well as 
placing advertisements in newspapers during the strike. In addition, 500 cyber fighters 
distributed union’s views through the Internet. As a result of those strategies, the union 
was able to gain successful outcomes from its mobilization strategy even though its 
strike was illegal.
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5.5.4.2. Evaluation
The strike was appraised as a big success by the media and union leaders. Nevertheless, 
some CHB union members considered the result unsatisfactory because the union failed 
to attain its original goal, the cancellation of the sale. First, the choice of strike 
justification (demanding the fulfilment of the Government’s promise of independent 
survival) was appraised as the proper one with which to mobilize resources (from inside 
and outside) and to secure people’s understanding of the strike (KJLS, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the conservative media outlets accused the strikers of selfishness, saying 
that they had cost the country money and seriously inconvenienced customers in order 
to preserve their own job security (Cho Sun Daily and Korea Times, 25 June 2003).
Secondly, the resource mobilization was extremely successful. Nearly all employees
(6,000 out of a total of 7,721) participated in the strike. The union showed its real power
in almost bringing bank business to a halt and in substantially impeding the activity of
IT centres. All evaluators, including the media, expressed surprise at the union’s
organizational power (Cho Sun Daily, 24 June 2003). The outside resource
mobilization, such as the use of the media, civic groups, the group of small
shareholders, the ex-executives and ex-employees of CHB, and the petition containing
1,000,000 signatures, was very useful in both communicating the reasons for the strike
to the general public and encouraging internal mobilization. A union official mobilizing
union members of IT centres said;
We planned the strike of IT centres from the first stage of the strike 
because we thought that just paralysis of branches’ business would not be 
enough to drag the Government to negotiation. Our fate depended on the 
staff of IT centres also participating. We saw the failure of strike at 
KMB/HB. It was because they failed to mobilize the IT centres (Chung 
Ahang Daily, 23 June 2003).
Thirdly, the use of political opportunity was effective in the accumulation of a 
justification for the strike, in postponing the sale, and in making the strike successful. 
The union could let people know its justification through various public information 
activities and collective activities during the period of the Presidential Election. In 
addition, helping the President at the Primary Election also proved advantageous to the 
union. The net result was that the Government could not crack down on the strike easily 
by force.
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Fourthly, the agreement contained all that the union had sought. The cancellation of the 
sale of CHB had not been possible because a precondition for the negotiations to even 
take place had been that the union agreed to the sale to SHG. Nevertheless, the 
agreement contained guarantees of full employment security, a wage increase, and other 
advantages flowing from the merger (Section 5.5.3). However, the union could obtain 
support from just 59 percent of the members to the agreement. This was because the 
central issue for the members (and, in reality, the union) was the cancellation of the 
sale; in that sense, the union failed to achieve its main objective.
A union member who voted for the agreement argued:
I thought we could have achieved our aim of the cancellation of the sale 
until the final decision of the sale was announced. However, I had to 
think of the whole situation of our position after the announcement of the 
sale. So I voted for the agreement because I thought that the cancellation 
of sale was difficult in reality and that we had no choice but to consider 
the second option (KISL, 2004).
On the other hand, a union member who voted against the agreement stated
A lot of young members thought that we could attain our aim of having 
the sale cancelled. They had been encouraged by a belief that a complete 
strike, including a complete paralysis of the IT network, would have 
eventuated if the strike had continued for one or two more days. In 
addition, we thought that it would be better if we let our fate be 
determined by the strike (whether we won or lost) rather than finishing 
the strike noncommittally (KISL, 2004).
Mobilization theorists argue that unions have to inspire a sense of injustice to members 
in order inspire them to collective action (McAdam, 1987, Kelly, 1998). The CHBU 
argued that the sale was unjust, and therefore justified strike action, after first 
demanding the cancellation of the sale in the negotiation. However, delegates had to 
make a choice between substantial demands and justifiable demands in the negotiation 
on the basis of the conditions that existed. After they reached a provisional agreement, 
they explained the negotiation outcomes and the overall situation in which the 
negotiation had taken place to members. However, they could not persuade all 
members. As a result, 41 percent of members voted against the outcomes of the 
negotiations. At the end of negotiations, it is always most important for delegates to 
know how to communicate results to the rank-and-file, and persuade them of the most 
appropriate next step. This can be difficult as it requires not only the skills of the 
negotiators but favourable conditions of time and place. What makes it especially
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difficult is that delegates may sometimes need to deceive not only the other parties 
involved in the negotiation process, but even their own members in order to attain the 
best possible outcomes.
The outcome of the strike was generally evaluated as follows: The union gained many
benefits, including job security, although it failed to stop the sale from proceeding. SHG
also succeeded in gaining CHB before the latter’s deposits were further drained. Finally,
the Government gained a justification to proceed with the second restructuring of the
banking sector (i.e. its bank large-sizing policy and privatization). A leading progressive
daily newspaper, Han Gye Rea Daily (23 June), stated that:
The outcome was the best for all the parties -  the union, the Government, 
and SHG -  as each had done its best during the dispute. The union had 
made the right decision for its members and CHB by transferring its 
demand from the cancellation of the sale to the gaining of real benefits. 
Although the Government’s policy had been changed72, there was no 
justification for the union’s opposition to the sale of CHB as a way of the 
Government generating public funds.
On the other hand, the conservative newspaper, the Cho Sun Daily (23 June), 
lamented that:
The outcome of the strike confirmed again the unions’ wrong belief that 
collective actions were the most effective measures to gain their 
demands. First of all, there will remain, as an aftermath, the 
Government’s agreement to the union’s involvement in management 
(issues of managerial rights). The consequence is that management will 
now have to obtain agreement from unions first whenever they pursue a 
merger or restructuring.
The Korea Economy Daily (23 June) reported:
Analysts believe further conflicts between the two banks will occur 
because the terms of the agreement are abstract and vague (referring to 
Agreement Clause 5; “the details of the merger will be formulated by a 
merger preparation committee during the first two years”; CHBU thought 
that the individual survival of CHB was still possible because the details 
of the merger included the idea that a merger between the two banks was 
not yet settled. On the other hand, SHG believed that the merger between 
SHB and CHB was confirmed). In addition, many sensitive issues were 
not discussed during negotiations. Particularly, they raise doubts about 
the synergy effects of the reluctant marriage between the two banks.
They say that SHG accepted most of the CHBU’s demands, a backward 
step in terms of financial restructuring. Critics say that SHG gave away 
too much to the union. Furthermore, the outcome seems likely to
72 This refers to the Government’s change of policy from a promise of independent operation of CHB in 
the July agreement it had signed with the KFIU to the plan to merge the bank with SHB.
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embolden organized labour at other companies. It is reasonable to expect 
more strikes in the months ahead.
5.5.4.3. Learning
The success of the strike derived, in part, from a positive learning of the failure of the 
strike at KMB and HB in December 2000, in which the KFIU experienced a bitter 
defeat. Although the union had then overseen a strike which had lasted for eight days 
and almost paralyzed bank business it had ultimately failed to achieve its objectives and 
had been broken up by riot police. Essentially, this failure was due to a poorly thought- 
out strategy. Consequently, 29 union officials were prosecuted, and the militant activity 
of the union was daunted for over two years (i.e. until the CBHU went on strike again).
On the other hand, the failure presented the KFIU and the CHBU with a learning 
opportunity. They learnt that membership mobilization alone was not enough if it was 
to prevail against the Government. They needed to prepare a more thorough strategy, 
mobilizing support from within and outside the union, and to actively exploit political 
opportunities. The lesson also came from an experience of the July 2000 strike; then, by 
the use of such strategies, the union had won a historic victory. They therefore tried to 
develop the justification for their action, to deploy various collective actions before 
going on strike in order to collect the maximum amount of resources for mobilization, 
and to use political opportunities arising from the Presidential election. At last, when 
they had to go on strike they concentrated almost all internal resources, including IT 
operators and irregular employees, on forcing the Government to negotiate with them. 
Then, once negotiations had begun they focused on substantial objects rather than 
justifiable ones. Therefore, they could attain their goals and did not suffer any 
significant damage although their strike was illegal. Their thorough and flexible strategy 
for victory was thus the result of positive learning (i.e. a careful analysis of the failure of 
KMB’s strike and the success of the July strike).
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5.6. Conclusion
Trade unions conducted four strikes in the Korean banking sector between 1998 and 
2003, all in response to the Government’s restructuring of that sector. The unions were 
more successful in two strikes than two others. On the first occasion, the unions of nine 
insolvent banks mandated their right of negotiation to the KFFU, and went on strike in 
September 1998. The strike was called in response to the Government’s order to the 
banks that they reduce their staff numbers as a precondition for the injection of public 
funds. Approximately 20,000 members attended a rally on the eve of the strike. 
However, the strikers could not maintain unity as two big bank unions chose to 
withdraw from the strike on the following morning (i.e. the day of the strike). Thus, the 
strikers could not attain a successful result although they did manage to reduce by 10 
percent the original number of staff that would lose their jobs (40-50 percent). Union 
members appraised the result as a failure (although the media appraised is as half 
success/half failure). It was because the unions had had no experience of such an 
industry-wide strike as the union form at the time was the enterprise union (i.e. each 
bank was represented by its own union, which negotiated directly with the employer). 
Consequently, bank unions’ unity was weak, and susceptible to pressure from individual 
employers who could appeal to the self-interest of its staff.
The second strike, in July 2000, was called in response to the Government’s second 
restructuring. Earlier in 2000, the union form had been transformed from enterprise 
unions to an industrial union. Preparation for the strike was also more thorough than it 
had been in 1998. A variety of collective actions were undertaken before the actual 
strike. These included the holding of big rallies, a strike vote, the collection of strike 
funds, the wearing of casual clothing to work, the submission of leave of absence 
requests, and an agreement from IT operators that they would participate in the strike. In 
addition, they sought the support of civic groups (to demonstrate solidarity) and of 
opposition MPs, requesting that they delay the FHC legislation. Consequently, 
approximately 30,000 members (out of a total of 60,000) from all banks participated in 
a rally on the eve of strike, staying until the end of the strike itself, at 8 pm on the 
following day. The union was able to attain a successful agreement with the 
Government. Union members appraised the strike as a victory, a result attributable to 
having learned from the mistakes of the September 1998 strike.
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The third strike, by union members of KMB and HB, was held in December 2000. Its 
aim was to prevent the Government’s plan of a merger between the two banks. 
However, the strike commenced before a thorough strike strategy had been prepared. In 
addition, the strikers rejected a provisional agreement already reached by the KFIU and 
the Government. They believed that their strong mobilization (13,000 members out of a 
possible 20,000) would bring about an even more successful result. However, the strike 
ended after seven days (it was broken up by riot police), without any outcome achieved. 
It was a defeat derived from an over-confidence, an attitude the union and its members 
held following the strike victory of July 2000. In fact union members of KMB and HB 
had not even participated in that earlier success. Nonetheless, they had been encouraged 
by the victory by other bank unions. However, without first-hand knowledge of that 
victory they were unaware of either the strike experience or the difficulties associated 
with prevailing in one. In short, they did not leam from the earlier strike. The defeat was 
also attributable to the absence of a KFIU strike strategy in the event of the members’ 
rejection of a provisional agreement.
The fourth strike was engaged in by union members of CHB in June 2003. The aim of 
the strike was to prevent the Government’s sale of their bank. They prepared a more 
thorough strategy and utilized political opportunity actively in order to achieve their 
objectives. They developed a justification for the strike, deployed various collective 
actions in order to mobilize to the utmost their internal and external resources, and used 
political opportunities flowing from the Presidential election before going on strike. At 
last, when they had to go on strike they utilized almost all their internal resources, 
including IT operators and irregular employees, in order to succeed in negotiations with 
the Government. They were thus able to attain their goals after a strike lasting for five 
days. Their comprehensive strike strategy was produced after a close analysis of the 
failure of the KMBU and HBU strike of December 2000.
The strike in December 2000 had been a bitter defeat for the KFIU. Although the strike 
had lasted for eight days, and had had a serious (but temporary) effect on the business of 
both banks it had concluded (following an intervention by riot police) without a 
successful agreement having been reached. This was due to there not being a well- 
thought-out strategy. Subsequently, 29 union officials were prosecuted. On the positive 
side, the KFIU and the CHBU were able to leam from the failure that membership 
mobilization alone was never enough to win a fight against the Government.
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The results of these strikes in the Korean banking sector show that the successful 
mobilization of union members is a necessary condition, but not of itself enough, for 
unions to prevail in strikes. Unions must develop (or prepare) a strategy for victory 
before going on strike. The strategy has to take into account the likely responses of the 
unions’ opponents, and the union has to be as fully prepared as possible for the 
surmounting of less predictable obstacles (e.g. environment and politics). Unions must 
develop a justification for strike action, utilize political opportunities, mobilize internal 
and external resources as much as possible, ensure that the rank-and-file and the union 
leaders are united, and develop more effective collective actions. Successful strike 
strategies can be developed from positive learning of earlier strikes by their own and 
other unions.
Unions in the Korean banking sector prevailed in two strikes (in July 2000 and June 
2003), but failed to achieve their aims at two others (in September 1998 and December 
2000). The reason for the former was that through reflection and more thorough 
preparation (i.e. learning from the failures of other strikes) they were able to devise 
successful strategies. Conversely, one reason for the latter was negative learning, such 
as over-confidence from previous strike victories (an especially bad fault in the case of 
strikers who had no direct experience of a successful strike).
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<TabIe 5-l> Capital Adequacy Ratio of unhealthy banks and measure
_______________ by the FSC (December 1997)__________________
Bank name CAR (%) Measure by the FSC
Seoul 0.97 Objective to sell foreign 
investors after input of public 
funds and restructuring ,
Jae 11 -2.70 -
Cho Hung 6.5 Conditional survival by 
restructuring (input of public 
funds)
Sang Yup 7.62 -
Han 11 6.9 -
Foreign Exchange 6.79 -
Chung Puk 5.92 -
Pyung Hwa 5.45 -
Kang Won 5.37 -
Dong Hya 5.34 Closure objective
Don Nam 4.54 -
Dae Dong 2.98 -
Chung Chong 7.05 -
Kyung Ki 6.69 -
Source: KFIU (1998)
<Table 5-2> Details of restructuring and strikes at retail banks
December 1997 December 1999 
(the first 
restructuring)
December 2001 
(the second 
restructuring)
December 2003 
(the third 
restructuring)
Contents Closure of 
insolvent banks 
and personnel 
reduction
Bank large- 
sizing policy
Privatization 
and bank 
large-sizing 
policy
No. of 
banks
26 17 15 14
No. of 
regular 
employees
113,994 74,744 68,360 66,881
Strike Industry-wide
strike
in September 
1998
Industry-wide 
strike in July 
2000.
A strike
at KMB and HB 
in December 
2000
Strike at Cho 
Hung Bank 
in June 2003
Sources: Corea Federation of Banks (2003),
Financial Supervisory Commission (2003), 
KFIU (1999-2004).
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<Table 5-3> Demands of the Government and the unions, and the major 
contents of the agreement signed at the conclusion of the strike
________________________________ in September 1998____________________________ _
The FSC’s demand to insolvent banks for public fund input (18 August 1998)_______ _
1. Seven unhealthy banks (Cho Hung, Han IL, Sang Yup, Foreign Exchange, Pyung 
Hya, Kang Won, and Chung Puk) were required to reduce staff numbers by 30 
percent (including those who had already retired in 1998) before the end of 1998; a 
further 10 percent reduction was required by the end of 1999. Staff would be paid a 
retirement bonus equivalent to five months salary.
2. The two other insolvent banks (Seoul and Jae IL Bank, both offered for sale to 
foreign investors) were required to reduce staff numbers by 50 percent (including 
those who had already retired in 1998) by the end of 1998, again with a retirement 
bonus equivalent to five months salary.________________________ _____________
Unions* demands (14 September 1998)_________________________ ___________
1. Cancellation of the Government’s forced demand for staff reduction.
2. Guarantee of autonomous negotiation between unions and employers.
3. Guarantee of 12 months retirement bonus.___________________________ ________
Agreement between unions and employers on 29 September 1998 (with
the Government’s guarantee)_________________________________________________
1. Staff reduction of 32 percent (including already retired employees in 1998) 
within 1998.
2. 9-12 months salary as a retirement bonus.________________ ____________________
Source: 1999 KFIU Annual Report (2000a)
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<TabIe 5-4> The KFIU’s demands and the content of the agreement reached at the
industry-wide strike in July 2000
KFIU’s six demands to the Government
1. Dismiss the Minister of Finance and Economy who is responsible for the failure and 
confusion of the financial market, and hold a hearing into the financial restructuring!
2. The Government has to take responsibility for the insolvent credits resulting from the 
Government’s involvement in financial institutions!
3. Enact special laws in order to eradicate the Government’s unreasonable involvement 
practices in financial institutions!
4. Cancel the policy of forced mergers of financial institutions!
5. Repeal the hurried legislation regarding Financial Holding Companies!
6. Cancel the plan to separate the credit business from the cooperative associations!
July Agreement between the KFIU and the Government
1. The Government confirms the basic direction of financial policy operation as 
follows. These will be orders of the Prime Minister, based on the decisions of a 
Cabinet Council.
-The Government will eradicate unnecessary and excessive legal regulations that hinder 
the autonomous management of banks as soon as possible.
-The Government guarantees thoroughly the responsibility of management and the 
transparency of bank management on the condition that it (the management) can 
exclude all instances of interference, pressure, and solicitation from external agents. It 
also guarantees autonomous management by a board of executives although the 
Government remains the largest shareholder.
-The Government will execute decisions based on government policy regarding the 
maintenance of financial market stability according to clear and transparent methods 
and processes in order to remove any public misunderstanding and suspicion.
2. The Government pursues the second reform of the financial sector as follows in 
order for the attainment of global competitiveness and in the pursuit of continuous 
financial reform.
-Reform will be pursued according to market principles.
-The Government will prepare legal supporting systems for the introduction of the 
Financial Holding Company system, the preferential treatment of authorization and the 
development of the infrastructure of the financial market, and the buying of 
subordinate debt.
-The reform of banks that do not receive public funds will be the responsibility of those 
banks.
-Those receiving public funds will have to submit a management normalization plan to 
the Government.
-The reform of banks that receive public funds will be pursued under government 
leadership.______________  . _____________________________
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In order to pursue the above, banks unable to normalize their business on the base 
of the end of June, and those receiving public funds will have to submit a 
management normalization plan to the Government by the end of September.
-Additional clauses related to the above.
a. An independent Management Evaluation Commission of Banks (MECB), in which 
the Government does not participate, will evaluate the reasonableness of the plan. The 
Government will pursue the reform of the banks according to the decisions of the 
MECB. A Chairman of the MECB will be appointed. He/she will be neutral and 
objective. The Commission will comprise eight members.
b. As a result of the evaluation, banks that are judged to be able to solve insolvent bonds 
for themselves and to survive independently will be permitted to pursue management 
normalization according to their own plan.
c. The Government will pursue a plan to normalize other banks that are judged not to be 
able to survive independently. This will be achieved by the FHC’s subsidiary after 
inputting public funds into each bank until the ratio of equity capital on the base of the 
BIS reaches to 10 percent under the prerequisite conditions of self-help efforts and 
burden sharing.
3. There will be no forced mergers instigated by the Government in the second 
financial reform. The Government will respect collective bargaining agreements 
between unions and employers regarding the reduction of personnel and 
reorganization.
4. The Government will execute the deposit guarantee system, (partly) in 
accordance with the plan. However, the Government will examine the completion 
of financial reform and the stability of financial market, and the possible distortion 
or maldistribution of capital movement between the financial institutions before 
the execution of the deposit guarantee system.
5. Other.
*The Government will pay banks the capital that it assumes responsibility for (debts 
from the Korea Deposit Insurance and Han Arm Composite Finance company) as soon 
as possible. *■
*The Government will decide on a clear method of the payment of loans (economy 
cooperation loan to Russia, loans by Korea Export Insurance Corporation’s guarantee) 
for which it accepts it has a legal responsibility as soon as possible.
11.7.2000
Sources: KFIU (2001a), KTC (2000).
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<TabIe 5-5> Comparison of mobilization, strategy, and learning between
strikes in September 1998 and in July 2000
September 1998 Strike July 2000 Strike
Mobilization 1 .Resource mobilization:
-internal: 7,000 union members 
participate in strike; 20,000 (out 
of 36,569 union members from 
nine banks) attend a rally on the 
eve of strike day.
-external: no outside resource 
mobilization.
2. Political opportunity:
no political opportunity able to be 
exploited due to the negative 
environment as a result o f the 
national financial crisis.
3. Collective action:
rallies, leaders shaving their 
heads, collection of strike fund 
(£2,500,000), strike in front of 
Myung Dong Cathedral.
4. Strike period/place: four 
hours/Myung Dong Cathedral’s 
plaza.
5. Strike impact: partial business 
paralysis during the morning at 
seven banks.
1. Resource mobilization:
-internal: 20,000 union members participate 
in strike; 30,000 members (out of 65,000 
from all banks) attend a rally on the eve of 
strike.
-external: use of civic groups, national 
centre of unions, and Tripartite 
Commission.
2. Political opportunity: 
successful exploitation of political 
opportunities by the use of opposition MPs 
to delay the FHC legislation; the 
identification o f the failure of the 
Government’s first restructuring and the 
problems of the Government's unreasonable 
involvement in financial institutions.
3. Collective action: various activities: big 
rallies, union leaders shaving their heads, 
wearing of casual clothing to work, 
collection of strike fund (£5,000,000), 
submission of leave of absence 
applications, strike at university stadium.
4. Strike period/place: 12 hours/university 
stadium.
5. Strike impact: partial business paralysis at 
almost banks.
Strategy 1. Mobilizing of inside resources 
(union members).
2. Business paralysis through 
membership mobilization.
3. Appraisal of strategy: poor strike 
strategy; poor activities before 
strike and a lack of unity between 
unions due to the enterprise union 
form.
1. Mobilizing of various resources from 
inside and outside.
2. Claiming justifications for strike against the 
Government’s second restructuring; 1). 
emphasizing the fact that employees were 
once again the sufferers because a) the 
Government had failed in its restructuring 
of the industry during the first round and b) 
of the Government's unreasonable 
involvement in financial institutions; 2). 
requiring the cessation o f the Government’s 
unreasonable involvement in financial 
institutions and the compensation of 
damages resulting from those practices.
3. Business paralysis through membership 
mobilization.
4. Appraisal of strategy: comprehensive strike 
strategy (see above points 1, 2, 3) and a 
strong unity between bank unions under an 
industrial union.
Learning No learning from the past due to no 
experience of industry-wide strike; 
poor preparation.
Positive learning from the failure of the 
September 1998 strike; thorough preparation.
Appraisal of 
strike
Half a failure and half a success: 
poor strike strategy, and 
unsatisfactory agreement
Success: successful strike strategy and 
satisfactory agreement
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<TabIe 5-6> Information about KMB and HB (January 2001)
KMB HB
Number of regular Regular: 11,026 Regular: 8,855
employees Irregular: 3,493 Irregular: 3,244
Number of union 
members
8,166 7,127
Number of branches 600 557
Total value of assets £45 billion £38.5 billion
Major shareholders Goldman Sachs 11.07 
percent, Government 6.48 
percent.
Government 14.5 percent, 
ING 9.9 percent
Sources: FSC (2002), KFIU (2001a)
<Table 5-7> Contents of provisional agreement and final agreement at 
KMB/HB strike in December 2000.
Provisional agreement (between the head of the KFIU and the Chairman of the 
FSC)
1. According to the July agreement, the merger between KMB and HB should be 
decided by autonomous negotiation between unions and employers. (Authors 
emphasis)
2. Four insolvent banks would be operated independently although they would be 
involved in a Financial Holding Company as subsidiaries.
3. Their functions should be reformed by July 2002 by negotiation between union and 
employers.
4. Redundancy should be decided by negotiation between union and employer. 
22. 12.2000
Final Agreement between the KFIU and the FSC
1. According to the July agreement, four insolvent banks (Han Bit Bank, Pyung Hya 
Bank, Kyang Ju Bank, Kyung Nam Bank) will be operated as independently as possible 
although they would be involved in a Financial Holding Company (FHC) as 
subsidiaries. The FHC will be a right of management in the normal business, such as 
management strategy and other branch issues, until the end of March 2002.
2. The FHC has to produce a plan of function reform by the end of March 2002, 
following a consultation process. The functions of the four banks have to be reformed 
by July 2002 by negotiation between union and employers.
3. Redundancy should be decided by negotiation between union and employer. The 
Government decides whether or not to input additional public funds half yearly after 
checking on the execution of the MO(J.
22 . 12. 2000.
Source: KFIU (2003a)
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<Table 5-8> Comparison of CHB and SHB (March 2003)
CHB SHB
Year of formation 1897 1994
Number of regular 
employees
6,629
(irregular employees: 1,092)
4,566
(irregular employees: 919)
Number of branches 547 348
Total of assets £37.5 billion £37 billion
Total of outstanding 
deposit
£24.5 billion £24 billion
Total of credit £25.5 billion £23.5 billion
BIS-set capital adequacy 8.81 percent 10.25 percent
Number of union 
members
5,445 (CHBU) 2,833 (SHBU)
Major shareholders Government: 80.05 percent Japanese investors: 28 
percent
Sources: FSC (2004), KFIU (2004a)
 <Table 5-9> The content of the agreement at CHB strike in June 2003_____
The content of agreement between KFIU and SHG
1. CHB will be an independent firm for three years within the Shin Han Holding 
Company.
2. CHB will be operated independently for three years.
3. The Chief Executive of CHB will be someone from within CHB for three years.
4. The CHB brand will continue to be used for three years.
5. The details of the merger will be formulated by a merger preparation committee 
during the first two years.
6. CHB and SHB will each contribute one-half of the membership of the committee of 
merger preparation.
7. Job security of all employees of CHB will be guaranteed.
8. The wages of CHB employees will be improved to the level of SHB wages within 
three years (meaning that the wages of CHB employees would increase by about 30 
percent).
9. Fifty percent of the executives of the Shin Han Holding Company will be from SHB, 
with the other half from CHB.
10. An equal merger will be a principle if the committee of merger preparation decides 
upon a merger.
In addition, the Government and employers promised the union, in the agreement, 
which they would try to minimize penal punishment or assign any civil responsibility 
related to the illegal strike to the union.
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<Table 5-10> Comparison of mobilization, strategy, and learning between
strikes of the KMBU/HBU and the CHBU
Strike by the KMBU and the 
HBU
Strike by the CHBU
Mobilization 1. Resource mobilization:
-union members only (13,000 
of a total of 15,293 members 
and 26,618 employees of 
KMB/HB participated).
-no support from outside.
2. Political opportunity:
No political opportunity due to 
the rapid progress of situation 
and the breach of provisional 
agreement by union.
3. Collective action:
Wearing of casual clothing, 
rallies, collection of strike fund 
(£650,000, i.e. £50 per 
member), strike in an education 
centre (i.e. not bank 
headquarters).
4. Strike period/place -  
seven days (22-28 
December)/Financial 
Education Centre.
5. Strike impact: almost total 
paralysis of business at KMB, 
and partial paralysis at HB.
1. Resource mobilization:
-Internal: all employees, including IT operators 
and irregular employees (6,000 of a total of 
7,721 employees participated/ 5,445 union 
members and others).
-External: use of group of ex-executives, civic 
groups, group of small shareholders, national 
centre of unions.
2. Political opportunity: utmost use of 
Presidential election period -  support from 
Presidential candidates, meeting with elected 
President.
3. Collective action:
-various activities: thwarting actual inspection, 
sending memos to the media, wearing of casual 
clothing, big rallies, cutting of hair by 4,000 
members, delivering of all employees’ 
resignations to the Blue House, blood donation, 
collection of strike fund (£2,500,000, i.e. £400 
per member), distribution of 1,000,000 leaflets 
to citizens, organization of petition against the 
sale, inserting of advertisement in newspapers, 
use of 500 cyber fighters, strike at bank 
headquarters.
4. Strike period/place -  five days (18-22 
June)/headquarters o f CHB.
5. Strike impact: total business paralysis due to 
the participation of almost all employees, 
including IT operators and irregular 
employees.
Strategy 1. Business paralysis through just 
membership mobilization.
2. Appraisal of strategy: Poor 
strike strategy; poor activities 
before strike, and a gap of 
strategy between leaders and 
members.
1. Mobilization of various resources from inside 
and outside
2. Claim of justifications for fight against the 
sale
3. Use of favourable political opportunity
4. Business paralysis through membership 
mobilization.
5. Appraisal of strategy: Comprehensive strike 
strategy (see above points 1. 2. 3. 4): 
coincidence of strategy between leaders and 
members.
Learning Negative learning from the 
KFIU’s strike success in July 
2000: poor preparation and over­
confidence.
Positive learning from strike failure at KMB in 
December 2000 and the KFIU strike in July 
2000: complete preparation and self-restraint.
Appraisal of 
strike
Failure: break up by police 
without agreement.
Success: production of successful agreement.
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CHAPTER 6. LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The main aim of the thesis is to identify how and why some strikes are more successful 
than others. To do this, first of all, we need to look at theories related to the research 
aim, theories of mobilization (including strategy theory) and OL. This chapter therefore 
examines those theories in detail and devises a theoretical framework for the thesis 
through the adaptation of the concept of OL to mobilization theory.
6.1. Mobilization theory
6.1.1. Progress of mobilization theory
According to McAdam (1988: 125), mobilization theorists have studied the reasons and 
processes that lead individuals to participate in collective action. Up to the mid-1970s, 
the study of social movements mainly focused on a form of collective behaviour that 
operates primarily at a social psychological level. Thus, answers to questions of 
movement emergence and individual participation tended to be sought in the 
characteristic psychological profile of the activist and the presumed psychological 
functions attendant to participation. This social psychological approach73 to the study of 
social movements is related to the relative deprivation (Crawford and Naditch, 1970), 
mass society (Komhauser, 1959; Selznick, 1969), and collective behaviour models 
(Lang and Lang, 1961; Smelser, 1962).
Since then the focus of movement analysis has shifted from the social psychological 
perspective to more political and structural accounts of movement dynamics arising 
from political turbulence and social changes. The new theoretical perspectives to 
emerge in the field are the resource mobilization and political process models in the 
United States and the new social movement approach brought by a comparative
73 Useem (1998: 215) calls it the breakdown theory, which is that forms of collective action, such as riots, 
rebellion, and civil violence occur when the mechanisms of social control lose their restraining power.
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dimension of political and cultural structures in Europe (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 
1977; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982, 1988; McAdam, et al., 1996; Evans, 1980; Morris, 
1984). These perspectives attribute rationality to movement participants and posit a 
fundamental continuity between institutionalized and movement politics.
These models differ chiefly only in emphasis. Resource mobilization theorists 
principally focus on how burgeoning movement organizations seek to mobilize and to 
routinize the flow of resources to ensure movement survival (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 
1977). On the other hand, the political process model emphasizes two sets of structural 
factors to facilitate the generation of social insurgency (McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978). 
The first is the level of organization within the aggrieved population and the second is 
the political opportunities available to insurgent groups (Eisinger, 1973).
However, all models, the social psychological model and the new ones that attribute 
exclusive importance to macro structural factors, tend to oversimplify the complexity of 
collective action. Thus, McAdam (1988: 127), who tried to make the conceptual bridge 
between macro political factors and the individual decision to participate through an 
empirical study of the American Civil Rights Movement, asserts that movements occur 
in a broad macro political-economic context, but that their actual development clearly 
depends on a series of more specific dynamics operating at the micro individual 
decision level74 (1988: 127).
As union decline has threatened the relevancy of mainstream industrial relations, Kelly 
(1998: 24-38) attempts to move mobilization theory away from structural correlates 
models, such as collective bargaining systems and its associated institutions, towards an 
examination of the processes that convert individual grievances into collective action. 
His work suggests that injustice serves as the central organizing principle for mobilizing 
workers and as such provides a potentially powerful construct for understanding the 
industrial relations process (Johnson and Jarley, 2004: 543).
Kelly (1998: 24-38) emphasizes that collective identity and collective action are most 
likely to emerge as a response to injustice, and that the role of leaders is critical in the
74 Snow et al. (1986, 1988) have referred to these (macro and micro-level) processes as the framing 
processes: the processes that mediate between opportunity, organization and action by ways of collective 
attribution and social construction (McAdam et al., 1996: 5).
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process. In his view, “mobilization theory allows us to analyse the processes by which 
workers acquire a collective definition of their interests in response to employer­
generated injustice. It is then possible to show that worker collectivism is an effective 
and situationally specific response to injustice” (1998: 1). Golden also identifies a 
limitation of the structural correlate models. According to her, the structural correlate 
models generally argue that where unions, employers, and/or wage bargaining are 
relatively encompassing nationally, industrial action will in general be less common 
because accommodation between unions and employers over workforce reductions 
would be more likely to characterize such settings. Conversely, where industrial 
relations systems are comparatively decentralized and fragmented, industrial conflict 
occurs with relatively frequency, and accommodation over workforce reductions would 
be less often expected. However, the structural characteristics do a poor job accounting 
for the outcomes both within and across countries because some countries with 
relatively decentralized union movements and fragmented industrial relations systems 
experience conflict over job losses only rarely, whereas others, with relatively 
centralized industrial relations systems experience such conflict often (Golden. 1997: 12). 
She argues that strikes held in response to restructuring tend to occur as a result of a 
cost and benefit analysis by unions (Ibid: 157-60; see Section 6.1.4).
In sum, mobilization theory has developed from a social psychological approach to a 
structural correlate approach, then to an approach of the processes that convert 
individual grievances into collective action.
6.1.2. Logic of mobilization
There are three highly relevant theories of the logic of mobilization. Firstly, according 
to Tilly, “the broad factors within a population affecting its degree of mobilization are 
the extent of its shared interest in interactions with other population, and the extent to 
which it forms a distinct category and a dense network (i.e. its interests and its 
organization). Outside the group, its power, its subjection to repression, and the current 
constellation of opportunities and threats most strongly affect its mobilization level” 
(1978: 81).
Tilly defines mobilization as the process by which a group goes from being a passive 
collection of individuals to an active participant in public life. He suggests a
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formulation of mobilization level: “Mobilization level = the sum of market value of 
factor of production under group control x the probability of delivery when called for” 
(Factors of production could include land, labour, capital, and expertise). He contends 
that the major variables affecting the probability of delivery are the extent of competing 
claims on the resources involved, the nature of the action to which the resources are to 
be committed, and how organized the mobilizing group is. If the resources are free of 
competing claims, if the action clearly defends the interests of every member, and if the 
group is an all-embracing moral community, the probability of delivery is close to 100 
percent. Loyalty is then at its maximum and the probability of departure or contestation 
is at its minimum. In other words, a significant part of the work of mobilization goes 
into changing the following three variables: 1). reducing the competing claims on 
resources controlled by members, 2). developing a program which corresponds to the 
perceived interests of members, and 3). building up a group structure which minimizes 
exit and voice (1978: 69-70).
Tilly also makes distinctions between defensive75, offensive76, and preparatory 
mobilization77. He argues that a population’s initial wealth and power significantly 
affect the probability that its mobilization will be defensive and offensive. People may 
generally think that the rich mobilize conservatively, in defence of their threatened 
interests, while the poor mobilize radically, in search of what they lack. However, this is 
wrong. It is true that the rich never lash out to smash the status quo, while the poor 
sometimes do. Yet, the rich are constantly mobilizing to take advantage of new 
opportunities to maximize their interests, while the poor can rarely afford to (1978: 73).
Secondly, Offe and Wiesenthal (1985: 182) argue that the rich (the more powerful 
organization) tries to minimize the poor’s (the less powerful organization) ability to 
exercise power while maximizing its own ability to do so. In addition, the power 
position already gained does not allow the poor to pursue the opposite strategy with the 
same chance of success. The reason is that the potential to change power relations is 
itself determined by those power relations that are to be changed.
75 In this mobilization, a threat from outside induces the members of a group to pool their resources to 
fight off the enemy.
76 In this, a group pools resources in response to opportunities to realize its interest.
77 In this, a group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities and threats.
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Offe and Wiesenthal ask how it is at all possible to explain actual changes in the power 
relationship. They suggest the following in the answer to their own question: it is 
necessary to employ a form of collective strategy of conflict which not only aggregates 
the individual resources of the members of the association in order to meet the common 
interests of these individuals, but which also overcomes the individuality of those 
resources and interests as well as the obstacles to effective organization, by defining a 
collective identity on the basis of which the chance to change existing power relations is 
no longer exclusively determined by these power relations themselves (Ibid: 183).
Thus, for instance, workers’ organizations, the less powerful side in the capitalist 
system, always find themselves forced to rely on non-utilitarian forms78 of collective 
action, which are based on the redefinition of collective identities, even if the 
organization does not have any intention of serving anything but the members’ 
individual practical interests, such as higher wages, employment security, and working 
conditions. No union can function in the absence of some rudimentary notions held by 
the members that being a member is of value in itself, that the individual organization 
costs must not be calculated in a utilitarian manner but have to be accepted as necessary 
sacrifices, and that each member is legitimately required to practice solidarity and 
discipline, and other norms of a non-utilitarian kind. It means that the logic of collective 
action of union organization implies a paradox that interests can only be met to the 
extent they are partly redefined. Therefore, unions must always be construed in such a 
way that they simultaneously express and define the interests of their members.
In addition, unions must be able to mobilize sanctions, such as strikes, in order to 
succeed in accomplishing stated interests. Then the unions’ strike mobilization capacity 
has to be built up in communicative (or dialogical) processes within the unions, whose 
individual potential to sanction is minimal because of their atomization. It means that 
sanctioning potential in unions becomes effective only through the organization of 
members and their explicitly coordinated action. Thus, what unions need is the 
conscious and coordinated active participation of their members. In other words, 
sanctioning potential in unions depends on their ability to generate their members’ 
willingness to act (Ibid: 184; see Section 6.3.6.4).
78 Volkenbury and Zoll (1995:139) interpret it is unions’ role as an emancipatory movement.
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Lastly, Olson argues that “unless there is coercion or some other special device to make 
individuals act in their common interest, rational, and self-interested individuals will not 
act to achieve their common or group interests” (1971:2). In other words, “collective 
organization and action is achieved through the provision of selective incentives -  
rewards for participation or punishments for free-riding -  that are only available to 
group members and which therefore change the calculations and actions of rational 
individuals” (Kelly, 1998:68). Olson’s theory is a kind of rational choice theory. Kelly 
is critical of it, stating that: “Olson has no concept of group identity as a way of 
understanding the regulation of people’s behaviour in group and inter-group contexts. 
His work is unable to account satisfactorily for the formation of trade union. In the 
world of trade unionism the clear majority of workers do not free-ride; they join unions 
of their own volition. If we understand how people come to define their interests in 
collective organization and action, then mobilization theory offers a far richer and more 
plausible account of the processes involved” (1998: 81-2).
6.1.3. Process of mobilization
Mobilization theorists have developed a large body of work to map closely onto the 
central problems of industrial relations: first, how do individuals acquire a sense of the 
collective? Secondly, how do individuals organize collectively to pursue their 
grievances? Thirdly, how will/do such individuals take collective action? (Tilly, 1978; 
McAdam, 1988; Gamson, 1992, 1995; Kelly, 1998). These questions entail analysis of 
the ways in which groups perceive and acquire power resources and deploy them in the 
construction of different types of conflictual and collaborative relationships (Kelly 
1998:24).
Tilly (1978: 56) argues that a useful theory of collective action must deal with interests, 
organization, mobilization, opportunity, and the different forms of collective action.
70Interest refers to the way that group members come to define them. Organization is 
the extent of common identity and unifying structure among members. Mobilization 
refers to the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources
79 Offe and Wiesenthal (1985: 197-8) argue that a dialogical process o f definition o f interest is required for the 
working class who depend on a common and collective concept of interest. This is because the interest o f any 
individual member of the working class is far more likely to be ambiguous, controversial, or wrongly perceived 
compared to that of a capitalist.
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needed for action. Opportunity is the extent of new claims to enhance the realization of 
its interests. It is itself divided into three elements; the balance of power between the 
parties, the cost of repression by the ruling group and the opportunities available for 
subordinate groups to pursue their claims. Lastly, collective action can take different 
forms according to the balance between interests, organization, mobilization, and 
opportunity. In addition, he contends that the form of an organization may affect the 
repression to which those with which it engages subject it. The repression depends 
mainly on the organization’s interest and the degree to which it conflicts with the 
interests of other organizations. In the longer run, an organization’s form, pace, and 
extent of mobilization affects the repression which others apply to it. A group’s form of 
both organization and mobilization affects its interests (1978: 56; Figure. 6-1).
McAdam (1988: 132) especially emphasizes the concept of injustice (or illegitimacy) as 
a necessary factor of mobilization. He argues that grievances arise when people are 
cognitively liberated from a belief in the legitimacy of the status quo. Dissatisfaction 
may be necessary to motivate collective action but it is not sufficient. For example, 
employees can understand that a company pay freeze is unavoidable if the firm is facing 
bankruptcy although they may not be happy about it. Therefore, a sense of injustice is 
necessary for collective action. The injustice can arise when management violates 
established rules or shared beliefs (or social values), e.g. instructing workers to do work 
that is not part of their job. McAdam (1988:132) also identifies two other elements of 
cognitive liberation, the assertion by employees of their rights and the perception of 
personal efficacy. And Gamson (1992: 7) notes that employees must also feel entitled to 
their demands and feel there is some chance that their situation can be changed by 
collective agency.
Figure 6.2 explains the mobilization processes, from the sense of injustice to collective 
action on the basis of McAdam’s model of collective action. It shows that a sense of 
injustice is derived from an organization’s breach of existing rules and consensual 
social values, and the assertion by workers of their rights and perception of personal 
efficacy. The perceived injustice is tunnelled to collective action through the processes 
of social identification, social attribution, and cost-benefit calculations (Kelly, 1998: 27- 
9).
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<Figure 6-l>  Tilly’s mobilization model
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6.1.4. Mobilization in restructuring
There are two contrary arguments regarding the mobilization of trade unions during a 
period of economic restructuring. Kelly argues that collective organization and activity
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ultimately stem from employer actions that generate amongst employees a sense of 
injustice or illegitimacy (1998: 44). For instance, in a period of economic recession, 
employers faced with declining profit rates have sought to intensify the labour process 
and/or to curb the growth of wages, often in conjunction with, or through the medium of, 
the state. These measures however impact on a workforce that has become accustomed 
to steady or at least frequent raises in living standards during the years of economic 
upswing, thereby fuelling a sense of injustice. Then, the presence of militant activists 
willing to organize collective action in a labour market where some groups of workers 
have become relatively powerful adds the final ingredient to the potent mixture that 
results in periodic eruptions of acute class struggle. Thus, economic restructuring helps 
to create the basis for a new period of worker mobilization because of its adverse impact 
on workers’ sense of justice, even though the organization and mobilization of workers 
is eroded and the ideologies of the labour movement are subjected to assault from a 
variety of sources during the restructuring period (Ibid: 130-2).
On the other hand, Golden argues that workforce reduction derived from economic 
restructuring has failed to generate industrial conflict in many countries. The reason is it 
is rational for unions to acquiesce layoffs when firms are threatened with bankruptcy 
due to an economic crisis. For example, fluctuations in employment in the United States 
are chronic, but rarely do they engender organized union resistance. Golden claims that 
unions resist job losses only when it presents a severe threat to union organization itself; 
unions, she states, aim first and foremost at protecting themselves as organizations. As a 
result, she argues that strikes are neither inevitable nor unpredictable when economic 
pressures induce firms to downsize. She theorizes that strikes over large-scale personnel 
reductions occur under two specific circumstances; first, when a firm inadvertently 
targets too many union activists for its trade union to tolerate, and, secondly, if offers 
from outside actors ( such as a national business association or a national trade union) to 
subsidize the costs of conflict lower the costs so as to incite both sides to conflict; in 
this case, each side prefers conflict over non-engagement because conflict becomes 
relatively cheap. That is, the former means that a main goal of union strikes is to secure 
protection for union militants and activists in order to protect the union itself. 
Accordingly, she suggests that unions should favour seniority-based layoffs in order to 
protect their activists. For example, union militants in the United States enjoy almost 
complete protection from expulsion from their firms thanks to seniority arrangements. 
In other words, job cuts are determined by the date one was hired, with the most
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recently hired the first to be let go. In this context, strikes over job losses are rare 
because union representatives tend to enjoy more seniority than average workers 
(1997:157-60). However, Golden’s argument of the rationality of union resistance to 
job losses derived from very specific cases and disregarded the distinct dynamics of 
group and inter-group behaviour analysed by social identity and mobilization theorists 
(Kelly, 1998: 72).
There have been many strikes around the world (including in Korea), the objective of 
which has been to protect the jobs of the rank-and-file, not those of senior union 
activists. This is very natural because the protection of union members’ jobs is a priority 
of union activity. In the case of the Korean banking sector, the unions (without outside 
financial support) have taken strike action against restructuring on four occasions since 
1998, each time to protect employees’ jobs, as the targets of redundancy were the rank- 
and-file, not the union activists (Chapter 5). In Korea, union activists are usually in a 
safer position than other employees because of collective agreements which include a 
seniority provision. As a result, unions were able to contribute to workers’ job security 
in successful strikes, while, in the case of unsuccessful strikes, it was the union leaders 
who were most critically damaged as some lost their (union) positions (in the case of the 
September 1998 strike) or went to jail (as happened following the strikes of December 
2000 and June 2003), in which cases they lost their bank jobs (see Section 8.2.1).
6.1.5. Effectiveness of mobilization
There is an extensive literature on mobilization effectiveness based on case studies of 
union strikes, with powerful arguments being made by both mobilization theorists and 
moderate unionism proponents.
The latter argue that if unions offer benefits such as cooperation in flexibility 
agreements and involvement in training programmes to employers, then they are more 
likely to extract concessions in return, such as recognition for collective bargaining and 
influence in decision-making (Crouch, 1982; Bassett, 1986; Lloyd, 1986; Leadbeater, 
1987; Rico, 1987; Kern and Sabel, 1992; Bacon and Blyton, 2002). Furthermore, they 
contend that strikes are ineffective insofar as they either fail to achieve their objectives 
or achieve them at such heavy financial cost to strikers that they constitute purely
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Pyrrhic victories . For example, Metcalf et al. (1993: 189) argue that wage strikes 
lasting more than about four days almost certainly generate more costs for the strikers in 
lost wages than they will recoup through employer concessions in wage bargaining. 
They also argue that militant unionism is vulnerable to employer counter-attack under 
conditions of recession in a way that more moderate unionism is not (MacGregor, 1986; 
Milne, 1994; Bacon and Blyton, 2004). As examples, they refer to strikes in the British 
coal and printing industries in the early 1980s.
These arguments have been reinforced by the increased competitive pressures in world 
markets and the internationalization of production and corporate organization. 
Competitive pressures have subjected employers to seeming continuous pressures to 
reduce costs, whilst internationalization has put key corporate decisions increasingly 
beyond the reach of workplace unionism. Because of this hostile environment, it is 
argued that unions are in no position to challenge fundamentally the priorities and 
interests of employers but must adapt as best they can, seeking out those issues on 
which they can forge common or compatible objectives with employers (Kelly, 1998: 
60).
On the other hand, mobilization theorists have argued for the effectiveness of strikes by 
emphasizing the conflicts of interest in the employment relationship (Cronin, 1979; 
Barling et al., 1992; Hartley, 1992; Cohn, 1993; Kelly, 1996, 1998). Kelly (1998: 64) 
argues that where unions have visibly demonstrated their strength and influence in 
pursuing, and winning, employee claims and grievances through strike action, then non­
union workers have been encouraged to join in unusually large numbers. Furthermore, 
he contends that such effectiveness is unlikely to be demonstrated through policies of 
moderation, even where unions attempt to pursue issues that are purportedly of equal 
interest to employers, such as training, equal opportunities, and health and safety.
Franzosi, in ‘The Puzzle of Strikes’ (1995: 342), argues that strike waves themselves 
produce changes in the economic, organizational, institutional, and political spheres; 
they are not the result of a set of those determinants. In other words, strikes are the 
cause, as well as the effects, of economic, organizational, institutional, and political
80 It means that although someone has won or gained something, it was not worth the sacrifices that they 
had to make.
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factors passing through the processes of union mobilization and the state and employers
Q 1
counter mobilization over a prolong period of time.
He mentions that strikes in Italy, firstly, transformed the very nature of working class 
organizations; not only did union membership increase, but also the union personnel 
changed as a consequence of the strike waves. In addition, the organizational structure 
of unions changed from the federal level to the confederal level. Secondly, the strikes 
affected not only the organization of labour but also that of employers (from national 
and regional associations to industrial associations). Employers tried to develop a 
collective response to the changed climate of class relations through their coalitions 
designed to break down strikes and workers’ organizations. It means that the strikes 
brought about a complete turnaround in ideologies and strategies of class relations. 
Thirdly, the political organization of the labour and its political position in the national 
power structure also changed. The Socialists were brought into a coalition government 
and labour involvement in political institutions increased. Fourthly, the strikes also 
brought about changes in the forms of institutionalization of conflict (e.g. toward more 
decentralized, industry wide bargaining and the extension of the practice of plant level 
bargaining). Finally, economic structures were deeply shaped and transformed by the 
strikes. In other words, the business cycle itself can be viewed as a product of class 
conflict, as the by-product of employers’ actions and state actions aimed at curbing 
labour militancy by thwarting workers’ bargaining power in the labour market. This is 
because mobilization of unions is likely to lead to counter-mobilization by state and 
employers. The state’s basic response to workers’ mobilization is repression of the 
most radical fringes of the movement and reward of the organizations (unions). The 
employers tried both to get rid of the most militant vanguard of workers (via layoffs and 
transfers) and to decrease the weight of labour in the mix of the factors of production 
(capital, labour, and raw materials). For example, employers turned to small factories
81 Kelly notes that the workers mobilization for strikes generates counter-mobilization by the state and the 
employers. The state attempts to persuade workers they have common interests with employers in 
boosting productivity and competitiveness, and curbing wage demands. The state also tries to repress the 
workers mobilization by legal measures and to change the forms o f collective action through the use of 
cooling off periods and secret ballots. It creates opportunities for union involvement in corporatist 
decision-making structures in order to reduce the incentives for unions to go on strikes. Employers use 
legal curbs and formalized industrial relations and productivity bargaining to counter or respond to 
worker power. Their tougher counter-actions include overt de-recognition of unions, the dismissal or 
transfer of militant union leaders, plant closures and redundancies, cutbacks in union facilities, more 
flexible work practice and labour intensification, and contracting out of functions (Franzosi, 1995: 342; 
Kelly, 1998:101-2).
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for labour peace and flexibility, because large factories had become sites of ongoing 
conflicts and labour rigidities (1995:301-40).
Dunlop (1967: 103) argues that a strike is often helpful in precipitating changes in each 
party’s bargaining position and usually encourages each party to reach a compromise as 
soon as possible. Furthermore, when there is a possibility that a strike could cause great 
social damage, both government and public opinion can sometimes push employers and 
unions to search for a quick resolution.
Due to the potential of such a big impact, strikes can produce strong shock effects on 
firms, forcing management to examine personnel practices and management strategies, 
to correct inefficient management practices, to tighten up and improve methods of 
production, and to adopt best practices (Neil, 1958: 289). In these ways, strikes can be a 
strong and highly effective means of exerting workers’ collective voice; unions limit 
employer behaviour that is arbitrary, exploitative, or retaliatory by balancing the power 
relationship between workers and managers; they [unions] also reduce turnover and 
promote stability in the workforce by establishing grievance and arbitration procedures. 
Such activities create conditions which, when combined with an overall improvement in 
industrial relations, enhance workers’ productivity (Hirschman, 1970; Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984: 5-6). Of course, strikes can also do great damage to both workers and 
firms if they are not successfully resolved.
There is also a considerable body of social movement literature dealing with the 
effectiveness of mobilization. Scholars in this field have argued that it depends more on 
one of such main factors as political opportunity, resource mobilization, or the strategic 
capacity of the union (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; Tilly, 1978; Ganz, 2000).
In the Korean cases under review unions appreciated that the strikes contributed to job 
security eventually because the Government and employers were forced to take union 
power into account at later stages of the restructuring. In addition, even the unsuccessful 
strikes also produced positive learning outcomes for union leaders and members as they 
planned forthcoming mobilizations (strikes). By learning from their mistakes unions 
were able to attain successful outcomes at subsequent strikes (see Chapter 5). Mann 
(1973: 46-7) argues that by the experience of solidarity with other workers at strikes 
workers recognize, in a very concrete way, the power that will eventually lead to the
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collective control by the workers of means of production. That is, the workers learn how 
to make the connection between their own collective action and plausible alternatives 
through the experiences of strikes. Consequently, the workers’ experiences extend the 
effectiveness of future mobilization.
The cases studied in this thesis will demonstrate that the unions can achieve the most 
successful outcomes when they exploit to the utmost resource mobilization, political 
opportunities, and collective actions. And, the development of a successful strike 
strategy is more easily achieved when unions are able to learn positively from previous 
strike experiences.
6.2. Strategy, strategic capacity, and tactical innovation
In order to understand and analyze the dynamics of mobilization we need to examine 
the concepts of strategy, strategic capacity, and tactical innovation.
6.2.1. Strategy
“The origin of the term ‘strategy’ lies in the military art, where it is a broad, rather 
vaguely defined, grand concept of a military campaign for application of large-scale 
forces against an enemy. Strategy is contrasted to tactics, which is a specific scheme for 
employment of allocated resources (Ansoff, 1965:114)”. According to Von Clausewitz 
(1968: 165), strategy forms the plan for war, and to this end it links together the series 
of acts which are to lead to the final decision, that is to say, it makes the plans for the 
separate campaigns and regulates the combats to be fought in each.
Ganz argues that “strategy is how we turn what we have into what we need to get what 
we want. It is how we transform our resources into the power to achieve our purposes. It 
is the conceptual link we make between the targeting, timing, and tactics with which we 
mobilize and deploy resources and the outcomes we hope to achieve” (2000: 1010). 
“The strategic importance of the choices we make about how to target resources, time 
initiatives, and employ tactics depends on how we frame them relative to other choices 
in a path toward our goals. One reason it is difficult to study strategy is that although 
choices about targeting, timing and tactics can be directly observed, the strategy that
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frames these choices and provides them with their coherence must often be inferred”, 
using data drawn from interviews with participants, oral histories, correspondence, 
memoirs, charters, constitutions, organizational journals, activity reports, minutes of 
meetings, and participant observation (Ibid: 1010).
Since strategy orients current action toward future goals, it develops in interaction with 
an ever-changing environment, especially actions and reactions of other actors (Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997: 34-56). In fixed contexts in which rules, resources, and interests 
are given, strategy can, to some extent, be understood in the analytic terms of game 
theories (Schelling, 1960). But in setting in which rules, resources, and interests are 
emergent, such as social movements, strategy has more in common with creative 
thinking (Morris, 1984). Strategic action can thus best be understood as an ongoing 
creative process of understanding and adapting new conditions to one’s goals (Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997).
“The relationship of strategy to outcomes can be clarified by the distinction game 
theorists make among games of chance, skill, and strategy. In games of chance, winning 
depends on the luck of the draw. In games of skill, it depends on behavioural facility. In 
games of strategy, it depends on cognitive discernment, in interaction with other 
players, of the best course of action. In most games, all three elements come into play”. 
“Similarly, environmental developments can be seen as chance in so far as any one 
actor is concerned. But, in the long run, some actors are more likely to achieve their 
goals than others because they are better able to take advantage of these chances. 
Environmental change may generate the opportunities for social movements to emerge, 
but the outcomes and legacies of such movements have more to do with the strategies 
actors devise to turn these opportunities to their purposes, thus reshaping their 
environment” (Ganz, 2000: 1011).
6.2.I.I. Strategy concepts in management
Concepts of strategy in management have blossomed in various terms such as strategic 
planning, strategic design, strategic positioning, scenario planning, and strategic intent. 
We need to look at these in order to obtain a broad understanding of organizations’ 
strategy-making skills.
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Strategic planning is the making of a plan describing how an organization will adapt to 
take advantage of opportunities in its constantly changing environment in order to 
maintain a strategic fit between the organization’s goals, capacities and opportunities. 
Ansoff (1965: 23-7), a great contributor to the strategic planning concept, identifies 
three different levels of management’s action: 1. an administrative level concerned with 
direct production processes; 2. an operational level which focuses on the maximization 
of efficiency of the administrative action level; 3. a strategic level that is directed 
toward an organization’s relation with its environment, forecasting changes in the 
environment, planning adequate responses, and controlling the organization’s correct 
realization of these plans. However, Ansoff s idea of strategic planning tends to make 
management as the strategic thinkers of an organization, seeing their task as defining the 
big picture, steering the organization with a strong grasp, while the lower level 
employees realize and implement what they have been told but which they could never 
see (Clegg, et al., 2005: 414).
Strategic design involves the analysis of organizations in terms of strengths, weakness, 
opportunities, and threats. It has been called SWOT analysis. The core strategic 
assumption concerns the identification of opportunities that an organization can exploit 
better than its competitors. To do this, firstly the strengths and weaknesses (internal 
conditions) have to be elaborated and the opportunities and threats (external conditions) 
have to identified; then, appropriate strategies can be developed (Clegg et al., 2005: 
416).
Strategic positioning occurs when an organization performs different activities from 
rivals or performs similar activities in different ways. In other words, it means 
deliberately choosing a different set of activities to deliver a unique mix of value. This 
is done because competitive strategy is about being different (Porter, 1996: 62). Porter 
argues that the profitability of an organization depends on bargaining power. That is, it 
pays less to its suppliers and sells at a higher price to customers compared with its 
competitors. Thus, forces and constraints, such as the threat of substitutes, the threat of 
new entrants, the power of suppliers, and the power of customers, together form 
competitive rivalry. These affect the ability to realize higher profitability through strong 
bargaining power, general conditions and trends in the business environment such as 
demographics, cultural and social changes, politics, legal trends, economic trends,
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access to natural resources, the activities of competitors, and relations with customers, 
suppliers, and stakeholders (Porter, 1980: 4-32).
Scenario planning is the forecasting of what the best and worst case scenarios for the 
future might be and what sorts of factors might be critical in dealing with them. 
According to Ringland (1998, 2002), scenario planners use four environmental factors 
in order to forecast an organization’s future: 1. social dynamics, including quantitative, 
demographic issues, and softer issues of values, lifestyles, demands, or political energy 
(e.g. the way that the war on terror seems to entail more surveillance and less 
autonomy); 2. Economic issues, including macroeconomic trends and forces shaping the 
economy as a whole, microeconomics (e.g. competition between small, innovator 
companies), and unique resource-based internal forces (e.g., employee training); 3. 
Technological issues, including direct (e.g. updating and innovating technologies or 
software), enabling (e.g. autonomous banking), and indirect (e.g. increased need for 
security experts) issues; 4. Political issues, including regulatory issues, such as the 
likely framing of future policies as more or less neo-economically liberal in key areas 
such as health, education, and transport. The actual questions that scenario planners will 
use vary, creatively, from case to case as they explore each case’s specificities, but 
typically, they seek insight into areas such as vital issues, favourable outcomes, 
unfavourable outcomes, internal systems, lessons from past successes and failures, 
decisions that have to be faced, and questions of responsibility (Ringland, 1998; Clegg 
et al., 2005: 425-6).
Lastly, strategic intent refers to a clearly understood statement of the direction in which 
a' firm intends to develop; the concept also encompasses an active management process 
that includes focusing the organization’s attention on the essence of winning, 
motivating people by communicating the value of the target, leaving room for 
individual and team contributions, sustaining enthusiasm by providing new operational 
definitions as circumstances change, and using intent consistently to guide resource 
allocations (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989: 64).
Strategy theorists argue that organizations make decisions in conditions of more or less 
uncertainty and knowledge. In other words, organizations operate in a bounded rational 
way, rather than being utterly rational optimizers, weighing every known fact and 
interpretation, and waiting for all the evidence to be available (Lindblom, 1959; March
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and Olson, 1972; Weick, 1979). Hence, rather than seeking optimization, organizations 
typically seek to arrive at the most satisfactory decision with regard to the evidence 
available (Clegg et al., 2005: 429).
Weick (1979: 10-1) argues that strategy making (or strategic planning) has many 
important functions. It brings people together and makes them think about where they 
are and where they want to go. It is simply a way of addressing the future -  speaking 
about missions and visions, hopes and fears, opportunities and threats. Strategy 
motivates and animates an organization -  it represents an organization’s dreams 
(strategic intent) and, in scenario planning, a way of overcoming its worst nightmares. 
Thus, strategies can assure people and give them confidence as well as provide them 
with future directions and ways of arriving there (Clegg et al., 2005: 430).
6.2.2. Strategic capacity
According to Ganz, in viewing strategy as a kind of creative thinking, there might be 
three key influences on creative output: task motivation, domain-relevant skills, and 
heuristic processes. In other words, the likelihood organizations will develop effective 
strategy (i.e. an organization’s strategic capacity) increases with motivation, access to 
salient knowledge, and the quality of heuristic processes people employ in their 
deliberations (2000: 1011-2).
Ganz (2000) explains the three elements of strategic capacity in more detail as follows. 
First, motivation influences creative output because it affects the focus one brings to 
one’s work, the ability to concentrate for extended periods of time, persistence, 
willingness to take risks, and ability to sustain high energy. Motivated individuals are 
more likely to work to acquire needed knowledge and skills. And they are able to 
override programmed modes of thought to think more critically and reflectively if 
intensely interested in a problem, dissatisfied with the status quo, or experiencing a 
schema failure as a result of sharp breaches in expectations and outcomes (DiMaggio, 
1997: 263). To the extent that success enhances motivation, it not only generates more 
resources but may encourage greater creativity. Regarding the sources of creative 
motivation, while some emphasize the rewards derived from stimulation of novelty, 
feeling of mastery, and feeling of control experienced in the competent performance of 
a task, others emphasize the meaningfulness attributed to the task by the person doing it.
211
For social movement leaders, motivation deriving from identify-forming values or the 
moral source that infuse one’s life with meaning and one’s work with meaningfulness 
are of particular importance. Work expressive of identity can be viewed as a vocation 
and work at one’s vacation promises more motivational reward than work at a job.
Secondly, salient knowledge is requisite to developing novel applications. It includes 
skills and information as well as the setting in which those skills are applied. The better 
our information about how to work within a particular domain -  our local knowledge -  
the more likely we are to know how to deal with problems arising within that domain. 
When problems are routine, mastery of known algorithms or repertoires of collective 
action facilitates effective problem solving. However, since environments can change in 
response to our initiatives, especially volatile social movement environments, regular 
feedback is important in evaluating responses to these initiatives (Ganz, 2002: 11).
Lastly, innovative solutions to new problems can be obtained by using heuristic 
methods to imaginatively reconceptualise data or synthesize it in new ways. To think 
creatively, we must recognize our problems as new ones (at least to us) that require new 
solutions. To find new solutions we use our gift for analogy to reframe data in new 
ways. Because it requires fresh perspectives and novel approaches, innovative thinking 
is facilitated by encounters with diverse points of view, from within one’s own life 
experience or that of the combined experience of the members of a group (Ganz, 2002: 
12).
Ganz also claims that an organization is more likely to achieve positive outcomes if it 
develops an effective strategy regarding timing of initiatives, targeting of resources, and 
tactics to be deployed. And, it is more likely to develop effective strategies if its leaders 
can access diverse sources of salient information, employ heuristic processes, and 
demonstrate deep motivation. Variation in strategic capacity, again, derives from 
differences in leaders’ life experiences, networks, and repertories, and organizations’ 
deliberative processes, resources flows, and accountability structures (2000: 1012; 
Section 6.4.1).
McAdam contends that an attempt to identify the influences on effective strategizing 
requires studying the same organization over time to discern the mechanisms that 
generate it. Strategic capacity, strategy, and outcomes might be distinct links in a
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probabilistic causal chain. In other words, greater strategic capacity is likely to yield 
better strategy, and better strategy is likely to yield better outcomes. However, the 
strategic capacity of organizations can grow or decline; such variation may help explain 
changes in effectiveness over time (1983: 735-52).
6.2.3. Tactical innovation
Pace of insurgent and tactical innovation
McAdam argues that challengers lacking institutionalized power must devise protest 
techniques that offset their powerlessness. This is referred to as a process of tactical 
innovation. He describes the process as follows. The central difference among political 
actors is captured by the idea of being inside and outside of polity. Challengers (or 
outsiders) lack the basic prerogative of members. Thus, the key challenge confronting 
insurgents, then, is to devise some way to overcome the basic powerlessness that has 
confined them to a position of institutionalized political impotence. The solution to this 
problem is pre-eminently tactical. Ordinarily, insurgents must bypass routine decision­
making channels and seek, through use of noninstitutionalized tactics, to force their 
opponents to deal with them outside the established arenas within which the latter 
derive so much of their power. In a phrase, they must create negative inducements to 
bargaining.
In most cases, then, the emergence of a social movement attests to at least limited 
success in the use of disruptive tactics. It must either extend its initial successes into 
positions of institutionalized power (as, for instance, the labour movement did) or 
continue to experiment with noninstitutional forms of protest. However, even the most 
successful tactic is likely to be effectively countered by movement opponents if relied 
upon too long. Barring the attainment of significant institutionalized power, then, the 
pace of insurgency comes to be crucially influenced by (a) the creativity of insurgents in 
devising new tactical forms, and (b) the ability of opponents to neutralize these moves 
through effective tactical counters. These processes may be referred to as tactical 
innovation and tactical adaptation, respectively. Together they define an ongoing 
process of tactical interaction in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chess-like 
fashion, to offset the moves of the other. How well each succeeds at this task crucially 
affects the pace and outcome of insurgency (1983: 735-6).
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Political/organizational context and tactical innovation
McAdam also mentions that as important as the process of tactical innovation is, it 
derives much of its significance from the larger political/organizational context in which 
it occurs. That is, the process only acquires significance in the context of the more 
general factors that make for a viable social movement in the first place. He stresses the 
importance of two structural factors in the emergence of widespread insurgency. The 
first is the level of indigenous organization within the aggrieved population: the second, 
the alignment of groups within the larger political environment. The first can be 
conceived of as the degree of organizational readiness within insurgent groups and the 
second, as the structure of political opportunities available to insurgent groups. As 
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for social insurgency, both factors are crucial 
prerequisites for the process of tactical innovation. Indigenous organizations furnish the 
context in which tactical innovations are devised and subsequently carried out. Such 
organizations serve to mobilize community resources in support of new tactical forms 
and to supply leaders to direct their use, participants to carry them out, and 
communication networks to facilitate their use and dissemination to other insurgent 
groups (1983: 736-7).
However, even with a conducive political environment and the presence of strong 
movement organizations, insurgents face a stem tactical challenge. Their opponents can 
be expected, through effective tactical adaptation, to neutralize the new tactic, thereby 
reinstituting the original power disparity between themselves and the challenger. To 
succeed over time, then, a challenger must continue its search for new and effective 
tactical forms (Ibid: 752).
6.3. Organizational learning
Theorists of OL generally perceive it as a process of adaptation to environmental 
changes. However, organizations frequently fall into the “competence trap”; they think 
that they do not need to learn more (Levitt and March, 1988: 319), and rely instead on 
routines. Consequently, they fail to respond to new environmental changes or 
challenges as many ancient civilizations have done and disappeared. OL theorists have 
sought to identify ways in which organizations leam the appropriate lessons and retain
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what is good while avoiding or discarding what is bad (Clegg et al., 2005: 367-8). This 
section summarizes their perspectives and attempts to apply them to trade unions.
6.3.1. Definition of OL
The application of OL is increasingly popular in academic disciplines that are interested 
in competitive efficiency and innovation. OL occurs when an organization learns 
lessons from the mistakes it has made. However, there are various perspectives of OL. 
Argyris and Schon (1978: 3) argue that “OL occurs when errors are detected and 
corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying norms, 
policies, and goals.” Fiol and Lyles (1985: 377) define learning as “the process of 
improving actions through better knowledge and understanding.” Dodgson (1993: 377) 
describes OL as “the ways organizations build, supplement, and organize knowledge 
and routines around their activities and within their cultures, and adapt and develop 
organizational efficiency by improving the use of the broad skills of their workforces.” 
Lastly, Crossan et al. (1999: 522) argue that “OL can be conceived of as a principal 
means of achieving the strategic renewal of an organization. Renewal requires that 
organizations explore and leam new ways while concurrently exploiting what they have 
already learned.”
Therefore, “there is no theory or model of OL that is widely accepted although there 
exist widespread acceptance of the notion of OL and its importance to strategic 
performance. It is because researchers have approached the subject from different 
perspectives, leading to more divergence” (Fiol and Lyles, 1985: 803). Crossan et al. 
(1999: 522) also observe that, “in large part, convergence has not occurred because 
different researchers have applied the concept of OL, or at least the terminology, to 
different domains”. For examples, theorists have referred to learning as (a) new insights 
or knowledge (Hedberg. 1981); (b) new structures (Chandler, 1962); (c) new systems 
(Miles, 1982); and (d) mere actions (Cyert and March, 1963). They have also referred to 
the following phenomena as learning; adaptation (Meyer, 1982; Levitt and March, 
1988), change (Dutton and Duncan, 1983), and unlearning (Nystrom and Starbuck, 
1984) (Fiol and Lyles, 1985: 803). Although therefore there are various approaches to 
OL the common assumption is that it will improve future performance and raise the 
probability of survival in changing environments.
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Scholars argue that there are distinctions between individual learning and OL. Hedberg 
states it this way: “Although OL occurs through individuals, it would be a mistake to 
conclude that OL is nothing but the cumulative result of their members’ learning. 
Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive systems and memories. As 
individuals develop their personalities, personal habits, and beliefs over time, 
organizations develop world views and ideologies. Members come and go, and 
leadership changes, but organizations’ memories preserve certain behaviours, mental 
maps, norms, and values over time” (1981: 6).
Fiol and Lyles contend that much of the individual learning theory that deals with 
repetition of speech and motor skills does not characterize OL, at least at the strategic 
level, in situations that are mainly unique and nonrepetitive. OL enables organizations 
to build an organizational understanding and interpretation of their environment and to 
begin to assess viable strategies. It results in associations, cognitive systems, and 
memories that are developed and shared by members of the organization (1985: 804).
Argyris and Schon argue that in order for OL to occur, learning agents’ discoveries, 
inventions, and evaluations must be embedded in organizational memory. They must be 
encoded in the individual images and the shared maps of organizational theory-in-use 
from which individual members will subsequently act. If this encoding does not occur, 
individuals will have learned but the organization will not have done so. Thus, learning 
systems, the content of which is the accumulation of histories, experiences, norms, and 
stories, not only influence current employees but also future members of the 
organization (1978: 29).
6.3.2. Levels of OL
There are two significant arguments concerning learning development within 
organizations. First, Argyris and Schon describe three types of OL, single-loop learning, 
double-loop learning and deutero-leaming. Single-loop learning refers to the error- 
detection and error-collection process, and it occurs when the error detected and 
corrected permits the organization to carry on its present policies or achieve its present 
objectives. Thus, “its members respond to error by modifying strategies and 
assumptions within constant organizational norms”. In other words, it can be equated to 
activities that add to the knowledge-base or firm-specific competences or routines
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without altering the fundamental nature of the organization’s activities (1978:18-29). 
Such learning happens within a given frame of reference. The parameters are given and 
clearly defined, and the learning experience focuses on how to optimize an 
organization’s capacity within this frame (Clegg et al., 2005: 353).
Double-loop learning occurs when, in addition to detection and correction of errors, the 
organization is involved in the questioning and modification of existing norms, 
procedures, policies, and objectives. In other words, “response to detected error takes 
the form of joint inquiry into organizational norms themselves, so as to resolve their 
inconsistency and make the new norms more effectively realizable”. Double-loop 
learning questions the business an organization is in, its culture and its strategic vision 
whereas single-loop learning is important for incremental performance improvement. 
Double-loop learning represents an ability to reflect on the single-loop learning 
processes and to understand when fundamental change is required (Ibid: 353).
Deutero-leaming occurs when organizations leam how to carry out single- and double­
loop learning. It involves changing the organization’s knowledge-base or firm-specific 
competences or routines.
Argyris and Schon argue that when an organization engages in deutero-leaming its 
members leam about previous contexts for learning. They reflect on and inquire into 
previous episodes of OL, or failure to leam. They discover what they did that facilitated 
or inhibited learning; they invent new strategies for learning; they produce these 
strategies, and they evaluate and generalize what they have produced. Thus, “its 
members leam about OL and encode their results in images and maps” (1978: 27-9). 
Mason (1993: 841) defines strategic learning as that process (deutero-leaming) by 
which an organization makes sense of its environment in ways that broaden the range of 
objectives it can pursue or the range of resources and actions available to it for 
processing these objectives.
Secondly, Fiol and Lyles (1985: 807) define two levels of learning, lower- and higher- 
level learning. Lower-level learning occurs within a given organizational structure, or a 
given set of mles. It leads to the development of some rudimentary associations of 
behaviour and outcomes, but these usually are of short duration and impact only part of 
what the organization does. It is a result of repetition and routine and involves
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association building. Cyert and March (1963: 20-1) identify success programs, goals, 
and decision rules as illustrative of learning based on routine. Because of this reliance 
on routine, lower-level learning tends to take place in organizational contexts that are 
well understood and in which management thinks it can control situations.
Higher-level learning, on the other hand, aims at adjusting overall rules and norms 
rather than specific activities or behaviours. The associations that result from higher- 
level learning have long-term effects and impacts on the organization as a whole. This 
type of learning occurs through the use of heuristics, skill development, and insights. It 
therefore is a more cognitive process than is lower-level learning, which is the result of 
repetitive behaviour. Some type of crisis is necessary for changes in higher-level 
learning; examples include a new strategy, a new leader, or a dramatically altered 
market. The desired consequence of this type of learning is often not any particular 
behavioural outcome, but rather the development of frames 
of reference, or interpretive schemes. That is, new cognitive frameworks within which 
to make decisions. In fact, “unlearning” may be one of the most important consequences 
(Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984).
6.3.3. Process of OL
There are two leading perspectives on the process of OL, one developed by Huber, the 
other by Crossan et al. Huber (1991: 90) identifies four steps in the OL process; 
information acquisition, its distribution, its interpretation, and organizational memory. 
As a first step, learning occurs when an organization acquires knowledge. Acquisition 
of declarative knowledge or facts and information is achieved by monitoring the 
environment, using information systems to store, manage, and retrieve information, 
carrying out research and development, carrying out education and training, patent 
watching, and bibliometrics (Dodgson, 1993: 381). Learning within an organization 
occurs not only as a result of acquiring knowledge from outside the organization but 
also when existing knowledge is rearranged (i.e. the revision of previous knowledge 
structures, and the building and revision of theories). Secondly, information distribution 
refers to the process by which an organization shares information among its units and 
members, thereby promoting learning and producing new knowledge or understanding. 
Knowledge in the form of tacit know-how, letters, memos, informal conversations, and 
reports are captured and distributed. In the third of Huber’s steps, information must be 
interpreted in order to be shared. Information interpretation is the process by which
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distributed information is given one or more commonly understood meanings. Sense- 
making or the formation of meaning is called “procedural knowledge” (Dodgson, 1993: 
380). Huber (1991: 91) states that individuals and groups have prior belief structures 
which shape their interpretation of information and thus the formation of meaning. 
These belief structures are stored as a rule-base or a profile which is automatically 
applied to any incoming information in order to form meaningful knowledge that can be 
stored. And, fourthly, organizational memory refers to the repository where knowledge 
is stored for future use. It is also called “corporate knowledge or corporate genetics” by 
Prahalad and Hamel (1994). Decision makers store and retrieve not only hard data or 
information but also soft information (i.e. information with meaning). This soft or 
interpreted information can be in the form of tacit know-how, expertise, biases, 
experiences, lists of contacts, anecdotes, etc. Both the demonstrability and usability of 
learning depend on the effectiveness of the organization’s memory. The major challenge 
for organizations lies in interpreting information and creating organizational memory 
that is easily accessible. Huber’s identification of OL processes will be adequate to 
explain the OL of top-down organizations. However, it is more difficult to explain the 
OL of bottom-up ones.
Crossan et al. (1999: 525) argue that OL is a multi-level process that begins with 
individual learning, leads to group learning, and then to OL. These levels, they argue, 
are connected by bi-directional processes that involve both the creation and application 
of knowledge (they describe the total process as “strategic renewal”). More specifically, 
they describe four processes that connect individual learning to OL; intuition, 
interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing. They define these four processes as 
follows:
Intuition is the preconscious recognition of the pattern and/or possibilities 
inherent in a personal stream of experience. This process can affect the 
intuitive individual’s actions, but it only affects others when they attempt 
to interact with that individual. Interpreting is the explaining, through 
words and/or actions, of an insight or idea to one’s self and to others.
This process goes from the preverbal to the verbal, resulting in the 
development of language. Integrating is the process of developing shared 
understanding among individuals and of taking coordinated action 
through mutual adjustment. Dialogue and joint action are crucial to the 
development of shared understanding. Institutionalizing is the process of 
ensuring that routinized actions occur. Tasks are defined, actions 
specified, and organizational mechanisms put in place to ensure that 
certain actions occur. Institutionalizing is the process of embedding 
learning that has occurred by individuals and groups into the organization,
219
and it includes systems, structures, procedures, and strategy (Crossan et 
al., 1999: 525).
They also argue that:
OL is a dynamic process. Not only does learning occur over time and 
across levels but it also creates a tension between assimilating new 
learning (feed forward) and exploiting or using what has already been 
learned (feedback). Through feed forward processes, new ideas and 
action flow from the individual to the group to the organization levels. At 
the same time, what has already been learned feed back from the 
organization to groups and individual levels affecting how people act and 
think. The concurrent nature of the feed forward and the feedback 
processes creates a tension, which can be understood by arraying the 
levels against one another. In addition to the processes that feed forward 
learning from the individual and groups to the organization, learning that 
has been institutionalized feeds back and impacts individual and group 
learning. The importance of these interactions can be highlighted by two 
relationships that are especially problematic (Crossan et al., 1999: 532).
It is argued that Crossan et al.’s four processes of OL can explain properly the processes 
of interaction between feed forward and feedback regarding learning within a union in 
which decisions are made by democratic procedures (i.e. in a bottom-up decision­
making structure). Thus, these processes of OL will be used in the analysis of union 
learning as it affects strike strategy-making.
<Figure 6-3> Processes of OL
Interpretation Integration
Organization:
Individual
(Members):
Intuition
Group
Institutionalization
Source: Crossan et al. (1999)
6.3.4. Influences on OL
Dodgson (1993: 378) states that learning is stimulated both by environmental changes 
and internal factors (individuals, culture, etc) in a complex and iterative manner. Fiol 
and Lyles (1985: 807) state that four contextual factors, environment, structure, culture,
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and strategy, affect the probability of learning occurring. Thus, an organizational culture 
conducive to learning, a strategy that allows flexibility, an organizational structure that 
allows both innovativeness and new insights, and the environment within which the 
organization operates are all key contextual factors. These have a circular relationship 
with learning in that they create and reinforce learning and are created by learning.
The adoption of certain structures and strategies encourages learning. Strategy 
influences learning by providing a boundary to decision-making and a context for the 
perception and interpretation of the environment. The strategic options chosen depend 
on the learning capacity of the organization. The amount of information flow or 
communication between organizational units and individuals determines learning. Poor 
communication between people and organizational units can be a major block to 
learning and quality improvement. Organizational culture (beliefs, ideologies, values, 
and norms) and the amount of resources (money and personnel) also determine the 
quality and quantity of learning.
OL occurs as a result of the interplay of various factors such as structure, strategy, 
environment, technology, and culture (Fiol and Lyles, 1985: 807). More and more 
organizations have realized that in order to be successful in a highly competitive 
environment, they must encourage double-loop and deutero-leaming (or higher-level 
learning). The implications of not becoming a learning organization can be costly..
6.3.5. Facilitators and inhibitors of OL
OL is stimulated both by environmental changes and internal factors in a complex and 
iterative manner. Organizations purposefully adopt structures and strategies to 
encourage learning (Dodgson, 1993: 37). They are not totally reactive, and can 
proactively seek to influence the environment in which they leam. The relationship 
between strategy and structure, and the role of strategy acting as an intermediary filter 
between the environment and the organization has long been a focus of interest in the 
management literature (Chandler, 1962, 1990; Ansoff, 1965; Weick, 1979, 1995; Porter, 
1980, 1985, 1996; Weick and Westley, 1999). Ganz argues that “organizational 
structures that afford members venues for regular, open and authoritative deliberation; 
draw resources from a diversity of salient constituencies; and hold leaders and rank-and- 
file accountable to each other are more likely to generate effective OL than those that do
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not” (2000: 1016). Facilitators of OL can also include the endowment of motives, the 
development of formal R&D structure, the introduction of new technologies (for better 
communications, rapid delivery of information, and effective education), the high level 
of trust in organizations, external challenges (or crises), and previous failures (Dodgson, 
1993; Morgan, 1997; G a n z ,  2000).
Argyris and Schon argue there are two kinds of inhibitory loops, primary ones and 
secondary ones. The former is a self-reinforcing cycle in which errors in action provoke 
individuals to behaviours which reinforce those errors. The latter is group and inter­
group dynamics which produce conditions for error (ambiguity, vagueness, etc). They 
also contend that organizations tend to create learning systems that inhibit double-loop 
learning, calling into question their norms, objectives, and basic policies. They call this 
tendency “defensive routines”; when people feel threatened or vulnerable they often 
engage in defensive routines designed to protect themselves and their colleagues. That 
is, people find ways of obscuring or burying issues and problems that will show them in 
a bad light and of deflecting attention elsewhere (1978: 3).
Morgan explains how departmental structures focus the attention of their members on 
parochial rather than organization-wide problems; how systems of accountability 
frequently foster defensiveness in attitudes; and how statements of what they do and 
what actually occurs varies. He argues that bureaucratization tends to create fragmented 
patterns of thought and action. Where hierarchical and horizontal divisions are 
particularly strong, information and knowledge rarely flow in a free manner. Different 
sectors of the organization thus often operate on the basis of different pictures of the 
total situation, pursuing subunit goals almost as ends in themselves. The existence of 
such divisions tends to emphasize the distinctions between different elements of the 
organization and fosters the development of political systems that place yet further 
barriers in the way of learning (1997: 88-9). Inhibitors of OL can include successive 
successes and the presence of obstacles to unlearning.
6.3.6 Discussion of OL
Sceptics (including labour process theorists) have raised questions about the claim that 
organizations leam; these hinge on assumptions about the critical importance of 
relationships among individual, interpersonal, and higher levels of social aggregation. 
They have challenged the desirability of OL, arguing that organizations may leam in
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ways that foster evil ends or reinforce the status quo. They claim that the ideal of the 
learning organization may be used to support a subtler and darker form of managerial 
control, or, further, that organizations can codify what is unimportant and 
inconsequential while missing that which is profound because it is so deeply embedded 
in the normal ways of doing things. Furthermore, they contend that the results of OL 
sometimes become dysfunctional. Superstitions or path dependency or organizational 
success stories can create the inability or unwillingness to change (Fiol and Lyles, 1985: 
808; Martin and Ross, 1999:4; Clegg et al., 2005: 368). Thus, some academics have 
observed and categorized phenomena, inhibitors of OL, which function as impediments 
to valid inference and effective action (see Section 6.3.5).
Brunsson argues that nonleaming organizations are healthier than learning ones, an idea 
directly opposed to the commonly accepted view that there is a positive relationship 
between learning and organizational performance. According to Brunsson, the learning 
organizations have to change, adjust, and align all the time, whereas nonleaming 
organizations can deal with contradictions, inconsistent demands, and gaps between 
ideal worlds and actual reality; the latter are emancipated because they can disregard the 
need for change that drives learning organizations (Brunsson, 1998: 421).
Weick and Westley (1999: 190) claim that learning and organizing are essentially 
antithetical processes; organizational learning is thus an oxymoron. This is because 
organizing is all about ordering and controlling (decreasing variety) whereas learning is 
about disorganizing and increasing variety. Thus, they understand learning as a process 
that is possible only in those spaces where order is juxtaposed with disorder. Learning 
thus happens when the old and the new clash and create a tension (Clegg et al., 2005: 
379-81).
On the basis of the above critical evaluations of OL, we can argue that creating a 
learning organization is only half the solution to a challenging problem. Equally 
important is the creation of an unlearning organization which essentially means that the 
organization must forget some of its past. In other words, to change organizational 
culture formed through its routines, practices, processes, and stories - the store of 
knowledge - organizations must both relinquish old habits and leam new ways. Thus, 
learning occurs amidst such conflicting factors. In addition, if organizations do not have 
the capacity to absorb or utilize individual learning the investment in learning could be
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meaningless and counterproductive. Yet, it is important to note that not all intuitive 
insights should, or can, be immediately interpreted, integrated, and institutionalized. 
What enables the organization to separate the wheat from the chaff as ideas and 
practices develop and are refined over time? It should be strategic contexts that help to 
frame things that are more or less relevant, (although the decision rules, criteria, and 
processes are not so clear) (Hedberg, 1981: 3; Dodgson, 1993: 385; Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1994; Clegg et al., 2005: 350).
Much of the QL literature highlights the significance of OL for competitiveness and the 
proactive role of strategy in its stimulation. However, much of its analysis of learning is 
limited to its outcomes, and it ignores or underestimates the problems and complexities 
in the processes of learning. Thus, even though there are some areas of agreement, there 
remains a great disparity in the fundamental underlying assumptions of different 
approaches, such as the differing focuses on outcomes and processes (particularly, 
between top-down organizations like firms and bottom-up organizations like unions). 
Synthesis of these differing approaches, and the development of an interdisciplinary 
perspective, will have particular value for the continuing study of OL (Dogson, 1993: 
391; Crossan, et al., 1999).
Furthermore, there is little OL literature on democratic, bottom-up organizations like 
trade unions whose decision-making processes and agendas83 may be very different to 
those of top-down organization like firms. Thus, a deep examination of OL in unions 
(including studying learning mechanisms that unions use through their structures and 
strategies and. the way they use motives to learning), based on mobilizations in the 
Korean banking sector between 1998 and 2003, would be very valuable, not only filling 
a specific gap in the literature but also contributing to the study of contemporary 
organizational behaviour.
82 Huzzard (2000: 353) notes that “orthodox texts on OL reflect a view of management which is top- 
down, managerialist and suppressive of marginalized voices. Those have very often an assumption that all 
members of the organization learn the same things according to the same-set o f values. A critical 
perpective, however, sees organizations not just as pluralistic arenas but also as arenas where interests of 
groups in the organization are differenciated by power and ideology (Fox, 1974)”.
83 For example, fair wage, satisfying working conditions, industrial democracy, and solidarity are top on 
the list of OL for unions while productivity, efficiency, and competitiveness are top on the list of OL for 
management.
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In spite of sceptics of OL, a discourse based on learning has surely offered better 
chance of progress in the form of small wins (Huzzard, 2001: 429). Thus, the grafting of 
the concepts of OL to unions and the development of new theory regarding unions 
would be urgent and indispensable tasks as union power has rapidly decreased since 
1980s. Previous theories of union revitalization look like the start of the study of union 
learning.
6.3.7. OL in unions
6.3.7.I. Unions and learning
A union is an organization and, thus, learns like other organizations. Zoll (unpublished 
manuscript) argues that unions are learning organizations. They try to adapt to changing 
circumstances, they initiate processes of organizational development or they try to deal 
with the future of public services. They have learnt, or endeavour to keep learning, how 
to cope with recurrent problems. In other words, they conduct OL that helps them to 
interpret new situations and to form new routines in coping with problems.
To aid this learning, unions have organized public conferences and invited scientists 
and trade union experts to discuss various problems. These discussions have sometimes 
led to prolonged debates between officials and interested members of the union. The 
discussions have influenced not only the resolutions of the union’s congresses but also 
their bargaining policies (and fighting strategies). These patterns have an inner logic 
that is self-confirming; they help to interpret reality, and because they do so they fit to 
reality, and because they fit to reality they are confirmed. However, this self­
confirmation can become an obstacle to any transformation (i.e. either new learning or 
new learning strategy). Martin and Ross note that “unions are path dependent , 
constrained organizationally by their pasts. They tend to move in directions which will 
not threaten shared ideas, values, and habits and learning will be skewed towards what 
is already known” (Martin and Ross, 1999: 4). Thus, unions are required to engage in 
higher-level learning because they do not wish to simply repeat learned reactions but
84 “Unions navigate with an undisciplined, sometimes mutinous, crew, an unweildly chain of command 
and inherited, often inaccurate, maps about the unpredictable waters around them. They are thus likely to 
be conservative often discounting longer term threats in favor of short run satisficing, in part to avoid 
costly and organizationally difficult changes. They may even take head-in-the sand positions 
undervaluing fundamental change” (Martin and Ross, 1999:4).
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need to use patterns that are interconnected learned reactions (Zoll, unpublished 
manuscript).
There are some differences (discussed in Section 1.3.2) between the OL of unions and 
that of firms due to the differences of their characteristics and interests. For example, 
while unions organize their actions in democratic processes, firms organize themselves 
in rather non-democratic ways. The democratic decision-making procedures of unions 
have considerably influenced the ways that they learn. Considering these differences, it 
is probably unsurprising that few scholars have dealt with OL in unions. Thus, it is 
necessary to develop theories that deal with OL in labour unions or other organizations 
(e.g. Non-Government Organizations) which operate according to voluntary and 
democratic principles.
Drinkuth et al. argue that: "There are two major obstacles that unions meet when OL is 
concerned: one is an ideology of conflict, which creates a unified institution intent on 
perpetuating its legitimacy through strategies of opposition, and another is a perspective 
according to which power is based on control over capital. In short, unions have a 
traditionally reactive action repertoire of strategies for action. This repertoire has limited 
the ways in which unions have been able to adapt to and influence economic 
development at the national, regional, and company levels” (2001: 456).
Union revitalization
However, since the 1980s, confronted with such deep and constant structural changes, 
unions have been discovering that learning is not only relevant but even necessary for 
their survival and development. One type of learning in unions can be seen in the 
processes through which they have responded to restructuring conducted by employers 
and the government. Another type of learning can be seen in the questioning of 
traditional tactics in labour relations and the search for new strategies (Ibid: 449).
Unions are now experimenting with a host of new ideas and practices in the name of 
union revitalization85 (or renewal) designed to rebuild their membership and restore 
them to a position of strength vis-a-vis employers and governments. This strategic
85 However, there are critics who claim that the union renewal model through organizing centres on a 
union’s own political and strategic inadequacies as ends in themselves (Fletcher and Hurd, 1998: 52; 
Fairbrother and Yates, 2003: 24). Thus, there is a need to build links between organizing for self-interest 
and organizing for social justice and a transformation of the broader political regime based on a new 
mobilized and oppositional working class (Gindin, 1995: 268).
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realignment by unions has included rationalization through reorganizing the organized 
(such as mergers between unions86 or strengthening of union democracy and solidarity), 
an emphasis on organizing the unorganized, and an experimentation with new forms of 
partnership between unions and employers 87 (Fairbrother and Yates, 2003: 2). 
Especially in US unions, debate over organizing strategies has distinguished two models 
of union revitalization; “the service model”, in which local union leadership tries to help 
members by solving problems for them versus “the organizing model”, in which 
solutions are found which include using both internal and external resources (Diamond, 
1988: 6). Banks and Metzger argue that the service model is equal to stale unionism, an 
overreliance on union staff and the grievance and arbitration process and a passive 
membership while the organizing model visualized focusing on collective action and 
militancy. They also contend that through the involvement of many more people in their 
daily life unions would be able to take on and solve more problems (1989: 50). The 
main contents of the organizing model are; 1. Members have to be active participants in 
the way unions organize and operate, thereby contributing to the collective focus and 
practice of the union. 2. Members have to be encouraged and trained to take 
responsibility for solving their own and the collective’s problems and to take an active 
role in extending union membership through organizing. The emphasis in training is on 
collective problem solving and self-sufficiency, with the intention of taking pressure off 
full-time officials. 3. Problems are often solved in creative fashions, circumventing 
established institutions, and placing direct pressure on employers through community 
and workplace activism (Fairbrother and Yates, 2003: 19; Schenk, 2003: 247).
Carter evaluates the results of the organizing approach as follows:
The organizing approach frequently leaves unanswered a series of 
questions about the strategic direction of the labour movement, including 
the constituencies of unions, and how issues of globalization and 
international solidarity are addressed. The weaknesses of labour are 
political as well as industrial, and the organizing approach, while a 
necessary prerequisite for the viability of effective political organization 
and representation, is frequently silent on these issues. In the hostile 
conditions of contemporary capitalism, trade union organizing is a 
necessary but insufficient step towards the confidence and self­
emancipation of labour (2006: 422-3).
86 Carter argues that a major impetus for the mergers will have been the failure to see benefits from its 
implementation of an organizing strategy (in the case study of MSF) because the mergers will not to 
strengthen organizing but to stall further successive rounds of demoralizing rationalization and cuts in 
expenditure and resources (2003: 180, 198).
87 Carter argues that “the results of union revitalization in the UK have faced more detailed challenges 
from those not opposed to the idea of the need for union renewal, but who have difficulty being 
convinced of the detail and extent of the process (2004: 140).
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The next section looks at the detailed content of OL in unions, using the OL theories 
discussed earlier as a basis.
6.3.7.2. Content of union learning
The content of OL in unions is, in many respects, similar to that in firms, although 
interest, level of decision-making, leaders’ motives, and organizational boundaries are 
different as discussed in Section 1.3.2. The similarities, however, are many. First, a 
union, like any organization, learns when it incorporates into its policies and actions 
lessons from the mistakes it has made. In other words, OL in unions occurs when errors 
are detected and corrected, thus strengthening their recent policies and improving the 
likelihood of the achievement of their goals (Argyris and Schon, 1978: 3). Unions build, 
supplement, and organize knowledge and routines around their activities and within 
their cultures, and adapt and develop organizational efficiency by improving the use of 
the broad skills of their organizations (Dodgson, 1993: 377).
Secondly, the goals of union learning can be aligned with union activities. A common 
explanation of the need to learn is the requirement for adaptation and improved 
efficiency in times of change. Some theorists of OL (Weick, 1979; Meyer, 1982; Levitt 
and March, 1988), for example, see learning as the highest form of adaptation, raising 
the probability of survival in changing environments. A learning organization is one 
which attempts to develop. This development is reflected in strategies and structures 
which purposefully facilitate and coordinate learning in rapidly changing and 
conflicting circumstances (Dodgson, 1993: 377).
Thirdly, the levels of union learning can be divided, like other organizations, into lower- 
level and higher-level learning. Lower-level learning refers to an error-detection and 
error-collection process which, however, once addressed, only leads to the organization 
carrying on as before. Higher-level learning occurs when, in addition to the detection 
and correction of errors, the organization questions and amends its norms, procedures, 
policies, and objectives; it aims, therefore, at the adjustment of overall rules and norms 
to adapt in changing environments and to improve efficiency. Thus, when a union 
engages in high-level learning its members (including its leaders) learn about previous 
contexts for learning. They reflect on, and inquire into, previous episodes of OL, or
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failures to learn. They discover what they did that facilitated or inhibited learning. Thus, 
they invent new strategies for learning, and they evaluate and generalize what they have 
produced (Argyris and Schon, 1978: 27).
Fourthly, OL in unions is a multi-level process that begins with individual learning, 
leads to group learning, and then to OL. Again, like other organizations, these levels are 
connected by bi-directional processes that involve both the creation and application of 
knowledge. And, the processes that link individual learning to OL are interpreting, 
integrating, institutionalizing, and intuiting (Crossan et al., 1999: 525). For interpreting, 
union members generally engage in dialogue with other members or union officers, at 
small group meetings, or via computer communication systems (through which 
information is created and disseminated). For integrating, union members use agenda 
setting at formal meetings (e.g. at representatives’ meetings such as National Congress), 
or suggestions to union officers through a union’s Internet homepage and suggestion 
box. New norms are established in this process. For institutionalizing, unions promote 
the establishment of information transfer systems or new organizational structures, such 
as education courses or centres, publications (e.g. union newspapers), and computer 
networks (e.g. union homepages). For intuiting88, unions generally utilize education 
courses, union newspapers, meetings, and participation in collective actions in order to 
help members extend their intuition (note: the intuition occurs at the individual level). 
Together, these four processes form a learning loop, as the effect of new 
institutionalizations of organizational members’ experiences feed into their individual 
intuitions (Figure 6-4). Thus, the learning process in unions is dialogical (Offe and 
Wiesenthal, 1985: 193).
Crossan et al. (1999: 525) argue that a key factor of the transformation of new ideas into 
“coherent, collective action” is the political will and skill of those attempting to make 
this transformation. Lawrence et al. suggest the forms of power related to the four 
processes of OL: 1. the interpretation of a new idea is best facilitated by a political 
strategy that involves the use of influence and is based on access to relevant expertise 
and/or appropriate skills. 2. The integration of a new idea requires a political strategy 
that involves the use of force based on formal authority. 3. The institutionalization of a 
new idea requires for its facilitation a political strategy that involves systems of 
domination. 4. The intuitions will best be facilitated by a political strategy that involves
88 Intuiting refers to the processes that help members extend their intuition.
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systems of discipline providing deep levels of experience and consistent bases for 
identity formation. More specifically, they argue that influence is useful to overcome 
the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with interpretation, that force facilitates the 
accomplishment of collective action in the integration process, that domination 
overcomes potential resistance to change and thus supports institutionalization, and that 
discipline supports the development of the expertise that is necessary to foster intuition 
(2005: 188).
<Figure 6-4> Learning processes in unions
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Source: The case of KFIU (Section 4.6.2.2.)
Fifthly, Fiol and Lyles (1983: 807) state that four contextual factors -  culture, strategy, 
structure, and environment -  affect the probability of learning occurring. If an 
organizational culture facilitates and encourages learning, learning will beget learning. 
How do these factors apply to unions? 1. An organization’s culture manifests itself in 
the overriding ideologies and established patterns of behaviour. Culture consists of the 
shared beliefs, the ideologies, and the norms that influence organizational action-taking. 
In the case of unions, their cultures are generally voluntary, democratic and reactive 
(Drinkuth et al., 2001: 446). Therefore, learning in unions tends to be conducted in 
response to members and leaders’ needs. (It means that unions tend to leam passively if 
they do not face crises.) 2. The strategic posture of an organization influences the goals 
and breadth of learning, and partially determines its learning capacity. Strategy 
determines the goals and objectives and the breadth of actions available for carrying out 
the strategy. Thus, strategy influences learning by providing a boundary to decision­
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making and a context for the perception and interpretation of the environment. The 
current strategy of unions is to survive and to develop in changing environments. 3. The 
organization’s structure plays a crucial role in determining learning processes. Union 
organizations are generally structured in two broad ways, as centralized organizations 
(as an industry-level body) and decentralized organizations (operating at the enterprise- 
level). Decentralized organizations facilitate the assimilation of new patterns and new 
norms by reducing the cognitive workload of individuals, but the fragmented learning at 
the enterprise-level is likely to lead to differences in learning between union members at 
the industry-level (Ibid: 449). On the other hand, centralized organizations facilitate the 
unification between members of new patterns and new norms by delivering those as 
unified methods. However, centralized organizations are likely to retard learning. 
Duncan (1973: 273) thus points out that different decision-making structures are needed 
in the same organizational unit, depending on the degree of flexibility that is required: A 
centralized, mechanistic structure tends to reinforce past behaviours, while a more 
decentralized structure tends to allow shifts of beliefs and actions (Foil and Lyles, 1985: 
805). However, decentralized organizations may not have the networking capability to 
keep the parts connected (Kim, 1993: 46). 4. The environment is also a crucial factor. 
Until the end of the 1970s, unions in the UK enjoyed increases in both membership and 
power due to the stability of the political and economic situation. However, since the 
1980s, both their numbers of members and their power have declined as a result of the 
globalization of capital and restructuring (derived from the Thatcher government’s neo­
liberalism policies). Unions recognize the necessity of learning in order to respond to 
these new challenges. Hedberg (1981: 5) notes that learning requires both change and 
stability, although too much stability within an organization can be dysfunctional (there 
is little inducement to leam and/or change if established behaviours never grow 
obsolete), while too much change and turbulence make it difficult for learners to map 
their environment (March and Olsen, 1976).
Lastly, facilitators and inhibitors of learning in unions differ significantly from that of 
firms, again due to the characteristics of unions (i.e. the fact they are democratic, 
voluntary and reactive). Due to their democratic and voluntary character, unions’ 
activities tend to be influenced by the internal and external motives of their members. 
The internal motives are the sense of mission of the leaders, and the sense of justice and 
solidarity (comradeship) between members. The external motives are the desires for 
wage increases, improved working conditions, and the promotion of industrial
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democracy. Those motives can become facilitators of union learning because of their 
tendency to promote voluntary learning (or creativity) of members. Hackman and 
Oldham (1976: 250) emphasize the meaningfulness attributed to the task by the person 
doing it as a source of creative motivation. That is, the motivation deriving from 
identity-forming values or the moral source that infuse one’s life with meaning and 
one’s work with meaningfulness are of particular importance (Ganz, 2002: 10). In 
addition, unions’ members come from a variety of firms and hold a variety of jobs. This 
heterogeneous membership means that unions have access to more varied and better 
information. Ganz (2000: 1012) argues that the better the information about how to 
work within a particular domain the more likely people are to know how to deal with 
problems arising within that domain. This characteristic could become a facilitator of 
learning as well.
On the other hand, unions’ reactivity (i.e. their reactive action repertoire) tends to inhibit 
learning because it promotes the ideology of conflict, defensive routines, and resistance 
to change (Drinkuth et a l, 2001: 456). Other inhibitors of union learning include the 
scarcity of full-time officers, the propensity of centralized decision-making, ideological 
rigidity, the side effects of excessive competition between political factions, and the 
frequent change of leadership.
Examining these inhibitors in more details, firstly, defensive routines are those which 
individuals or organizations develop to protect themselves from threatening situations; 
for example, when individuals critically examine their own role in the organization 
(Argyris, 1999: 101). The effects of defensive routines are that they impede people’s 
ability to discover how the very way they go about defining and solving problems can 
be a source of problems in its own right. Such defensive routines perpetuate themselves 
in organizational cultures that externalize blame and generate a sense of hopelessness 
and cynicism (Argyris, 1999: 45). Secondly, the scarcity of professional full-time 
officers impedes the storage, feedback, and re-creation of learning. Thirdly, the 
centralized structures of decision-making block learning because a centralized, 
mechanistic structure tends to reinforce past behaviours, whereas an organic, more 
decentralized structure tends to allow shifts of beliefs and actions (Foil and Lyles, 1985: 
805). Fourthly, the role of anxiety, manifested, for example, as ideological rigidity, 
becomes an obstacle to OL. In such a case, once a pattern has been learned, anxiety 
alone is enough to keep the behaviour going if no shocks are ever again administered
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(Schein, 1993: 87). Fifthly, excessive competition between political factions tends to 
hinder positive learning because the ruling party tends to oversample successes and 
undersample failures; in the case of opposition parties, the reverse usually applies. 
Lastly, the frequent change of union leadership (especially in Korea89) also interrupts 
OL because the personal learning of leaders tends to die with them, without being 
passed onto others. This (when one actor or unit learns but the whole does not) is called 
fragmented learning. Such learning is also typical of decentralized organizations in 
which it is difficult to network all the parts.
6.3.7.3. Union organizational structure, learning, and strategic capacity
Unions’ organizational structures can generate OL. There are structural factors that 
promote deliberation, draw resource flows, and facilitate accountability (Figure. 6-5). 
Ganz (2000: 1016) argues that “organizational structures that afford members venues 
for regular, open and authoritative deliberation; draw resources from a diversity of 
salient constituencies; and hold leaders and rank-and-file accountable to each other are 
more likely to generate effective OL than those that do not”. Organizational structures 
have a profound influence on innovativeness and strategy. Consequently, OL improves 
the strategic capacity of organizations.
Examining this subject in more detail, firstly, organizational members who take part in 
regular, open, and authoritative deliberation gain access to salient information, 
participate in a heuristic process by means of which they leam to use this information, 
and are motivated by commitment to choices they participated in making and upon 
which they have the autonomy to act. Regular deliberation facilitates initiative by 
encouraging periodic assessment of the organization’s activities. Deliberation open to 
heterogeneous points of view enhances strategic capacity because ‘deviant’ perspectives 
facilitate better decisions, encourage innovation, and develop group capacity to perform 
cognitive tasks more creatively and effectively. Authoritative deliberation, in the sense 
that it results in actionable decisions, motivates actors both to participate in decisions 
and to implement that which is decided upon (Ibid: 1017).
Secondly, organizations that mobilize resources from multiple constituencies enjoy 
greater strategic capacity than those that do not. Leaders who must obtain resources
89 The service period of 85 percent of the incumbent full-time officers in the KFIU is less than three years 
(KFIU, 2004b).
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from constituents must devise strategy to which constituents will respond. In addition, 
organizations that draw resources from multiple constituencies gain strategic flexibility 
because they enjoy the autonomy of greater room to manoeuvre. Lastly, accountability 
structures affect strategy by establishing routines for leadership selection and defining 
loci of responsiveness. Leaders selected democratically are at least likely to have useful 
knowledge of the constituency that selected them and enough political skills to have 
been selected if that constituency is within one’s operating environment. 
Entrepreneurial or self-selected leaders are more likely to possess skills and intrinsic 
motivations associated with creative work (Ibid: 1018).
For example, the KFIU (the union with which this thesis is principally concerned) is 
structured (and operates) in such a way as to facilitate the three factors (deliberation, 
resource flows, and accountability) that generate OL (see Section 4.6.2.4). Firstly, KFIU 
has various channels which afford deliberation. Secondly, the union’s members are 
employed in a wide variety of bank positions, as a result of an Article 6 (on the post­
entry closed shop) in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)90. This means that 
the union is able to draw resources from multiple constituencies. Lastly, union leaders 
must be elected by their constituents, making them therefore accountable to the 
members. Therefore, we can conclude that KFIU executes OL through dialogical 
organizational structures (Figure 6-4) and that learning improves its strategic capacity.
<Figure 6-5> Union organizational structure, OL, and strategic capacity
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90 CBA: Article 6 (Scope and Qualification o f  Membership): E m ployees (som e em ployers are exem pt, 
according to TU LR A A ) becom e union members at the m om ent they are em ployed without any procedure 
o f  joining. Article 8 (Withdrawal o f  M embership): In cases in which a member wants to withdraw from  
the union he/she has to hand in an application o f  withdrawal to the union 60 days in advance; during that 
time the Union Executive com mittee reviews the application.
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6.3.7.4. Learning in unions and Mobilization
How does learning in unions affect their mobilization? Offe and Wiesenthal (1985: 182) 
suggest an answer to the question. They argue that unions must be able to mobilize 
sanctions in order to succeed in accomplishing their interests. Then, the mobilization 
potential must be built up by communicative processes within unions, whose individual 
potential to sanction is minimal because of their atomization. In other words, unions’ 
mobilization potential becomes effective only through organized members and the 
coordinated active participation of their members (namely, the willingness to go on 
strike)’ this potential is achieved by dialogical processes in the organization. The 
process of communication in unions is conducted by their organizational structures 
(Figure 6-4). The effectiveness of communication can increase when internal 
democracy is realized effectively. In other words, the level of OL in unions depends on 
a climate that leaders and rank members’ ‘intent’ and ‘will’ to increase their strategic 
capacity through dialogical processes, namely, democratic processes in union 
instruments (or constitutional processes in unions; such four processes of OL) in order 
to adapt and overcome coming challenges (Cook, 1963: 16). On the other hand, in the 
union oligarchy, if leaders leam and rank members do not leam, then the union is more 
likely to fail to promote rank members’ will to act and make a right strategy-making 
that rank members could accept.
The communication process in unions is an illustration of the four OL steps identified 
by Crossan et al. (1999: 525). As we have seen, they argue that OL is a multi-level 
process that begins with individual learning, leads to group learning, and then to OL. 
This process, importantly, is also bi-directional, thus assisting in constantly renewing 
the organization. OL is, therefore, a dynamic process. Not only does learning occur over 
time and across levels but it also creates a tension between the assimilation of new 
learning by feed forward and using what has already been learned by feedback. It means 
that organizational learning processes in unions by dialogical processes are 
indispensable for the promotion of the members’ willingness to act. In other words, 
unions can increase their mobilization potential when they can get positive (]higher- 
level) learning through OL (specifically, dialogical processes as part of internal 
democracy). Fiol and Lyles argue that the aim of higher-level learning is to adjust 
overall rules and norms (in order to adapt in changing environments and improve
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organizations’ efficiency) rather than specific activities or behaviours. The higher-level 
learning occurs through the use of heuristics, skill development, and insights (1985: 
807).
6.4. Theoretical Framework
6.4.1. Hypothesis
How and why are some strikes more successful than others? There are arguments in the 
literature regarding the success and failure of collective actions (or organizations) from 
the mobilization perspective, the strategy perspective, and the OL perspective. Firstly, 
social movement mobilization scholars argue that explanations of the emergence, 
development, and outcome of social movements have been usually based on variation in 
resources and opportunities (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; Tilly, 1978; McAdam 
1982; McAdam. et a l, 1996; Evans, 1980; Morris, 1984). This means that social 
movements unfold as actors respond to new political opportunities and newly available 
resources. However, it can be more difficult to explain why one organization is able to 
utilize more effectively opportunities and resources than another which appears to be 
similarly placed, in terms of political opportunities and resource mobilization.
Secondly, Ganz (2000: 1012) argues that an organization is more likely to achieve 
positive outcomes if it develops an effective strategy using resources and opportunities. 
It is more likely to develop an effective strategy if its leaders can access diverse sources 
of salient information, employ heuristic processes, and demonstrate deep motivation. 
According to Ganz, the possibility that an organization will develop an effective 
strategy (so-called ‘strategic capacity’) is also derived from differences in leaders’ life 
experiences, networks and repertories, and organizations’ deliberative processes, 
resources flows, and accountability structures. However, his argument possesses the 
same limitation identified above; that is, it does not adequately explain why same (or 
similar) organizations and same (or similar) leaders sometimes succeed and sometimes 
fail.
Thirdly, QL scholars (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Fiol and Lyles, 1985: 807; Dodgson, 
1993; Mason, 1993; Crossan et al., 1999) argue that organizations leam by detecting
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and correcting errors. They also argue organizations can gain higher-level learning 
when they are involved in the questioning and modification of existing norms, 
procedures, policies, and objectives in addition to the detection and correction of errors.
From the above three perspectives (mobilization, strategic capacity, and OL), we can 
assume that an organization (such as a union) could succeed in its battle (such as a 
strike) when it can make an effective strategy, exploiting opportunities and resources. 
And, that its strategic capacity might derive from OL. In other words, an organization 
having positive learning from previous experiences of success and failure is more likely 
to have a better strategy-making ability, one which uses opportunities and resources 
well.
On the basis of the assumption, I will explain that the difference of results in the case of 
strikes organized by the same (or similar) organization derives from the existence of 
positive learning (or OL) processes from previous strikes. In other words, when an 
organization experiences positive learning processes from previous strikes the 
organization’s strategic capacity increases. Consequently, an organization can make a 
better, potentially more successful, strategy for future action based on opportunities and 
resources than an organization which has not had such experiences (Figure. 6-7). 
Nevertheless, an organization which has accumulated a lot of learning could still fail if 
its strategic capacity is damaged by internal friction, over-confidence, unpredictable 
environmental changes, and the ability of opponents to be able to utilize more effective 
counteractions. Johnston’s argument (1994: 5) supports this hypothesis. He argues that 
“both unionists’ and employers’ assumptions and strategies collide when faced with 
new conditions. Each adapts to new conditions and learns -  sometimes through painful 
experience -  what succeeds and what fails”.
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<Figure 6-6> Relationship between OL, strategy, and mobilization.
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6.4.2. Adaptation of organization learning to mobilization theory
Based on the mobilization and OL theories discussed in this chapter, we can consider 
the ways they can be adapted to improve the effectiveness of mobilization. Tilly (1978: 
56) argues that the main determinants of a group mobilization are its organization, its 
interest in the possible interaction with other groups, and the current opportunity/threat 
of those interactions. Thus, the extent of an organization’s collective action is a result of 
its mobilization and the current opportunity and threats confronting its interests. Tilly’s 
argument however is confined to the process of mobilization; organizations, though, 
may be interested in ways of extending the effectiveness of mobilization rather than the 
process. We can assume that that effectiveness (in the form of collective action) can be 
extended through positive learning (or OL). That is, an organization (or part thereof)
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which utilizes its learning might be better able to mobilize (resources and opportunities) 
and exploit that knowledge in its future actions, as Figure 6-8 shows in its adaptation of 
OL to Tilly’s mobilization theory. In addition, an organization’s strategic capacity (in 
Ganz’s (2000: 1012) terms, this involves the use of motivation, access to salient 
knowledge, and use of heuristic processes) could increase through OL as well. As a 
result, the organization could achieve more successful outcomes through the effective 
use of the main strategic factors, such as timing of initiatives, targeting of resources, and 
tactics to be deployed (Figure 6-9).
In the cases of strikes, unions can leam from both their successes and failures. The 
learning can be either positive or negative, depending on the union’s learning attitude. 
Examples of positive learning would be higher-level learning, such as adjustment of 
overall rules and norms due to self-examination of problems and the recognition of the 
necessity of thorough preparation. An example of negative learning would be lower- 
level learning, such as reliance of routine due to over-confidence and negligence. 
Unions which gain positive learning from previous experiences could increase their 
strategic capacity for later strikes. On the other hand, if the learning is negative their 
strategic capacity is likely to decrease. Thus, unions gaining positive learning increase 
their chances of winning future strikes while those gaining negative learning are more 
likely to lose out in subsequent disputes (Figure 6-10). The examples of strike actions in 
the Korean banking sector illustrate this point well (see Chapters 5 and 7.).
In addition, it should be noted that, in the main, OL theory has been developed with top- 
down organizations in mind (i.e. enterprises in which decisions are, in effect, the Chief 
Executive Officer’s imperatives). However, there are a lot of non-enterprise 
organizations which operate democratically (from the bottom up). Thus, it is necessary 
to develop an OL learning theory which is appropriate for an analysis of, and can be 
used by, democratic organizations such as trade unions. Learning at such democratic 
organizations needs to be conducted through dialogical processes between leaders and 
members. Failure to leam could result if the process is not dialogical, but simply 
directed from above (i.e. from the leaders’ own knowledge) (see Section 7.4.1.3).
239
<Figure 6-8> Mobilization model, utilizing OL 
________ (Extension of Tilly’s model)________
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T erm  definitions (Tilly, 1978: 54-5):
1. In terest: the shared advantages or disadvantages likely to accrue to the population in 
question as a consequence of various possible interactions with other populations.
2. O rganization: the extent of common identity and unifying structure among the individuals in 
the populations. 3. Resource m obilization: the extent of resources under the collective control 
of the organization. 4. O pportunity : The relationship between the population’s interests and the 
current state of the world around it. 5. M obilization (or Collective action): the extent of an 
organization’s joint action in pursuit of common ends. 6. O L: the way that an organization 
learns lessons from the mistakes (or achievements) it (others) has made. OL occurs when errors 
are detected and corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying 
norms, policies, and goals. (Argyris and Schon, 1978).
<Figure 6-9> Relationship between OL and strategic capacity 
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<Figure 6-10> Relationship between learning content, strategic capacity, and
outcome
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+<TabIe 6-l> Review of OL
Concept Content References
Definition 1. The way that organizations build, supplement, and organize
knowledge and routines around their activities and within 
their cultures, and adapt and develop organizational 
efficiency by improving the use of their broad skills 
(or strategy).
2. OL occurs when errors are detected and corrected in ways
that involve the modification of an organization’s 
underlying norms, policies, and goals.
(Dodgson, 1993: 377)
(Argyris and Schon, 
1978:3)
Goal 1. Adaptation and improved efficiency in times of change (Dodgson, 1993 : 
378)
Process 1. Intuition-interpreting-integrating (feed forward).
Institutionalizing-intuiting (feed back).
2. Information acquisition-distribution-interpretation-
organizational memory (feed forward).
(Crossan et al., 1999: 
522)
(Huber, 1991: 90)
Levels 1. Single-loop: error detection and collection process. Double­
loop: questioning and modification of existing norms, 
procedures, policies, and objectives. Deutero-leaming: 
learning how to carry out single- and double-loop learning. 
It involves changing the organization’s knowledge-base or 
firm-specific competences or routines.
2. Lower-level learning: repetition of routine within a given
organizational structure, or a given set of rule. Higher-level 
learning: adjusting overall rules and norms.
(Argyris and Schon, 
1978: 3)
(Fiol and Lyles, 1985: 
807)
Contextual
factors
1. Organizational culture: shared beliefs, ideologies, and 
norms to influence organizational action-taking.
2. Strategy: determine goals, objectives, and breadth of actions 
available for carrying out strategy.
3. Structure: the degree of flexibility depends on 
organizational structure (centralized or decentralized).
4. Environment: learning depends on both change and stability 
between learner and environment.
(Fiol and Lyles, 1985: 
807)
Inhibitors 1. Primary inhibitory learning loops: self-reinforcing cycles 
which reinforce those errors. Secondary inhibitory loops: 
group and inter-group dynamics which enforce conditions 
for error (ambiguity, vagueness, etc).
2. Defensive routines
(department structures, bureaucratization).
3. Successive successes and obstacles of unlearning.
(Argyris and Schon, 
1978: 5)
(Morgan, 1997: 88-9)
Facilitators 1. Coordinated organization and strategy.
2. Organizational structure allowing for deliberation, access to 
information, and accountability.
3. Endowment of motives, development of formal R&D 
structure, introduction of new technologies (for better 
communications, rapid delivery of information, and 
effective education), high level of trust in organizations, 
external challenges (or crises), and previous failures
(Dodgson, 1993: 378) 
(Ganz, 2000: 1016)
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<Table 6- 2>  Process of C>L in Union
Process Interpretation Integration Institutionalization Intuition
Definition Explaining, through 
words and/or 
actions, of an 
insight or idea to 
one’s self and to 
others.
Process of 
developing shared 
understanding 
among individuals 
and of taking 
coordinated action.
Process of embedding 
learning by individuals 
and groups into the 
organization.
Recognition of 
the pattern 
and/or 
possibilities 
inherent in a 
personal stream 
of experience.
Key
requirements
Managing 
ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the 
adoption of 
language and the 
construction of 
cognitive maps.
Translating new 
ideas consistently to 
members in order to 
achieve collective 
action.
Overcoming the 
resistance to change of 
organization’s 
members.
Developing 
organizational 
members with 
experience and 
identities that 
facilitate expert- 
level pattern 
recognition.
Examples Conversation and 
dialogue (small 
group meetings, 
computer 
communication).
Agenda setting at 
formal meetings 
(representatives’ 
meeting). 
Suggestions via 
union’s homepage, 
phone, suggestion 
box, and meetings 
-New norms 
making
Establishment of 
information transfer 
system, physical 
layout of workplace, 
regular education 
courses or centres, 
Regular publications 
(e.g. newspapers). 
Computer 
communication 
networks.
Education. 
Reading union 
publications (e.g. 
newspapers). 
Participation in 
meetings or 
collective 
actions.
Associated 
form of 
power
(Lawrence et 
al., 2005)
Influence Force Domination Discipline
<Table 6-3> Facilitators and inhibitors of learning in unions
Facilitators Inhibitors
-Meaningfulness:
Internal motives; leaders' sense of mission, 
sense of justice and solidarity. External motives: 
wage increases, employment security, 
improvement of working conditions and 
industrial democracy.
-Organizational structure: deliberation, multiple 
constituencies (access to wide range of 
information), accountability.
-Reactive action repertoire (Drinkuth et al., 2001: 
456): ideology o f conflict, defensive routines, 
resistance to change 
-Ideological rigidity (Schein, 1997: 87)
-Propensity of centralized decision-making (Fiol and 
Lyles, 1985)
-Other: scarcity of full-time officers, frequent change 
of leadership, excessive competition between 
political factions
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CHAPTER 7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘OL’ 
AND MOBILIZATION IN STRIKES
7.1. Introduction
This chapter looks at the relationship between OL and results of mobilization at four 
strikes held during the period of the Government’s restructuring of the banking sector 
following the 1997 national financial crisis. The unions gained successful outcomes 
from the strikes in July 2000 and June 2003, but failed to do so from the strikes of 
September 1998 and December 2000. This chapter looks at the reasons for these 
successes and failures through an analysis of the relationship between OL and 
mobilization.
To do this, this chapter analyzes the OL possessed by the unions before the strikes 
(based on Crossan et al.’s (1999) conception of the OL process), the effects of learning 
on strike strategies (utilizing Ganz’s (2000) strategic capacity perspective), the details of 
mobilization derived from those strategies (based on Tilly’s (1978) mobilization 
theory), and the outcomes of the strikes.
7.2. Strike in September 1998
7.2.1. Organizational learning
7.2.1.1. Content of OL
As there had been neither industry-wide nor individual bank strikes prior to 1998, bank 
unions could draw on no first-hand experiences from which they could have acquired 
learning about industry-wide strikes. However, bank unions had witnessed union strikes 
at other companies. Although it might be expected that they could have learned 
something indirectly from those other unions’ experiences of strikes it was clearly not 
sufficient to induce positive OL (thereby, leading poor strategic capacity). Consequently, 
the strike strategy was poor and so were the outcomes from the action.
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7.2.I.2. Level and Process of OL
Since the national financial crisis at the end of 1997, the bank unions had, via the OL 
processes of interpreting, integrating, institutionalizing, and intuition, acquired 
information regarding strike preparation indirectly (i.e. by learning from the experiences 
of other union strikes). However, the learning had been lower-level learning, such as the 
benefits of a reliance on routines within a given set o f rules and norms, and a given 
organizational structure. Using the aforementioned steps, the details of the learning they 
had acquired were as follows.
Interpretation
With respect to interpretation, there were meetings and dialogues between rank-and-file 
members and union officials regarding the approaching restructuring at the National 
Office (NO), the branch office, and the sub-branches. One of the most important 
demands made by the IMF (when the Government required a bailout following the 
financial crisis) was the restructuring of the banking sector. Employees in the banking 
sector thus predicted the subsequent restructuring which would lead, as a result of 
mergers between banks, to mass redundancy. They also witnessed many strikes 
consequent upon bankruptcies and mass layoffs in other industries after the national 
financial crisis. They talked about such things as well as the coming restructuring of the 
banking sector. The unions thus searched about for response measures. Union 
newspapers and the media, and meetings between union officials and members (at 
branches and sub-branches) generally influenced a shared understanding (i.e. 
interpretation of the situation) between union officials and the rank-and-file members.
Integration
The rank-and-file and union officials tried to integrate the results of the interpretations 
of the aforementioned situations into the union organization through the National 
Congress (NC) and the Central Committee (CC), where discussions about possible 
response measures to the restructuring took place. At the NC on 10 July 1998, in 
response to the Government’s announcement of a restructuring plan concerning 
insolvent banks, the unions decided to go on an industry-wide strike in order to protect 
their members’ employment security. In addition, the representatives of bank unions 
decided to mandate all rights of strike to the KFFU at the NC. Later, at the CC, officials 
of the NO and the chiefs of bank unions discussed tactical issues.
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Institutionalization
As for the institutionalization, following the decision to go on strike, the NO formed a 
committee, the “Emergency Fighting Committee”, in order to prepare for the strike. The 
committee devised a strike strategy and phased fighting tactics91. These were needed in 
order to press the Government and to inspire members with a will to fight.
Intuiting
To assist in the intuition, the union informed its members of its decisions and plans, 
news of other unions’ experiences, and updates on political developments via union 
newspapers and fax. The union also utilized branch meetings, sub-branch meetings, and 
education courses to provide information to the rank-and-file.
7.2.2. Mobilization
The unions’ strategy was to prevent the mass redundancy through an industry-wide 
strike (because the Government had demanded the redundancy as a precondition for the 
input of public funds to nine insolvent banks). The unions therefore mobilized union 
members from those banks. The unions went on strike, hoping to change the 
Government’s demands by paralyzing bank business. However, the mobilization of just 
an inside resource (i.e. union members) was a poor strategy, and their unity was not 
strong as well.
As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the unions tried to maximize the mobilization of union 
members. They collected strike funds (£2,500,000) and held two big rallies before 
taking strike action. Their mobilization efforts were initially successful, as 
approximately 20,000 members (out of 36,569 in the nine banks) participated in the 
rally on the eve of the strike. However, just 7,000 members participated in the strike 
itself on the following day because of a failure to maintain solidarity between the 
unions. This was a consequence of a poor strategy that had not included preparation for 
predictable problems such as their weak unity and opponents’ counteractions.
91 Tactics included members’ voting for a strike, big membership rallies during August and September, 
the union President’s hunger strike beginning on 22 September, the holding of an emergency NC on 23 
September to strengthen representatives’ determination, a big membership mobilization on the eve of the 
strike at the Myung Dong Cathedral to put more pressure on the Government before going on strike and 
to assemble members in a comfortable environment, and, then, finally, the strike itself on 29 September 
(Section. 5.3.1).
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As a result, the unions attained unsatisfactory outcomes (Table 5-3). The poor strategy 
derived from the fact that the unions had no previous strikes from which to leam. 
Although they succeeded in mobilizing members pn the eve of the strike they failed to 
maintain unity between the union leaders throughout its duration. In addition to the poor 
strategy, the union form (enterprise union), in which the union leader of each bank 
retained sovereignty, contributed to the unsuccessful result of strike.
Moreover, it was difficult for the unions to exploit any political opportunity because the 
public, aware of the national financial crisis, understood and supported the 
Government’s restructuring plans. Consequently, union members in the banking sector 
felt defeated as they perceived that the strike had been a failure.
7.2.3. Conclusion
The unions had learnt about strikes by observing those by other unions. However, those 
were indirect experiences, which had led to lower-level learning (relying on given 
organizational structures and a given set of norms) about strikes. This led to their strike 
strategy being nothing but the mobilization of their members. As a result, the unions 
were unable to obtain a successful result from their action (Figure. 7-1). If unions had 
employed a better strategy, one that mobilized various resources and political 
opportunities, as well as strengthening unity between unions, better results may have 
ensued.
<Figure 7-l> Relationship between learning and outcome of strike
in September 1998
Poor
outcome
No strike 
experience
Poor
strategic
capacity
Poor strike
strategy-
making
Lower-level 
learning: due to
indirect learning 
from other 
unions’ strikes / 
repetition of 
routine
247
7.3. Strike in July 2000
7.3.1. Organizational learning
7.3.1.1. Content of OL
By conducting a throughout evaluation of the reasons for the failure of the strike of 
September 1998 the unions were able to leam from it. The reasons were the loose unity 
derived from the enterprise union form and the inadequate preparation for the strike, 
articulated in the poor strategy (in which resource mobilization had comprised simply 
the mobilizing of union members, but not included preparation for opponents’ 
counteractions). Thus, they recognized two needs, one for a change of union form to an 
industrial union to effect stronger unity, and the other for thorough preparation (and, 
therefore, a comprehensive strategy including the use of outside resources and use of 
political opportunities in order to prevail opponents), before embarking on the next 
strike. First, they chose more militant leaders at the next leadership election. Secondly, 
they transferred the union form from enterprise unions to an industrial union. Thirdly, 
they conducted joint collective bargaining and a signing campaign to take legal 
proceeding against the IMF in order to promote internal membership unity and external 
solidarity with civic groups. Fourthly, they developed a justification for strike action 
that could gain public support. Lastly, they devised a strategy that could successfully 
mobilize more resources and exploit political opportunities.
7.3.1.2. Level and process of OL
The experience of an unsuccessful strike in September 1998 provided the bank unions 
with the opportunity to implement the aforementioned higher-level learning (Table 7-1) 
that aims at adjusting overall norms and organizational structures (Fiol and Lyles, 
1985). The learning was conducted according to Crossan et al.’s OL processes (i.e. 
interpreting, integrating, institutionalizing, and intuiting) which, it was felt, would 
improve the chances of success at the next strike. Briefly, these processes involve 
interpretation at the level of individuals or groups, to integration at the organization 
level, to institutionalization into the organization system, and, finally, to intuiting in 
individuals.
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Interpretation
As processes of interpretation, there were meetings and dialogues between the rank-and- 
file and union officials regarding the evaluation of the September 1998 strike at the NO, 
the branch office, and the sub-branches. Further interpretation took place through 
normal communication channels. Union members generally engage in dialogue with 
other members or union officers, attend small group meetings, and utilize computer 
communication systems for the creation and dissemination of information.
According to the 1998 activity report of the KFFU (KFIU, 1999), the union members 
evaluated the strike outcomes as follows: 1. the unity between bank unions was very 
weak due to their organizational form (i.e. they were enterprise unions). 2. The 
achievement of the strike, the CBA, was poor. Although the union was able to reduce 
the percentage of staff redundancies (from 40 percent to 32 percent) the members felt it 
was meaningless. 3. The weak unity and the poor result were derived from weak union 
leadership. Bearing these responses in mind, the union resolved to address the problems 
of weak unity and leadership.
However, the leaders of the KFFU, who had coordinated the strike action, believed that
the strike had been a great victory. In a report presented to a meeting of the chiefs of
bank unions held on 1 October 1998 the leaders observed:
The strike success contributed greatly to the recovery of bankers’ spirit of 
self-respect. It is a vivid demonstration of how much power bankers 
generate once they are unified; we were able to prove our great influence 
to both those inside and outside the union. Thus, we increased greatly the 
status of our organization. The fact that we could go on an industry-wide 
strike is significant (the first in the history of the banking sector), and our 
evaluation is that the strike was a great victory; it was proven to be not 
only justified but also a success in terms of achievement. However, the 
one aspect to be regretted centred on the events of the closing stages of 
the strike; we did not handle this wisely. This is a good lesson to be 
remembered for future strikes (KFFU, 1999: 94).
Such an evaluation might be attributed to the tendency of leaders to overestimate the
result of their actions. On the other hand, as one of the KFFU Presidential candidates
argued at the NC in November 1998:
The great wave and battle cry of 30,000 colleagues that filled the plaza of 
Myung Pong Cathedral last September was our proud appearance that 
confronted the Government’s impromptu restructuring. However, at the 
conclusion of the unsuccessful strike all that remained to us were just 
anguish and auto-destruction in spite of heartbreaking fighting.
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The reasons were, firstly, the KFFU had no leadership to lead members 
and individual unions. There should have been strong leadership. Instead, 
the KFFU was weakly led by them during the strike. Secondly, the 
movement ideology of the KFFU has been wrong. The federation had 
proceeded with a moderate negotiation method that was dependent on the 
Government and employers’ paternalism. However, the real power of the 
labour movement is based on its strong solidarity (the unity between 
union officials and the rank-and-file) and fighting. Thirdly, the KFFU 
needs to strengthen the function of policy-making to respond to 
forthcoming challenges. Thus, we need to recruit more policy-making 
staff and to establish a labour policy-making research centre. Moreover, 
we have to strengthen our partnerships with professional labour policy 
institutes in order to improve our policy-making function. Fourthly, we 
have to extend the range of union movement activity. So far, the KFFU 
has been negligent of external activities, and, thus, it has been accused of 
being a selfish organization. Now, the federation has to emerge and 
become a big movement through solidarity with civic groups as well as 
other unions (having a propensity toward militancy). Lastly, we have to 
establish an industrial union in order to overcome enterprise unionism 
and to bring about a bigger unity (KFFU, 1999: 69).
His address struck a chord with the rank-and-file. The majority of representatives 
voted for him and he became the new President of the KFFU, winning 137 out of 236 
votes (the incumbent President gained just 98 votes; one representative chose not to 
vote).
Integration
The union members attempted to integrate the results of the evaluation of the strike into 
the union organization through the NC and the CC. At the meetings, representatives 
from branches requested the change of union form and a more thorough preparation for 
the next fight.
First, the representatives from bank unions changed the leadership of the KFFU (a 
federation of bank unions) to a more militant one at the NC in November 1998. The 
new leaders argued that the failure of the September strike was due to the limitations of 
the enterprise union system, and promised to change the union form from enterprise to 
an industrial union by 2000 (KFIU, 1999).
Secondly, at the NC in Novemberl998, the representatives approved the NO proposal to 
form a special committee to oversee the establishment of an industrial union.
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Thirdly, at the CC in March 1999, the representatives agreed to the joint collective 
bargaining of wage in the 1999 fiscal year (FY) in order to promote stronger unity and 
to help establish the industrial union.
Fourthly, at the CC in April 1999, the representatives decided to take legal proceedings 
to claim for compensation against the IMF. They argued that the IMF caused mass 
bankruptcy and redundancy through forcing the Korean Government to adopt wrong 
policies (such as high interest and extreme retrenchment policies) as the conditions of 
receipt of IMF bail-out funds. The aim of the suit was to remove the pressure the IMF 
was exerting on the Korean Government to implement the second restructuring92; the 
union sought to expose the problems stemming from the IMF policies and restraints. 
The union also endeavoured to win the support of civic groups for its campaign, 
promoting the idea of solidarity with and among civic groups.
Fifthly, in February 2000, the NO proposed to the CC that a report which included plans 
for industrial action and an analysis of the political situation in 2000 be written. The 
report would also include predictions of the impact of the Government’s second 
restructuring on the banking sector. The members of the CC agreed to the proposal.
Sixthly, at the NC in March 2000, the representatives decided to dismiss their enterprise 
unions, and establish an industrial union, the Korean Financial Industrial Union (KFIU). 
Lastly, at the CC of the KFIU on 9 June 2000, union officials decided to go on an 
industry-wide strike on 11 July in order to prevent the Government’s implementation of 
its restructuring plan. This decision was precipitated by the Government’s 
announcement (on 7 June 2000) that it was to establish a holding company in order to 
solve the insolvent bank problem.
92 The Government continued to consult with the IMF on the subject of policy as it propelled the 
restructuring of the banking sector. Thus, the union needed to restrict the IMF’s push of restructuring. The 
union met lawyers in order to talk of the issue. The lawyers answered that a compensation suit against the 
IMF’s policy failure would be possible. The union suggested the idea of a lawsuit to the CC; the CC 
agreed that the legal action should proceed. The lawsuit campaign was a movement that promoted public 
opinion against the IMF, informed both domestic and international audiences of the negative aspect of the 
IMF’s policy. To effect this, the union instigated a public petition and sought solidarity with international 
non-government organizations at an international NGO conference, the “DaeGu Round”, held at DaeGu 
City, in Korea, in August 1999.
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Institutionalization
Learning was institutionalized, first, in response to the representatives’ demand for 
stronger leadership; there was a reshuffling of union officials following the election of 
new leaders at the NO. In addition, two more officials (research and publicity 
professionals) were recruited to aid the preparation of a more vigorous and powerful 
challenge in any future action
Secondly, the NO, following a decision made at the NC in November 1998, formed a 
special committee whose aim was to establish an industrial union. The committee held 
several workshops, prepared new rulebooks, and issued a declaration announcing the 
establishment of an industrial union. The committee also created a poster and an 
information pamphlet about the proposed industrial union, which were distributed to 
6,000 sub-branches prior to the union’s formal establishment in March 2000.
Thirdly, according to a joint collective bargaining decision made by the CC in March
1999, the NO negotiated (between May and July) an agreement to joint bargaining
involving almost all of the retail banks (15 out of 17). It was the biggest such exercise in
Korean banking history, and was made possible by strong leadership and strong unity
between bank unions. Joint collective bargaining led to such successes as agreements on
employment security and a limitation on the recruitment of irregular workers.
According to the KFIU (2000a):
The results of 1999 collective bargaining show that the union’s strategy of 
bargaining extended to cover employment security and the participation in 
management after previously been confined mainly to wage increases and 
fringe benefits. It is a reflection of the fact that the bank unions recognized 
the necessity of new strategies, such as the strengthening of union unity and 
the necessity of participation in management, after the mass redundancies 
suffered in 1998.
Fourthly, following the decision at the CC in April 1999 to sue the IMF, the NO 
prepared a signing campaign to encourage people to support the suit. It progressed with 
the assistance of civic groups. The union also organized a rally to oppose the IMF’s 
policies; approximately 20,000 people attended. More than 300,000 people signed the 
petition, and the union proceeded with the suit in a Korean court in July 1999. Through 
the signing campaign, the union was able to promote both members' unity and solidarity 
with civic groups as preparation for the union’s next fight.
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Fifthly, according to a decision concerning strike strategy made at the CC in February 
2000, the NO formed a policy-making committee to develop a comprehensive logical 
case against the second restructuring and to prepare for a strike. The committee 
informed the rank-and-file of their decisions and actions via union newspapers and its 
homepage.
Sixthly, with the establishment of the KFIU at the NC in March 2000, the NO changed 
the system of organization from a federation of enterprise unions to an industrial union. 
As a consequence, the KFIU acquired authority over bargaining in the banking sector; 
this meant stronger unity among union members in the banking sector.
Lastly, following a decision (on 8 June 2000) at the CC to strike, the NO formed a 
committee, the “Emergency Measure Committees” in order to lead the strike effectively.
Intuiting
There was a process of intuiting to rank and file members. This was achieved mainly 
via the KFIU’s monthly newspaper, entitled “Financial Labour News”, and the 
members-only sections of its homepage. The union also sent (at any time) newsflashes 
and statements to the chiefs of union sub-branches for circulation to members. 
Furthermore, the KFIU occasionally published books for the education of members; 
these were sent to the chiefs of sub-branches for display as well. Members were able to 
read these at any time they chose. In order to facilitate the intuition of new information 
by union members, unions generally utilized education courses, meetings, and 
participation in collective actions as well as newspapers.
Integration and institutionalization of the strike strategy
To integrate and institutionalize the strike strategy, the NO distributed a report to the
CC in February 2000. The report dealt with fighting direction and the political situation
in 2000. It included material about the Government’s second restructuring of the
banking sector and the union’s strategy to oppose it. The members of the CC agreed
with its findings. The report observes.
The Government will propel the merger between banks from the latter 
part of 2000 through the privatization of banks owned by the 
Government if banks themselves do not proceed M&A actively. This is 
required because the foundation of the second restructuring is a bank 
large-sizing policy, necessary for the banks’ global competitiveness. As a 
result of the M&As, employment security will become the biggest issue
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once again. Thus, the target of the fight against the second restructuring 
will not be the employers, but the G overnm ent's policy. In order to 
change Government policy, the union has to stage a powerful industry­
wide strike and to mobilize all kinds of resources and political 
opportunities in order to prevail. Rallies and general collective activities 
are not enough to change the Government's policy.
With respect to detailed fighting methods, first of all, the union needs to 
formulate a logical oppositional argument against the second 
restructuring and to disseminate it to the public and it’s rank-and-file. 
Secondly, the union has to actively exploit the period of the General 
Election in April, and make public its opposition to the second 
restructuring. Thirdly, the union has to utilize actively the period (April 
to June) of collective bargaining on FY 2000 wages to learn and prepare 
for the forthcoming fight. Fourthly, the union has to strengthen solidarity 
with civic groups, other unions, and political parties before commencing 
the industry-wide strike. Fifthly, the strike demands have to contain 
alternatives of sound nurture and development of the financial industry. 
Lastly, the best time to go on strike should be July. There are several 
reasons for this: 1. the union has to take advantage of the favourable 
political opportunity of the General Election during March and April. 2.
The union has to utilize the period of collective bargaining as part of its 
preparation for the fight. 3. The union has to make its opposition to the 
second restructuring in the banking sector a main issue in the strike 
season (July) as the union attempts to keep pace with other unions also 
planning to strike in July (KFIU, 2001a).
The development of these new strategies was a result of the N Q ’s strengthening of the 
function of policy-making (two new staff had been recruited and a policy-making 
committee had been established), in accordance with the new President’s election 
promise. The new committee comprised staff from headquarters and branches. The 
members of the committee listened to other officials and the rank-and-file in the process 
of strategy-making. Thus, the union’s strategy-making function was strengthened.
In accordance with a decision concerning fight direction made at the CC in February
2000, the NO created a committee detailed to oversee the opposition action against the
second restructuring. The committee devised logically rigorous arguments against the
restructuring, and informed the rank-and-file of these via union newspapers and the
union homepage. The details of their argument were as follows:
First, the fundamental reasons for the current problems in the banking 
sector stemmed from the Government’s unreasonable involvement 
practices in the sector and the links between politicians and enterprises. 
Examples were the immoderate support of Cheabols (conglomerates) and 
the Government policy of stock (security) market nurture through banks. 
Secondly, the IMF’s policies for Korea had only worsened the situation 
within the banking sector. The IMF had misinterpreted the reasons for 
the Korean financial crisis, identifying it as a total credit crisis, when in
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fact it was just a temporary crisis of dollar liquidity. The IMF demanded 
retrenchments by way of a high interest policy. This resulted in 
unnecessary mass bankruptcies of enterprises and worsened the financial 
condition of the banking sector.
Thirdly, the bank large-sizing policy by merger or the establishment of a 
financial holding company and privatization will create the following 
problems: 1. The sovereignty of the financial market will transfer to 
foreign investors as domestic enterprises do not have enough money to 
buy the banks and, furthermore, are subject to bank law regulations when 
buying banks’ shares (i.e. a domestic investor is not allowed to own more 
than five percent of a bank’s shares). 2. Mergers between banks cannot 
produce a synergy effect because there are no differences between banks 
(e.g. types of customers or market areas). 3. Due to unnecessary mergers, 
there will be, once again, mass redundancies. The prevention of 
unemployment is one of the Government’s chief responsibilities.
Lastly, as an alternative, for the sound development of the banking sector 
and enterprises, the Government should transfer the direction of the 
restructuring of the sector from the Anglo-Saxon model (a stock market- 
centred system) to the German model (a bank-centred system). The stock 
market-centred system induces endless immoderate restructuring of 
enterprises in order to pursue short-term profit for shareholders instead of 
the long-term sound development of enterprises. As a result, mass 
redundancy and social bipolarization occur. In addition, the stock market- 
centred system causes, eventually, the loss of sovereignty of the financial 
market, with foreign investors becoming the main beneficiaries. On the 
other hand, the bank-centred system is better for the development of the 
banking sector and enterprises for several reasons. These include: 1. Due 
to co-ownership between a bank and an enterprise, management can 
operate the enterprise with a long-term perspective and the bank can lead 
restructuring in case of the enterprise’s management crisis. Thus, the 
bank can prevent the unnecessary bankruptcy of an enterprise. 2. Due to 
a co-determination system between labour and management, the 
enterprise can proceed with restructuring without unnecessary conflicts.
3. Consequently, the country can retain sovereignty of its financial 
market during the period of restructuring and prevent another national 
financial crisis caused by the sudden outflow of foreign capital (KFIU, 
2000b, c and 2001a, b).
The NO also utilized the period of the General Election in April and the period (April to 
June) of collective bargaining to inform the public of the union’s opposition to the 
restructuring and to prepare for a strike. The NO produced a pamphlet containing the 
union’s argument against the restructuring and distributed it to the people on the street 
and at canvassing venues. The NO informed and educated the rank-and-file regarding 
the necessity of the strike through rallies and union newspapers.
As the CC, on 9 June 2000, decided to go on an industry-wide strike on 11 July, the NO 
created a committee of emergency measures which would lead the strike. The 
committee had four broad responsibilities, one concerned with policy-making and
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analysis of the political situation, another to do with mobilization and external 
cooperation, a third to deal with public information and management of the media, and a 
fourth to handle general affairs and support for the action. The members of the 
committee responsible for policy-making and analysis of the political situation played a 
role in developing an effective strike strategy based on an understanding of the political 
context at that time. Those concerned with mobilization and external cooperation 
mobilized internal and external resources and endeavoured to maximize political 
opportunities. Those dealing with public information and management of the media 
produced union newspapers dedicated to the strike and distributed these to members. 
They also attempted, through meetings with journalists, to win public support via 
positive reports in the media. Those dealing with general affairs and fight support 
prepare materials and provided general assistance to other teams.
A chief of the department of policy-making in the NO remarks on the strategy-making 
process:
After the experience of the 1998 strike, we felt keenly the necessity of 
strengthening the unity between and inside unions in the KFFU as well as 
establishing solidarity with outside organizations. Thus, we concentrated 
our efforts on such activities as multi-employer negotiations of FY 1999 
wages (to strengthen the unity of bank unions) and, with other civic 
groups, a lawsuit against the IMF to promote solidarity with them.
However, these activities were not enough to overcome bank workers’ 
(habituated) fragmented consciousness. We were also aware of the 
increasing possibility that they would react opportunistically as crises 
recurred due to endless restructuring. Accordingly, a systematic and 
lasting process of education and publicity to members was required. In 
addition, we recognized that workers would become even more 
fragmented if we could not change the Government’s direction on 
restructuring. Thus, we had to prepare a fight on the basis of opposition 
to the Government’s neo-liberal restructuring policy of labour and the 
financial sector.
We thought it was impossible to change the Government’s policies 
simply through rallies or collective actions. So, we decided that we 
should instigate a bigger, general action, mobilizing all resources, against 
the Government.
We focused on strengthening our publicity, aimed at both the public and 
our members, emphasizing the necessity of opposition to the 
restructuring of the financial sector, and the need for a five-day working 
week to be introduced (in order to achieve another aim, that of sharing 
jobs), during the period of the General Election in April 1999. In ' 
addition, we strengthened the basis for a general strike through multi­
employers bargaining and preparation for the establishment of an 
industrial union.
In addition, during the General Election campaign, we undertook 
activities that strengthened solidarity with civic groups and opposition
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parties who were also opposed to the Government’s neo-liberal 
restructuring. We also did our best (with the assistance of academics) to 
develop alternative policies regarding the cultivation of a sound financial 
sector. In the fight, the KFFU had to play a leadership role. So, we firstly 
wrote drafts of our strike strategy and policies in order to assist union 
officers in making decisions. Next, we provided drafts of plans to the CC 
and the NC, and representatives discussed these and then made decisions.
After that, we informed the rank-and-file of our plans through union 
newspapers and other educational materials in order to encourage their 
participation in the fight. The policy-making department produced 
material containing policies and strategies, and organized conferences 
and seminars in order to collect opinions. The publicity and education 
department published materials (including newspapers) and distributed 
those to members; they also organized education courses. Leaflets 
containing questions and answers were very useful for the rank-and-file 
wishing to understand difficult policy alternatives and justifications for 
the fight.
To sum up, we fixed the direction of the fight at the first stage, and then 
made thorough preparations for the strike. Thus, we were able to devise 
an effective strategy, leading to successful outcomes. This we were able 
to do by a serious and thorough reflection on the failure of the previous 
strike, in September 1998 (Interview by the author, November 2005).
7.3.I.3. Facilitators of OL
There were facilitators of OL in the unions at this time. In general, facilitators of 
learning include external challenges (or crises), previous experiences of failure, internal 
and external motives of union members, and organizational structures which foster 
deliberation, accountability and resource flow. Thus, in this case, facilitators included 
the failure of the previous strike (which increased the unions’ determination to prepare 
more thoroughly for the next strike), the impending second restructuring of the sector 
by the Government, an especially strong motivation to adapt to challenges posed by 
changes in the external environment, the worry of additional redundancies, and the 
ability to access a wider variety of information derived from the fact of the union being 
an industry-wide organization.
7.3.2. Strategy
7.3.2.1. Content of strategy
The union’s strike strategy was to prevent in advance the Government’s second 
restructuring of the banking sector. The union identified the restructuring as an injustice, 
and sought to vigorously mobilize resources and exploit opportunities. The content of 
the strategy was as follows: first, it was to claim justifications for the strike against the
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Government’s second restructuring on the basis that labour was once again going to 
suffer because of the Government’s failure to successfully restructure the sector in the 
first round, and that the main reason for the financial crisis was the Government’s 
unreasonable involvement practices in financial institutions. Secondly, it was to require 
the eradication of the above mentioned involvement in financial institutions and the 
compensation of damages due to that involvement. Thirdly, it was to mobilize various 
resources from inside and outside the union, and to utilize political opportunities. 
Lastly, it was to paralyze bank business through strike action.
7.3.2.2. Increase of strategic capacity
As a result of reflection on the problems with the previous strike through the above OL 
processes, the union’s strategic capacity regarding endowment of motives, use of 
information, and use of the heuristic process increased significantly in the next strike.
Endowment of Motives
The KFIU used a mixture of internal and external motives in order to maximize 
membership participation in the strike as well as the cooperation of non-member bank 
employees. The union told bank employees that the insolvency of the banks had been 
caused by the Government’s involvement in bank business, stressing that the 
eradication of that involvement was bankers’ mission for the times. This was an internal 
motive, aimed at encouraging membership participation. The union demanded that the 
Government compensate banks for the losses attributable to its involvement. Although 
such a demand was the responsibility of bank management, management dared not do it 
because their positions were under the direct influence of the Government. If the 
requirement (to compensate the banks) was accepted by the Government it would be a 
big help to the banks’ financial situations. Thus, this demand that the Government 
accept its responsibilities became an external motive for all bank employees, including 
management. These justifiable requirements actually did succeed in persuading both 
employees to participate, and management to understand (and cooperate indirectly), in 
the strike action.
Use of information
Due to the support the union’s justifiable requirements had won from both staff and 
management, it was able to access various and useful information resources from all 
constituents of the banking sector in developing its strategy.
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Use of heuristic process
In reflecting on the failure of the previous strike the union recognized the fact that to 
succeed they needed to utilize internal and external resources and political 
opportunities. Thus, although the KFIU endeavoured to use mostly inside resources, 
such as its members and non-union members, it also made use of external resources 
such as civic organizations in addition to enlisting the (political) support of, for instance, 
members of the main opposition party and the Tripartite Commission.
7.3.2.3. Effective use of strategic factors
Due to the aforementioned increase of strategic capacity, the union could more 
effectively employ the main factors of any strategy, such as timing of initiatives, 
targeting of resources, and deployment of tactics. First, the union began to mobilize 
resources and identify opportunities once it recognized that the Government would 
pursue the second restructuring of the banking sector. In other words, the union began 
its strike preparation by arguing against the second restructuring before the Government 
actually started the restructuring. It was thus an example of the interventionist approach 
mentioned at Section 1.2.2. Secondly, the union targeted various resources and 
opportunities when it went on strike in order to induce an agreement from the 
Government. Lastly, the union deployed various fighting tactics and methods in order to 
allow more members to easily participate in the action. For example, the union held 
several rallies and asked members to wear casual clothing to work prior to going on 
strike. The union also amassed a large strike fund in order to finance various actions and 
instil confidence in both union leaders and rank-and-file members. The union ordered 
members to submit a leave of absence form to their banks, thus releasing them from the 
burden of participation in an illegal strike. The union chose a university stadium located 
in the city centre as the strike venue; this was more accessible for most members, and 
allowed the union to control members more easily and to prevent them from leaving. As 
members were sitting down they were able to enjoy cultural events, and listen to, and 
talk with, leaders easily. Thus, the union promoted members’ confidence in the strike.
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7.3.3. Mobilization
7.3.3.1. Resource mobilization
The union maximized internal and external resource mobilization. First, the union 
succeeded in inspiring 30,000 members (out of 65,000 from all banks) to attend a rally 
on the eve of the strike. Of these, approximately 20,000 participated in the strike on the 
following day. Secondly, the union utilized actively outside resources such as civic 
groups, the national centre of unions (FKTU), and the Tripartite Commission in order to 
induce the Government to the negotiation table.
7.3.3.2. Use of political opportunity
The union succeeded in exploiting political opportunities by asking opposition MPs to 
delay the FHC legislation, and to highlight both the failure of the Government’s first 
restructuring and the problems resulting from the Government’s unreasonable 
involvement in financial institutions. Thus, the union was able to win the public’s 
support for the fight and produce a successful agreement with the Government.
7.3.3.3. Use of various collective actions
The union deployed various collective activities such as big rallies, union leaders 
shaving their heads, the wearing of casual clothing to work, the collection of strike 
funds (£5,000,000), and submission of leave of absence applications in order to 
encourage more members to participate in the strike. Such actions assisted the union in 
staging powerful strike action that lasted for 12 hours and caused partial business 
paralysis at almost all banks.
7.3.3.4. Outcome
The outcome of the strike (a successful agreement) was a great victory for the union. 
Because the union achieved a positive learning outcome from the failure of the strike in 
September 1998 through OL processes it was able to improve its strategic capacity, 
thereby devising an effective strategy for the next strike. The improved strategic 
capacity contributed to success in a number of ways, including the timing of the 
initiative, the targeting of resources, and the deploying of tactics. Thus, the union could 
mobilize the maximum amount of resources from inside and outside, utilize political 
opportunities, and deploy various collective actions. As a result, the union was able to 
secure a great victory.
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7.3.4. Conclusion
Due to the experience of an unsuccessful strike in 1998, the unions were able to learn 
much (i.e. conduct higher-level learning) (Table 7-1) through processes of interpretation, 
integration, institutionalization, and intuition prior to the following strike. The process 
of OL generally proceeded from interpretation by members, to integration by the NC (or 
the CC), to institutionalization by the NO, then to intuition by members. In addition, the 
NO played a leading role in the actual making of the strike strategy on the base of the 
OL. The NO suggested a plan regarding the development of a strike strategy to the NC 
which required the establishment of a committee to develop strategy and tactics, and 
then to execute them. What the union had chiefly learned was that victory without 
optimal mobilization of external resources and exploitation of political opportunities as 
well as strong unity between workers within banking sector was unlikely. Therefore, the 
unions established an industrial union in order to promote stronger unity, to aid in 
maximum mobilization of internal and external resources, and to assist in identifying 
and using possible political opportunities and collective actions. As a result, the unions 
won a historic victory in the July strike (Figure. 7-2).
There had also been significant organizational changes in union structure within the 
banking sector. First, the KFIU had been established, meaning that there had been a 
transformation of union form from enterprise unions to industrial union. The KFIU 
leaders, unlike earlier bank union leaders, were militant, not moderate. The union had 
also strengthened its policy-making department. In all, the restructuring in the union 
system had the potential to contribute substantially to labour movement revitalization in 
the financial sector (Behrens et al., 2004a: 119). As result, the KFIU could increase its 
political and bargaining power and institutional vitality in the endlessly changing 
environment (Behrens et al., 2004b: 21).
Scholars of union revitalization argue that organizational change in unions is possible 
when resistance to such change is neutralized; for example, where there is a sufficient 
level of environmental pressure to start the process, and when unions articulate a 
conception of their future which might be formally codified as a mission (or vision) that 
provides a basis for strategic priorities (Behrens et al., 2004a: 118).
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<Figure 7-2> Relationship between learning and outcome of strike in July 2000
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7.4. Strike in December 2000
7.4.1. Organizational learning
7.4.1.1. Content of OL
There was negative learning from the success of the strike in July 2000, in the dual 
sense that over-confidence grew and the union failed to adequately prepare for any 
future challenge. The KFIU had had a great victory in the strike in July 2000. It 
demonstrated a power of mobilization to both its members and the Government, 
achieving a successful agreement with the latter. The morale of members was lifted 
greatly, but the union was intoxicated by the victory. Thus, they were negligent in 
reflecting on, and analyzing problems associated with, the strike, steps that would have 
allowed them to predict and prepare for the future (specifically, the Government’s 
second restructuring of the banking sector) (See Section 5.4.3.).
7.4.1.2. Level and process of OL
There was lower-level learning (e.g. reliance on routine) in the union after the strike in 
July 2000. After the strike ended, the union had an evaluation meeting. However, the 
evaluation mainly focused on good things (e.g. the well-targeted strategy and the 
strike’s outcomes). Although problems, such as the secession by some members in the 
middle of the strike and the decision by several branches not to participate, were 
mentioned at the meeting, the union did not actively seek feedback from the rank-and- 
file or try to correct any problems before a new challenge appeared. Thus, there was no 
process of high-level OL in the union after the previous strike. That is, although the
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union recognized problems that had to be corrected it failed to address them. In short, 
the union could not gain higher-level learning from the previous strike because of the 
over-confidence it felt after its great victory.
To sum up, before the union went on strike in December 2000, there was a process of 
interpretation of problems highlighted from the previous strike, but no processes of 
integration and interpretation in response to these problems as follows. Therefore, the 
union suffered defeat in the strike.
Interpretation
At the CC meeting in July 2000 (held shortly after the strike of that month), the 
representatives evaluated the results of the July strike as a big victory. Their comments 
were as follows:
The strike was a political one that required a change of restructuring 
policies in a financial sector oriented by neo-liberal policies. The strike 
allowed the rank-and-file to overcome the defeatism left over from the 
September 1998 strike. It therefore increased their confidence in strike 
action. As the strike demands extended beyond employment security to 
persuading the Government to change its policies the strike raised 
members’ consciousness of the significance of the fight. The strike 
promoted the status of the KFIU as it showed that the union had the 
ability to make alternative policies (the union suggested restructuring the 
sector on the German, instead of the Anglo-Saxon, model). It was a strike 
that gained the peoples’ support through various publicity activities. The 
Korea Economy Daily reported the results of a poll which showed that 
the majority of people supported the reason for the strike action (i.e. the 
failure of the Government’s policies). On the other hand, the strike 
revealed once again the limits of union unity as members of two union 
branches left in the middle of the strike (Section 5.3.2.2). It meant that 
the union had not overcome the factionalism due to differences in interest 
(i.e. healthy banks were less committed to the strike than unhealthy 
banks)93. The strike proved that it was a matter of urgent necessity that 
irregular employees also be organized; as it was they who were asked to 
take strikers’ jobs during the strike (KFIU, 2001a, b).
The above comments reveal that the representatives overemphasized the positive effects 
of the strike rather than sufficiently addressing the problems. Instead of 
overemphasizing the positive effects, the representatives should have taken special 
measures to solve the problems urgently at the CC.
93 This subsequently became a reason for the failure of the strike in December 2000. Conversely, when 
healthy banks went on strike unhealthy banks did not help them. The healthy banks are ones whose CAR 
is over 8 percent, according to the BIS standard.
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Integration and institutionalization
Despite the above problems revealed by the strike in July 2000, the union did not 
engage in the processes of integration or institutionalization to solve the problems 
before going on the next strike in December 2000. That is, the union failed to review or 
act upon the problems until the Government revealed the merger plan of KMB/HB in 
November 2000.
After the strike finished in July 2000, the union spent time (from August to November) 
to have summer vacation and to execute normal union business, such as participation in, 
and support of, branch events, finishing of bargaining for the FY 2000 wage levels, and 
participation in other labour-related events. In addition, the union established a 
committee to deal with measures involving insolvent banks during the period. In other 
words, the union was absorbed in the repetition of routines, thereby staying in lower- 
level learning. However, the union should have endeavoured to urgently address the 
serious problems (i.e. the divisions between branches of healthy banks and branches of 
unhealthy banks resulting from differences of interests regarding restructuring, and the 
organization of irregular employees) revealed at the July strike and to predict (or 
prepare for) possible new challenges from the Government.
7.4.I.3. Inhibitors of OL
Looking at the background of the failure of the strike, it is possible to identify inhibitors 
(or barriers) to OL such as interruptions of learning processes, psychological barriers, 
and organizational structures, each stemming from the July 2000 strike victory. First, 
there were interruptions to learning processes. These were: 1. there was an interruption 
of the learning cycle between leaders and the rank-and-file. March and Olsen (1976: 
159) call this barrier ‘audience learning’ to highlight the idea that the link between 
individual action and organizational action is interrupted. This type of incomplete 
learning cycle is to be found when individuals change their own behaviour but cannot 
persuade others to change the organizational rules for behaviour. 2. There was 
superstitious learning. This type of interruption occurs when organizational members 
draw incorrect conclusions about the impact of organizational actions on the 
environment. 3. There was ambiguous learning, which occurs when changes in the 
environment cannot be clearly identified (March and Olsen, 1976: 156).
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These interruptions to learning between the leaders of the KFIU and the members of the 
KMBU and the HBU happened just before the strike commenced on 22 December 
2000. The leaders of the KFIU could not persuade the members of the KMBU and the 
HBU to the postponement of the strike according to the provisional agreement. 
However, the members believed they would gain their demands within two to three 
days if they went on strike. This misapprehension occurred because they could not 
identify clearly the change of environment, and therefore drew incorrect conclusions.
Secondly, there was a psychological barrier derived from previous strike victory. 
Success can become a barrier to OL because it leads to managerial overconfidence in 
the ability to foresee risks. On the other hand, crises are deemed necessary to shake an 
organization out of its complacency (Sitkin, 1992: 243). Nevertheless, learning is also 
seen to require positive feedback from successful experiences. Berthoin et al. (2001: 
867) argue that success blocks learning when existing competences are mined, 
sometimes without due thought, for new ideas. Organizations can get caught in a failure 
trap when one idea after another is tried out and then abandoned before enough 
experience has been accumulated for it to be used successfully. Sull (1999: 42) observed 
that when long-successful companies start to experience failure, they tend to engage in 
flurries of activity rather than question the assumptions underlying their organizational 
strategy, processes, and practices. These actions tend to aggravate the problem and 
multiply failures, because they are not based on a revised understanding of the market. 
The tension between the characterization of success as a barrier to learning and failure 
as a trigger of learning is heightened in the literature by the observation that 
organizations suffer from the tendency to oversample successes and undersample 
failures. In other word, more attention is paid to successes than to failures, suggesting 
that the ability of the organization to learn is not just a matter of the number of 
successes or failures that have been experienced but also of the ways in which they are 
perceived, interpreted, and remembered (Berthoin et al., 2001: 868).
Lastly, there were barriers created by organizational structures and leadership. Although 
the KFIU was an industrial union, the KMBU/HBU maintained significantly the inertia 
of enterprise unions. Therefore, the influence of the KFIU on them was limited. The 
leaders of the KFIU could not persuade members of the KMBU/HBU because the 
provisional agreement focused on regional banks, and contained nothing on the 
KMBU/HBU. This was an example of the structural barrier mentioned by Morgan
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(1997: 88-9), who pointed out that departmental structure can inhibit OL by focusing 
the attention of members on parochial rather than organization-wide problems. In 
addition, it could be said that the structural barriers were a consequence of a lack of 
good leadership. According to Schein (1985: 317), such a lack of leadership is an 
impediment to OL. In other words, learning is impeded when there are neither enough 
leaders nor leadership behaviour conductive to learning.
7.4.2. Strategy
7.4.2.1. Content of strategy
The union could not prepare a complete strike strategy in advance because the situation 
which gave rise to the strike -  the merger of two banks -  had not been anticipated. 
Furthermore, the union decided to strike in order to prevent the merger at the earliest 
stage. The period between the appearance of the issue (i.e. the announcement of the 
merger) and going on strike was just 25 days. In addition, the union connected the 
solution of problems of other insolvent banks to the merger issue at KMB/HB. This was 
an awkward conjunction, and the union was unable to coordinate a coherent strategy or, 
later, a complete solution (a bargaining agreement) that could satisfy all branches. 
Ultimately, the union’s strike strategy was simply to mobilize members; by so doing, it 
aimed to paralyze bank business. Despite successful mobilization of members at 
KMB/HB, the absence of a comprehensive strategy meant that failure was inevitable.
7.4.2.2. Decrease of strategic capacity
Due to over-confidence and indolence derived from the success of the previous strike, 
the union’s strategic capacity regarding endowment of motives, use of information, and 
use of heuristic process decreased significantly in the case of the December 2000 strike.
Endowment of motives
The union confined itself to just motivating its members. It did so by telling them that 
the merger would lead to at least 30 percent of the staff being made redundant, an 
allegation that had not been confirmed. Thus, the maintaining of job security became 
the external motive for membership participation in the strike. In addition, the union 
contended that a merger between healthy banks would not produce a synergy effect and 
that the Government’s bank large-sizing policy was an unnecessary one. That is, the 
union emphasized that the pursuit of an unnecessary merger was an injustice and that it
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was in breach of the July Agreement. This argument was considered an internal motive 
to KMB/HB employees (union and non-union members).
However, the management of both banks counter-argued that the merger would not lead 
to compulsory redundancies because the merged bank would need more personnel and 
that the merger was being pursued not because of financial problems but because of the 
strengthening of global competition. The Government also argued for the necessity of a 
bank large-sizing policy for the promotion of global competitiveness. Furthermore, they 
argued that the merger was being pursued by big shareholders, rather than the 
Government. These counter-arguments were persuasive to the public, who lent their 
support to the merger. Thus, unlike in July 2000, the union’s motives could not inspire 
either outside resources or cooperation from management of either bank.
Use of information
The union failed to use an appropriate variety of information sources, chiefly because 
the situation progressed very rapidly and the CEOs of both banks so actively pursued 
the merger. In addition, the union could not devise a proper strike strategy in advance 
because it had to simultaneously deal with issues concerning other insolvent banks.
Use of heuristic process
The union could not use know-how from previous strike experiences because of a 
mismatch between the union’s strategy and the members’ demands. It was therefore 
unable to persuade members of the KMBU/HBU of the merits of the provisional 
agreement. These members urged strike action even though a comprehensive strategy 
had not been developed.
7.4.2.3. Ineffective use of strategic factors
Due to the decrease of strategic capacity identified in the preceding paragraphs, the 
union could not effectively use the main elements of a strategy (timing of initiative, 
targeting of resources, and devising of appropriate tactics). First, the union began to 
mobilize its members only after it became aware that the Government and management 
would pursue a merger between KMB and HB. This was too late. In other words, the 
union failed to predict new challenges and prepare for proper strategy in advance. 
Secondly, the union could target only those members employed by the affected banks as 
union members in other banks did not support the strike. Lastly, the union had no choice
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but to just conduct a sit-in strike in the FEC until opponents surrendered. This, however, 
was a kind of defensive tactic. In addition, the strike venue, the FEC, was located in a 
regional area, which isolated strikers from their comrades and the public, and 
discouraged some potential participants. As a result, strikers could not take more 
aggressive actions, and their efforts became weaker and less effectual as the strike 
progressed. Furthermore, opponents were much stronger.
7.4.3. Mobilization
7.4.3.1. Resource mobilization
The union could mobilize union members from just the KMBU/HBU branches for the 
strike. About 13,000 members (of a total of 26,618 employees of KMB/HB; in other 
words, approximately 50 percent of the staff) participated in the strike. Although the 
union sought support from other union branches near the end of the strike it was 
unsuccessful because union members at other banks did not wish to actively support the 
action (Section 5.4.2.2).
7.4.3.2. Use of political opportunity
The union could find no political opportunity to exploit because the situation progressed 
so rapidly, and the union was in breach of a provisional agreement it had made with the 
Government before going on strike.
7.4.3.3. Use of various collective actions
In spite of the rapid development of the situation, the union tried to deploy various 
collective actions, such as the wearing of casual clothing, rallies, and the collection of 
strike funds (£650,000, i.e. £50 per member). These actions were very poor compared 
with those taken before and during the July strike. Nonetheless, the strike was the 
strongest and longest-lasting in bank union history, lasting for eight days, from 22 to 29 
December.
7.4.3.4. Outcome
The result of the strike was a defeat for the union in that no agreement was signed. By 
not learning as an organization from the July 2000 strike the union had a decreased 
strategic capacity for the next strike. This decreased strategic capacity meant that the 
union did not time its initiative well, did not target resources effectively, and did not
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deploy the most appropriate tactics. Thus, the union could not induce maximum 
resource mobilization from inside and outside, utilize actively political opportunities, 
and deploy various collective actions. The inevitable consequence was an unsuccessful 
strike.
7.4.4. Conclusion
The union’s failure of OL from previous strikes was due to its being intoxicated by the 
success of the July strike, and thus being negligent in its preparation for the next 
challenge. Therefore, the union failed to predict the coming challenges94, one of which 
was the change of the Government’s tactics to pursue a bank large-sizing policy by 
merging healthy banks. The KFIU had not prepared response measures to such mergers; 
rather, its priority had been to prepare a response to the restructuring of unhealthy 
banks. Furthermore, the Government’s attack was so quick that the union was unable to 
respond effectively. In addition, the failure of unity promotion between union branches 
(of healthy banks and unhealthy banks) meant that the strike of the KMBU/HBU was 
perceived to be of little relevance to members of other union branches.
As a consequence, the union again tasted defeat. This setback flowed from no 
integration and no institutionalization with respect to the solution of problems revealed 
at the previous strike (Figure 7-3).
<Figure 7-3> Relationship between learning and outcome of strike
in December 2000
Experience Lower-level Decrease of Ineffective strike
of July 2000 -* learning: strategic -►strategy-making
strike due to over­ capacity
confidence and
negligence/
repetition of
routine
Unsuccessful
strike
94 The challenges included the need to persuade members of the KMBU/HBU to accept the provisional 
agreement and the Government’s strong determination to proceed with the KMB/HB merger.
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7.5 Strike in June 2003
7.5.1. Organizational learning
7.5.1.1. Content of OL
The union was able to prepare thoroughly for this strike by calling on the higher-level 
learning it had accumulated from the strike failure at KMB/HB in December 2000 and 
the success of the industry-wide strike in July 2000. Therefore, the union could 
undertake a complete preparation, based on self-restraint, against the latest challenge. 
The union first evaluated the reasons for the failure of the strike at KMB/HB. The 
principal reason had been a poor strategy based on an over-confidence derived from the 
July 2000 victory. Secondly, the union learnt from that latter success, realizing that a 
strike would succeed if it could maximize resources mobilization from inside and 
outside, could use available political opportunities, and could utilize various collective 
actions flexibly, depending on the situation.
Thus, the union firstly did its best to strengthen the system of industrial unionism 
through successful industrial collective bargaining (multi-employer bargaining). 
Secondly, it established the Committee of Unification (CU), the Committee of Social 
Welfare (CSW), and the Committee of Politics (CP) in order to maximize the use of 
political opportunities and external resources in case of need. Thirdly, it formed the 
Emergency Measure Committee to develop a strike strategy at CHB, incorporating the 
development of a justification and the mobilization of resources and opportunities. The 
result would be a complete and flexible mobilization, thereby maximizing chances of 
victory.
7.5.1.2. Level and process of OL
Through both the failure of the December 2000 strike and the success of the July 2000 
strike, the KFIU obtained once again the higher-level learning above mentioned (Table 
7-2) which helped it to succeed in its next strike. The higher-level learning progressed 
through four processes (e.g. interpreting, integrating, institutionalizing, and intuiting) 
identified by Crossan et al. (1999). The higher-level learning occurred through the use 
of heuristics and strategy development.
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Interpretation
There was, firstly, interpretation (or evaluation) of the December 2000 strike from the 
rank-and-file and union officers at the branches and the NO. This interpretation was 
undertaken in meetings and through dialogue (face-to-face, at small meetings, and via 
computer networks) similar to that described in Section 7.3.1.2.
The principal content of the evaluation was: 1. the union did not have a comprehensive 
strategy that would lead to success due to an over-confidence derived from the success 
of the July strike. 2. The unity between branches was poor although the strike was an 
industry-wide action. This was due to an inadequate industrial union system; the union 
needed to strengthen that system and improve its strategy for the mobilization of 
resources (internal and external) and political opportunity if it were to succeed in future 
strikes.
First, at an evaluation meeting of the strike that the KFIU organized in 2001 (KFHJ,
2001a), an official of the KMBU stated:
We thought that the Government would surrender within one or two days 
of the strike’s commencement. However, we were wrong. We were not 
well enough prepared, owing to the over-confidence gained by the 
victory in the July strike. So, we could not help failing because of a lack 
of preparation. There was no leadership of the KFIU during the strike.
There was no democratic decision process concerning the strike’s 
eventual resolution.
Another official of KMBU argued:
I think there was an invisible achievement although we had no visible 
outcome. We showed labour’s resistance to the Government and 
promoted members’ fight consciousness.
An official of the KFIU observed:
The preparation period for the strike was too short. Different 
organizations had different reasons for fighting, depending on whether 
they were healthy or insolvent banks. We failed to win public support or 
convince other banks to strike in support.
An official of Pyung Hya Bank Union branch commented:
I think that the four insolvent banks received benefits thanks to the strike 
by the KMBU and the HBU.’’
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An official of Han Bit Bank Union branch noted:
The failure of the strike frustrated other banks. The strike was a complete 
failure.
An official of Seoul Bank Union Branch claimed:
The strike, although an industry-wide action, was mobilized through 
promoting enterprise-level consciousness yet the goals of each bank were 
different. The KFIU could not cope with the situation. Such a strike 
would fail anytime.
Professor Chan Kyun, Lee, an advisor to the KFIU, commented:
There were no tactics and no strategy for the strike. The union did not 
assess the problems of the July strike because of an over-confidence 
engendered by that strike’s overall success. Restructuring by the 
Government would carry on continuously because it remained 
government policy for an advanced financial industry. Unions could only 
leam if they comprehensively evaluated the strike.
Secondly, there were evaluation meetings at branches. For example, Kywang Ju Bank
Union branch’s appraisal of the strike was that:
It revealed the KFIU as a low-level industrial union. It was clearly a 
limitation that the President of the KFIU could not unify individual 
branches, and that it was the chiefs of those branches who still had the 
power to mobilize members at the enterprise level. Neither the chiefs nor 
the members had a great interest in the other bank unions. After the July 
strike, the union should have done a thorough appraisal of branches’ 
participation in the strike, praising some, admonishing others. However, 
the appraisal that was undertaken was not as rigorous as it could have 
been, as everyone was intoxicated with the joy of victory. After the 
December strike, union leaders of those banks which had participated in 
the action were strongly criticized by their members. Challenging 
government policy is not easy, and the excessive sense of triumph 
following the July agreement blinded the union and its members to the 
difficult reality of engaging in another strike.
Nevertheless, the media’s evaluation of the strike was that it had been half a success,
half a failure (Han Kook Economy Daily, Han Gye Rae Daily, 23 December 2000). As
far as the media was concerned:
The KFIU had demonstrated its power by being able to organize a week- 
long strike that had had a substantial commercial impact on the banks 
and, by extension, the economy. 2. The KFIU had been able to reveal that 
the Government was indeed behind the proposed merger, and evidence 
that the Government had breached the July agreement. 3. The KFIU had
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prolonged the life of the four insolvent banks until at least June 2002 in 
its new agreement with the Government. On the negative side, the media 
concluded: 1. The KFIU had failed to stop the merger or sustain the 
strike until all its objectives had been met. This failure angered and 
frustrated some of its own members. 2. The level of distrust between 
branch unions was revealed and increased as the KFIU had failed to deal 
with the differences between them.
Integration
In its response to the evaluation of the December 2000 strike, the union first took steps 
to integrate methods to strengthen the industrial union system through the NC and the 
CC. Branch representatives and union officials resolved, at the NC and the CC, that 
such a strengthening was a necessary step if victory was to be achieved at the next 
strike. For instance, at a meeting (on 5 January) of the chiefs of branches held after the 
strike, there was discussion on the measures to cope with the aftermath of the strike’s 
failure (KFIU, 2001a). At the meeting, the chief of the union branch at Jae EL Bank 
commented that:
We need to reflect on ourselves and apologize to each other. And, we 
have to consolidate our organization quickly in order to recover to its 
pre-strike condition.
The chief of the union branch at Kyang Ju Bank suggested several measures:
In order to strengthen our union (KFIU), I would like suggest several 
things. First, we have to supplement full-time officers at headquarters. 
Second, we have to give stronger support to the leaders of the KFIU.
Third, we have to recognize the necessity of solidarity with other labour 
organizations, including KCTU, and strengthen our ties with them. 
Lastly, we have to formulate a regulation concerning relief measures for 
members affected by union activities.
The chiefs of branches agreed with these suggestions (KFIU, 2001a, 2002a and 2003a). 
First, following a meeting at the CC in October 2001, the representatives decided 
formally to make a regulation defining the relief measure for members engaged in union 
activities in order to protect activists and promote their confidence.
Secondly, at the NC in December 2001, the representatives decided to change the 
election method for executives95, from an indirect election by representatives to a direct 
election by members. This was done to promote the rank-and-file's participation and to 
strengthen the leadership’s authority.
95 The President, the first Vice-President, and the General Secretary of KFIU
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Thirdly, at the NC in February 2002, the representatives decided to change the delivery 
method for the share of membership dues dedicated to headquarters, from delivery by 
branches to a check-off system. This change was required because several branches had 
sometimes delayed delivery, or failed to deliver, this part of the dues. The method of 
dues collection is related to the balance of power between headquarters and branches. 
By withholding delivery, branches were able to strengthen their bargaining position in 
discussions with headquarters. The representatives decided to increase, by stages, the 
share of the dues for headquarters from 10 percent, in 2003 to 25 percent, in 2006.
Fourthly, the NO proposed the establishment of a number of committees, the 
Committee of Unification (CU), the Committee of Social Welfare (CSW), and the 
Committee of Politics (CP), at the CC meeting in March 2002. These were to be set up 
in order to strengthen solidarity with civic groups and political parties. The CC agreed 
to the proposal.
Fifthly, the union tried to extend its potential to use political opportunities in the future. 
As a test case, the NO proposed, at the CC meeting in March 2002, that the union 
extend its political influence by participating in the Presidential election process. It 
could do this by supporting a pro-union candidate for the ruling party, Mr. Rho. The CC 
agreed to the proposal.
Sixthly, at the same CC meeting, the representatives decided to publish a union 
magazine for members. The magazine would include more detailed news collected from 
all branches. It was perceived that it would effectively enable the rank-and-file to obtain 
information about the union and all branches. It would also assist in the promotion of 
unity among members.
Seventhly, at the CC meeting in May 2002, the representatives decided upon the 
establishment of systems to send massages simultaneously to 5,000 chiefs of sub­
branches by fax and to their mobile phones. The aim was to disseminate union news 
quickly and to mobilize them as soon as possible if necessary. Lastly, at the CC meeting 
in November 2002, the representatives decided that the organization of irregular 
employees was a high priority (approximately 30 percent of all staff was irregular 
employees). The union had hesitated to organize them because of the differences in their
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interests; for example, the use of irregular employees can help the company to budget 
for a wage increase for regular employees, who are members of the union (this is 
possible because an irregular worker’s wage is, generally speaking, only 50 percent of 
that of a regular worker). On the other hand, the increase of the ratio of irregular 
employees would, under the current system, hurt union power eventually because the 
density of union membership in the firm would decrease. The union recognized this 
fact, and noted that, to preserve union power, it should not hesitate in organizing 
irregular employees.
Institutionalization
Learning and knowledge was further institutionalized in the strengthening of the 
industrial union by the NO. That is, the NO executed new rule-making, policy-making, 
the establishment of new systems, and the contracting of CBA according to decisions 
made at the NC and the CC (KFIU, 2001a, 2002a, 2003a, and 2004a).
First, the NO, acting on a decision made at the CC meeting in October 2001, wrote a 
regulation96 defining relief measures for members suffering hardships as a consequence 
of union activities.
Secondly, the NO, following a decision made at the NC in December 2001, created a 
regulation, stating that executives would be directly elected by members. The first such 
election was held in 2002.
Thirdly, in accordance with a decision made at the NC meeting in February 2002, the 
NO instigated the check-off system for headquarters share of membership dues by 
making a CBA with employees.
Fourthly, following a decision made by the CC in March 2002, the NO established the 
CU, the CSW, and the CP. The purpose of the CU is to join with civic groups in 
activities that further the unification of the Korean peninsular. The union could build a 
close friendship with a lot of civic groups. The aims of the CSW are to pursue projects 
of social welfare, charity, and social service in order for the union to become more 
integrated with Korean society. The CP’s aim is to instigate or become involved with
96 The main content of the regulation is to compensate members who suffer as a result of dismissal, 
reduction of salary, or bodily injury as a result of participation in union activities such as industrial 
actions.
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activities that extend the union’s political influence. The subsequent actions of the 
committees were as follows: 1. The CU first supported and participated in the ‘People 
Unification Festival’ that various civic groups organized and which opened at Mt. 
KumGang (North Korea) in May 2002. The committee also supported and joined in a 
‘People Unification Rally’ in August 2002. 2. The CSW established a social welfare 
foundation and dispatched members to a rehabilitation facility to help disabled people in 
July 2002. It also sent 40 members to Kang Lyung City to help with the recovery 
activities following the typhoon of September 2002. 3. The CP’s activities included 
support of pro-labour candidates, regardless of their political affiliation, at the regional 
elections in June 2002. The support took the forms of provision of election funds, the 
sending of union staff to assist the candidates, the advising of union members which 
candidates the union were supporting, and the provision of members’ addresses to 
candidates. This was an example of the union attempting to extend its utilization of 
external resources and political opportunities.
Fifthly, again acting on a decision made by the CC in March 2002, the NO actively 
helped Mr Rho at the Primary Election of the ruling party. The NO explained this 
decision to its members in the following terms: 1. Mr Rho has acted for human rights 
and labour rights, and has even, during his career, been jailed because of his support for 
trade unions. 2. Mr Rho has informed the media of his pro-labour views, such as a 
preference for an EU-style social democracy, his opposition to privatization of key 
public industries, and his support of union participation in management. 3. His
07campaign promises include the repeal of the National Security Law and the 
breakdown of regionalism. The NO therefore encouraged the rank-and-file to vote for 
Mr Rho at the primary election of the ruling party98. The union’s decision to support 
him was reported widely in the media. This support was one of the factors that led to Mr 
Rho being chosen as the ruling party’s Presidential candidate. He was eventually elected 
as the President in December 2002. Being in the union’s debt, the new President tried to 
help the union in its dispute with Cho Hung Bank.
97 The law has prevented movements promoting both the unification of the Korea Peninsular and 
democracy.
98 The Primary Election is an election in which people (including non-party members) vote for someone 
to become a Presidential candidate for a political party.
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Sixthly, following a decision made by the CC in March 2002, the NO established a 
system to publish and send both a new bimonthly KFIU magazine" (“Future of 
Labour”), covering news of all branches, and a biweekly KFIU newspaper100 (“Financial 
Labour News”) to all members. Furthermore, in accordance with another decision made 
by the CC in May 2002, systems of news-sending by fax and message-sending by 
mobile phone to 5,000 sub-branch chiefs were established.
Seventhly, acting in accordance with a decision made at the CC in November 2002, the 
NO formed a committee101 whose task was to prepare the organizing of irregular 
employees.
Lastly, the union has undertaken various other activities in order to strengthen the 
industrial union. These include the contracting of industry-wide Collective Bargaining 
Agreements (Basic CBA 108 clauses, Agreement of Employment Security, Agreement 
of Company Development Committee) in 2001, the introduction of five working days 
per week for the first time in Korean history in 2002, the introduction of a semi-post- 
entry closed shop102, extension of leave for childbirth from 90 days to 105 days, the 
provision of company nurseries, and the establishment of an allocation system for the 
promotion of female employees in 2003. These achievements have greatly increased the 
morale of union members. All systems, such as information transfer, education, and 
organization, have been changed with the objective of developing strong unity within 
the KFIU. For example, the union has established a computer network system 
accessible to both the rank-and-file and union leaders. In addition, the union has 
increased the number of full-time officers in its headquarters103 in order to strengthen 
the role of the industrial union. As already explained in Section 7.3.1.2, for 
institutionalization, unions generally promote the establishment of information transfer 
systems or new organizational structures.
99 “Future of Labour” is 90 pages in length, and deals with news of all branches and significant union 
issues in detail.
100 “Financial Labour News” is composed of eight tabloid pages, and reports union news quickly. It has 
been published since 2000, when the KFIU was established.
101 The roles of the committee are to research all aspects of irregular employment. This includes their 
number, their working conditions, educating them about the union, finding the best way to organize them,
and creating a union homepage for them (bi.kfiu.org).
102 Although an offer of employment is conditional on joining a recognized union the union members can 
secede from the union without any punishment according to Korean labour law.
103 As a result, the number of full-time officers in headquarters increased from 17, in 2001, to 32, in 2003.
277
The following comments by a manager of the NO express well the notion of
institutionalization:
We have done our best to strengthen the industrial union system in our 
organization to improve the union’s capacity after tasting failure at the 
KMB/HB strike. We firstly changed the method of union leadership 
election from indirect vote by representatives at the NC to direct vote by 
the rank-and-file; this promoted members’ participation in the union’s 
activity and bolstered the leadership’s authority. Secondly, we have 
conducted industrial bargaining successfully to the point that now all 
employers are involved in multi-employers bargaining. Through 
industrial bargaining, we gained an industrial CBA, a five-day working 
week, semi-closed shop, and real wage increases. Moreover, through the 
processes of industrial bargaining, we have been able to strengthen the 
unity between members and promote members’ morale. Thirdly, the 
number of full-time officers in the NO increased. As the industry-level 
bargaining advanced, the NO’s role was strengthened and the BOs 
dispatched their officers to the NO. Fourthly, the number of members 
increased (from 61,875, in 2001, to 79,820, in 2003) as the union’s power 
increased and the semi-closed shop system commenced. Fifthly, publicity 
and education activities were increased as the NO’s role increased. We 
now publish a monthly newspaper and bimonthly magazine, and send 
emergency messages by fax and mobile to chiefs of sub-branches and 
union officers. We have also conducted in-house education courses for 
new union officers (for two days and three days), and started a 
professional education course, ‘Labour College’, for union officers 
(length of course is three months); the aim of the latter is to cultivate 
labour leaders for the long-term. We have also conducted a regional 
education course for the chiefs of sub-branches (a one-night, two-day 
course), and arranged for seminars by scholars and other labour experts 
for union officers in the NO and branch chiefs. Sixthly, we have held 
several cultural activities, where members can join in union activities; 
these include the Financial Workers Turtle Marathon, climbing, athletic 
meetings, and a commemoration on the anniversary of the July 2000 
strike victory (which a huge number of members attended). Seventhly, 
we operate several apparatuses such as CP, CSW, and CU to extend 
solidarity activities with civic groups and political parties. Lastly, we 
have developed policies and strategies with scholars and labour and 
finance professionals. In addition, we are now operating a research 
institute of finance policy in order to develop alternative policies in 
advance, and therefore respond effectively and rapidly to coming 
challenges (Interview by the author, November 2005).
Intuiting
In order to effect the intuition of new information by members, the union utilized 
newspapers, journals, books, education courses, meetings, and participation in 
collective actions. Since 2001, the union has established several education courses (such 
as the aforementioned ‘Labour College’) for all levels of union representatives, union 
officers, chiefs of sub-branches, and presidents of branches. The biweekly newspaper
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and the bimonthly magazine continued to be published. In addition to the newsflashes 
and statements to the chiefs of sub-branches (for circulation to members) there have 
been new initiatives such as the “Any Fax System” for 6,000 sub-branches, the “Mobile 
Message System” for the chiefs of those sub-branches, fax newspapers for sub-branches, 
and special newspapers devoted to collective bargaining for all members. The KFIU 
also continues to occasionally publish books which are sent to the chiefs of sub­
branches for display, and which members can read at any time.
Union members’ intuition of new information through the union’s institutionalization of 
delivery systems of information and regular meetings (or education and events) 
promotes once again the other processes of learning (interpretation, integration, and 
institutionalization). Together, these processes contribute both to the unity between 
members and to the development of future strike strategies.
A union member comments on the process of obtaining information about the union:
I gain information about the union mainly from the union’s newspapers. I 
can access those easily because the chief of the sub-branch directly 
distributes them to me. My colleagues and I often discuss interesting or 
controversial union issues. We also sometimes ask questions to the chief 
of the sub-branch on the spot or at the sub-branch meeting. We 
sometimes enquire of the full-time officers in the union branch office 
through the union’s Internet homepage. In the period of collective 
bargaining, my colleagues and I frequently used to access the union’s 
Internet homepage in order to find out the most up-to-date progress on 
the bargaining. I also have chances to discuss union issues with 
colleagues who work at other branches whenever I attend union events 
such as picnics or athletic meetings or rallies. I was especially able to 
learn a lot about the union when I participated in the strike in June 2003.
It was a place of education; I was able to learn what the union’s activities 
is, how strong union power is, how our bank is operated, and what is the 
government’s restructuring policies (A rank-and-file member interviewed 
by the author, November 2005).
The processes and effects of learning (as they related to the strike at CHB) are well
expressed in the following interviewees’ comments:
We (the rank-and-file members) and union officers were united 
completely at the previous strike. We trusted them. They actively 
conducted a publicity campaign, using union newspapers and flash news.
In addition, there were a lot of meetings and information 
communications. (A rank-and-file member interviewed by the author, 
November 2005)
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We conduct an education course for the chiefs and deputy-chiefs of sub­
branches every spring, one for woman members every fall, another for 
exemplary members (cadets) annually, and another for regional union 
officers twice a year. Our branch (CHBU) and Seoul Bank branch 
especially emphasize the importance of education, much more so than 
other union branches (A full-time branch officer, interviewed by the 
author, November 2005).
Since the second half of 1999, when union and management made a 
compromise (bank management now have to take into account the degree 
of employee participation in union education when they evaluate the 
branches’ management achievement), managers of bank branches have 
been encouraged to send union members to union-run education courses.
Thus, inevitably, the degree of members’ participation in education has 
increased (A full-time branch officer, interviewed by the author, 
November 2005).
Since 2000, we have operated regional meetings at which the chiefs of 
sub-branches gather. We divided 400 sub-branches into 21 regions (i.e. 
approximately 20 sub-branches are represented at each meeting). We 
have allowed enough in the budgets of each region for them to hold 
meetings or events (e.g. picnics, athletic meetings, meetings of the chiefs 
of sub-branches). Through these' events, unity between members at the 
regions has been strengthened. The real worth of the regional meetings 
was displayed at the strike in June 2003 when there was a very successful 
mobilization (A full-time branch officer, interviewed by the author, 
November 2005).
Integration and institutionalization of the strike strategy
First, the NO recommended, in a report to the CC in November 2002, that it was 
necessary to form an emergency counter (measure) committee as part of the preparation 
to oppose the sale of CHB. According to the report, the Government was preparing a 
third restructuring of the banking sector, involving the privatization of banks and 
mergers. The sale of CHB would be the first step in this new restructuring, and that 
privatization through mergers would also lead to more mass redundancies. Thus, the 
report states, the union needs to form a special committee to respond to the third 
restructuring (KFIU, 2003a and 2004a).
Secondly, the CC approved the proposal made by the NO.
Thirdly, the NO, acting on a decision made by the CC, changed the organization system 
to an emergency counter(measure) system, and formed the “Emergency Measure
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Committee” in order to respond to the sale of CHB. The committee defined its
opposition to the sale of CHB as follows (KFIU, 2003a and 2004a):
1. The sale of CHB is a breach of the July Agreement that guaranteed the 
survival of an independent CHB on the condition that it put into 
operation a self-help plan approved by the MECB. The MECB granted 
this approval, believing the CHB had the ability to survive 
independently, in November 2000. 2. The sale of CHB to SHB will result 
in a loss of public funds, as the Public Fund Management Cooperation 
(PFMC)104, due to political pressure, underrates the sale price of CHB. 3.
The Government, for political reasons, is forcing too early the 
privatization of CHB in order to show that it is restructuring the banking 
sector. 4. The goal of privatization focuses on only mergers and the 
reckless inducement of foreign capital, thus subordinating the financial 
industry and the national economy to foreign capital. It will also cause a 
fundamental distortion of the national economy because foreign investors 
will only pursue short-term profits. 5. The Government has to form a 
committee comprising representatives of the Government, unions, and 
other professionals who can discuss and plan the best long-term direction 
for privatization and the development of the financial industry.
In addition, the Emergency Measure Committee devised a fight plan against the sale of
CHB. The fight plan contained the following (KFIU, 2003a and 2004a):
1. As for the active use of political opportunities, the union should make 
use of the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC), arrange meetings with 
the Presidential candidates and the chiefs of political parties, contact also 
the Minster of Finance and the Economy, the chief of the Financial 
Supervision Commission (FSC), and members of the committee of the 
sale of CHB in order to persuade to cancel the decision of the sale of 
CHB. 2. As for the mobilization of external resources, the union has to 
form an organization composed of civic groups that support opposition to 
the sale of CHB, and to organize a signing campaign, featuring opinion 
leaders such as prominent social figures and academics, to oppose the 
sale of CHB. 3. For the mobilization of internal resources, the union has 
to organize a signing campaign from all employees, their families, and 
bank customers. The union then has to deliver these petitions to the Blue 
House. The union also has to let all members wear ribbons with a 
message declaring their opposition to the restructuring (including the sale 
of CHB). In addition, the union has to organize a group of 500 cyber 
fighters with the intention of winning public support, via Internet 
publicity, for the union’s fight. The cyber fighters are to invade 
homepages of government institutions, the media, and political parties, 
disseminating information against the sale of CHB. The union also has to 
organize a campaign in which all employees of CHB hand in their 
resignation letters before going on strike in order to demonstrate the 
strength of their determination to fight. The union has to form a team 
which will devise a strike strategy.
104 The Public Fund Management Corporation (PFMC) plays a major role in the management and 
evaluation of public funds.
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Lastly, the NO executed the committee’s plan (see Section 5.5.2 for full details of the 
strike, including the lead-up and the aftermath).
7.5.1.3. Facilitators of OL
There were facilitators of learning for the strike. The main facilitator for the strike at 
CHB was the strike failure at KMB/HB in December 2000. Secondly, the worrying 
prospect of redundancy resulting from a merger became another facilitator of learning. 
Thirdly, there was a strong sense of mission in union leaders and members that they had 
to prevent the sale of the nation’s oldest bank to foreign investors. Lastly, factors of 
accountability, deliberation, and access to a various information sources within the 
union organization (see Section 4.6.2.4) were facilitators of learning as well. The union 
was thus able to reflect on the failure and success of previous strikes prior to preparing 
more thoroughly for the next challenge.
7.5.2. Strategy
7.5.2.I. Content of strategy
In mobilizing various resources the union aimed to persuade the Government to cancel 
its plan to sell CHB. The union identified the sale plan as an injustice. The content of 
the strategy was as follows.
First, it wanted to establish justifications for the strike by highlighting several facts: 1. 
the hasty sale of CHB was a breach of the July agreement; the Government had 
promised that it would permit the independent survival of those banks that demonstrated 
management normalization. 2. The sale to SHG was seriously undervalued and 
motivated by political reasons. 3. The sale of the nation’s oldest bank (it was 106-years- 
old) to a bank owned by foreign investors would be to relinquish national financial 
sovereignty. Therefore, the union’s fighting motto was “opposition to a forced merger 
and desperate defence of a historically important national bank”.
Secondly, it sought to mobilize various resources from inside and outside, to utilize 
political opportunities, and to use various collective actions flexibly.
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Lastly, it aimed to paralyze bank business through the mobilization of all employees, 
including IT operators and non-union members such as irregular employees. Due to 
such a thorough strategy, the union was able to stage a successful strike.
7.5.2.2. Increase of strategic capacity
Due to positive learning from the failure and success of the two previous strikes 
(thereby conducting the higher-level learning: Table 7-2), the union’s strategic capacity 
regarding endowment of motives, the wider dissemination of more information, and the 
use of the heuristic process increased significantly in the strike in December 2000.
Endowment of motives
The KFIU used internal and external motives in order to maximize employee 
participation and management cooperation for the mobilization. The union claimed 
justifications for the strike by imprinting on the minds of all employees in CHB the fact 
(mentioned Section 7.5.2.1) that the cancellation of this unjust sale should be of 
paramount importance to them. It became an internal motive of employee participation. 
The demand that the sale be cancelled also contained an external motive for employees 
because the sale produced an outcome, redundancy by a merger. In other words, the 
claiming of proper justifiable demands for mobilization became the best endowment of 
motives.
Use of information
Due to the union’s justifiable requirement to be able to induce all employees to 
participate, the union was able to access a wide variety of useful information from both 
employees and management. In this case, one of privatization, the strike issue of strike 
directly impacted on managers’ interests as well as those of union members.
Use of heuristic process
By application of the heuristic process (i.e. the refection on the failure and success of 
previous strikes), the union recognized that they could succeed in strikes when they 
utilized both internal and external resources, exploited political opportunities, and 
adopted various and flexible collective actions.
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7.5.2.3. Effective use of strategic factors
Due to the aforementioned increase of strategic capacity, the union could use effectively 
the main elements of strategy, timing of initiative, targeting of resources, and deploying 
tactics. First, the union decided to go on strike only when it appeared to have no choice, 
having exhausted all other kinds of collective actions and political opportunities. The 
timing, therefore, was when all employees agreed that to strike was the only option.
Secondly, when the union went on strike at last it mobilized even IT operators and 
irregular employees in order to completely paralyze bank business. That is, the union 
targeted as many resources (including outside resources) as they could in order to 
prevail in the strike.
Lastly, the union deployed strong fighting tactics, such as the occupation of the bank’s 
headquarters and the mobilization of IT operators and irregular employees, in order to 
substantially paralyze bank business. In addition, during negotiations, the union 
employed the flexible tactic of having both substantial and justifiable demands on the 
basis of then-current conditions. In other words, the union deployed a flexible, yet tough 
negotiating tactic in this strike, necessary in circumstances in which it had its back to 
the wall. As a result of negotiations with the Government and those undertaking the 
merger, the union won a successful agreement.
7.5.3. Mobilization
7.5.3.1. Resource mobilization
The union maximized resource mobilization from inside and outside. First, the union 
succeeded in mobilizing employees, including IT operators and irregular employees. 
About 6,000 (out of total 7,721 employees) participated in the strike. Secondly, the 
union utilized outside resources such as a group of ex-executives of CHB, civic groups, 
a group of small shareholders of CHB, the FKTU (a national centre of unions), and 
news media.
7.5.3.2. Use of political opportunity
The union exploited to the utmost the Presidential election period in order to cancel the 
sale of CHB. It argued that the sale of CHB was hurried and tantamount to a giveaway, 
a ploy by the Government to show the great success of the restructuring of the financial
284
sector. Not only was the sale poor business (because it was being sold so cheaply) but 
the union contended that there was a political conspiracy related to the sale, in that it 
would benefit a specific buyer. Thus, the union was able to receive support from 
Presidential candidates and induce public support for its cause.
7.5.3.3. Use of various collective actions
The union deployed various collective activities for mobilization. These included 
confiscating of loan files to thwart inspection, sending of memos to the media, wearing 
of casual clothing, big rallies, cutting of hair by 4,000 members, delivering of all 
employees’ resignations to the Blue House, members’ blood donations, collection of a 
strike fund (£2,500,000, i.e. £400 per member), distribution of 1,000,000 leaflets to 
citizens, organization of a petition against the sale, inserting of advertisements in 
newspapers, using 500 Cyber fighters, and the holding of a strike at bank headquarters. 
Together, these actions were the most active industrial responses in the history of the 
Korean white-collar labour movement. The resultant strike was a powerful one, in 
which almost all employees of CHB participated and which lasted for five days (18-22 
June). It led to total business paralysis at CHB.
7.5.3.4. Outcome
The result of the strike was a victory for the union because the action led to a successful 
agreement. The positive OL obtained from assessments of the failure of the strike in 
December 2000 and the success of the action in July 2000 made the union increase 
strategic capacity for the next strike. The improved strategic capacity led to success in 
the timing of the initiative, the appropriate targeting of resources, and the astute 
deployment of flexible tactics regarding the mobilization. Thus, the union could induce 
maximum resource mobilization from inside and outside, utilize political opportunities, 
and deploy various collective actions for the achievement of its victory.
7.5.4. Conclusion
The experience of strike failure in December 2000 actually contributed to the high-level 
learning (OL) for the next strike. The process of OL proceeded from interpretation by 
members, to integration by the NO (or the CC), to institutionalization by the NO, and to 
intuition by members. The NO played a leading role in strike strategy-making, 
recommending the formation of a special committee in order to respond to the sale of
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CHB to the CC, organizing a committee with the responsibility to develop a logical and 
articulate opposition to the sale, and, in the end, executing the strategy. The main things 
the union had learned from the previous strike were that the union had to strengthen the 
system of industrial unionism, improve its strategic capacity regarding the mobilization 
of resources (internal and external), and better use political opportunities if it were to 
succeed in future strikes.
Therefore, the union’s effort was, first, to strengthen the systems of industrial unionism 
in order to promote stronger unity and to be able to respond to future challenges 
effectively. It did this in a number of ways, including the introduction of the direct 
election system of union executives, the contracting of CBAs regarding check-off 
system of membership dues (i.e. for the amount dedicated to headquarters), the 
establishment of a semi-post entry closed shop, winning, for the first time in Korean 
history, a five-day working week for employees, publishing a new magazine, and 
establishing a computer network system accessible by all members. Secondly, the union 
established the CP, the CSW, and the CU in order to maximize the use of political 
opportunities and external resources in case of need. Thirdly, it formed the Emergency 
Measure Committee to develop a strategy for the strike at CHB. This strategy included 
the development of a justification for the action and mobilization of resources and 
opportunities.
Consequently, the union succeeded in mobilizing, to the maximum, internal resources, 
including IT operators, irregular employees and managers, and external resources such 
as a group of ex-executives of CHB, civic groups, a group of small shareholders of 
CHB, the FKTU (a national centre of unions), and news media. It was also able to 
utilize political opportunities such as support of Presidential candidates during the 
election period. In addition, the union developed and used various and new tactics of 
collective actions (see Section 7.5.3.3). This all contributed to the subsequent strike 
victory (Figure 7-4).
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<Figure 7-4> Relationship between learning and outcome of strike in June 2003
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7.6. Conclusion
As a result of the analysis of the four strikes, we are able to confirm that there was a 
relationship between learning and the outcome of mobilization. At the first strike, in 
September 1998, bank unions’ learning on the subject of strikes was based on the 
experience of other unions. However, this was only indirect experience, and led to 
lower-level learning relying on given organizational structures and given set of norms. 
This led to their strike strategy being little more than the mobilization of their members. 
Furthermore, they failed to overcome the employers’ counteraction (which led to a 
break-up of union unity). Consequently, they could not produce a successful outcome 
from the strike (Figure 7-1). In addition, the unions were unable to overcome the 
political and environmental obstacles created by the national financial crisis. Chief 
among these obstacles was the public’s understanding that restructuring to overcome the 
crisis was necessary.
For the second strike, in July 2000, the KFIU used higher-level learning (adjusting 
overall norms and changing organizational structures) (Table 7-1), gaining positive 
learning data, such as the necessity of an industrial union for stronger unity and a 
complete mobilization of resources and opportunities, through OL processes (i.e. 
interpreting, integrating, institutionalizing, and intuiting, the processes identified by 
Crossan et al. (1999)), from the earlier strike’s failure. Thus, it was able to increase 
strategic capacity regarding endowment of motives, use of information, and use of the 
heuristic process. It could therefore devise a better strategy regarding timing of 
initiative, targeting of resources, and tactics, thereby more effectively mobilizing
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resources and opportunities. Consequently, the union produced a successful outcome 
from the strike (Figure 7-2).
In the case of the third strike, in December 2000, the union conducted only a lower level 
of learning again. This might even be called negative learning, as it comprised over­
confidence and negligence in its review of the problems from the previous strike. The 
great success of that strike had lulled the union into not seriously considering that there 
had also been problems. Thus, the union’s strategic capacity was decreased, leading to a 
poor strategy and inadequate mobilization. Although the union succeeded in mobilizing 
internal members in the KMB and HB it was not enough to lead to strike success 
(Figure 7-3).
Neither the union’s resource mobilization in the two banks nor the political situation 
was bad compared with the situations in the case of the strike in July 2000. The union 
could have achieved better outcomes if it had conducted better communication between 
leaders and the rank-and-file.
Lastly, at the strike in June 2003, the union conducted a higher-level learning (Table. 7- 
2), once again reaping the benefits of positive learning, such as self-restraint, 
development of various new tactics, and use of various resources and opportunities, 
from the lessons (good and bad) of previous strikes. Thus, the union was able to 
increase strategic capacity of mobilization, create a better strategy, and induce better 
mobilization of resources and opportunities. Consequently, the union could produce a 
successful outcome from the strike (Figure 7-4).
In conclusion, an analysis of the four strikes shows the existence of a relationship 
between OL and effectiveness of mobilization. To sum up, when unions learnt 
positively from previous strikes they were able to increase strategic capacity regarding 
endowment of motives, use of information, and use of the heuristic process. This led to 
a better strategy regarding timing of initiative, targeting of resources, and tactics, all of 
which led, in turn, to better effectiveness of mobilization of resources, exploitation of 
political opportunity, and use of collective actions. Consequently, the unions gained 
successful outcomes from these strikes. On the other hand, when they had negative 
learning or poor learning from previous strikes, strategic capacity was decreased or, at 
least, not increased. This led to poor, even worse, strategies and ineffective
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mobilization. The strike outcomes were also poor. Strikes to which positive learning 
contributed were those in July 2000 and June 2003 (the victories), while those which 
suffered from either an absence of, or negative, learning, were those of September 1998 
and December 2000 (the failures) (Figure 7-5).
<Figure 7-5> Relationship between OL and effectiveness of strike
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<Table 7-l> Content of OL (higher-level) at the strike in July 2000
Date Content Reason and result
11.1998 Changing the leadership of the KFFU 
(a federation of bank unions) to a 
more militant one
To establish a stronger leadership 
and to prepare for future challenges
1.1999 Reshuffling union officials’ jobs and 
recruiting two more officials 
(research and publicity professionals) 
in the NO
To aid the preparation for a more 
vigorous and powerful challenge in 
any future action.
11.1998 Forming a special committee of 
whose aim was to establish an 
industrial union
To promote unity between unions.
3.1999 Conducting a joint bargaining 
agreement involving almost all of the 
retail banks (15 out of 17). It was the 
biggest such exercise in Korean 
banking history
To pursue stronger unity and 
produce better outcomes.
It led to successful results such as an 
agreement of employment security 
and an agreement to limit the 
recruitment of irregular workers.
4.1999 Instigating a signing campaign to 
take legal proceedings against the 
IMF to claim for compensation. It 
progressed with the assistance of 
civic groups.
Thorough the campaign, the union 
was able to promote both members’ 
unity and solidarity with civic groups 
as preparation for the union’s next 
fight.
2.2000 Forming a policy-making committee. To develop a comprehensive and 
logical case against the second 
restructuring and to prepare for a 
strike.
3.2000 Establishment of an industrial union 
(change of the organization form 
from a federation of enterprise unions 
to an industrial union).
The KFIU acquired authority over 
bargaining in the banking sector. 
This meant stronger leadership and 
unity among union members in the 
sector.
6.2000 Forming the Emergency Measure 
Committee.
In order to lead the strike effectively.
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<Table 7-2> Content of OL (higher-level) at the strike in June 2003
Date Content Reason
10.2001 Making a regulation defining relief measures for 
members suffering hardships as a consequence of 
union activities
To promote members’ 
active participation in 
strikes
12.2001 Making a regulation allowing members to directly 
elect executives
To promote members’ 
participation and 
loyalty
2.2002. Check-off system for headquarters share of 
membership dues by making a CBA with employees
To strengthen 
leadership authority
2.2002 Establishing the CU, the CSW, and the CP. To extend its 
mobilization of 
external resources and 
use of political 
opportunities.
3.2002 Participating in the Primary Election of the ruling 
party by helping a pro-labour candidate, Mr Rho.
To extend the use of 
political opportunity
3.2002 Establishing a system to publish and distribute both 
a new bimonthly KFIU magazine (“Future of 
Labour”) covering news of all branches and a 
biweekly KFIU newspaper (“Financial Labour 
News”) to all members
Establishing systems of news sending by fax and 
message sending by mobile to 5,000 sub-branch 
chiefs.
To share information 
quickly and to 
promote members’ 
participation, thereby 
helping intuiting
11.2002 Forming a committee whose task was to prepare the 
organizing of irregular employees.
To extend 
membership.
2001 to 
2003
Contracting industry-wide Collective Bargaining 
Agreements (Basic CBA 108 clauses, Agreement of 
Employment Security, Agreement of Company 
Development Committee) in 2001; introduction of 
five-day working week for the first time in Korean 
history in 2002; introduction of a semi-post-entry 
closed shop; extension of leave for childbirth from 
90 days to 105 days; the provision of company 
nurseries; introduction of an allocation system for 
promotion of female employees in 2003; 
establishing a computer network system accessible 
to both the rank-and-file and union leaders; 
increasing the number of full-time officers in its 
headquarters from 17, in 2001, to 32, in 2003
To strengthen the 
industrial unionism, 
thereby developing 
strong unity within 
the union. These 
achievements have 
greatly increased the 
morale of union 
members
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
This thesis posed the question of how and why some strikes are more successful than 
others. By looking at how learning from previous strikes influenced strategy-making 
and outcomes of subsequent strikes in the Korean banking sector, this thesis aimed to 
observe the relationship between OL in unions and the effectiveness of mobilization. 
Four strikes conducted by the KFIU were studied, and three major issues -  the content 
and processes of learning from previous strikes, the strategy development of subsequent 
strikes, and the content and outcomes of mobilization -  were analyzed. Studying the 
learning processes in unions reveals the function (or role) of dialogical organization in 
power (or mobilization). In other words, unions recognize and correct their problems, 
devise creative strategies, and produce better outcomes through the meaningful 
dialogical processes.
This chapter summarizes the main findings of the research, identifies academic and 
practical implications of the research, and lastly, points out academic limitations that 
raise issues for future research.
8.1. Overview of Main Findings
8.1.1. Comparison of the degrees of success at the four strikes
As we examined in Chapter 5, two of the strikes conducted by the Korean bank unions 
were more successful to achieve their desired outcomes than others. One explanation for 
the varied results can be obtained by relating the content of the mobilization and the 
outcomes of each strike as follows.
First, when we compare the two industry-wide strikes, in the first, the September 1998 
action, the unions succeeded in mobilizing 19 percent of their members (7,000 out of a 
total of 36,569 members employed by the nine banks) in their protest against planned 
redundancies. Furthermore, the unions had succeeded in attracting 20,000 members to 
the rally held on the eve of the strike. However, the unions failed to maintain unity until 
the following day due to their opponents’ (employers and the government) conciliation 
and intimidation. Consequently, the outcomes of the strike were poor, and the union
292
members concluded that the strike had been a failure (although the media evaluated it as 
the half success and half failure). On the other hand, the unions succeeded in mobilizing 
almost 31 percent of their members (20,000 out of total 65,000) for the second strike, in 
July 2000, called with the aim of persuading the Government to change its restructuring 
plan. The pre-strike rally held on the eve of strike attracted 30,000 members. In 
addition, the unions succeeded in developing a strike justification -  that the level of the 
Government’s involvement in bank business was immoderate — with which all parties 
(union members, employers, and even the Government officials including the media) 
were in sympathy. Furthermore, they actively sought solidarity with civic groups as 
well as obtaining the support of opposition political parties. Consequently, all parties 
evaluated the strike as a great success (Table 5-5).
Secondly, when we compare the two strikes at the individual banks, the union 
succeeded in mobilizing 85 percent of their members (13,000 out of a total of 15,293 
members at the KMB and HB) in December 2000. Although the strike (called in an 
attempt to persuade the Government not to proceed with the merger of the two banks) 
was strong, and lasted for seven days, it was eventually broken up by force (by the 
police) without having achieved its stated outcome. Consequently, the members’ 
evaluation was that the strike had been a failure (although the media evaluated it as 
partly a success and partly a failure; Section 5.4.4.2). On the other hand, in the June 
2003 action at CHB (called to cancel the privatization plan for the bank), the union was 
able to mobilize all 5,445 union members and even many non-union employees of the 
bank. In addition, the union employed various tactics as well as astutely and actively 
used external resources and political opportunities. Consequently, it did reach an 
agreement (with SHG and the Government) which included many substantive benefits 
for its members although the union failed to gain its main goal (the cancellation of the 
privatization plan) (Table 5-10).
Looking at the content of each mobilization and the subsequent outcomes of the four 
strikes, we can rate the strikes (bearing in mind that it is much more difficult to succeed 
in industry-wide strikes than in strikes at individual banks).
We can say that the strike in July 2000 was the most successful one. The reasons are as 
follows: 1. the unions succeeded in mobilizing almost 31 percent of their members to 
participate in the industry-wide strike. 2. They produced a successful agreement with
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the Government. 3. They developed a good justification for the strike. 4. The outcomes 
of the strike were evaluated favourably by all parties. 5. The unions made intelligent and 
active use of political opportunities and external resources.
The strike in June 2003 can be evaluated as the second most successful strike. The 
reasons are as follows: 1. the union succeeded in mobilizing all of its members. 2. They 
produced a fruitful agreement which was approved by a majority of its members in a 
ballot at the end of the action. 3. They developed various collective actions and actively 
exploited political opportunities and external resources. 4. However, 41 percent of the 
members opposed the agreement because it did not include attainment of the prime goal 
of the strike. The reason for this perception though was that the members’ justification 
for the strike was motivated by just a target (the cancellation of the privatization plan), 
thus, they were unable or unwilling to appreciate the other beneficial results that were 
obtained.
The strike of September 1998 can be placed in third position. The reasons are as 
follows: 1. the unions succeeded in mobilizing 19 percent of its membership (although 
55 percent of the members had participated in the rally held on the eve of the strike) in 
the first industry-wide strike in their history. 2. They produced an agreement. 3. 
However, they did not make great efforts to use external resources and political 
opportunities. 4. They failed to maintain the unity of bank unions, thereby leading to a 
poor outcome. Thus, members experienced a sense of defeatism, evaluating the strike as 
a failure.
Lastly, we could grade the December 2000 strike as the least successful. The reasons are 
as follows: 1. they succeeded in mobilizing 85 percent of their members and carried out 
a strong strike for seven days. 2. However, they failed to gain any outcome. 3. As the 
goal of strike was derived from self-interest, other unions were unwilling to support the 
action (Section 5.4.2.2). 4. They failed to use external resources and political 
opportunities. 5. They went on strike without a complete strategy because the strategy 
promoted by the union leaders was at odds with that of the members (Section 5.4.4.2).
If we score the degrees of strike success related to mobilization of membership, use of 
external resources and political opportunities, strategy, and outcomes we could, utilizing
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a scoring system ranging from four points for ‘very good’ to one point for ‘very poor’105, 
rate them as follows: the July 2000 strike scores the most (16 points), followed by the 
June 2003 strike (15 points), then the September 1998 action (eight points); the lowest 
score (six points) is attained by the December 2000 strike (see Table 8-1).
In evaluating strikes, we need to remind ourselves of Tilly’s mobilization level 
(memberships’ participation ratio) and Offe and Wiesenthal’s collective strategy of 
conflict (employing a form which not only aggregates memberships and their interests 
but also overcomes the individuality of interests and the obstacles to effective 
organization by redefining a collective identity on non-utilitarian forms discussed in 
Section 6.1.2). Thus, after taking into consideration the differences in membership 
control unions have in industry-wide actions as opposed to those in strikes held at 
individual banks, we can judge the unions to have succeeded in mobilizing their 
members at all four strikes. However, at two strikes (those of September 1998 and 
December 2000) the unions failed to overcome the difficulties (such as the aggregation 
of memberships’ interests and the overcome of individuality of interests) consequent 
upon mobilizing few people other than their own members, partly, of course, because 
those members acted out of self-interest; moreover, they were unable to successfully 
deal with such obstacles as external environmental factors and counteractions by their 
opponents. The reverse applied in the other two strikes which were, therefore, more 
successful.
<Table 8-l> Comparison of the degree of strike success
Industry-wide
strike
Industry-wide
strike
Individual bank 
strike
Individual bank 
strike
Date of strikes 9.1998 7.2000 12.2000 6.2003
Mobilization of 
membership
3 (good) 4 (very good) 3 (good) 4 (very good)
Use of external 
resource and 
political 
opportunities
1 (very poor) 4 (very good) 1 (very poor) 4 (very good)
Strategy
(including
tactics)
2 (poor) 4 (very good) 1 (very poor) 4 (very good)
Outcomes 2 (poor) 4 (very good) 1 (very poor) 3 (good)
Total score 8 16 6 15
Sources: Section 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 
Degree of mobilization success is continuum.
105 The scoring system is: Very good -  four points, Good -  three points, Poor -  two points, Very poor -  
one point.
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8.1.2. Reasons for the difference of the degrees of strike success
Through analyzing the four strikes organized by the KFIU between 1998 and 2003, we 
can confirm that the degree of strike success is associated with the existence (or ' 
otherwise) of positive learning (or OL) from previous strikes. In other words, when the 
union conducted higher-level learning, such as the adjustment of overall norms or rules 
and the change of organizational structures, in order to resolve its inconsistency and 
make its norms more effective, it was able to increase strategic capacity regarding 
endowment of motives, use of information, and use of the heuristic process. It was able 
to devise a more effective strategy regarding timing of initiative, targeting of resources, 
and deploying of tactics, thereby more effectively mobilizing resources and 
opportunities. Consequently, the union was able to obtain successful outcomes from the 
strike. More detailed studies of Korean strikes, employing OL theory, the strategic 
capacity perspective, mobilization theory, and identifying when the KFIU gained 
higher-level learning through the processes of OL which facilitated self-reflection on 
previous failures, were included in Chapter 7.
There were two examples of higher-level learning. In the case of the July 2000 strike, 
bank unions (learning from the unsuccessful September 1998 strike) recognized two 
needs, one for a change of union form to an industrial union to effect stronger unity, and 
the other for thorough preparation (and, therefore, a comprehensive strategy), before 
embarking on the next strike (Table 7-1). Thus, they first chose more militant leaders at 
the next leadership election. Secondly, they changed the union form from enterprise 
unions to an industrial union. Thirdly, they developed a justification for strike action 
that could gain public support. Lastly, they devised a strategy that could successfully 
mobilize more resources and exploit political opportunities. As a result, the union 
gained successful outcomes from the strike.
In the case of the June 2003 strike, the KFIU was better prepared after evaluating 
reasons for the failure of the strike at KMB/HB in December 2000. These reasons 
included the development of a poor strategy (based on over-confidence derived from the 
July 2000 victory) and the mobilization of members only. Consequently, the union 
recognized once again the necessity of thorough self-reflection, of maximizing the 
mobilization of both internal and external resources, of exploiting available political
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opportunities, and of utilizing various collective actions flexibly if it was to achieve a 
successful outcome; all of this was positive learning, gained from the successful strike 
of July 2000 and the failed strike of December 2000. Positive learning does not 
guarantee success; it is, however, a necessary if not sufficient condition for success.
The union undertook specific actions prior to, and during the, 2003 strike (Table 7-2). 
These were, first, to strengthen the systems of industrial unionism in order to promote 
stronger unity and to be able to respond to future challenges effectively. Thus, it 
introduced a direct election system for union executives (meaning that it was the rank- 
and-file who voted for the executives, and, to whom, the executives became therefore 
directly accountable), contracted CBAs regarding a check-off system for membership 
dues (thus ensuring that the head office received the dues it was owed), introduced a 
semi-post entry closed shop introduced, for the first time in Korean history, the five-day 
working week, published a new magazine, and established a union computer network 
system to which all members had access. Secondly, the union established the 
Committee of Politics (CP), the Committee of Social Welfare (CSW), and the 
Committee of Unification (CU) in order to maximize the use of political opportunities 
and external resources that might be needed. Thirdly, it formed the Emergency Measure 
Committee (EMC) at an early stage of the strike planning to develop a successful strike 
strategy at the CHB; this strategy included the articulation of a justification for the 
strike, the mobilization of a variety of resources and opportunities, and the development 
of a range of new tactics (see Section 5.5). The intention was to facilitate a complete 
and flexible mobilization, thereby maximizing chances of victory.
Conversely, when the union conducted lower-level learning (negative or passive 
learning), such as reliance on routine, the partial ignorance due to lack of strike 
experience, or the over-confidence and negligence bom of complacency after the great 
success of earlier strikes, the union’s strategic capacity decreased, leading to poor 
strategy, poor mobilization, and, inevitably, failure to achieve its aims in the strike.
An example of such low-level learning can be found in the case of the December 2000 
strike, when negative learning caused by over-confidence and negligence in the review 
of problems that had existed, notwithstanding the success of the preceding strike, led to 
a decrease in the union’s strategic capacity. The consequences of this were a poorer 
strategy, inadequate mobilization, and, failure in the subsequent strike. Another
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example is provided by the case of the September 1998 strike, the first bank strike in 
Korea’s history. Bank unions, with no accumulated learning from previous industry­
wide strikes, were unable to develop an effective strategy because they responded to 
crisis by making strategies within constant organizational norms. The unions, calling on 
members only, were able to mobilize relatively small support. Consequently, they could 
not produce a successful outcome from the strike.
In addition, we can observe that there were differences in the extent of resource 
mobilization and the use of political opportunities between successful and failed strikes. 
The KFIU prevailed in the strikes of July 2000 and June 2003. In each case, the union 
mobilized both an internal resource (i.e. most of the affected branch’s, or branches’, 
members), and outside resources (e.g. civic groups, political parties and media), and 
utilized political opportunities (e.g. the General Election and the Presidential Election). 
On the other hand, in the failed strikes of September 1998 and December 2000, the 
union mobilized only its own members. Furthermore, the results of the four strikes 
illustrate the difference in effectiveness between an interventionist approach by unions 
to restructuring and a pragmatic (reactive) approach (see Section 1.2.2). Bank unions 
were able to achieve most successful outcomes at strikes in July 2000 and June 2003 by 
intervening in the restructuring at an early stage, but were unable to obtain successful 
outcomes from the strikes of September 1998 and December 2000, when they adopted a 
reactive approach (i.e. engaging in negotiation in response to management’s proposals).
To sum up, the union’s strikes were successful when it conducted higher-level (positive) 
learning from previous strikes. This success was due to better mobilization of resources 
and the use of political opportunities, each a product of higher-level learning. 
Conversely, strikes failed when the union conducted lower-level (negative or passive) 
learning from previous strikes (Figure 7-5). Such learning led the union to only 
mobilize its own members.
8.1.3. Content of OL in unions
8.I.3.I. Processes of OL
This study shows that the KFIU (a dialogical organization) learns via the four processes, 
interpreting, integrating, institutionalizing, and intuiting, identified by Crossan et al 
(1999). The process of OL generally proceeded from interpretation by members (rank-
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and-file members and officials), to integration through the National Congress (NC) (or 
the Central Committee (CC)), to institutionalization by the National Office (NO), to 
intuiting by members. The NO played a leading role in strike strategy-making, with its 
officials communicating with the rank-and-file and branch officials. After this 
consultation, the NO suggested a plan regarding strike strategy to the NC and organized 
a committee to develop and execute strategy and tactics. The processes of 
communication in unions discussed in Section 4.6.22.2 is exactly the same as the OL 
processes in unions (Figure 6-4). However, OL can occur only when unions utilize the 
processes to improve their strategic capacity by making substantial efforts such as 
changing their rules or norms or organizational structures.
The KFIU was able to employ higher-level learning in two strikes (those of July 2000 
and June 2003) through application of knowledge obtained from previous strikes. The 
union recognized the need to change its leadership and organizational form (from 
enterprise unions to an industrial union) and form the EMC (the committee charged 
with the task of developing a winning strategy and leading the strike), and create new 
apparatuses (such as the CP, the CSW, and the CU) in order to maximize the use of 
political opportunities and external resource mobilization. Such learning (and its use) 
helped the union gain successful outcomes from these strikes. On the other hand, failure 
to obtain higher-level learning (from previous strikes) in the cases of the September 
1998 and December 2000 strikes led to unsuccessful outcomes from those strikes.
8.I.3.2. Level of OL
This case study of four strikes confirms that unions sometimes conduct higher- or 
lower-level learning levels according to their learning attitude. The KFIU conducted 
higher-level learning before it went on strikes in July 2000 and June 2003 through 
thorough evaluation (or deliberation) of the reasons for the failures of the strikes of 
September 1998 and December 2000. Consequently, the union could gain successful' 
outcomes. On the other hand, the union conducted lower-level learning before it went 
on strikes in September 1998 and December 2000, due to over-confidence and 
negligence or repetition of norms. These strikes were, as a consequence, unsuccessful.
To explain lower-level and higher-level learning in more detail, the former refers to the 
error-detection and error-collection process within a given organizational structure or a- 
given set of rules, and it occurs when the error detected and corrected permits the
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organization to carry on its present policies or achieve its present objectives. On the 
other hand, higher-level learning occurs when, in addition to the detection and 
correction of errors, the organization is involved in the questioning and modification of 
existing norms, procedures, policies, and objectives, and when the organization learns 
how to carry out learning. Higher-level learning aims at adjusting overall rules and 
norms. In other words, when a union engages in high-level learning its members 
(including leaders) leam about previous contexts for learning. They reflect on and 
inquire into previous episodes of OL, or failure to leam. As a result of such 
retrospection, they discover what facilitated or inhibited learning. Thus, they invent new 
strategies for learning, and they evaluate and generalize what they have produced 
(Argyris and Schon, 1978: 27).
High-level learning in unions is a multi-level process that begins with individual 
learning, leads to group learning, and then to OL. These steps are connected by bi­
directional processes that involve both the creation and application of knowledge. More 
specifically, they are composed of four processes that connect individual learning to 
OL; interpreting, integrating, institutionalizing, and intuiting (Crossan et al., 1999: 525).
8.I.2.3. Facilitators and inhibitors of OL
Facilitators of learning include external challenges (or crises), previous experiences of 
failure, internal and external motives of union members, and organizational factors of 
accountability, deliberation, and access of various information within the union. This 
case study shows that there were facilitators and inhibitors of learning within the KFIU. 
The facilitators of learning were the failure of the previous strike and the approaching 
restructuring of the banking sector by the Government. In addition, the worry of 
additional redundancies prompted unions to react strongly. Reflection on the failure of 
an earlier strike made unions more determined to prepare thoroughly for the next one.
On the other hand, the inhibitors of learning in the KFIU were over-confidence and 
negligence derived from a previous success. In addition, in the case of the December 
2000 strike, other inhibitors (or barriers) to learning included interruption of learning 
processes, psychological barriers, and organizational structures. Interruptions to 
learning processes are: 1. an interruption of the learning cycle between leaders and the 
rank-and-file. March and Olsen call this barrier “audience learning” (1976: 159) to 
highlight the idea that the link between individual action and organizational action is
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interrupted. This type of incomplete learning cycle is to be found when individuals 
change their own behaviour but cannot persuade others to change the organizational 
rules for behaviour. 2. Superstitious learning. This type of interruption occurs when 
organizational members draw incorrect conclusions about the impact of organizational 
actions on the environment. 3. Ambiguous learning. This type of interruption occurs 
when changes in the environment cannot be clearly identified (March and Olsen, 1976: 
156). These interruptions to learning happened between the leaders of the KFIU and the 
members of the KMBU and the HBU just before the strike on 22 December 2000. The 
leaders of the KFIU could not persuade the members of the KMBU and the HBU to 
postpone the strike, in accordance with the provisional agreement. However, the 
members disagreed, and were convinced that their demand that the merger be cancelled 
could be attained within two to three days if they went on strike. This misapprehension 
occurred because they could not identify clearly the change of environment, and, 
because of the three types of learning interruptions identified above, drew incorrect 
conclusions from the information available to them.
Secondly, a psychological barrier is sometimes derived from previous strike victories. 
Success can become a barrier to OL because it leads to managerial overconfidence in 
the ability to foresee risks. Such a barrier was in evidence in the case of the strike at 
KMB and HB in December 2000. Union members of two banks had a hazy illusion that 
they would definitely win if they went on strike. This illusion was inspired by observing 
the strike victory of July 2000, an action, however, in which they had not actually 
participated. This indirect experience meant that they were unaware of the fact that a 
strike could fail, especially one without a comprehensive strategy. On the other hand, 
crises (unlike successes) are deemed necessary to shake an organization out of its 
complacency (Sitkin, 1992: 243).
Thirdly, there are barriers to organizational structures and leadership. Although the 
KFIU was an industrial union, the KMBU/HBU retained, to a significant extent, the 
inertia of enterprise unions. Therefore, the influence of the KFIU on the KMBU/HBU 
was limited, and the leaders of the former were unable to persuade the members of the 
two branch unions to accept the provisional agreement because it focused on regional 
banks, and contained nothing except that discussions relating to the KMB/HB merger 
were to be delayed (see Table 5-7). This dissension of views between the KFIU and the 
KMBU/HBU was an example of the structural barrier referred to by Morgan (1997: 88-
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9), who pointed out that departmental structure can inhibit OL by focusing the attention 
of members on parochial rather than organization-wide problems. In addition, it could 
be said that the structural barriers were a consequence of a lack of good leadership.
Other inhibitors of learning in unions could include their reactive action repertoire, the 
scarcity of full-time officers, ideological rigidity, the side-effects of excessive 
competition between political factions, and the frequent change of leadership.
8.1.4. Changes in employment and industrial relationships
Since the national financial crisis in 1997, banks have, firstly, changed their sales 
strategy from one of increasing market share to that of the pursuit of profitability and 
have reorganized their work by rationalization and new customization. The main forms 
of this work reorganization have been the pursuit of divisional organization, 
fragmentation of branch business, and the new-Taylorism of call centres. Mass 
customization has led to the pursuit of differentiated customer service, the use of new 
techniques such as CRM and CSS, and the diversification of service delivery outlets 
(see Section. 4.4.).
Secondly, human resource management in the banks (i.e. evaluation and pay systems, 
and recruitment and education methods) has also been dramatically revised. In 
summary, the changes regarding pay, evaluation, recruitment, and education/training are 
as follows: 1. the pay system and promotion policy has been changed from a traditional 
ones based on seniority to ones based on performance and ability. The form of 
performance pay has itself changed gradually, from one of collective performance 
bonuses to all employees to one of individual performance bonuses. 2. The method of 
performance evaluation employed by the bank has been transformed from one that 
entailed an admission (permission) method by relative evaluation, a one-side evaluation 
by superior officers, and input-oriented evaluation based on length of service and 
education, to a graduation (acquisition) method characterized by absolute evaluation, 
multi-side evaluation by superior officers, colleagues, and subordinates, and output- 
oriented evaluation by MBO. 3. Recruitment methods have changed from regular 
recruitment once or twice a year, either through newspaper advertisements or by 
promoting or transferring existing staff to irregular recruitment on demand, to 
advertising on the Internet and the increased usage of job agencies. 4. Education
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methods have changed from in-house bank courses, job rotation, and OJT (in short, the 
cultivation of generalists), to cyber education, support of self-education (i.e. the 
cultivation of financial experts). In other words, the resultant HRM policies were 
mainly those associated with ‘hard HRM’. In essence, bank management strategy 
changed from a long-term developmental perspective aimed at ensuring continued 
stability (thereby treating employees as assets) to the pursuit of a flexible approach 
which facilitated short-term profitability (thus treating employees as a variable cost).
Thirdly, the restructuring of the financial sector has seriously damaged employment 
security. There has been a huge reduction in the number of regular employees as many 
banks have been closed and merged, leading to many redundancies as the Government 
has restructured the sector and banks have sought to cut costs. The number of regular 
employees in the banking sector decreased from 113,994, in 1997, to 66,881, in 2002 
(Table 4-10). In addition, the use of irregular employees has increased remarkably as 
banks, in their pursuit of a strategy of labour flexibility, have recruited them in order to 
fill the vacancies created by the departure of regular employees. As a consequence, the 
number of irregular employees increased from 15,043 to 22,951 during the same period 
(Table 4-10). It means that the era of lifelong employment in the banking sector has 
gone, and been replaced by employment insecurity.
Fourthly, faced with a steep rise in employment insecurity and changes of HRM 
policies as a result of restructuring, bank unions mounted a strong resistance. Trade 
unions in the banking sector changed the form of trade union from an enterprise union 
system to an industrial union; it was felt that an industry-wide union could more 
effectively represent the sector’s employees in the new environment. This also had a 
direct impact upon the bargaining method, which shifted from single-employer 
bargaining to multi-employer bargaining. The change (centralization of IR) was a result 
of unions’ great efforts and needs to respond effectively to restructuring conducted by 
the government. However, it was also possible because employers did not have any IR 
control or power in the historical restructuring and thought it easier to deal with the 
union’s strong responses to restructuring by negotiating as part of a multi-employer 
group rather than as single banks. Furthermore, they were used to group negotiations, as 
that had been the norm for last three decades (Section 4.6.5.1).
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Furthermore, the bank workplace, previously a strike-free zone, has become the site of 
industrial hostility as unions have sometimes felt that strikes are the most effective form 
of industrial action with which to fight mass redundancies. Bank unions have engaged 
in four major strikes (September 1998, July 2000, December 2000, and June 2003) in 
response to the restructuring of financial sector by the Government. Clearly, the 
tradition of stable industrial relations had come to an end and the epoch of 
confrontational industrial relations begun.
Lastly, since the financial crisis, the Government’s industrial relations policy has shifted 
from a previously authoritarian one to corporatism in order to affect a smoother 
restructuring of the financial sector. As part of this transition, the Government 
established the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC). The KTC has since played an 
important role as a mediator between the Government and unions during strikes
To sum up, since the national financial crisis of 1997, the employment relationship has 
changed from lifelong employment security to employment insecurity and HRM 
systems have changed from ones based on seniority and regularity to ones based on 
performance and irregularity. The industrial relationship has changed radically from 
symbiosis to confrontation (from moderation to militancy and from paternalism to 
restructuring) within the Korean banking sector. Nevertheless, there have been attempts 
to build new forms of industrial relations, such as industrial unionism, corporatism, and 
reorganizations of the workplace that meet the needs of the three main groups (labour, 
government and employers) in order to survive in the era of global competition. It is to 
be hoped that these new forms can be built on the foundation of the traditional 
symbiosis of Korean banking.
8.1.5. Generalizing to other cases
8.I.5.I. Reasons for success and failure of strikes
The impact of OL on the effectiveness of strikes was investigated in relation to the 
actual content of learning and the strike strategy-making in each of the four strikes (see 
Chapter 7). Although the results show that the effectiveness of each strike was affected 
by the level of learning (and attitude) the union had achieved by evaluating previous 
strikes, it could be argued that the extent to which success or failure was attributable to 
learning was not conclusively established. Other factors, such as political opportunities
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or unpredictable environmental changes (whether or not those are favourable), the 
ability of opponents to be able to utilize more effective counteractions, and other 
obstacles, such as internal union friction, may have also played a part.
Nevertheless, strike success is more likely to depend on strikers’ effort and 
determination to use opportunities and to put into practice higher-level learning than on 
those other factors. For example, the existence of favourable political opportunities does 
not necessarily guarantee that a strike will be successful nor, conversely, does the 
existence of unfavourable opportunities necessarily lead to strike failure.
As examples, the union was able to gain a victory at the July 2000 strike as it had made 
great efforts to conduct higher-level learning while its failure in a strike later that year, 
in December, was due, at least in part, to its being content to repeat existing routines 
even though the political environment surrounding both actions had been similar. In the 
case of the strike in June 2003, one could argue that a main factor in the strike’s success 
was a favourable political environment. However, in this case as well, the union was 
able to exploit that favourable environment because it had actively tried to conduct 
higher-level learning through thorough self-reflection and great efforts after the failure 
of the strike in December 2000. In other words, as the union actively made efforts to 
strengthen the industrial union system and its policy-making capacity, and to prepare 
itself to make better use of political opportunities and outside resources through the 
establishment and operation of such groups as the CP, the CWF, and the CU, it was able 
to then exploit those favourable opportunities and properly use those outside resources 
(i.e. fit to situation) when it went on strike.
Furthermore, even in the case of the September 1998 strike, when political opportunities 
were least propitious, if bank unions could have made more efforts to strengthen their 
unity before going on strike and if they could have learnt more thoroughly from other 
unions’ strikes, thereby developing a more effective strategy (i.e. one that strengthened 
its weak organizational unity and exploited more opportunities and resources) better 
outcomes might have resulted; they might have avoid organizational secession during 
the strike and thus been able to overcome their opponents.
It should also be remembered that the innovative tactics of opponents can impact upon a 
strike’s success or failure. In the case of the December 2000 strike, it can be suggested
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that the strike failed because although the union had predicted the Government’s bank 
large-sizing policy, it had not predicted that the policy would begin with mergers of 
healthy banks. However, even in this case, if the union leaders could have prepared 
proper alternatives to the opponent’s (potential) innovative tactics and made more 
efforts to improve their members’ understanding of their (potential) situations (they 
could meet) and strategies (for those situations) by conducting ceaseless higher-level 
learning processes (i.e. sharing the situations and alternatives with the rank-and-file: 
scenario planning) the union might have avoided defeat.
In the early stages of the dispute, union leaders were actually able to devise a proper and 
appropriate strategy by their intuition. Thus, the leaders succeeded in producing a 
provisional agreement with the Government before the strike. However, the leaders’ 
intuition was derived from their own learning, not that of all the union’s members (who 
had different interests and different strike experiences). In short, learning had not been 
shared by the leaders and the rank-and-file of KMB and HB. There was thus a failure to 
achieve a shared understanding of the union’s strategy. (However, the leadership can 
argue that the union should be more flexible, sometimes proceeding with strike action 
after mobilizing the rank-and-file, sometimes demobilizing as the circumstances 
change; i.e. flexibility between times of mobilization of power and demobilizations 
retreating from conflict).
As a result, leaders could not persuade the rank-and-file members of KMB and HB to 
not strike. The union went on strike without a complete strategy as union members were 
under the illusion that they could win within two or three days. Instead, they tasted 
bitter failure. This can be attributed to the union’s negligence (by both leaders and the 
rank-and-file) to conduct higher-level learning to prepare for forthcoming battles; this 
negligence derived from the over-confidence consequent upon the great victory at the 
strike of July 2000.
At this point, we need to refer to a case which utilizes a management strategy theory, 
scenario planning. In the 1990s, all oil companies were equally hard hit by the sudden 
oil price increase by OPEC, but Royal Dutch Shell responded to the unpredictable 
environmental change in a way that dealt effectively with it; it did this by scenario 
planning. Essentially, this consisted of trying to envisage what the best and worst case 
scenarios for the future might be and what sorts of factors might be critical in dealing
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with them. Armed with a range of scenarios, and a range of strategic responses to deal 
with them, organizations could be more fleet-footed and nimble in responding to their 
environments than if they just assumed that the future was an extrapolation from the 
past (Ringland, 1998; Clegg et aL, 2005: 425).
To sum up, if unions can conduct higher-level learning continually, therefore always 
being prepared for forthcoming challenges they are more likely to prevail in their 
battles. They will be able to develop effective strategies to fit the situations even if 
political situations are unfavourable and opponents deploy new tactics. However, 
conducting continuous higher-level learning is not easy. In fact, it is this very difficulty 
which lies behind the frequent failures of organizations and individuals.
For the generalization of the relationship between unions’ success and OL, we need to 
look at cases in other countries in which unions have produced better results through 
upgrading their efforts in strikes or in response to membership decreases due to 
restructuring. For examples, firstly, there is Johnston’s analysis of two strikes in 
California (1994). In his comparison of a strike by public sector female workers in San 
Jose in 1981 with a strike by private sector nurses in Santa Clara Valley in 1982 (both 
concerned with comparable worth), he argues that the difference in strike results is 
derived from the strikers’ learning processes from their previous experiences. The 
former (despite its apparent weakness) was able to produce a successful result by a 
strategy of coalition-building with local communities and a delicate process of issue 
articulation106 while the latter failed (despite of its apparent strength107).
10RAccording to Johnston, the demands and resources of the city workers in San Jose 
were deeply shaped by the context within which the movement surfaced. The latter 
strike failed, however, because the claim to comparable worth in the private sector had 
relied on the use of legal power to regulate wage relations. Thus, workers in the latter 
should have made greater efforts to make new strategic orientations (or strategic fits) of 
the demand in their context (private sector). However, the grass-roots feminist impulse 
lent its force to a conventional economic strike (market-oriented appeal) in the nurses’ 
strike (Ibid: 111-5) without the efforts of alliance-building.
106 Asserting the value of the women’s work through city politics and grassroots movements at 
neighborhood-based points of production.
107 It was the longest and largest nurses’ strike in Californian history.
108 Including the campaign for comparable worth with the involvement in the broader patterns of 
coalition-building: “societal corporatism of the public sector”.
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In addition, the activists in the San Jose strike had had many experiences in previous 
campaigns on the subject of comparable worth, and had accumulated learning from 
other workers’ actions, thereby reaping the lessons of a decade of militancy while those 
in Santa Clara Valley had not had such processes and experiences. In short, the San Jose 
workers’ strategy development was derived from their earlier scripts and experiences; 
they were able to fashion new strategies in response to their own sometimes painful 
experiences and to changing opportunities (Ibid: 212-3).
Secondly, we can compare strikes organized by the National Farm Workers Association 
(NFWA) and ones organized by the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee 
(AWOC in AFL-CIO) in the 1960s in California (Taylor, 1975; Ganz, 2000). The 
former succeeded (despite having a lower strike fund and fewer professional staff) while 
the latter failed despite strength in both of those areas.
According to Ganz (2000), due to the lack of aforementioned resources, the former 
actively pursued coalition-building with communities, (such as local churches, Mexican 
communities, human right organizations and local students), submitted an application 
for an Office of Economic Opportunity grant to fund the strike, developed a proper 
strategy (focusing on union recognition rather than wage increases, opting for non­
violence, and choosing a policy of risk sharing by everyone), and deployed various 
tactics (such as roving picketing and a march to the company headquarters in New 
York). These strategies and tactics were developed as a consequence of learning how to 
survive by relying on volunteer resources (Ganz, 2000: 1032).
In addition, in a deliberative process to which the NFWA turned frequently when faced 
with critical choices, the best way to give a sense of the creative process -  and the 
interaction of people and ideas central to it -  was to leam from other union’s strikes 
(such as that of the New Mexico miners who had travelled to the company headquarters 
in New York and the failure of the AWOC in Imperial Valley).
On the other hand, the AWOC’s tactics were to maintain traditional picket lines at the 
companies at which it had struck, to keep its members occupied and to make sure none 
of them returned to work. This traditional approach was adopted because its strategy 
was just to increase members’ wages and to isolate itself from outside involvement in
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order to avoid costly legal entanglements (Taylor, 1975; Ganz, 2000: 1024-38). Such 
strategy and tactics, depending on traditional methods and risk evasion, were typical of 
lower-level learning.
In short, the AWOC, relying on AFL-CIO financial support adequate for its limited 
objectives, saw no need to change while the NFWA made great efforts to increase its 
access to information, enriched its heuristic facility, and deepen its motivation by 
transforming the organization and its leadership in order to overcome its limitations 
(Ganz, 2000: 1035). In other words, the former depended on routine derived from 
passive learning while the latter, using positive learning, actively endeavoured to 
change its norms and organization, thereby improving its strategic capacity. Although 
Ganz argues the success of the NFWA derived from its better leadership and 
organizational structures, the improvement of leadership and organization’s strategic 
capacity derived from positive learning attitudes from the past cases.
Thirdly, there are many cases of union revitalization in response to membership 
decreases. Some of these include: 1. the American unions were engaged in an 
aggressive effort to improve significantly their organizing capacity and success for the 
1990s, despite a rapidly deteriorating economic, political, and legal climate. They 
invested staff and financial resources into organizing, mobilizing leaders and members 
to support the organizing campaign, and developing and implementing more effective 
organizing strategies and tactics. Formal programmes launched by the AFL-CIO and 
individual unions have included the creation of the Organizing Institute in 1989, the 
launching of the Union Summer and Union Cities programmes in 1996,- and the Justice 
for Janitors programme. Initiatives of these programmes and campaigns have included 
the restructuring of organizing departments, the appointing of more specialist 
organizers, the drawing of lay activists into organizing activity, and the launching of 
training programmes. The main focus of organizing has been the expansion of unions’ 
job territories in response to declining memberships. Unions have therefore targeted a 
wider range of potential members, such as low wage, immigrant, and non-standard 
contract workers. The organizing campaigns sought majority support and used a variety 
of, often imaginative, tactics to contact, persuade, collectivize, and mobilize workers. 
Occasionally, they engaged with the wider community, and involved coalition-building 
with other organizations. The primary method, however, was for unions to organize 
collectively, often in the face of intense employer opposition (Heery and Adler, 2004:
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48). As a result, for the first time in decades, they (i.e. American unions) attracted as 
many new workers as were lost from lay-offs, plant closings, decertification and 
contracting out (Bronfenbrenner et al., 2003: 32).
2. British unions have also been engaged in organizing campaigns. Thus, there has been 
the creation of the TUC’s Organizing Academy, the pursuit of mergers between unions, 
extension of union services such as legal and financial services (e.g. union credit cards, 
union-brokered insurance schemes and mortgages), and the offer of new bargaining 
formulas such as partnership agreements, single-union agreements and pendulum 
arbitration offered to employers (Jefferys, 1996: 181-2). As a result, they have 
succeeded in maintaining approximately 30 percent union density since 1990 while the 
union density in many other countries has constantly decreased.
3. Spanish unions were highly involved in political exchanges with the government 
regarding to the social pacts that granted them a voice and some influence in deciding 
on the contents of labour market and social policy reforms. The union power (to be able 
to do those) was derived from the strategic use of the general strikes in the 1990s that 
made unions re-established as legitimate and important social actors. “This participation 
in social pacts has been facilitated by the unions’ distance from the leftist parties 
(unions’ traditional political allies) and a pragmatic relationship with all major parties as 
well. Thus, the political actions have played a major role in the revitalization of unions 
in Spain” (Hamann and Kelly, 2004: 103). The union density in Spain increased from 
5.7 percent in 1980 to 13.3 percent in 1997 (Behrens et al., 2004: 19).
The variety of strategic options available to unions throughout the world has been 
bounded by external and internal environmental constraints and by the character and 
scope of existing union services, by their existing and potential national memberships, 
and by their own ideologies, histories, politics and cultures (Jefferys, 1996: 181). 
Nevertheless, the examples show that unions can produce better results when they make 
great efforts to device successful survival strategies and live up to their actions through 
the changes of routines and organizational structures.
8.I.5.2. OL in unions
This case study of the KFIU showed that the union conducts OL through four processes, 
interpreting, integrating, institutionalizing, and intuiting. In addition, this case study of
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four strikes confirms that unions occasionally conduct higher-level or lower-level 
learning levels according to their learning attitude, and that there are facilitators and 
inhibitors of learning in unions. The content of learning might be regarded as the typical 
learning content of democratic or dialogical organizations which operate from the 
bottom up, such as political parties or Non Government Organizations (NGOs). 
However, the processes of OL sometimes tend to be used just as the processes of 
communication in unions, thereby not embedding in organizational memory members’ 
discoveries, inventions, and evaluations. If such embedding of OL in organization does 
not occur, individuals will have learned but the organization will not have done so 
(Argyris and Schon, 1978: 19).
Moreover, if leadership does not have the ability to conduct OL or if the organization 
does not hold regular meetings for communication, or has a top-down form of resource 
flow, or has poor constituency accountability the organization will probably not be 
conducive to effective learning processes. GanZ argues (2000: 1019) that organizations’ 
learning might also be influenced by other factors, such as differences in leadership 
ability or organizational structure. He argues that an organization could develop an 
effective strategy if the leaders access salient information, employ heuristic processes, 
and demonstrate deep motivation; this requires that its leaders have diversity of 
experience, strong ties to constituencies (or diversity of ties), and diversity of 
repertoires, and that the organization has deliberative processes, facilitates resources 
flow and has accountability structures.
In addition, the learning processes may be affected by the use of influence on 
interpretation, the use of force on integration, the use of domination on 
institutionalization, and the use of discipline on intuiting. Lawrence et al. (2005: 188) 
argue that influence is useful to overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty associated with 
interpretation, that force facilitates the accomplishment of collective action in the 
integration process, that domination overcomes potential resistance to change and thus 
supports institutionalization, and that discipline supports the development of the 
expertise that is necessary to foster intuition (see Section 6.3.6.2).
8.I.5.3. Changes in industrial relations
This research showed, in detail, what is entailed in the reorganization of workplaces and 
the changes of employment and industrial relationships in the Korean banking sector
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due to the restructuring that has followed since the 1997 national financial crisis. The 
changes have been as follows: the employment relationship has changed from lifelong 
employment security to employment insecurity (and HRM systems based on seniority 
and regularity to systems based on performance and irregularity) while the industrial 
relationship has changed from symbiosis to confrontation. In addition, the Government 
began to experiment with corporatism by the KTC in order to conduct restructuring 
smoothly.
Although the restructuring was most immediately linked to the national financial crisis 
it was actually influenced by globalization. Therefore, workplace reorganization and 
changes in the employment and industrial relationships are part of a global trend in the 
banking sector.
However, there has been a Korea-specific trend in the change of industrial relationship 
in the banking sector. That is, unlike in Western countries where there has been a trend 
towards decentralization in bargaining in the banking sector, in Korea there has been a 
trend towards centralization. Korean bank unions transferred their union form from 
enterprise unions to an industrial union in order to respond more effectively to the 
restructuring. By thus establishing stronger solidarity they were able to gain better 
outcomes from strikes and collective bargaining. Such an approach can be explained by 
examining the different histories of industrial relations between Korea and Western 
countries. Korean trade unions, for a long time restrained by the Government into 
enterprise unionism, had looked forward to the industrial unionism for the extension of 
union power.
The transformation from enterprise unionism to industrial unionism advanced greatly in 
the four-year period between 1998 and 2002 as a result of the national financial crisis. 
In that time, 17 new industrial unions were formed. Most of these were formed by 
merging existing individual enterprise unions. The combined membership of these 
industrial unions reached 31.4 percent of total union membership in Korea in 2002; it 
had been only 6.2 percent in 1997 (Table 3-6). This trend is probably unique in a period 
characterized by the spread of globalization.
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8.2. Academic and practical implications
8.2.1. Academic implications
The research findings have some academic implications. First, this research reveals the 
relationship between union learning (and learning attitude) and mobilization outcome 
(Chapter 7 and Figure 7-5). The case studies, the four KFIU strikes, confirm that the 
outcomes of strikes were affected by the union’s learning level (higher or lower) or 
attitude (e.g. positive or negative) obtained from previous strike experiences. In other 
words, when the union carried out higher-level learning (or positive learning), such as 
overall changes of norms and rules, by self-refection it was able to improve its strategic 
capacity, therefore developing a better strategy. This, in turn, led to successful outcomes 
from strikes. On the other hand, when the union carried out lower-level learning 
(negative learning), such as repetition of routines, or felt over-confidence after success, 
strategic capacity was decreased, leading to a less effective strategy. Consequently, the 
union failed to gain successful outcomes from its next strike (Figure 7-1).
Therefore, the findings of this research can help to explain a union’s success or failure in 
any given strike, and can thus contribute to mobilization theory. It can do so because 
mobilization scholars of social movements, in their explanations of outcomes of social 
movements, have so far usually depended on variations in resources and opportunities 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; Tilly, 1978; Evans, 1980; McAdam, 1982; Morris, 
1984; McAdam. et al., 1996). However, they have failed to explain why one 
organization may be able to utilize more effectively political opportunities, mobilized 
resources, and collective actions while another, which is similarly placed in terms of 
resources and opportunities, fails to do so. To answer this, Ganz (2000) argued that an 
organization could develop the more effective strategy than another, if its leaders can 
access salient information, employ heuristic processes, and demonstrate deep 
motivation. All of these factors are affected by differences in leaders’ life experience, 
networks, and repertories, and organizations’ deliberative processes, resources flows, 
and accountability structures. If leaders do as Ganz suggests, the organization is more 
likely to succeed. However, his argument also possesses the same limitation that was 
identified above; that is, it does not explain why same (or similar) leaders of same (or 
similar) organizations can still either succeed or fail, albeit occasionally in the case of
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the latter. Thus, this research finding extends Ganz’s argument. This research shows if a 
union’s leaders and lay members could engage in positive learning from their previous 
experiences their strategic capacity would increase and the union is more likely to 
succeed in the next strikes.
Secondly, this research finding supports “the organizing model” of union revitalization. 
The main content of the organizing model is identical with that of OL, as in the model, 
unions try to adapt in response to such challenges as a decline in union membership and 
attacks by employers through attempting to make sea changes in their functioning and 
structure and constant re-evaluation (Diamond, 1988: 6; Schenk, 2003: 247; Section 
6.3.6.1). The KFIU case study demonstrates this identity of OL and the organizing 
model (See the Tables 7-1 and 7-2). Behrens et al. argue that the effectiveness of union 
revitalization depends on unions’ efforts to make right strategic choices (2003: 24-5).
Thirdly, this research exposes the mechanism of learning processes in union 
organizational structures (Figure. 6-4; Section 6.3.6). This has not been done before 
although Crossan et al. (1999) argue that the learning processes that operate in 
organizations (in a general sense) are interpreting, integrating, institutionalizing, and 
intuiting. The case study of the KFIU illustrates clearly the learning processes regarding 
mobilization (see Chapter 7, Figure 6-4). Therefore, this research can contribute to OL 
theory of democratic organizations, such as unions, NGOs, and political parties, in 
which decision-making is conducted by bottom-up processes.
Fourthly, this research represents the first systematic study of changes in industrial 
relations (including work reorganization) in the Korean banking sector since the 
national financial crisis in 1997 (Chapter 4). This study has revealed how mass 
restructuring by the Government has influenced bank workplace reorganization and led 
to changes in employment and industrial relationships; it has also detailed how unions 
have responded to the restructuring. Thus, this research supplements the literatures of 
restructuring and employment relations.
Lastly, this case study of four strikes presents a series of historic banking sector strike 
stories to the world of industrial relations literature for the first time. The strikes are, as 
far as we are aware, unique and the biggest ever in the world-wide banking sector. In 
addition, the strategies and tactics that the bank unions developed and deployed
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regarding the mobilization of resource, the use of political opportunities, and the use of 
various collective actions, were very interesting and without precedent. For example, 
first, the deployment of 500 Cyber fighters, the cutting of hair by 4,000 members, the 
delivering of all employees’ resignations to the President, the staging of a sit-in strike at 
bank headquarters, the use of mobile phone technology and the Internet for the 
communication of the union’s orders to members, the distribution of 1,000,000 union 
leaflets to citizens, the use of shareholders, the use of a university’s stadium as a strike 
venue in July 2000 (30,000 members attended a rally on the eve of the strike), and the 
use of the Presidential Primary Election in the case of strike on June 2003, are all 
innovative internal mobilization tactics. Secondly, in an original response to the wrong 
policy of an international institution, the union brought a lawsuit against the IMF. 
Thirdly, as examples of union resolve, in the December 2000 strike, four union leaders 
were imprisoned (two for one year, one for eight months, and one for two months) and 
25 others received fines, while in the June 2003 strike, four were imprisoned for one 
month and two were fined. All of the above qualities of innovation and determination 
can serve as examples and an inspiration to other unions around the world considering 
strike action.
8.2.2. Practical implications
Assessing the influence of learning on the effectiveness of strikes is the main interest of 
this research. Thus, union leaders (practitioners) need to recognize, in a concrete way, 
the importance of higher-level learning on mobilization. This research reminds union 
leaders of three facts. First, a union is more likely to succeed in strike action when it can 
gain higher-level learning, such as meaningful changes of norms and organizational 
structures, from previous strikes. Secondly, a strike is more likely to succeed when it 
can maximize the mobilization of resources (internal and external) and political 
opportunities. Thirdly, the possibility of mobilization success depends on whether or not 
the union utilizes OL through four dialogical processes, interpreting, integrating, 
institutionalizing, and intuiting. This OL process in unions is indispensable because the 
union is a dialogical organization. For example, the case of the December‘2000 strike 
confirms that unions can fail if the leaders and the rank-and-file do not leam together 
through the dialogical processes.
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Offe and Wiesenthal (1985: 184) argue that unions’ strike mobilization capacity has to be 
built up in a communicative process within the unions, whose individual potential to 
sanction is minimal because of their atomization. It means that sanctioning potential in 
unions becomes effective only through the organized members and their explicitly 
coordinated action. Thus, what unions need is the conscious and coordinated active 
participation of their members, including, as a final resort, the willingness to go on 
strike. In other words, sanctioning potential in unions depend on their ability to generate 
their members’ willingness to act. For successful mobilization, it appears reasonable for 
unions to maximize membership because by so doing it maximizes the resources that 
are available to it as well as supposedly minimizes internal competition among those 
who are members.
These three facts provide union leaders with a useful insight into what unions should do 
in order to achieve successful results in strikes. Union leaders should do their best to 
gain higher-level learning from previous experiences through dialogical processes in 
order to maximize mobilization of resources and opportunities, thereby raising the 
possibility of strike success. In addition, as a useful practical tool, union leaders could 
make a model (check list or modus operandi) for successful strikes.
The model should be able to check the possibility of strike success through checking the 
level of OL in the union and the degree of the possibility of mobilization of resources 
(internal and external) and political opportunities. As a result of this checking, union 
leaders would be better able to assess situations and identify what still needed to be 
done, how long they could continue the strike action, and how to use the strike as part of 
the bargaining process. The model could thus be helpful in minimizing costs incurred as 
a consequence of hasty or ill-planned strikes. It is a form of SWOT analysis (see 
Section 6.2.1). Furthermore, unions now need to leam how to do ‘scenario planning’ in 
order to prepare for and prevail in future challenges. Scenario planning helps members 
and leaders leam to recognize the future uncertainties in their operation environments. 
By participating in the scenario building process, they can understand today better by 
imagining tomorrow, increasing the breadth of vision and enabling them to spot change 
earlier (Ringland, 2002: 4-5).
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The case study of union learning (discussed in Chapter 7) could be a good model for 
other unions that have to mobilize resources and opportunities in order to succeed in 
accomplishing their stated interests.
8.3. Limitations at the research and implication for future research
The research is subject to some limitations with respect to research methodology and 
scope. Firstly, the research has been conducted in a specific period (the period of 
restructuring of the financial sector by the Korean Government). Moreover, as cases in a 
specific industry (in a specific country) are selected it is difficult to distinguish between 
sector effects and country effects. If we had looked at various sectors, various periods, 
and various countries we would have obtained a mere nuanced pictures. Locke and 
Thelen (1995: 344) in examining key challenges to trade unions in few countries liken 
their work to the comparison between apples and oranges because “the specific struggles 
we analyze are manifestly quite distinct”. Secondly, the issues we have sought to 
address here are limited to the impact of learning on the effectiveness of mobilization. 
Thus, if the research had encompassed more aspects affecting the effectiveness of 
mobilization the outcomes of the research would have been richer and better.
Lastly, there were the shortcomings of the way in which the contents of OL in the union 
were measured. As the research focused on the processes of OL in unions related to 
mobilization, interviews were limited to union officials and active rank-and-file 
members who had participated in strikes. Moreover, the content of debates within union 
meetings (such as the NC, the CC, and branch meetings) was not thoroughly enough 
investigated or described in order to be able to let the reader get a sufficiently strong 
sense of the integration part of OL in unions. This was because the unions did not 
generally make detailed records of debates; instead, only note summaries of debate 
outcomes appeared in union reports. Thus, if union members not directly involved in 
strikes or passive in union activities had been interviewed to supplement the 
measurement of the effects of OL and more interviews had been conducted to dig out 
the detailed content of debates on significant issues in union meetings the research 
would have been much persuasive.
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These limitations raise a number of issues for future research; these are as follows. First, 
we would need to look at the impact of union learning on the effectiveness of 
mobilization in a manufacturing sector (in the same period of restructuring). The 
automobile sector, for instance, is of a similar size to the banking sector. Such a 
comparison might reveal differences between sectors (i.e. the sector effect).
Secondly, we would need to look at the impact of learning on strikes held in ‘normal’ 
(non-restructuring) periods in order to ascertain the effect of general issues, such as 
demands for wage increases or improvement of working conditions. Such a study would 
identify issue effects (and period effects).
Thirdly, comparative research between countries that have different cultures of 
industrial relations and are at different level of economic development could expose 
differences between countries (or country effects).
Fourthly, we need to look at different reasons that influence the effectiveness of 
mobilization. For example, if opponents develop better strategies as a result of higher 
learning, or if unpredictable obstacles occur due to environmental and political changes, 
or if there are other internal (i.e. within the union) reasons, such as internal conflicts, the 
effectiveness of mobilization might be altered regardless of the impact of higher-level 
learning conducted by unions.
There have been two special occasions in Korea in which strike effectiveness was 
influenced by political and environmental factors. First, in 1987, when the so-called 
“Great Labour Struggle” occurred, a political factor (the sudden extension of political 
democratization following a civilian revolution, known as the “June Revolution”) led to 
the creation of many new unions. Strikes called by these unions proceeded without the 
unions being able to call on the learning that could have been gained from previous 
experience. Nevertheless, almost all of them were successful, chiefly due to this being a 
politically favourable period. Secondly, in 1998, when restructurings were conducted in 
almost companies due to the national financial crisis, many unions again took strike 
action. However, few of them could produce effective outcomes despite a wealth of 
strike experience. Regarding opponents’ developing of better tactics for counteraction, 
we need to recall McAdam’s argument that described in Section 6.2.3:
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The pace of insurgency comes to be crucially influenced by (a) the 
creativity of insurgents in devising new tactical forms, and (b) the ability 
of opponents to neutralize these moves through effective tactical 
counters. These processes are an ongoing process of tactical interaction 
in which insurgents and opponents seek, in chess-like fashion, to offset 
the moves of the other. How well each succeeds at this task crucially 
affects the pace and outcome of insurgency (McAdam, 1983: 736).
Fifthly, we need to look at the long-term effectiveness of mobilization. Unions can fail 
to achieve anything substantial through strikes even when they have succeeded in 
mobilizing their members; the December 2000 strike is an example of this. However, 
the strike may still be effective in the long term. Although the KFIU failed in the 
December 2000 strike against the Government, it was afterwards able to maintain a 
superior position during negotiations (because of its proven ability to mobilize its 
members at any time) with employers regarding general issues, such as wage or 
working conditions. In addition, the strike failure forced the union to leam (at a high 
and detailed level) from its mistakes in order to improve its chances of success at the 
next strike (which took place in June 2003). In other words, learning often happens 
through a trial-and-error process in which mistakes and failure provide the richest 
source of learning (Clegg et al., 2005: 362).
Lastly, this research relied exclusively on qualitative research methods, and involved a 
study of a single organization. It assumed unidirectional causality, with a small number 
of mediating variables, and two levels of and four processes of learning. For better 
balance in future investigations of the effect of OL on mobilization, what is needed 
would be a parallel research design balanced between quantitative and qualitative 
approach (including more balanced interviews including rank-and-file strike non­
participants).
Mann argues that by the experience of solidarity at strikes workers recognize in a very 
concrete way the power that will eventually lead to collective control by the workers. 
That is, the workers leam how to make the connection between their own collective 
action and plausible alternatives through the experiences of strikes. Consequently, the 
workers’ experiences extend the effectiveness of future mobilization (1973: 46-7).
Through this thesis we can confirm the importance of higher-level learning from 
previous strike experiences. However, a majority of unions have not experienced
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strikes. Thus, how can they gain the higher-level learning necessary for success in their 
future strikes?
On the basis of my experience, I can suggest an alternative way for unions to leam. This 
is by actively participating in other unions’ strikes as well as the study of other strikes of 
success and failure (‘benchmarking’). Such experience can be obtained by assisting at 
strikes and contributing to all activities (e.g. mobilization and strategy). By doing so, 
unions can also experience strikers’ agonies and directly observe (and leam from) their 
trials and errors. Whether the strikers fail or succeed the helpers (i.e. union activists not 
actually on strike) will gain some positive learning from the strikes, thereby improving 
their own strategic capacity for future actions. It is a comparable logic to that employed 
by the many countries which dispatch their armies to other countries’ wars (i.e. as allied 
forces).
The bank workers' mobilization depended in part on invariant features of the Korean 
banking sector, in part on the unique historical conditions faced by the workers and their 
employers, and in part on the learning processes of labours. Thus the combination of 
explanations offered in the thesis is inherently unstable and certainly limited in its 
relevance to future trends. Neither the competitive environments nor political 
developments will impact directly on a new pattern of IR in the banking sector. Once 
again, the learning process of IR actors will be decisive factors (Johnston, 1994: 223).
Unions constantly face the challenge of adapting to changing conditions. Thus, 
behaviours institutionalized under earlier conditions may not fit conditions today. 
Among the legacies of the past are defensiveness and reactiveness bordering on 
passivity among some unions leaders and members. The unions will not be well served 
by a stance that defends the present position at all costs. The most effective unions may 
be those that link their interests to the public (or social) interests (Ibid: 224). Allan 
Flanders’s cry (1970: 15-6), “unions have to act as a sword of justice as well as a vested 
interest”, has to be kept constantly in mind by the union movement.
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